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ELIZABETH LUHANGA MANDA 
 
Price instability in the maize market in Malawi 
 
The thesis examines seasonal price instability in the Malawi maize market over the 21-year 
period from 1989 to 2009, covering five interlocking dimensions. The first establishes the 
reasons that maize price instability in Malawi is critical for vulnerability to food insecurity. 
The second sets out the causes and effects of price instability, and its relationship to the 
history of the maize market in Malawi. The third analyses the average magnitude of 
seasonal price changes, and contextualizes this in relation to different district maize 
markets and different food crops. The fourth examines the competitiveness and efficiency 
of the Malawi maize market. The fifth provides an analytic narrative account of three 
episodes of extreme maize price volatility experienced in Malawi between 2000 and 2009. 
 
The thesis produces a number of findings. The gross seasonal margin for maize in Malawi 
averaged 60 per cent in the period 1989-2009. Seasonality varies by location, with the 
highest seasonal margins occurring in remote rural areas, and places close to border 
crossing points for informal maize imports. Other food crops exhibit less price seasonality 
than maize, and two of them, rice and beans, display evidence of declining price seasonality. 
The structure and conduct of the maize market is competitive at local and more aggregate 
levels of market participation. Cointegration analysis shows that the maize market is 
spatially efficient. Extreme price spikes follow similar patterns, characterized by the 
dominance of political over economic considerations. 
 
The private-public coordination problem takes central position in the policy interpretation 
of these findings. The thesis would concur with the prognosis of other researchers that until 
the government adopts a rule- rather than discretion-based approach to maize market 
management, episodes of excessive instability in the maize market are unfortunately likely 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In common with other sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, Malawi has long relied on 
maize as the principal source of dietary carbohydrate for its growing population. The 
origin of this African reliance on maize is somewhat obscure; maize, after all, originated 
in Central America where it was the main pre-conquest food staple in what is now 
modern day Mexico and Guatemala (Rebourg et al., 2003). Maize came to Africa with 
the slave trade in the 17th century, and was initially grown close to the coast in West 
African countries that were the sites of Atlantic slave trading (McCann, 2005, Ch.2). In 
the 18th and 19th centuries maize spread throughout Africa, and eventually came to 
dominate the diet of the peoples of eastern and southern Africa (Miracle, 1965). 
Portuguese sailors and traders seem to have been instrumental in this process, but also 
significant internal migrations occurred across the continent during that era. By the time 
of the early colonial period (early 1900s) in countries like Northern Rhodesia, 
Nyasaland and Tanganyika (modern day Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania) maize was 
already by far the most important food crop grown by local smallholder farmers, and so 
it has remained up to the present time.1 
 
Maize is a critical food security crop par excellence, similar in its role in eastern and 
southern Africa to wheat in the earlier history of Europe, and rice in East and Southeast 
Asia. The ability of the population either to feed themselves directly from their own 
maize production, or to secure maize at affordable market prices, is at the centre of food 
security in many countries, and more so in Malawi than in other countries that have 
more diverse patterns of food output and consumption. All aspects of maize are critical 
in such circumstances: the reliability of production, the effectiveness of storage, the 
availability for purchase in the lean season, the level of prices received by farmers who 
have surplus to sell, or paid for maize by families that find themselves in food deficit. 
Factors that disrupt or deteriorate any of these aspects can cause failures of food 
entitlement (Sen, 1980; 1981) with consequent misery and hunger either on a localised 
or wide scale. 
 
                                                 
1  As with all such historical processes, the transmission routes for the diffusion of maize in 
Africa were, in reality, complex and multi-stranded, and available evidence leaves scope for 
different interpretations of the principal historical sequences involved (see Miracle, 1965 and 
McCann, 2005 for informative accounts). 
2 
The chief way that fluctuations in maize availability manifest themselves in domestic 
economies is in unstable maize prices, and specifically in price changes that occur 
between the harvest period of one crop cycle and the pre-harvest period of the next 
(intra-seasonal price changes), and changes in price level that occur from one year to the 
next, depending on production outcomes (inter-seasonal price changes). For a staple 
food crop like maize that is mainly consumed by its own producers, seasonal price 
changes can be exaggerated because marketed supply is only a small proportion of total 
production. The logic of this is set out later in the thesis. For now, it is sufficient to note 
that the market for maize in a country like Malawi is what economists call a ‘thin’ 
market, meaning that the traded part of the market is a relatively small proportion of 
total production and consumption. A characteristic of thin markets is that prices in them 
tend to change disproportionately (up or down) when small imbalances between supply 
and demand occur (Hayenga, 1978). 
 
Seasonal price instability in the maize market in Malawi is the central topic and 
unifying theme of this thesis. While price seasonality is a widely recognized problem in 
Malawi and other eastern and southern African countries, being alluded to in relation to 
market liberalisation (Jayne et al., 1997; 2002; Jayne and Tshirley, 2009), market and 
coordination failures (Doward and Kydd, 2004; Poulton et al., 2006a), national food 
security (Harrigan, 2001; 2008) and household vulnerability to hunger (Devereux, 1997; 
1999), the long-term patterns of such seasonality in Malawi have yet to be examined by 
researchers, and no previous analysis of price seasonality over the 20-year timescale 
covered in this thesis (1989-2009) has been previously undertaken. This is not for want 
of sufficient data since weekly data on maize prices has been collected using the same 
methodology for 38 different markets over this entire period (Government of 
Government of Malawi, 2003). Nevertheless, researchers have tended to be preoccupied 
with other aspects of maize market functioning, often in relation to critical events in the 
working of the market in the short and medium term. 
 
A key entry point to the thesis is a collection of papers and a report produced in 2005 on 
the topic of risk and price instability in staple food markets in low-income countries. 
These publications arose from a workshop held in Washington DC in February 2005, at 
which many of the leading authorities on food markets in low-income countries were 
present. The workshop resulted in a World Bank report on this topic (World Bank, 
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2005), as well as a collection of papers in a special issue of the journal Food Policy 
(Byerlee et al., 2006). 
 
The contributions to this body of work emphasize the continued importance of seasonal 
price instability for growth and food security objectives, especially in very poor 
countries containing substantial populations that are both rural and food deficit from 
their own production; and that consequently are highly prone to being unable to afford 
sufficient food in the lean season before the next harvest. In addition to representing a 
serious problem for the protection of the poorest from hunger, high price instability is 
detrimental to the poor constructing their own routes out of poverty, since it increases 
the risk of failing to secure food from the market and reinforces a pattern of subsistence 
reliance on one or a few main food crops for household level food security. In addition 
price instability acts as a disincentive to surplus producing farmers, and to private 
investment in marketing infrastructure, since returns to such investment are so uncertain. 
 
These arguments are elaborated in more detail in Chapter 2 of the thesis, where they are 
contextualised in the broader literature on food price instability. Here it is useful to draw 
attention to some key findings and themes that many eastern and southern African 
countries share in common, and that provide useful pointers for locating the study of 
maize price instability in Malawi. 
 
The farm size structure of production is a key feature creating particular impacts of 
price instability in countries of this region. One important consideration is that farm size 
in the smallholder sector has been declining for the past 40 years and is estimated in 
Malawi, Zambia, Kenya and Ethiopia to have approximately halved over this time 
interval (Jayne et al., 2003). In addition, the distribution of landholding size is highly 
unequal within the small farm sector. Data on farm sizes for five countries cited in 
Jayne et al., (2006) reveal mean farm sizes in the small farm sector ranging from 1 ha in 
Rwanda and Ethiopia to 2.5-3.0 ha in Kenya and Zambia. The bottom 20 per cent of the 
land distribution is approaching functional landlessness in all cases, with access to less 
than 0.5 ha of land. According to the same source, in Malawi 80 per cent of smallholder 
farm households possess less than one ha of land. 
 
These land distributions imply highly unequal and differentiated participation in grain 
markets. Specifically, about half of the marketed output is supplied by just 2-3 per cent 
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of farmers, operating in the farm size range of 4-20 ha. The remaining half of marketed 
supply originates from a second tier of roughly 20 per cent of households, selling in the 
range of 0.1 to 5 tons maize per household. A third rural group are buyers only of staple 
grains, corresponding to 40-60 per cent of all rural households. A fourth group both buy 
and sell grain within a calendar year, and these correspond to 10-20 per cent of rural 
households. Finally, there are households that neither buy nor sell the staple grain, 
implying either that they are more or less self-sufficient in an average year, or that they 
have one or more additional food crops that fill the gap between their staple grain 
production and their consumption needs. Cassava is typically the crop that can 
contribute to self-sufficiency in carbohydrates in this way. 
 
These categories of the rural population are affected in different ways by food price 
instability (Jayne et al., 2006, pp.334-5; Poulton et al., 2006b, pp.343-4). Particular 
attention must be paid to the large proportion of buyers only or net buyers of staple 
grain, since they correspond, with variations in different countries, to around 50 per cent 
of the rural population. This category is adversely affected by above average price hikes, 
whether these occur for intra-seasonal or inter-seasonal reasons, and the extent of the 
damage to their consumption capabilities depends on just how high prices go, and the 
intensity of the shock factor created by the unexpected inability to purchase enough 
food. Surplus food producers are affected in the opposite way, by exaggerated price 
troughs that can occur, both intra- and inter-seasonally due to the arrival of a bumper 
harvest. A price collapse at harvest sharply reduces their expected real income from 
crop sales, and acts as a disincentive to make investments in farm intensification, with 
knock on effects for agricultural growth. A third category for whom undue price 
instability represents a serious problem are ‘distress sellers’ who place themselves in a 
difficult position at both ends of the market, gaining less from their sales if prices slump, 
and finding themselves unable to buy when prices soar.2 
 
Most countries in eastern and southern African region have a dual grain marketing 
structure comprising a state marketing or food security agency, and private traders of 
varying sizes, market niches, and outreach. A key issue for price stability is how the 
private and public sectors interact when an initial disturbance causes a chain of 
responses on each side of the public-private divide. The nature of this public-private 
                                                 
2  The term ‘distress sales’ refers to involuntary sales made to meet unavoidable obligations at 
harvest time including paying off debts to traders and moneylenders, buying food essentials 
other than the staple grain, and meeting urgent school or medical expenses. 
5 
interaction is part of a continuing debate in food and broader agricultural policy about 
the proper role of governments in liberalised markets that have failed to deliver the 
outcomes for agricultural growth that were expected by liberalisation enthusiasts. 
 
One side of this debate emphasises institutional weaknesses in liberalised markets, and 
the continuing crucial role of government in coordinating actions and services that the 
private sector fails to deliver successfully due to risk, transaction costs, moral hazard 
and missing markets (de Janvry et al., 1991; Dorward et al., 1998; 2005a; 2009a; Kydd 
et al., 2002; Poulton et al., 2006a). The other side points to the failure of government to 
properly let go its controlling capabilities in staple food markets, because efforts by 
private marketing agents are hampered by regulatory powers that are erratically and 
arbitrarily invoked, increasing risk and aggravating the unwillingness of the private 
sector to invest in improving marketing infrastructure and services to farmers (Kheralla 
et al., 2000; Jayne et al., 2002). These arguments overlap a lot, and all informed 
observers agree that predictability, transparency and adherence to rules rather than 
discretion in decision-making are necessary for the public-private relationship in food 
markets to work effectively. 
 
From the viewpoint of this thesis, one particular area of this policy discussion is of 
particular interest which is the degree to which public-private coordination failures can 
result in greater price instability than would occur either under complete government 
control, or under truly private market decision making, including freedom by private 
traders to import or export grain according to their own judgement regarding the 
balance of supply and demand in the market. As articulated by Jayne et al., (2006): 
 
‘. . . .the strategic interactions between private and public marketing 
actors leading in some cases to heightened market instability and food 
crises’ (Ibid., p.328). 
 
‘This case [the Malawi food crisis of 2001-02] illustrates that well-
intentioned but poorly implemented government actions can 
exacerbate food price instability rather than reduce it’ (Ibid., p.336). 
 
The foregoing discussion indicates two subsidiary areas that play important supporting 
roles in this thesis, in relation to the primary emphasis on maize price instability itself. 
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The first of these is the conduct and performance of private maize trading in Malawi, 
especially at local levels where dimensions of competition, choice and market structure 
in privately traded maize are investigated. The second takes its lead from the two 
quotations provided above and comprises examination of sequences of events, and 
private-public market interactions, that have occurred on occasions of maize price crisis 
in Malawi in the 2000s in which coordination failures may have resulted in substantially 
more severe outcomes for price levels and hunger amongst vulnerable sections of the 
population than could have pertained given the policy levers at the government’s 
disposal. Politics also importantly enters food policy decision making in such 
circumstances (Byerlee et al., 2006, p.285), and the part of the thesis that tackles these 
crisis situations also integrates political factors into the explanation of sequences of 
decision making actions as they occurred. 
 
In summary so far, this thesis is about price instability in the domestic market for the 
staple food commodity of a poor country, utilising maize in Malawi as its case study. 
Price instability has various causes, and serious ramifications for poverty, hunger and 
agricultural growth. The core empirical effort of the thesis is directed at measuring 
maize price instability in Malawi, with special attention paid to departures from 
‘average’ instability, and on whether instability seems to be growing, remaining stable, 
or diminishing over time. Comparisons with other food crops are made. The 
competitiveness and efficiency of private maize trade and coordination failures at the 
interface between public and private roles in the maize market play important 
supporting roles. 
 
As a foretaste of the later focus of the thesis, Figure 1.1 displays the pattern of maize 
prices experienced in Malawi during the 2000s, using monthly price data. This data is a 
national average, calculated from prices in 38 agricultural markets up until 2005, and 72 
markets since 2005scattered across the country. Nominal prices have been deflated by 
the monthly rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) in Malawi to give the real 
price trend. It can be seen from this graph that seasonal price fluctuations are routine in 
Malawi; however, since 2000 there have been three occasions when extreme price 
instability has occurred. In addition, it is apparent that real prices may have been rising 
in this decade. Indeed maize prices have been rising towards import parity, so that the 
more extreme seasonal price spikes shown in the graph have taken lean season prices 
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well above import parity in the Malawian case (Jayne et al., 2006; Jayne and Tschirley, 
2009). It is notable that these price events in the domestic market do not correspond to 
 
Figure 1.1: Malawi: Real Maize Price Trend 2000-09 
 
 
Note:  Nominal maize prices deflated by the Malawi CPI 2000=100.0  
Source: Calculated from monthly price data collected by MoAFS, Agro 
Economic Survey Unit  
 
trends in international maize prices; indeed the Malawi maize price spike that occurred 
towards the end of 2008 corresponded to a steeply declining trend in international prices 
after the 2007-08 ‘food price crisis’. This graph therefore exemplifies many of the 
aspects that this thesis sets out to tackle: the degree of price instability, the incidence of 
unusual instability events, the functioning of private markets that may or may not 
contribute to such events, the public-private interface that seems critical for 
understanding such events. The rest of this chapter restates the objectives and research 
questions of this thesis more formally, and provides some basic factual information on 
maize in Malawi including its national contribution to nutrition, production trends and 
yields. The chapter concludes with a brief description of the structure of the rest of the 
thesis. 
 
1.2 Thesis Objective, Research Questions and Methods 
The objective of this thesis is to gain an in-depth understanding of maize price 
instability in Malawi; its characteristics and patterns; its causes in the economics, 
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brought to bear to diminish its magnitude and adverse impacts in the future. The reasons 
for such an objective are rooted in the singular importance of maize for food security in 
Malawi, the not infrequent incidence of extreme instability events when seasonal price 
changes are double or triple the normal price range, and the excessively damaging 
effects that such events have for the welfare of the country’s poorest and most 
vulnerable citizens. All these aspects are given due attention in the thesis, which also 
provides a history of maize market regulation in Malawi and grapples with the difficult 
dimension of the politics of maize in a country where this single food commodity plays 
such an overwhelmingly central role in the food security and nutritional status of the 
population. 
 
The central objective is buttressed by two subsidiary areas of enquiry that are designed 
to lend support to the chief focus on instability. One of these concerns the functioning 
of private trade in maize in Malawi, about which much has been written (and this is 
synthesised in the thesis), and which is also investigated by fieldwork in three maize 
producing villages, and by cointegration analysis of time-series price data in different 
markets. The other concerns the interaction between the public and private sectors that 
occur at times of maize price crises in Malawi, of which there have been several 
occurrences during the 2000s. This involves examining specific sequences of events and 
decisions at times of maize market crisis, and bringing in political as well as economic 
and institutional considerations that can shed light on the unfolding of events. 
Specifically, the thesis investigates the following research questions, in pursuit of its 
overall objective: 
 
(a) what is the underlying, long term, character of seasonal maize price instability in 
Malawi, during the 21-year period 1989-2009? 
 
(b) is there a detectable trend in the extent of such instability, and does the degree of 
instability vary between markets in different parts of the country? 
 




(d) what lessons can be learnt from the functioning of private maize trade in Malawi 
that may shed light on patterns of price instability, especially with respect to 
competition, choice, market structure, and spatial price behaviour? 
 
(e) examining ‘events’ of extreme maize price fluctuations in Malawi in the 2000s, 
what can be learned about the influence of world markets, state regulatory behaviour, 
public-private coordination, and the politics of public decision making in helping to 
explain the prevalence and intensity of such events? 
 
The first three of these questions are examined using a toolbox of statistical methods for 
examining time series price behaviour in markets that have an established position in 
agricultural market analysis (Goetz and Weber, 1986; Sahn and Delgado, 1989; Trotter, 
1992; Maddala and Kim, 1998). This methodology is set out in full in Chapter 3 of the 
thesis. Question (d) is explored in part using both qualitative and quantitative data 
collected during field visits to maize producing villages in the south, centre and north of 
Malawi in mid-2008, during the maize harvesting season. These field visits 
implemented questionnaires to samples of farmers and traders, concerned with choices, 
competition, margins and market structure. An attempt was made to use a snowball 
research method called ‘follow-the-bag’ as part of this enquiry; however, the marketing 
chains pursued proved either non-existent (due to no maize sales being undertaken) or 
very short (up to one or two sequential traders), so this attempt was only partially 
successful. Question (d) is also addressed using the econometric method of 
cointegration to examine the likelihood that spatial arbitrage occurs efficiently, resulting 
in rapid price adjustments across markets when there are supply and demand imbalances 
between them. The final question (e) that combines aspects of state regulation, 
institutions (in the North, 1990, sense of ‘rules of the game’), coordination, and politics 
is not susceptible to statistical testing; however, it uses principles of analytical narrative 
and inductive reasoning that have an established position in the social science research 
methods repertoire (Bates et al., 1998; 2000). 
 
1.3 Maize and Poverty in Malawi 
There is a well-known social aphorism in Malawi that goes ‘if you have not eaten nsima 
(thick maize porridge), you have not eaten’ (‘ngati siunadye nsima ndiye kuti siunadye 
chakudya’). While such sayings often have to be treated with caution because they may 
be referring to a state of affairs or a mode of working of society that no longer really 
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applies, in this instance the saying contains more than just a small kernel of truth. The 
basic facts of the matter are: 
 
(a) maize contributes 71 per cent of all calories consumed by the population of Malawi, 
a proportion that stubbornly refuses to decline despite long declared intentions by 
the government to encourage diversifying food consumption in the country;3 
 
(b) some 75.4 per cent of households in Malawi are customary small farmers, and 97 
per cent of these farmers grow maize on their holdings (Government of Malawi, 
2005a) 
 
(c) the consumption of maize and other cereal products corresponds to 10.6 per cent of 
the consumer price index in Malawi, derived from the 2004-05 Integrated 
Household Survey (Government of Malawi, 2005a) 
 
Malawi has 9.4 million ha of land of which an estimated 7.7 million ha is available for 
agriculture (Government of Malawi, 2002 p.7). Population density is high at 139 
persons per sq km of land (Government of Malawi, 2008b). The agricultural land is 
divided between estate areas (1.2 million ha) and customary smallholder areas (6.5 
million ha). In recent years, maize production is estimated to have occupied an area of 
1.5 million ha, and since maize is mainly grown in the small farm sector, the maize 
cultivation area therefore corresponds to roughly 23 per cent of all land under 
customary tenure. 
 
The division between estate and small farm land is not made on the basis of farm size. 
The difference is rather one of tenure, with small farm holdings corresponding to 
customary allocation and inheritance, while estate agriculture is based on state 
leaseholds or freehold farms (Cross, 2005; Harrigan, 2008). Nevertheless, estate land 
tends to comprise holdings of 10 ha or more, while small farm agriculture occurs in 
                                                 
3  There is quite a lot of inconsistency between different sources regarding this figure. A maize 
contribution to total calories of 71.3 per cent is consistent with annual per capita 
consumption of 172.2 kg, which seems to be the average in the 2000s used by MoAFS in the 
Malawi Food Balance Sheet (Government of Malawi, 2008a). This level is also consistent 
with the pattern of deficits and surpluses of maize production with respect to a consumption 
trend (see Chapter 6 below). FEWSNET uses a calorie contribution of 72.8 per cent 
(FEWSNET, 2007a). On the other hand Jayne et al., (2008a) infer a proportion of 55 per 
cent from various sources. 
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farm sizes below this level, and for the majority a tenth or less of this level (Chinsinga, 
2008). It has been estimated that 55 per cent of smallholder farmers have holdings of 
one ha or less (Government of Malawi, 2002). 
 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) (Government of 
Malawi, 2007a), the total number of farm holdings in the customary sector is 3.06 
million. However, the 2008 population census gives total households for the whole 
country at 2.96 million, so there seems to be a mismatch between MoAFS and NSO 
data with respect to this estimate. The Welfare Monitoring Survey 2008 (WMS) 
conducted by NSO states that the small farm sector constitutes 80 per cent of all 
households in Malawi (Government of Malawi, 2008c p.59). When taken in conjunction 
with 2008 census results, this implies 2.4 million small farm households, or 11 million 
people at an average household size of 4.6 persons. 
 
According to time series data maize output in Malawi rose gradually through the 1960s 
to 1980s, rising from 1.1 to 1.4 million tons by the end of the 1980s (Table 1.1). Figure 
1.2 compares annual output data to a 5-year moving average, the latter serving the 
purpose of smoothing out annual fluctuations in order to get at underlying trends. In the 
early 1990s, there ensued a period of high instability in estimated output, with a 
resumption of an upward movement to around 1.7 to 1.8 million tons by the end of the 
decade. In the 2000s there has been instability once again, followed by a strong surge in 
output dating from the 2005/06 crop season when a large scale agricultural input 
subsidy was introduced (on which more in Chapter 2). The later 2000s have seen output 
varying apparently between 2.6 and 3.6 million tons. This is well in excess of annual 
domestic consumption, and should imply that the country is more than self- sufficient in 
its staple food. However, as we shall see in later chapters, price behaviour in these latest 
years seems to tell a more complicated story, and it is possible that estimated production 
figures in some recent years do not state the true output position (Jayne and Tschirley, 
2009). 
 
An examination of domestic maize availability per capita over this same time period 
conveys an interesting story. Again annual output per capita and 5-year moving average 
data are graphed in Figure 1.3. The Malawi population has grown from 3.9 million 
people at independence in 1964 to an estimated 13.4 million in 2009. The latest spot 
check provided by the 2008 population census was a total population of 13.066 million 
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in that year. Overall population growth over the entire period since independence has 
equalled 2.8 per cent per year, with variations in different intercensal periods. The per  
 
Table 1.1: Malawi: Basic Time Series Data on the Maize Economy 
 
Crop Year Maize Output (tons m.) 
Maize Area 





1967/68 1.27  1.07 4.29 295.7 1,187 
1968/69 1.09  1.07 4.42 246.6 1,019 
1969/70 1.06  1.00 4.55 233.1 1,060 
1970/71 0.90  1.05 4.68 192.3 857 
1971/72 1.24  1.10 4.82 257.5 1,127 
1972/73 1.31  1.15 4.95 264.4 1,139 
1973/74 1.28  1.11 5.10 251.1 1,153 
1974/75 1.28  1.00 5.25 244.0 1,280 
1975/76 1.00  1.00 5.40 185.2 1,000 
1976/77 1.09  1.00 5.55 196.2 1,090 
1977/78 1.32  1.15 5.76 229.1 1,148 
1978/79 1.42  1.16 5.97 237.7 1,224 
1979/80 1.39  0.97 6.19 224.4 1,433 
1980/81 1.17  1.10 6.42 182.1 1,064 
1981/82 1.25  1.20 6.66 187.6 1,042 
1982/83 1.42  1.17 6.91 205.6 1,214 
1983/84 1.37  1.17 7.16 191.2 1,171 
1984/85 1.36  1.15 7.43 182.4 1,183
1985/86 1.30  1.19 7.70 168.1 1,085
1986/87 1.20  1.13 7.99 150.4 1,062 
1987/88 1.42  1.14 8.15 174.7 1,252 
1988/89 1.51  1.27 8.31 181.6 1,188 
1989/90 1.34  1.34 8.48 158.4 999 
1990/91 1.59  1.39 8.65 183.8 1,142 
1991/92 0.66  1.37 8.82 74.5 480 
1992/93 2.03  1.33 9.00 226.1 1,533 
1993/94 0.92  1.13 9.18 100.1 814 
1994/95 1.33  1.23 9.36 141.9 1,083 
1995/96 1.79  1.21 9.55 187.8 1,488 
1996/97 1.23  1.23 9.74 125.9 994 
1997/98 1.53  1.29 9.93 154.5 1,187 
1998/99 2.25  1.37 10.21 220.0 1,640 
1999/00 2.29  1.44 10.49 218.2 1,596 
2000/01 1.59  1.45 10.79 147.4 1,099 
2001/02 1.49  1.51 11.08 134.0 981 
2002/03 1.85  1.62 11.39 162.2 1,142 
2003/04 1.61  1.62 11.71 137.4 994 
2004/05 1.23  1.51 12.03 101.8 809 
2005/06 2.61  1.62 12.37 211.1 1,608 
2006/07 3.23  1.19 12.71 253.8 2,722 
2007/08 2.63  1.60 13.07 201.6 1,650 
2008/09 3.66  1.66 13.43 272.7 2,202 
 
Source: Government of Malawi (2007a) and MoAFS Crop Estimates, with the exception of 
maize area 1967/68 to 1985/86 (FAO, 2009b). Population figures interpolated from NSO census 
figures, generally at 10 year intervals. 
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Figure 1.2: Malawi: Trend in Maize Output 1967/68 to 2008/09 
 
Source: data compiled in Table 1.1 
 
capita maize availability picture displays a declining trend from the mid-1960s to the  
mid-1990s, from 245 kg to 145 kg per capita, an overall decrease of 40 per cent. This is 
quite striking, and might suggest quite a serious reduction in dependence on maize for 
dietary calories, although other data does not corroborate such a conclusion, and maize 
imports also need to be factored into the picture.4 Since 1995/96 per capita domestic 
availability has been mixed and unstable, with a strong upward burst towards the most 
recent period. Nevertheless, the figure of around 240 kg per capita for 2008 and 2009 
remains below the equivalent figures for the mid-1960s. If true output in recent years 
has been less than stated (as discussed above), then per capita availability in the late 
2000s will still be significantly below what it was 40 years ago. Not too much should be 
read into this finding, at this stage, but this factor possibly becomes pertinent later in the 
thesis when quite exceptionally high lean season prices were experienced in the 2007/08 
and 2008/09 maize seasons. 
 
The area in production and yields are additional important dimensions of the Malawi 
maize economy that it is useful to establish at an early stage in the thesis. The area in 
                                                 
4  It is also probable that the quantity of maize grown for subsistence was over-estimated in 
the earlier years of this time-series (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982), so that early levels of per 
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production (Table 1.2) has averaged 1.4 million ha over the past 20 years, with some 
tendency to decline in the middle of this period, and to rise towards the end of the  
 
Figure 1.3: Malawi: Trend in Maize Output per Capita 1967/68 to 2008/09 
 
 
Source: data compiled in Table 1.1 
 
period. Moving average data suggests a production area of just over 1.5 million ha in 
the 2000s. Of course increases in maize area also mean declines in the area devoted to 
other crops in a country where opportunities for expansion in agricultural land area are 
extremely limited. Thus efforts by policy makers to encourage a more diverse use 
ofland in the customary small farm sector do not seem to have achieved their aim yet. 
Figure 1.4 shows the yield trend in this 20-year period, again comparing annual data to 
a 5-year moving average. Maize yields were erratic in the 1990s, rising from around 1 
ton per ha to 1.5 tons per ha, then falling back in the early 2000s based on the 5-year 
moving average. In 2004/05, a low average yield for that single season of only 0.8 tons 
is recorded (Table 1.1); however, this is followed by a doubling of yield to the 
following year, and subsequent estimated yields of 2.7, 1.6 and 2.2 tons per ha in 
2006/07, 2007/08 and 2008/09 respectively. 
 
The rise in estimated maize yields in recent years in Malawi represents a combination of 
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a key role. Malawi has three broad types of maize varieties and these are local, 
composite and hybrid maize. Local maize commonly known as chamakolo, is maize  
 
Table 1.2: Malawi: Trends in Area by Maize Varieties 1988/89 to 2008/09 
 
 
* area figures include ‘winter maize’ in years when this is reported 
Source: (Government of Malawi, 2007a, 2009b)  
 
traditionally passed on among farmers. This category comprises open pollinated 
varieties that can be retained for sowing in successive planting seasons with little 
adverse effect on yields, have low yields, process easily into fine white flour called ufa 
woyera for preparing nsima, and are resistant to weevils in storage because of their hard 
starch (Smale and Heisey, 1997). Their seed production is the result of random 
pollination, and they can be passed on for up to three successive years without major 
Crop 
Year 
Total Local Composite Hybrid*
′000 ha ′000 ha % ′000 ha % ′000 ha %
1988/89 1,270.8 1,160.0 91.3 25.1 2.0 85.8 6.7
1989/90 1,343.8 1,184.0 88.1 24.7 1.8 135.0 10.0
1990/91 1,391.9 1,193.6 85.8 18.9 1.4 179.4 12.9
1991/92 1,368.1 1,137.9 83.2 13.3 1.0 216.9 15.9
1992/93 1,327.0 996.8 75.1 3.9 0.3 326.4 24.6
1993/94 1,129.3 920.9 81.5 0.8 0.1 207.6 18.4
1994/95 1,225.6 859.1 70.1 2.3 0.2 364.1 29.7
1995/96 1,205.3 856.4 71.1 17.5 1.4 331.4 27.5
1996/97 1,233.5 914.5 74.1 20.3 1.6 298.7 24.2
1997/98 1,292.7 912.8 70.6 25.0 1.9 354.9 27.5
1998/99 1,369.2 767.1 56.0 45.4 3.3 509.6 40.7
1999/00 1,435.2 798.6 55.6 107.9 7.5 528.7 36.8
2000/01 1,446.3 906.4 62.7 207.3 14.3 332.5 23.0
2001/02 1,513.9 832.0 55.0 232.6 15.4 372.4 29.7
2002/03 1,617.9 767.0 47.4 277.8 17.2 457.1 35.4
2003/04 1,617.6 720.9 44.6 334.2 20.7 423.7 34.8
2004/05 1,513.9 768.6 50.8 372.7 24.6 372.6 24.6
2005/06 1,624.0 654.2 40.3 545.6 33.6 424.3 26.1
2006/07 1,185.4 164.7 13.9 555.5 46.9 465.1 39.2 
2007/08 1,597.0 559.9 35.1 587.0 36.8 450.0 28.2
2008/09 1,662.5 528.7 31.8 570.6 34.3 563.2 33.9
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adverse impact on yield, thereafter genetic deterioration tends to set in. Hybrids are high 
yielding maize varieties the pollination process of which is controlled, and in which 
inbred parent lines of maize are crossed to create seeds of greater yield potential than 
 
Figure 1.4: Malawi: Trend in Maize Yields 1988/89 to 2008/09 
 
Source: data compiled in Table 1.2 
 
either parent. Their seed cannot be recycled because their yield vigour deteriorates fast 
for genetic reasons with each successive generation of seed replanted (Smale, 1993; 
Smale and Jayne, 2009). The hybrids also have poor ‘poundability’ or flour processing 
characteristics, because of their soft starch, which is nevertheless favoured by the 
industrial food sector (Smale and Heisey, 1997).5 
 
Several reasons have been adduced for Malawi being slow in developing and adopting 
hybrid maize varieties compared to other countries in the southern African region. For 
example, Zimbabwe had available a first hybrid called Southern Rhodesia-1 (SR-1) 
released in 1949, and a second hybrid (SR-2) was released in 1960. It is thought that the 
non-existence of a significant settler population set Malawi apart in this respect (Smale 
and Jayne 2009). Also relevant from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s was the relative 
neglect of the small farm sector, in favour of policies promoting economic growth 
through estate agriculture (Harrigan, 2001). A third factor was the small proportion of 
                                                 
5  These three groups of maize varieties are also sometimes referred to as flint, semi-flint and 
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farmers producing a surplus of maize for the market, making it difficult for most small 
farmers to afford new seeds and adequate fertilizer application on an annual basis 
(Smale and Jayne 2009). A fourth factor was the strong consumption preference of 
Malawi small farmers for local varieties that had good poundability, processed well into 
ufa woyera, and stored well on the farm (Smale, 1993; Smale and Heisey 1997; Smale 
and Jayne 2009). These four factors (lack of a significant settler population, government 
growth strategy through estates, lack of cash for inputs, and farm families’ preference 
for local maize) combined to discourage investment in maize genetic research specific 
to Malawi. The first semi-flint hybrids like MH18 with processing and storability 
characteristics acceptable to smallholder farmers were not released until 1990 (Smale 
and Jayne, 2009). 
 
As shown in Table 1.2, the share of maize cultivation devoted to local varieties declined 
only gradually and erratically from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, after which an 
accelerated adoption of composite and hybrid varieties took over. The majority maize 
cultivation remained under local varieties until the 2002/03 crop season. The areas 
under composite varieties remained very low indeed until the late 1990s, but this has 
grown rapidly in the 2000s and now corresponds to a third of the cultivated area. The 
fortunes of hybrid varieties differ again from the other categories. Here there was some 
success in persuading farmers to shift into hybrids in the early 1990s, but the proportion 
of maize area under hybrids then stagnated at around 27-28 per cent for many years 
until the mid-2000s, when their use jumped upwards in connection with the introduction 
of the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) in 2005/06. Currently, the three 
categories of maize varieties correspond roughly to one third of the cultivated area each, 
with hybrids apparently on the rise, and in all likelihood local varieties will continue to 
diminish in importance. A combination of the rising uptake of hybrid varieties and 
greater use of improved inputs under the AISP (as well as fortuitous rainfall) has 
resulted in the significant gains in maize yields noted for the second half of the 2000s. 
 
Malawi is an exceptionally poor country. The most recent full household income and 
expenditure survey conducted in 2004/05 (Government of Malawi, 2005a) yielded a 
poverty estimate of 52.4 per cent and an ultra-poverty estimate of 22.4 per cent.6 The 
                                                 
6  This was the second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2). Subsequent partial surveys 
conducted in 2007 and 2008 (Welfare Monitoring Surveys) suggest a fall in poverty and ultra 
poverty since 2005. The WMS 2008 estimated rates for these poverty measures of 40 per cent 
and 15 per cent respectively in 2008 (Government of Malawi, 2008c) 
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ultra-poverty line is set at a level representing the cost of a minimum acceptable level of 
calorie consumption, and is therefore sometimes referred to as the food poverty line. 
This means that anyone measured as falling below this line does not gain enough 
income even to satisfy basic nutritional requirements, let alone secure other basic needs. 
Malawi is a poor, but also unequal country. The gini coefficient of inequality for per 
capita consumption expenditure at 0.39 is fairly average by international standards; 
however, urban inequality with a gini coefficient of 0.48 is high, and there are big 
disparities between urban and rural incomes as shown in Figure 1.5. Based on mean per 
capita consumption for each decile of the population the graph shows for the country as 
a whole, and for rural areas separately, that the bottom 60 per cent of the population 
have little separating them in terms of material standards of living. Indeed, in rural areas, 
only US$1.8 per capita per month separates each decile from the first up to the sixth 
decile (Ellis, 2010). However, the towns are a lot less poor, and a lot more unequal, than 
the rural areas. It is thus that Figure 1.5. displays a steep rise in mean decile per capita 
incomes at the top of the income distribution led by urban inequality, with this rise 
being much less marked for rural areas taken on their own. 
 
Figure 1.5: Malawi Rural, Urban and Total Income Distributions, by Decile 
 
Source: Ellis and Marchetta (2009) based on data from Government of Malawi IHS2 
2004-05 
 
A great deal has been written about vulnerability in Malawi, understood as meaning 
‘vulnerability to hunger’ rather than any other type of vulnerability (Devereux, 1997; 
1999; Government of Malawi and World Bank, 2006). In this context vulnerability 



































means a combination of both being exposed to risk and shocks, and not having the 
ability to deal with such shocks when they occur. Shocks can be divided between 
personal adverse events (illness, death, accident, theft etc.), sometimes called 
idiosyncratic shocks, and society-wide events of catastrophic magnitude (drought, 
floods, crop and livestock diseases). In a very poor country like Malawi, most families 
face a combination of such shocks on an ongoing basis (Dercon, 2002; 2005). Families 
can deal with shocks, up to a point, by drawing down on assets (including social assets 
of community and kinship) (Corbett, 1988); however, this is a destructive process, and 
successive shocks can mean that previously viable households are driven into chronic 
poverty and vulnerability. One reason that fairly minor fluctuations in agricultural 
outcomes seem to result in hunger on a wide scale in the 2000s is this erosion over time 
in previous asset buffers. 
 
In summary of this background sketch of the maize economy, several key features can 
be emphasized. One is that Malawi’s ‘dependence’ on maize on the production side has 
barely diminished over 30 or 40 years, and indeed in terms of crop area may be rising in 
the most recent era. A second is that almost all time series manifest considerable 
variability in annual outcomes and provide evidence of ‘shocks’ i.e. years when either 
yields, or area, or a combination of both have resulted in unusually low output. This 
annual output variability causes considerable distress in the rural economy, especially 
for the large proportion of food deficit farm households. It also has a potentially strong 
influence on price instability, depending in part on storage and trade (import or export) 
influences at the aggregate level. A third is that despite recent successes in production, 
per capita maize availability from domestic production may not be as high in the late 
2000s as it was in the late 1960s.7 This may not matter, since it is to be expected that 
diversity in consumption will have increased somewhat over this period, due in part to 
urbanisation and in part to rising living standards for at least some of Malawi society. 
The precise levels and magnitudes of change represented by the time series data need to 
be interpreted with caution. Crop area and yield estimates in a poor country are an 
inexact science, and politics can enter this domain just as it does in many other aspects 
of the maize economy of Malawi. 
 
                                                 
7  Subject to the caveat given at footnote 3 above. 
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The intention of this chapter was to set up the thesis. The objective of the thesis is to 
explore price instability in the Malawi maize market. The reasons for this focus are put 
forward. The chapter provides background on the significance of maize for food 
security in Malawi, and on the evolution of events in recent history that make seasonal 
price instability a critical policy problem. In addition to verifying the degree of price 
instability, the thesis also explores plausible causal factors for its persistence, and 
provides evidence of its own that contributes to an ongoing debate and discussion about 
the functioning of the maize market in Malawi. 
 
The main literature review for the thesis is in Chapter 2. The chapter summarises 
literatures on price seasonality as a problem in food markets, the policy responses that 
historically and contemporarily have been used to ameliorate price seasonality, and the 
history of maize market regulation in Malawi. Chapter 3 describes the research methods 
deployed in the thesis. It covers, first, the method that is used to analyse seasonal price 
formation in maize and other food crop markets in Malawi. It then describes the 
methods and fieldwork sites of the component of the thesis concerned with examining 
competition and conduct in contemporary maize marketing. Third, it summarises the 
methods of cointegration and analytic narrative that are specific to certain parts of the 
thesis. Finally, it summarises other methodological issues surrounding the formal 
(government) collection of maize market data in Malawi that can help to interpret the 
accuracy of important data series such as output, yields and prices. 
 
The time series analysis of price seasonality in maize and other food crop markets is 
presented in Chapter 4. This chapter centres on the measurement of seasonality in the 
maize market and how the degree of seasonality has evolved over a twenty year period 
from 1989 to 2009. Price seasonality in different maize markets across the country is 
compared, and the results for maize are compared with those for other key food crops, 
since differences between crops with respect to whether and in what direction price 
seasonality has been changing over time, raise interesting issues for plausible different 
explanations of the maize market findings. The statistical analysis conducted in this 
chapter has not hitherto been done for Malawi, to the knowledge of the author, and it 
constitutes the principal claim of the thesis to making an original contribution to our 
understanding of evolving maize market behaviour in the country. 
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Chapter 5 presents findings in relation to three aspects of maize market functioning in 
Malawi that were explored in the research, and that contribute to the understanding of 
the relative importance of different factors in explaining the maize price seasonality 
findings. The first such aspect is the conduct of the maize market, especially in terms of 
competition in marketing at the farm-gate level, in relation to which fieldwork research 
in three different sites was conducted. The second aspect concerns the structure of the 
market in terms of traders and buyers of different sizes, playing different roles in the 
time, space and form functions of vertical marketing chains between the producer and 
final consumer. The third aspect concerns maize price transmission across geographical 
space, for which time series price data at different locations is used in order to examine 
the degree of spatial market integration, using cointegration methods. 
 
Chapter 6 examines three episodes of extreme seasonal price instability that occurred in 
Malawi in the 2000s, in 2001/02, 2005/06 and 2007-09 (the latter across two crop 
seasons). The chapter begins by examining these three episodes in terms of the price 
behaviour they display, and with a view to comparing similarities and differences 
between them. It then considers the maize supply factors that contribute to explaining 
such extreme price volatility, partly through the maize balance sheet for the 2000s, and 
partly through events and trends in stock holding and external trade in maize. Next, the 
chapter studies these three episodes in narrative form, paying particular attention to the 
actors and institutions involved, and the political factors influencing the timing and 
direction of public responses to emerging maize market imbalances. The chapter draws 
together patterns of experience that are common to all such price crises, and points the 
way towards the private-public coordination problem that lies at the heart of 
malfunctions in maize policy in Malawi. 
 
The conclusions of the thesis are presented in Chapter 7. This chapter summarises the 
findings of the thesis, distinguishing those findings that emerge directly from a 
statistical process of verification, from those that depend more on interpretation 
amongst plausible alternative explanations and arguments. The chapter returns to some 
of the key contemporary debates about the working of food markets in countries like 
Malawi, and suggests ways that the findings of the thesis support or detract from critical 
arguments found in the recent literature. The chapter also considers a recent framework 
that has been suggested for getting more purchase on the public-private coordination 
22 
problem, and distinguishes aspects that arise from the thesis for which such a 
framework seems a helpful way forward. 
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Chapter 2 : Food Price Seasonality, Policy Responses and Maize Market 
Regulation in Malawi 
 
2.1 Price Instability in Food Markets and Policy Responses 
As already established in Chapter 1, price instability in food markets has existed from 
the moment that producers and consumers of food became separate from each other, and 
markets came into being to facilitate the transfer of food from producer to consumer in 
the context of a cash economy. Price instability originates in the seasonality of 
agricultural production, especially for annual crops; in production characteristics of 
food; and in the low price elasticity of demand for food (Kahlon and Tyagi, 1983). 
 
Seasonality by itself is the cause of a significant proportion of the instability in food and 
other farm prices (Timmer, 1980; 1989). In the case of an annual crop, a single harvest 
season occurs causing a high volume of sales to flood the market. This effect is 
ameliorated somewhat if the crop can be readily and successfully stored for later sale. 
On the other hand, own crop storage by farmers is prone to losses or reduction of 
quality in store for a variety of reasons (to which we return shortly), so other agents 
typically mainly carry out the storage function after farm gate sales have occurred. In 
principle, the price difference between the lowest harvest price and the peak price 
before the next harvest, known as the storage margin (Goetz and Weber, 1986; 
Siamwalla, 1988), should equal the competitive cost of providing storage. However, this 
depends on the competitive and efficient working of private trade, and can be upset by 
risks and shocks that cause more speculative storage behaviour to occur. 
 
Price instability also arises importantly from the feature of agricultural production 
whereby farmers make their planting decisions based on prices obtained on the past 
harvest, with a considerable time lag (typically 6-8 months for grains) between planting 
and the next harvest. This feature can result in price behaviour known as the cobweb 
theorem, whereby prices oscillate from one harvesting season to the next depending on 
whether farmers expand production due to previous high prices, or contract production 
due to last season’s low prices (Tomek and Robinson, 1981: Ch.9). The cobweb effect 
is a real, not just a theoretical occurrence, and is commonly observed in short season 
horticultural crops like carrots, tomatoes or onions; and equivalent short cycle livestock 
production such as the fattening of pigs (e.g. Harlow, 1960). Its potential presence in 
annual food staples is obscured by government policies that aim to avoid such 
occurrences, in both rich and poor countries. 
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Depending on supply and demand characteristics, cobweb cycles can converge towards 
a long run equilibrium price, or be subject to increasingly violent price swings, or 
indeed behave somewhere between these alternatives. The comparative statics of these 
outcomes are provided in Tomek and Robinson (1981, pp.184-5). Essentially if supply 
is less elastic than demand, then the successive quantity and price adjustments 
converge; if supply is more elastic than demand then successive quantities and prices 
diverge; and if supply and demand are roughly similar in their responsiveness to price, a 
constant amplitude cycle results. These processes are, of course, highly stylized in 
comparative static models, and real world price cycles are unlikely to correspond to the 
theoretical behaviour except in rare instances. 
 
The other important production characteristic of food that contributes to price instability 
is natural variation in harvest outcomes from one season to the next or one annual cycle 
to the next. Harvests can vary for all kinds of reasons, aside from catastrophic scenarios 
such as droughts or floods. Relatively minor variations in the seasonal pattern of rainfall 
or temperature (including both maximum and minimum temperature), as well as 
varying incidence of crop pests and diseases, can cause harvest volumes to vary from 
one year to the next, with consequent effects on average annual price levels. These 
cyclical price effects are superimposed on the within-season price behaviour, and may 
have the effect of amplifying or dampening down seasonal price instability. 
 
The final reason for price instability in agricultural markets is to do with the character of 
the demand for food. When a food crop is the chief dietary staple of a population, there 
is a strong consumption preference towards that food, and there are few alternative 
sources of dietary energy, then the price elasticity of demand for that crop is generally 
under 1, and may be as low as 0.2 to 0.5 (Bond, 1985; Haggblade et al., 2008).8 If we 
take a demand elasticity of 0.5 as an example, then a 10 per cent rise in price only 
reduces the quantity demanded by 5 per cent. Conversely, this means that a 10 per cent 
shortfall in supply will invoke a 20 per cent rise in price. Thus, a low price elasticity of 
demand coupled with variations in the harvested volume of a staple food crop is a recipe 
for big price fluctuations. 
 
                                                 
8  Strictly the demand elasticity is a negative number since it refers to the decline in quantity 
caused by a rise in price (or vice versa); however, it is conventional in this sort of discussion 
to ignore the negative sign on the elasticity, which is taken as understood. 
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In fact, when the majority of farmers are small-scale staple food producers, mainly 
consuming what they produce, the price instability that results from this circumstance 
can be even stronger than is suggested in the above simple calculations. This is because 
the variation in supply made available to consumers is considerably greater than the 
underlying variation in production (Hayenga et al., 1978). Say, for example, two million 
tons of staple grain is produced in a normal or average year, and 80 per cent of this 
harvest is retained for self-consumption by the farmers that produce it. So 20 per cent or 
0.4 million tons is sold in the market to other consumers. Now, if there is a 10 per cent 
fall in harvest in a particular year, but producers continue to maintain their level of self-
consumption, then production is 1.8 million but only 0.2 million will be offered for sale 
to consumers. In other words, there is 50 per cent fall in market supply, leading to the 
possibility of 100 per cent rise in the price, assuming the same demand elasticity of 0.5 
as in the previous calculation. 
 
Of course, no one is pretending that this is exactly what would occur in a country with a 
high ratio of semi-subsistence producers, strong preference for a single staple food, and 
inelastic demand. Some farmers would adjust their self-consumption in the light of 
steeply rising prices, offering more to the market, and a proportion of consumers would 
modify their consumption, perhaps moving away from their preferred staple to other 
alternatives. Thus, the price instability scenario might not be quite as drastic as 
suggested in the simple example. Nevertheless, this example has some considerable 
force for a low income country typified by Malawi with its great dependence on maize. 
It demonstrates that very basic, yet very powerful, economic forces can militate in the 
direction of a propensity towards high price instability in the basic foodstuff that is 
critical to the welfare and wellbeing of the majority of the population. The particular 
way these forces manifest themselves in the context of state regulation of the maize 
market in Malawi is at the core of this thesis, and the examination of maize price 
instability and its control and consequences is the preoccupation of the narrative in this 
and later chapters. 
 
Corresponding to the basic analytics of price instability, there is a parallel well trodden 
path concerning its welfare implications and the legitimacy of state action to reduce or 
eliminate it. In this, overall instability, which, as we have seen, can comprise both 
seasonal and cyclical elements needs to be considered separately from pure seasonal 
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effects, since the latter pose a narrower set of challenges for policy, and are especially 
connected with the function of seasonal crop storage. 
 
Going back many decades, economists have debated the welfare implications of price 
instability for producers and consumers, and have tried to deduce principles for policy 
arising from these impacts. The simple analytics involve partial equilibrium analysis 
(see Schmitz, 1984 for an excellent account). Early contributions to this discussion 
argued that policy intervention should be avoided. Waugh (1944) offered a partial 
equilibrium analysis of the demand side of price instability, and concluded that 
stabilising prices at the mid-point between two outcomes caused by variation in supply 
would result in a welfare loss, using consumer surplus to measure gains and losses.9 
Some 17 years later, Oi (1961) offered an equivalent analysis of producer welfare 
resulting from shifts in demand, and likewise concluded that price stabilisation midway 
between two price outcomes would reduce producer welfare. The descriptive 
interpretation of these findings was, in the demand case, that consumers could buy more 
of the commodity when prices were low, and less when prices rose, resulting in an 
overall net gain in the presence of unstable prices. In the supply case, producers gained 
more by selling a lower harvest at a high price, and a higher harvest at a lower price, 
than if they had sold the two harvests at the mean price. 
 
Interestingly, it was not for another eight years before Massell (1969) produced a joint 
producer and consumer analysis that showed price stabilisation at the mid-point in the 
presence of supply shifts caused a producer gain that outweighed a small consumer loss, 
thus resulting in a net overall gain in welfare from price stabilisation. This analysis 
remained the accepted wisdom, with embellishments, for many years, and constitutes 
the partial equilibrium analysis of price stabilisation offered by Ellis (1992: Ch.4) which 
is reproduced below (Figure 2.1). In this figure, the intersection between supply curves 
(not shown) and the demand curve oscillates between point A and point B. A buffer 
stock is assumed to operate to keep the price at its target level of Pe and welfare and 
resource changes are as follows: 
 
Buffer stock operations cancel out:    d + g = e + f + h 
Consumer surplus loss: d (because c + e = a + b) 
                                                 
9  See Ellis (1992: Ch.3) for an exposition of the use of consumer surplus to measure changes in 
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early literature remained locked into fairly abstract assumptions about markets that bear 
little relation to how they work on the ground, and especially on how they work for 
different types of producer and consumer with varying farm sizes and annual incomes. 
The part of Newbery and Stiglitz that remains very much alive as a policy debate today 
is the recognition that private storage carries out a socially useful function in inter-
temporal food supply across seasons; and that if such private storage were working 
competitively and efficiently, reflecting just the cost of storage between low and peak 
price seasons, then the role of public buffer stocks essentially vanishes. 10  This 
conclusion is reinforced if imports are freely permitted to balance the annual market in 
the event of gap between domestic production and consumption. However, this is 
jumping ahead, some more on storage first. 
 
It was remarked earlier that the grain storage capability of small farmers themselves 
tends to be quite limited, and is prone to disadvantages that mean that farmers are most 
unlikely to hold more grain than they require for family consumption purposes. In 
particular, family granaries are prone to moisture deterioration, infestation by weevils, 
and damage from vermin (and, in some cases, theft as well). In addition, most farm 
families arrive at the harvest season with cash resources severely depleted, or 
indebtedness to lenders or input supply agencies that need to be repaid. For these 
reasons, the marketed surplus of a staple grain like maize tends to be sold at harvest 
time, and a proportion of these sales represent distress sales in order to recover from 
debt or purchase non-food basic needs. This means that the inter-seasonal storage of the 
marketed surplus tends to be undertaken primarily by traders (or by the government), 
and not by farmers. 
  
The economics of storage is an interesting topic in its own right, and one that can get 
quite complicated (see Brennan, 1958, for an original contribution). In the context of 
this thesis, with its focus on seasonal price instability, storage plays the time 
transformation role in the marketing system that converts availability of the food at an 
initial time period into its availability for sale at a later date (Goetz and Weber, 1986). 
The agents that carry out this time function need to be recompensed for the costs they 
incur in doing so. These costs comprise, primarily, the opportunity cost of the cash 
resources tied up in the value of the stock, together with operational costs of the storage 
                                                 
10  This is in relation to the pure inter-seasonal storage function, not in relation to other 
objectives such as acting as a strategic grain reserve for food security purposes. 
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facility, and a competitive net margin. By far the largest of these is the opportunity cost 
of capital; however, operating costs are not negligible if the quality of the product in 
store is properly maintained, and losses in store are minimised. Under competitive 
conditions, speculative stock holding (or ‘hoarding’ as it is typically called) cannot 
occur unless serious unexpected events open a window of opportunity to do so (such as 
evidence of an impending harvest failure). This is because no single storage agent could 
risk holding grain beyond the price rise that other storage agents regarded as acceptable, 
since they might then end up having to sell at a loss (Siamwalla, 1988). 
 
From the latter description, it can be seen that a public buffer stock might interact in 
damaging ways with the private storage function. The public buffer stock might operate 
with a purchase and sale margin that is narrower than private operators can operate 
within; or it may bid up the cost of purchasing stock; or unexpectedly reduce selling 
prices by disposing of substantial supplies on the market. It may also have preferential 
access to imports (that help it to do all these things), and obtain a government 
subvention to enable it to cover any losses. For this reason, and this is a topic to which 
we return in due course, the public-private relationship in inter-seasonal storage can 
only work within strict and transparent rules governing public action, for otherwise it 
raises the level of risk confronted by private stock holders, and inhibits a competitive 
private market in storage from emerging (Jayne et al., 2006). A fundamental precept for 
a workable public-private relationship in food crop storage is that the public storage 
margin is wide enough for private storage to earn a competitive return to investment. 
This means mandating the public storage agency as buyer and seller of last resort, rather 
than as the principal agent carrying out the inter-seasonal storage function. 
 
Returning now to some important factors that were missing in earlier theoretical work 
on food price instability, one of these is risk; another is the differential impact of prices 
of different levels on producers and consumers of different farm sizes and income levels. 
Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) incorporate risk in their buffer stock models, but as an aid 
to understanding private decisions about buying, selling and storing commodities, and 
public-private storage interactions, not in relation to agricultural growth. In the 
agricultural development literature, risk has been generally regarded as a bad thing, 
inhibiting optimal farm decision making and the adoption of new technologies for 
agricultural growth (Lipton, 1968; Binswanger, 1980; Hazell et al., 1986; Walker and 
Jodha, 1986; Ellis, 1993, Ch.5). Since price instability adds to risk, it is possible that the 
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strategic argument swings in favour of stabilization once the detrimental impact of risk 
on agricultural growth is taken into account (Timmer, 1989). 
 
Summarising available evidence on the production side, the World Bank (2005, p.26) 
concludes that the efficiency losses of price instability are quite small, typically under 2 
per cent. On the other hand, there is widespread agreement that price instability has 
adverse welfare implications for poor consumers, and these damaging effects are 
intensified for the poorest and most vulnerable consumers (Ibid., pp.26-7). Myers 
(2006) shows that for food insecure households i.e. those that persistently face a ‘food 
entitlement gap’, a rise in price above a certain threshold has adverse consequences that 
go far beyond any calculation of loss deriving from simple welfare analysis. This is 
because beyond a certain point rising prices will cause a reduction in food consumption, 
nutritional impairment (especially of children), hunger, starvation and possibly death. In 
addition, poor nutrition adversely affects the ability to work, and, for children, causes 
lifelong impairment to their productive capabilities (Dercon, 2005). 
 
Despite the ambiguity of the pure microeconomic case for stabilisation (Newbery and 
Stiglitz, 1981), the mainstream policy response to price instability from the 1950s to the 
1980s was to seek to contain instability within narrow bounds, or even to seek to 
eliminate it with fixed prices to producers and consumers. The general historical 
outlines of this are well-known and are not pursued in enormous detail here. The 
specifics of the Malawi case to be detailed later provide an example that reproduces 
many of the salient features common in sub-Saharan Africa in that historical period. 
 
As a generalisation, price policy in Asia, including in the populous countries of India, 
Bangladesh and Indonesia followed the route of price stabilisation using buffer stocks 
(Cummings et al., 2006). In this the government owns a buffer stock authority, the task 
of which is to ensure that the prices of one or more strategic crops remains within a 
range established by a floor price for producers and a ceiling price for consumers. These 
prices were (or sometimes continue to be) announced in advance of the next crop season. 
As producer prices in the market decline at harvest time towards the floor, the buffer 
stock authority moves to purchase all grain offered to it at the floor price. This grain is 
then stored in a countrywide network of warehouses or silos, ready for release in the 
deficit season before the next harvest if consumer prices threaten to breach the ceiling 
level. With minor variations in implementation this was the approach taken in the past 
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in India (Kahlon and Tyagi, 1983), Bangladesh (Ahmed, 1988), and Indonesia (Timmer, 
1986a; Ellis, 1990). 
 
Buffer stocks generally seemed to work adequately, and the critical literature on their 
functioning is a lot more muted than the equivalent literature regarding marketing 
boards and parastatal crop authorities in Africa. Indeed, some agricultural development 
commentators with otherwise impeccable economic liberalisation credentials 
nevertheless on balance considered that buffer stocks did a good job (Timmer, 1986b; 
1989). 11  There are several reasons for this. An important one is that buffer stock 
operations do not suffocate private trade, they merely restrict the decision making 
flexibility of private traders within certain parameters. Provided the rules are understood, 
and are adhered to by the government side, then private traders operate freely within the 
price band set, and are free to either sell to the government or buy from the government 
when prices are in the vicinity of the boundaries of the range. In general, under such 
arrangements, price stabilisation is achieved by the buffer stock authority handling 
around 5 per cent of total production (Timmer, 1986a). 
 
It is of course critical for this relative success that the price range is pitched at a level 
and width that corresponds to parity pricing criteria, and that allows private traders 
scope to operate within the band. In addition, adjustments to the official price levels 
need to be made to take account of inflation, for otherwise returns to producers and 
other actors in that commodity market are squeezed compared to other sectors that are 
able to adjust freely to changing prices. Finally, the ability to use imports to help defend 
the ceiling price is essential, otherwise in a deficit market prices will spiral out of the 
prescribed range, and depleted public stocks will make it impossible to prevent this 
from happening. 
 
Buffer stocks are of course not entirely free of the adverse attributes that have tended to 
attract so much critical analysis regarding the execution of price policy in Africa 
(Cummings et al., 2006, p.201). The ownership and maintenance of a countrywide 
network of grain storage facilities is an expensive undertaking that in all cases ends up 
requiring support from the government in order for buying and selling operations to 
proceed within plausible limits of price variation. In other words, it is virtually 
                                                 
11 A number of benefits of stabilisation in the Asian case are identified by Cummings et al., 
(1986) including risk reduction for producers, and avoidance of shocks for both producers and 
consumers. 
32 
impossible in practice to make public stock operations self-supporting financially, and 
recognition of this was one of the principle reasons that Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) 
came out so definitively against this policy approach. In addition, public buffer stock 
authorities in Asia like their counterparts in sub-Saharan Africa are prone to similar (in 
kind, if not in degree) governance, incentive and efficiency deficits leading to waste and 
mismanagement and rent seeking behaviour on the part of their officials. 
 
In Africa, a different trajectory was followed over the same historical period, often 
connected to organisational arrangements that were put in place in the colonial period, 
in some cases to protect the economic interests of settler farmers (Jones, 1972; 
Whetham, 1972). In Africa, the typical organisational form was the marketing board, 
and the typical price policy approach was to set fixed prices (rather than a price band), 
and to make such fixed prices pan-seasonal and pan-territorial in scope and coverage. In 
order to defend a fixed price, the marketing board then needed to assume monopsony 
powers over crop purchase, for otherwise varying prices across space and time would 
occur due to the separate operations of private traders. While there were evident 
variations between different countries, and indeed between different regions in Africa, 
the mainstream model was for marketing boards gradually to accrue ever more 
substantial powers. In some instances they became responsible not just for executing 
price policy but also for delivering inputs and credit to farmers, providing research and 
extension for the crops for which they were responsible, and operating strategic food 
security reserves in the case of food crops. These expanded crop authorities were (and 
still are in many cases) the ‘crop parastatals’; meaning that they were semi-autonomous 
agencies of the state, possessing considerable powers to act independently of ministerial 
interference, but nevertheless subject to overriding control by government, especially 
with respect to price level decisions and budgetary allocations (Mellor and Ahmed, 
1988). 
 
The monopsony purchasing powers conferred on crop parastatals essentially meant that 
private trade was banished to the peripheries of the marketing system for individual 
food or export crops. In some cases, this exclusion of private traders was strongly 
politically motivated due to the pre-independence dominance of non-indigenous ethnic 
groups in trading and exchange. The minor participation of private trade shrivelled to 
the unrecorded transactions that occur in village markets, especially just after harvest, 
but otherwise supplies were mandated to be sold to the parastatal authority, and 
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practically the only source of food grain in the lean season was by purchase at official 
outlets of the same parastatal. 
 
A very substantial literature exists on the emerging flaws of African food crop 
parastatals in the period up to the mid-1980s (World Bank, 1981; Ellis, 1983; Harvey, 
1988; Mellor and Ahmed, 1988; Krueger, 1992). 12  They were found in numerous 
studies to have depressed real prices to producers and widened marketing margins, 
mainly to secure their own expansion, rather than consciously to deliver a financial 
surplus to government. Indeed, financially, the reverse was the case, with advances for 
crop purchases never being repaid, and cumulative indebtedness to publicly owned 
banks being prevalent. The eventual size of such organisations meant that the true unit 
cost per ton of produce handled through the marketing system tended to be 
exceptionally high for a vertical crop marketing margin. In addition, they often delayed 
payment or even failed to pay farmers for their sales, allowed grain to deteriorate to the 
point of being inedible in store, and were haphazard in their provisioning of deficit areas 
in the advent of food shortages. It seems plausible, although difficult to test, that the 
‘retreat into subsistence’ that has to a greater or lesser extent characterised the 
behaviour of small farmers in many African countries over the past thirty to forty years 
began in the parastatal period, for the rational reason that the marketing system could 
not be relied upon to deliver either a reliable sales outlet or a source of food in difficult 
times. 
 
In relation to price instability, the crop parastatal approach was broadly successful at 
keeping prices to producers and consumers stable, but at exceptionally high cost, as 
suggested in the preceding paragraph. Nevertheless, ‘hidden’ price instability at local 
and remote levels, may have been greater than is really known for that era, from official 
data. Certainly, in some countries, so-called parallel markets were found to be stronger 
than previously thought when researchers started to investigate them in detail in the 
early 1980s, and they were typically found to involve significantly higher prices for 
both producers and consumers than officially designated price levels, especially in the 
food deficit season (e.g. for Malawi, Christiansen and Stackhouse, 1989, p.734; for 
Tanzania, Ellis, 1988). 
 
                                                 
12  For a view that identifies positive features in the coordination capabilities of parastatals see, 
for example, Dorward and Kydd (2004, p.352) 
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From the early 1980s, the well-known shift in thinking towards liberalised markets 
occurred, and in Africa this took the form of structural adjustment lending allied to 
conditionalities that pressured governments to dismantle previous state controls. At this 
time previously well-established ‘market failures’ in low income agricultural sectors 
were juxtaposed to widespread evidence of ‘state failures’, and the balance of the 
argument shifting decisively against state controls (Ellis, 1992, Ch.1). Liberalisation 
proceeded in different patterns in different countries from the early 1980s onwards. 
Nevertheless there were sufficient commonalities for the process as a whole to be 
treated as a single shift in policy sentiment. The typical liberalisation sequence began 
with a sharp currency devaluation, subsequent market determination of the exchange 
rate, elimination of import quotas, reduction in import tariffs, a tightened monetary 
policy and pressures towards fiscal discipline. A second wave of reforms tackled 
controls in specific markets more directly, occurring from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s. 
It is here that subsidy removal on farm inputs, and opening up of crop marketing to 
competition from the private sector were key policy targets of policy change 
(Commander, 1989; Cornia and Helleiner, 1994). 
 
However, by the mid-1990s, perhaps a decade or 15 years into the ‘reform process’, a 
marked disenchantment with its prescriptions began to be expressed (Gibbon, 1992; 
1996; Engberg-Pedersen et al., 1996). On the agricultural production side, price and 
output gains from liberalisation seemed fragmentary and often short-lived, and some 
low income African countries were seen to experience more frequent food security 
crises than had occurred in the era of extensive state controls. A deterioration in the 
efficacy of public services to agriculture, such as extension and veterinary services, 
could be widely observed in many countries. Fertilizer use declined, especially amongst 
the small, poor, semi-subsistence, food crop farmers, exacerbating the seasonal food 
deficits to which they were anyway prone. 
 
In this period of rising structural adjustment scepticism, divergent views began to 
emerge regarding the way forward for agricultural policy. One powerful critique, taking 
the new institutional economics as its conceptual starting point (Williamson, 1985; 
North, 1990) emphasized the extreme weakness of private delivery of marketing and 
other services to farmers, in the presence of high transaction costs, high risk, low trust, 
moral hazard, and missing markets (Dorward et al., 1998; Kydd et al., 2002). In other 
words, the SAP approach seriously underestimated a variety of difficulties attendant on 
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the market successfully assuming the delivery and coordination roles previously 
assigned to state agencies. 
 
One aspect of this is the problem of missing markets. Markets do not even come into 
existence unless the risk adjusted returns from a potential transaction outweigh the cost 
(de Janvry et al., 1991; Dorward et al., 2004a; 2005b). Secondly, and partly as a 
consequence of the missing market problem, there is no guarantee that the private sector 
will operate evenly or consistently across geographical space, or across farmers of 
differing capabilities at producing output surplus to their own consumption needs. 
Thirdly, the optimal delivery of some services to farmers requires coordinated action to 
be effective, for example, inputs and the credit for their purchase need to be 
simultaneously available. Coordination represents a special class of problems where 
state facilitation is needed to achieve desired outcomes even if the private sector is 
chiefly responsible for delivery (Kydd and Dorward, 2004; Dorward et al., 2005b; 
Poulton et al., 2006a). 
 
Coordination takes on several different meanings and levels in this literature (Dorward 
et al., 2009a; 2009b). At a basic level, a single transaction represents a coordination 
problem between buyer and seller. The more difficult this coordination is to achieve 
(due to lack of trust, absence of quality standards, ill-defined property rights etc.) the 
higher the transaction costs incurred, and the less likely that markets function 
predictably and efficiently. Second, there is the problem of missing complementary 
investments when no single actor is prepared to invest in new capacity (e.g. a storage 
facility) if other actors fail to invest in complementary products or services (e.g. 
increased yields by farmers; improved rural roads). Third, there is coordination between 
complementary services of the kind noted in the previous paragraph(for example, inputs 
and credit). Fourth, there is coordination between the state and the private sector, in 
which the absence of consistency, rules and trust can result in breakdown that 
exacerbates the weak functioning of markets. 
 
The policy message that emerges from these ideas is that purely market solutions are 
unlikely to provide a conducive environment for renewed and sustained agricultural 
growth. Rather a role for the state remains necessary to facilitate the gradual reduction 
in transaction costs involved in agricultural service delivery, and to help solve 
coordination failures, as well as to address gaps in private coverage. The extent of 
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public intervention in Asia at the time of the Green Revolution is invoked in support of 
this conclusion (Dorward et al., 2004b). 
 
An alternative interpretation of events and outcomes over the past two decades is that 
the liberalisation project was only ever partially followed through by governments, and 
substantively represents unfinished business (Kherallah et al., 2000; Jayne et al., 2002). 
In this view, many African governments liberalised agricultural markets grudgingly and 
fragmentarily, with backsliding and unpredictable reversals in policy stances (e.g. for 
Tanzania see Cooksey, 2003). In output marketing, private trade was permitted subject 
to restrictive licensing requirements, but crop parastatals were rarely themselves 
privatised or dissolved, so they remained an overarching potential presence in the 
market, and their operational functions could be re-invoked at will by unilateral policy 
decisions by government decision makers. In input supply, subsidies often disappeared, 
then reappeared with unpredictable and variable participation by private sector fertilizer 
or seed suppliers in successive switches in the policy stance. The unpredictability of the 
continued erratic state presence in agricultural markets is itself held responsible for 
many of the market failures identified by the new institutional school discussed above. 
Traders face great uncertainty in their regulatory environment, inhibiting investment 
and discouraging normal entrepreneurial risk taking. As noted in Chapter 1, in some 
instances, changes in government regulatory stances have been observed to exacerbate 
rather than ameliorate market imbalances as they appear (Jayne et al., 2006, p.328). 
 
The conclusions deduced from these alternative interpretations on the failures of 
liberalisation are not, however, as far apart as the above dichotomy might suggest. 
There is wide agreement that consistency, predictability and transparency in the rules by 
which government behaves in input and output markets are prerequisites for private 
markets and services to experience declining risk and transaction costs, and improving 
coverage over time. The partial liberalisation school would go further in the direction of 
the responsibility of the state actively to support and facilitate private sector 
development, a position also held, albeit rather unevenly, in the World Development 
Report 2008 on agriculture published in late 2007 (World Bank, 2007). The new 
institutional school would, on the other hand, err more in the direction of selective 
government action to overcome constraints hampering farmer uptake of inputs and 
improved technologies, as well as in order to address coordination problems between 
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complementary services that the private sector seems to have particular difficulty in 
achieving. 
 
For price instability, a range of different options are opened up by recent thinking. At 
one end of this range, there is the traditional use of buffer stocks, albeit with a lot more 
emphasis placed on the role of imports and exports than in the distant past. At the other, 
there is the deployment of private sector mechanisms to secure improved inter-temporal 
supply stability, utilising commodity exchanges and futures markets. In between there 
are various initiatives governments can take, with or without private sector participation, 
to improve information flows and the speed of price adjustments in domestic markets. 
The next section turns to these options for stabilisation, and elaborates them in more 
detail. 
 
2.2 Current Policy Options for Price Stabilisation 
While always representing a potential problem in food markets, especially for food 
deficit rural poor people, price stabilisation receives varying attention in the agricultural 
policy literature depending on particular ideas that are in the ascendancy at given 
moments in time. One way that high seasonal prices are brought back into the picture is 
in the context of severe food security stress in very poor countries like Malawi and 
Ethiopia that have become prone to recurrent food security crises in the past ten to 
fifteen years (Ethiopia, indeed, for even longer). A considerable proportion of the safety 
net literature (e.g. Grosh et al., 2008) is to do with protecting vulnerable people from 
the adverse effects on their food consumption of adverse price swings, and this is true 
also of more recent interest in social protection policies (Ellis et al., 2009). 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, in 2005 a workshop was organised at the World 
Bank on risk and price instability in food markets in which contributions by many of the 
leading authorities on marketing arrangements in low income countries were presented, 
with subsequent publication as a report (World Bank, 2005) and a set of journal articles 
in the journal Food Policy (amongst which Byerlee et al., 2006 provides the editorial 
overview). In addition to reaffirming many of the perennial policy difficulties that 
surround successful price stabilisation, this workshop was able to bring to the surface a 
number of important factors that have changed over the past ten or fifteen years, that 
broaden the options for stabilization as compared to earlier periods. Some of these 
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factors are as follows (see Byerlee et al., 2006, Cummings et al., 2006; Dana et al., 
2006; Jayne et al., 2006; Poulton et al., 2006b): 
 
(a) private trade is more prevalent, and stronger and more capable, in the 2000s than 
was true in the 1970s or 1980s in virtually all economies, including in very poor  
African countries; 
 
(b) globalisation has, in general, created relatively stable international food markets at 
low real prices in historical terms, and ability to import food has not been 
constrained by available global supply;13  
 
(c) new devices for securing inter-temporal market stability have come into being, even 
in poor regions of the world, including commodity exchanges, futures markets, and 
specialised insurance contracts; 
 
(d) mobile telephony has enormously increased the spread and speed of market 
information in most regions, with countrywide coverage being available even in 
quite poor countries, and access by the poor being possible due to the divisibility of 
the technology;14 
 
(e) the same technology, allied to the falling real cost of computers and software, and 
the use of internet and email, mean that market information systems (MIS) for food 
crop prices can achieve more rapid and greater coverage, more cheaply, than was 
possible in past decades; 
 
(f) in some regions, rising real incomes mean that consumers can afford more diverse 
diets than before, and price instability in any single component of their food  
consumption is less critical to their welfare than ten or twenty years ago (however, 
this applies less in very poor sub-Saharan African countries than it does elsewhere). 
 
                                                 
13  The price spike in 2007-08 was an exception to this statement, although prices for most 
commodities had returned to long run real levels by mid-2008. Some experts consider, 
however, that this crisis presaged more global food price instability and higher real prices in 
the future (Trostle, 2008 p.29; Banse et al., 2008 p.30). 
 
14  Non-owners of phones can purchase time use in small amounts from owners. 
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These factors mean that governments can seek to ameliorate price instability in a 
number of different ways, rather than relying predominantly on fixed prices or buffer 
stock operations. Moreover, there remain almost no valid reasons why marketing boards 
or parastatal crop authorities should retain monopsony control over market supply, or 
operate buffer stocks within narrow margins that exclude private traders from intra-
seasonal storage. Nevertheless, a mix of some modified traditional, and some new 
policy instruments, is likely to prevail in food insecure very poor sub-Saharan African 
countries for political as well as economic and social welfare reasons. Price instability 
has such severe repercussions for food deficit small farmers that failing to contain it 
within ‘tolerable’ limits is not an option either politically or in terms of protecting the 
food entitlement of the poor. Such a mixed approach is likely to comprise the following 
components: 
 
Public Buffer Stocks 
For the purposes of discussion here, a public buffer stock is any government operation 
that comprises purchases of a staple food from farmers or traders, its strategic storage 
for the purposes of release in the event of a market shortage, and the sale of stock at a 
trigger price or ceiling price to prevent upside price movements. Such a definition thus 
covers conventional buffer stocks of the kind that have been historically prevalent in 
Asia (Cummings et al., 2006), as well as food security reserves or strategic grain 
reserves that have the additional important function of provisioning food deficit 
populations in the event of an emergency. The important character of a buffer stock is 
that it sets a floor (producer) price and ceiling (consumer) price, thus intending to keep 
domestic market prices within a range through purchases (at the floor) and sales (at the 
ceiling). Not all strategic reserves carry out the latter function, but they do tend to buy 
from producers and traders at a published producer price, thus putting a floor under the 
market. As discussed in the previous section buffer stocks have detractors as well as 
supporters, but they are certainly not written out of the acceptable array of policy 
options in a poor country in the early 21st century. 
 
There are many variants on the basic buffer stock principle. For example, Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) in Malawi, since it stopped 
operating a pan-territorial producer price (see section 2.3 below), has at times had a 
price range for purchases from producers, and an entirely separate fixed consumer price 
(Chilowa, 1998). At other times, it has retained a producer price but decided not to 
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defend the consumer price. In Asia, some buffer stocks have had ‘trigger’ prices in 
addition to floor and ceiling prices, recognising that there is a lag between purchase or 
sales actions and the impact of such actions in halting or slowing price trends. As 
previously discussed, it is widely agreed that buffer stocks should operate using a price 
band sufficiently wide for private traders to find the intra-seasonal storage of grain 
worth carrying out. The use of export parity pricing for the floor price has been 
suggested (Byerlee et al., 2006). Buffer stocks are notorious for being politicised, and 
making variable pricing decisions depending on political pressures. For this reason, it is 
argued that they need to be recast as independent agencies or trusts, with a legal status 
that enables them to operate free of political interference (see discussion in Poulton et 
al., 2006b). 
 
A further proposal is that they should be split between a physical stock operation, and a 
financial fund (Byerlee et al., 2006). The purpose of the financial fund is to enable 
timely ordering of imports in the event of an emerging domestic market shortfall. This 
might be done directly by the agency itself, or by providing reliable credit lines to 
private importers. The financial fund, like the suggestion for the buffer stock more 
generally, should be managed independently of government and be in a convertible 
foreign currency like the US dollar. For coastal countries, the financial fund could be 
the chief instrument; while for landlocked countries like Malawi a mixture of physical 
and financial capabilities would be more appropriate. 
 
More Flexible Use of Imports and Exports 
The policy advice that low income countries should be more prepared to make use of 
imports to help keep their domestic food market in balance between demand and supply 
goes back to the very earliest advocacy of liberalisation (e.g. World Bank, 1981; Mellor 
and Ahmed, 1988). Using stocks to handle every possible range of fluctuation in the 
domestic food balance is exceedingly costly, and the volume of such stocks has to be a 
high proportion of domestic consumption (perhaps as much as 15 or 20 per cent) if the 
market is to be supplied always and reliably from domestic sources rather than from 
imports. At present in most African countries, grain imports and exports by private 
traders remain heavily controlled by the state, with each transaction requiring a license, 
and outright bans being unpredictably invoked. 
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As for buffer stocks, the policy advice in this area is for much greater predictability and 
transparency in government actions, allied to the removal of discretionary powers to 
alter at will the rules under which private traders carry out their activities (Byerlee et al., 
2006; Poulton et al., 2006b). It is generally agreed that import and export licensing 
needs to be relaxed, and free cross-border movement of grains and other foodstuffs 
allowed to occur. This makes particular sense in southern Africa where, except when 
there is a regional drought, surpluses and deficits occur unevenly across the region, and 
free movement of supplies would help to even out the ensuing surpluses and deficits in 
different countries. For landlocked countries like Malawi or Zambia, political leaders 
have a genuine fear that imports will not be secured fast enough in the event of a crop 
deficit at home; however, the ability of the private sector to respond to such a situation 
remains largely untested since, almost without exception, one of the first things 
governments do when confronted by an emerging crisis is to hobble the ability of 
private trade to respond by banning private exports and imports. 
 
Private Risk Management Options 
The difficulties and paradoxes often encountered in government instruments to reduce 
instability in staple food markets leads in some sections of the literature to the advocacy 
of private instruments that can help smooth out undue fluctuations in markets, taking 
advantage of private incentive structures, inter-temporal mediation in formal exchanges 
like futures markets, and insurance contracts. The World Bank seems especially keen on 
expanding the use of such instruments (World Bank, 2005). Here we mention four 
instruments (or collections of instruments) that have received a lot of attention in the 
literature (Byerlee et al., 2006; Dana et al., 2006). These are commodity exchanges, 
warehouse receipt systems, futures markets, and weather insurance contracts. 
 
Agricultural commodity exchanges (ACEs) are organised trading systems which bring 
together buyers and sellers of agricultural commodities, physically or through virtual 
trading platforms, using brokers who trade through price bidding as opposed to the 
individually agreed prices in a spot physical transaction (UNCTAD, 2005; Kutka, 
2009). Three basic market functions are considered to be achieved by an ACE, and 
these are price discovery; price transparency through a bidding process that provides a 
mechanism for market clearing based on supply and demand; and lastly a reduction in 
transaction costs through the facilitation of contacts between buyers and sellers. This 
latter occurs because the exchange enables spatially separated buyers and sellers to be 
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simultaneously brought into contact with each other, by comparison to the bilateral 
bargaining that occurs in individual spot sales. 
 
It is thought that ACEs can reduce price instability since they facilitate more rapid 
spatial and inter-temporal adjustment of prices to changes in demand and supply, and 
therefore indicate to traders places and times when profitable purchases or sales can be 
made. Among the exchanges active in eastern and southern Africa are the Agriculture 
Commodity Exchange for Africa (ACE), based in Malawi, the Kenya Agriculture 
Commodity Exchange (KACE) in Kenya, the Malawi Agriculture Commodity 
Exchange (MACE), 15  and the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) in South 
Africa. Amongst these the only fully fledged futures market with international 
credentials is SAFEX. Other exchanges operate at varying lesser levels of sophistication 
involving spot and forward contracts; however, importantly allowing buyers and sellers 
in different places geographically within a country to trade with each other, therefore 
also helping to spread price information and achieve spatial arbitrage in which 
commodities move from surplus to deficit areas (Tollens, 2005). 
 
The warehouse receipt concept is designed to enable smoother intra-seasonal storage by 
private traders, greater flexibility in the timing of sales, and collateral against which 
credit can be obtained (Coulter and Onumah, 2002). A trader or farmer deposits a stated 
quantity of grain in a warehouse, for which a receipt is issued, specifying the exact 
quality and amount delivered. The receipt is itself tradable (it can be sold to someone 
else), and can act as collateral against loans. It also allows for the decision to sell the 
commodity to be deferred by the owner of the receipt, since the receipt is only cancelled 
out when its owner orders the sale of that quantity out of store. An example of a pilot 
warehouse receipt system in Zambia is given a favourable write-up by the World Bank 
(2005, p.47). However, the use made of this facility began to dwindle after an initial 
promising start due to (i) an inability to pass required changes in the Agricultural Credit 
Act; (ii) heavy government intervention in the maize market, which reduced the supply 
of commercially traded grain that could be deposited in licensed warehouses; and (iii) a 
high degree of policy uncertainty in the maize market, reducing the ability of traders to 
take more than a one or two month view ahead of the market (Onumah et.al., 2007; 
Tembo et.al., 2009 p.19; Jayne et al., 2009). 
                                                 
15 The difference between MACE and ACE in Malawi, is that the target clientele of the former 
are smallholder farmers and buyers, while the latter is a purely private initiative serving large-
scale buyers and sellers mainly for export markets. 
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A futures market permits forward purchase and sale of commodities to occur in future 
months, not just in a spot market physical exchange (see World Bank, 2005, pp.47-51). 
Users of futures markets make contracts to buy or to sell a commodity like maize for a 
given month in the future, and if they did nothing else until the date of contract fell due, 
then they would have to take physical possession of the commodity at the agreed buying 
price (or deliver the commodity at the agreed selling price) on that date. However, very 
few contracts in a futures market result in physical exchange in this way. This is 
because most futures traders take out an opposing contract that effectively closes out 
their position when the due date falls, so no physical trade takes place. 
 
The way this works can be illustrated as follows. A trader believes that the maize price 
will rise steeply in six months time, say, from a current level of US$100 per ton. The 
trader takes a bet on this price movement, and takes out a futures contract now to buy 
100 tons of maize in six months time at US$110 per ton. If the trader was correct and 
the price has risen, say, to US$150 per ton as the due date approaches, the trader will 
close out the contract by selling 100 tons of maize at the current price, thus realising a 
profit of US$40 per ton. Thus numerous traders take positions with respect to future 
price trends, and some of them make losses and some of them make gains from taking 
such positions, with the overall effect of causing a degree of inter-temporal price 
smoothing in the market (although such markets can also get into speculative cycles in 
which beliefs about future scarcity cause spiralling upward prices). 
 
Futures markets can be combined with physical markets to offset risks in storage and 
future sale (or purchase) of the physical commodity. This is called hedging. To extend 
the previous example, if a trader has 100 tons of physical maize in store purchased at 
US$100 per ton, that trader’s main worry is that the price of maize may fall or not rise 
enough over the next few months to compensate for the cost of purchase and storage. 
The trader can therefore take out a futures contract for sale of the same quantity of 
maize in three months time, say, at US$120 per ton. Then if the price in the physical 
(spot) market declines, say to US$80 per ton (resulting in a US$20 loss on the physical 
trade), the price in the futures market will also have declined, and the trader can close 
out the futures contract by buying maize at US$100 per ton (resulting in a gain of 
US$20 per ton in the futures market). This example evidently ignores commission and 
other charges on futures dealings. 
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Hedging is used widely by food processing industries worldwide to protect food 
manufacturers against unforeseen price changes in their raw material supplies. These 
hedges will normally be to counteract future unexpected rises in prices. In principle a 
government (or independent quasi-government agency) could do the same thing with 
respect to its projected likelihood of requiring imports in the future. In fact futures 
markets offer an additional device called a call (for purchases) or put (for sales) option 
that is more appropriate for the imports and exports respectively. A call option gives the 
buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy the underlying asset (usually a futures 
contract) at a maximum strike price specified in the option contract; while a put option 
gives the seller the right, but not the obligation, to sell at a minimum agreed price. With 
support from DFID, Government of Malawi took out a call option for a specified 
quantity of maize in 2005 on the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX), and was 
able to exercise this option successfully in order to offset a rise in physical import 
prices16 that had occurred in the intervening period (Slater and Dana, 2006). 
 
Nevertheless, futures markets, hedging and options represent considerable difficulties 
for their application in places where the more basic governance issues surrounding grain 
trading have yet to be resolved. In principle large traders in a country like Malawi could 
use hedging to stabilize operations not only in their own storage and sales operations, 
but also, by extension, to smaller traders and processors due to the greater price stability 
they would be able to secure through combining physical and financial trades. However, 
no maize trader in Malawi would enter into such contracts (especially if they involved 
imported supplies) given the high likelihood of sudden and unpredictable bans or 
restrictions by government. Meanwhile, governance issues would also pervade 
government direct operations in a futures market, since huge losses as well as gains 
could be incurred by positions taken in such a market. 
 
Index-based weather insurance is a financial derivative instrument for reducing the risks 
of natural disasters, especially drought, by providing payouts against deviations from 
threshold rainfall or temperature indices. The levels of payouts made by insurance 
                                                 
16  In September 2005, the Malawian government signed an options contract with Standard 
Bank of South Africa which allowed Government of Malawi to purchase a maximum of 
60,000 tonnes of maize at a cost of approximately US$18 million. By October and 
November 2005 international maize prices had risen by US$50 to 90 which Government of 
Malawi avoided having to pay. 
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companies or banks offering the service are based on weather statistics, in particular 
rainfall data, compiled at specific weather stations. Deviations from threshold levels 
trigger automatic payouts without using conventional insurance methods based on 
actual calculated loss. The payout could then be used to purchase a call option 
(described above), to ensure that the country has timely access to maize at a guaranteed 
ceiling price. The weather derivative is believed to be superior to conventional 
insurance because payouts can be made quickly, as soon as the levels of the appropriate 
index (e.g. rainfall data) needed to trigger the payment are reached. However, two major 
limitations of index-based weather contracts are evident: differences between the 
amount of payout and the value of the actual loss experienced, and the fact that the 
weather index only covers ‘deficit rainfall’ risk and does not address other risks to 
agriculture such as pests, diseases, excessive rainfall at the wrong time of year, or floods. 
The system also needs substantial investment in weather station equipment and 
communication, and verified clean historical weather data. It requires a high level of 
trust between a government and the private sectors suppliers of the service, and rigorous 
testing of the trigger thresholds. Successful examples of private markets for rainfall 
insurance can be found in India (Byerlee et al., 2006). 
 
Index based weather insurance potentially acts positively on price instability by 
providing the financial means (through the rapid payout) either to purchase physical 
imports immediately, or (as suggested above) to use futures markets to offset risks 
regarding the future price of physical imports. The timely arrival of imports, even in a 
landlocked country, would then have the effect of counteracting upward price pressures 
in a deficit market. However, reluctance to take early action on imports is an observed 
feature of government decision making in countries like Malawi, so perhaps the reasons 
for such reluctance need to be addressed first, before entering into more sophisticated 
instruments for smoothing out the cost of the imports. 
 
The plausibility of all these private risk management alternatives is crucially dependent 
on rule- rather than discretion-based decision making by governments, for otherwise the 
required level of trust in the future security of contracts entered into today is fatally 
compromised. Interestingly, the World Bank (2005, pp.53-54) which sets out a powerful 
advocacy for the greater use of such instruments, nevertheless rules them out for 
circumstances where the necessary predictability and adherence to contract and rule of 
law by government is lacking. 
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Market Information Systems  
Market information systems (MIS) are discussed separately here because they can be 
run by the government or by private information suppliers. If the latter then they would 
belong in the group of private risk management instruments discussed in the preceding 
section. The objective of MIS is to improve the speed and reliability of price 
information available to all market participants i.e. farmers, traders, storage agencies, 
food processors, institutional buyers and so on. Timely and accurate price information 
can help farmers obtain better prices from traders, can help traders identify buying or 
selling opportunities, and can help the spatial functioning of markets by allowing 
participants to observe market conditions in different parts of the country (Mukhebi and 
Kundu, 2003; Shepherd, 1997). In this way, like commodity exchanges, MIS should 
stimulate more rapid spatial arbitrage, in which crops are moved from surplus areas 
with lower prices to deficit areas with higher prices. For all these reasons, MIS can also 
help to avoid excessive price instability occurring in particular locations where local 
markets are in short or excess supply, although by itself it is unlikely to reduce 
generalised price instability occurring due to shortages or surpluses occurring on a 
national scale. 
 
To some degree, low income countries have long had MIS of a kind. There is often a 
price unit in the Ministry of Agriculture that collects prices from markets and diffuses 
this price information to other government agencies as well as to the media which may 
publish or broadcast them on a routine basis. Such information has long been used by 
food security agencies within government such as crop early warning systems. The 
speed of transmission of this information is greatly improved by newer technologies. 
Prices can be phoned in from market collection points, entered on computer, and sent 
out by email to a network of institutions. 
 
A more fully-fledged MIS takes this basic idea and extends it in coverage and speed. It 
adds more markets from which price data is retrieved, and has agents at markets that 
transmit the current price hourly rather than just once or twice a day. Using mobile 
telephony, prices are texted to a central data processing unit, thus avoiding errors of 
transfer from one communications medium to another. The central data unit then 
automatically texts data outwards to the mobile phones of subscribers to the MIS 
service; hence a trader in one part of the country can be made hourly aware of prices at 
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selected markets all over the country. Such a system is also likely to provide regular 
price updates by radio at set times of the day, every day of the week, and may also 
negotiate a daily slot on television. Price data submitted by text are easily converted into 
database or spreadsheet tables, which can then be emailed out to government, NGO and 
private institutions. 
 
Malawi has had a publicly funded MIS that does all these things since 2004. The service 
is jointly provided by MoAFS and MACE. The latter collects wholesales prices from 13 
markets for over 40 commodities, using market information points called Market 
Resource Centres (MRCs) across Malawi’s three regions. Some of the MRCs are run 
directly by MACE and some are franchised to private operators. In addition to 
collecting price information, MRCs also facilitate trade transactions in the form of 
offers to sell and bids to buy agricultural produce. In parallel, MoAFs collects farm gate 
and retail prices from 80 markets (the methods for doing this are detailed in Chapter 3 
below). Retail prices from both sources are disseminated by MACE using mobile phone 
SMS, email, radio and (to a limited extent) internet (IDEAA Malawi, 2005). 
 
Social Safety Nets 
It is possible that permitting price instability within a range that properly allows for the 
competitive intra-seasonal storage of grain by the private sector, may nevertheless, 
create undue hardship for the proportion of the population whose livelihoods are so 
precarious that quite moderate seasonal price rises place purchase beyond their reach, 
and they begin to compromise family nutrition, and face real hunger. This can occur to 
farm families that only ever manage to produce less than 6-8 months of their annual 
food requirement, and for whom available employment opportunities are very limited. 
 
One approach to dealing with this problem without squeezing the margin between the 
buying and selling prices of the government food security agency, so that it incurs 
losses and private traders are excluded, is to treat extreme vulnerability as a separate 
policy problem, better treated by social protection instruments than by price policy 
instruments. This approach receives considerable support from the World Bank (Grosh 
et al., 2008). The main form in which it appears in poor countries with major problems 
of vulnerability to hunger is in food-for-work or cash-for-work schemes, often also 
referred to as public works programmes (PWPs). Food-for-work and cash-for-work 
schemes are self-targeted forms of social protection. They rely on providing food or 
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cash in return for work, at a value that is below the ruling market wage, so that only 
those who have no other option for avoiding hunger are likely to turn up to do the work. 
 
In the case of food-for-work, the food that is provided is typically food aid supplied by 
the World Food Programme or channelled through NGOs; while cash-for-work is 
normally funded by donors in low income African countries. It is worth noting that food 
and cash have different market effects. Food delivery has a moderating effect on food 
prices, and is therefore appropriate if absolute shortage of supply is the key cause of an 
upward spike in prices; whereas cash increases people’s purchasing power over food, 
and would tend to support the price of food rather than bring downward pressure to bear 
on it. These effects are only likely to be significant for large PWP programmes, such as 
the Productive Safety Nets Programme in Ethiopia (Ellis et al., 2009; pp.30-32). 
Despite their popularity in the 1990s and early 2000s, PWPs have a number of well-
known flaws (Ellis, 2007 p.6; McCord, 2008):  
 
(i) by definition, their recipients must be capable of hard physical work, which 
means that they are unable to target the old, the ill, the disabled, or women 
looking after orphans and vulnerable children – categories that are considered by 
many to be the most significant vulnerable groups; 
 
(ii) there is a risk that their occurrence in the hungry season, which is also the 
cultivation season for the next year’s crop, diverts labour away from the best 
cultivation practices; 
 
(iii) PWP projects are costly to set up and execute, since skilled personnel are needed 
to design and manage them if they are going to produce useful infrastructure; 
 
(iv) they are costly for other reasons too: maintaining a national capacity to respond to 
scattered and unpredictable geographical food deficit failures is very expensive, 
and gearing up and winding down seasonally intermittent projects is also costly; 
 
(v) for vulnerable people facing inadequate access to food for a few months in the 
hungry season timing is crucial, yet PWPs are prone to logistical delays meaning 
that they sometimes miss the critical months; 
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(vi) when dependent on local power brokers to select beneficiaries (which often 
occurs when self-targeting is rationed), inclusion and exclusion errors are rife; 
however, the more accurate method of community targeting is skill- and time-
intensive in its own right; 
 
For these and other reasons, current thinking has moved away from food- or cash-for-
work towards more continuous forms of cash transfer to vulnerable people. Such cash 
transfers can be targeted in a deliberate way towards the poorest and most vulnerable 
people in a country (so-called ‘poverty targeting’), or can take the form of categorical 
transfers such as a social pension that is universally provided to all people that fit the 
category (in the case of a pension, the single criterion is an age threshold such as 65) 
(Ellis et al., 2009). 
 
2.3 A History of Maize Market Regulation in Malawi 
In Malawi, maize production has always been fundamentally a smallholder crop, in 
contrast with neighbours Zambia and Zimbabwe in which large-scale commercial maize 
production was historically an important feature of their food production structures. 
Policy towards the maize sector since independence in 1964 has often represented 
tensions between food security and export promotion objectives, mediated by farm size 
and tenure considerations. For at least two decades after independence, the government 
of Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda pursued a policy of land alienation from the customary 
sector, allied to the growth of export production (especially tobacco) on larger holdings. 
The outcome of this process was the emergence of a dual agricultural economy 
characterised by shrinking customary land on which most food was grown by small 
farmers, and an expanding export crop estate sector, with the customary sector 
nevertheless expected to play the predominant role in national food self-sufficiency 
(Kydd and Christiansen, 1982; Harrigan, 2001). 
 
From independence until 1987, the markets for maize and other outputs from the 
customary small farm sector were heavily regulated. Initially this regulation was 
implemented through a marketing board called the Farmers Marketing Board, the latter 
being converted with extended powers and responsibilities into the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) in 1971. ADMARC and its 
predecessor organisation implemented pan-territorial and pan-seasonal fixed prices to 
smallholder producers, a fixed public sale price to food consumers, and the delivery of 
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subsidised fertilizers to farmers (Chilowa, 1998). Both producer and consumer prices 
were announced before the beginning of the growing season. While some localised 
private trading may have occurred on the small scale in the 1960s, ADMARC was 
conferred monopoly powers over the purchase of marketed food and other crops, with 
the result that private trade in scheduled commodities from the early 1970s onwards was 
effectively prohibited, and would have only continued to occur in small quantities in 
localised informal markets. 
 
During the 1970s, a systematic extraction of a financial surplus from the small farm 
sector via price policy and its transfer to the estate sector occurred (Kydd and 
Christiansen, 1982). Maize, however, was not drawn into this process, due to the critical 
role of the smallholder sector in ensuring national food self-sufficiency and the 
importance of low cost food availability for the growing workforce on estates 
specialising in export production. Maize, if anything, was subsidised rather than used 
for surplus extraction, with ADMARC trading losses in maize purchases and sales 
recorded in most years (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982, p.367). Rather, the financial 
surplus was created by paying small farmers low prices for export crops (fire-cured 
tobacco, cotton and groundnuts) and selling these crops at high export prices. Surpluses 
thus generated were transferred to the estate sector through cross-ownership holdings 
between ADMARC and Press Holdings, a national conglomerate owned by the 
President but operated as a private holding company with equity investments in almost 
all sectors of the economy (Harrigan, 2001, pp.35). 
 
Available evidence suggests that domestic maize output more or less kept pace with 
rising population and demand through the 1960s and 1970s. Of course, only a small 
fraction of total maize output was sold, and most maize was grown for subsistence. The 
growth of subsistence production (predominantly maize) used in Malawi’s national 
accounts in this period seems to have been substantially exaggerated, therefore also 
resulting in overestimates of agricultural and economic growth (Kydd and Christiansen, 
1982; Pryor, 1990; Harrigan, 2001, pp.18-22). In this period, too, there was 
discrimination in policy between ordinary customary smallholders, and larger food crop 
farmers known as achikumbe (progressive farmers) who were able routinely to deliver a 
food surplus to ADMARC, and who were favoured in the delivery of inputs and 
extension services (Harrigan, 2001, pp.57-8). 
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It has already been noted that for a landlocked country like Malawi, remote from 
international markets, the gap between import parity and export parity prices for maize 
is so large that parity pricing principles offer little guide to the appropriate level of 
domestic prices. Indeed, Harrigan (1988, p.417, fn1) cites a calculation made by the 
World Bank for the single year 1977 in which the farm-gate export parity maize price 
was 1.4 tambala per lb, while the farm-gate import parity maize price was 7.9 tambala 
per lb.17 Farm-gate maize prices set by ADMARC during the 1970s were significantly 
above export parity, reaching 6.6 tambala per lb in the 1979/80 crop season. 
Nevertheless, most calculations suggest that the income terms of trade of food crop 
farmers barely held its own during the 1970s due to no discernable growth in yields and 
rapid inflation towards the end of the decade eroding the real value of ADMARC 
purchase prices. 
 
Towards the end of the 1970s, the Malawi economy ran into serious crisis, characterised 
by rising import prices (especially the 1979 price spike in oil and petroleum products), 
declining export prices, and rising losses in estate and other commercial companies 
owned by the government, or in which the government had a significant stake. The IMF 
and the World Bank arrived at the door, and several IMF Standby Facilities were 
negotiated, as well as three successive World Bank Structural Adjustment Loans 
(known as SAL I, II and III). According to Harrigan (1988; 2001) the World Bank 
seriously misunderstood the peculiar set of pillars upon which the Malawi agricultural 
sector rested, resulting in an over-optimistic view about output and yield trends in maize 
production, as well as about small farmers’ ability to respond to improving price signals 
for export crops. The Bank initially heavily pressured for smallholder export crop prices 
to be pushed to export parity (SAL I in 1981) and recommended that the maize price not 
be raised in real terms. The Government of Malawi reluctantly acceded to raising export 
crop prices, but disobeyed the Bank with respect to the maize price, which it nearly 
doubled in nominal terms to 11.1 tambala per lb for the 1981/82 crop season. 
 
During the 1980s, at least up to 1987, ADMARC continued to implement maize price 
policy much as it had done in the past, albeit with increasing difficulty in remaining 
commercially viable as a marketing corporation in the process (Christiansen and 
                                                 
17  The tambala is a unit of Malawi currency which gradually became valueless with inflation 
during the past 30 years. There are notionally 100 tambala to 1 Malawi Kwacha (MK). The 
recent official exchange rate in the 2000s has been 140MK to the US$, so that 1MK is worth 
0.7 US cents, and one tambala would be worth 0.007 US cents. 
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Stackhouse, 1989). The maize producer price continued to be pan-territorial and 
announced in advance of the crop season, and was kept towards the top of the import-
export parity price range. Consumer prices of maize were held down, however, so that 
ADMARC incurred accumulating losses in its maize trading activities. The rise of 
smallholder export crop prices towards export parity also squeezed the corporation’s 
margins for those crops, thus removing its ability to remain profitable in crop sales. In 
addition, its functions in input supply and delivery of other services to farmers were 
insufficiently funded by government, adding to its burgeoning losses. In addition, in 
1981, ADMARC had been assigned the new task of running the country’s Strategic 
Grain Reserve, meaning additional costs incurred in the longer-term bulk storage of 
maize for national food security purposes. In effect, a crisis was precipitated in 
ADMARC by the policy shifts of the period 1981 to 1985, and by the 1985/86 crop 
season the corporation was incurring huge losses (Christiansen and Stackhouse, 1989; 
Chilowa, 1998). 
 
The first two SALs did not insist on liberalisation of crop markets; however, the second 
one strongly advocated the payment to smallholders of export parity prices for those 
export crops that they were permitted to grow. The second one also advocated the 
gradual elimination of the fertilizer subsidy, and a fertilizer subsidy removal programme 
was created to put this into effect. The third SAL, which occurred in two stages in 1986 
and 1987 became much more forceful with respect to liberalisation, essentially 
requesting the government to divest ADMARC of its functions that were unrelated to 
crop marketing, and to open up all crop markets to competition from private traders. 
Specifically, SAL III Supp, demanded that agricultural markets were deregulated and 
(Christiansen and Stackhouse, 1989) that: 
 
(a) government announce that private individuals could participate in crop trading; 
(b) all markets in which ADMARC purchased less than 60 tons per annum be closed; 
(c) ADMARC institute differential crop prices between its regional depots and the 
traditional seasonal buying points; 
(d) ADMARC eliminate the losses on the maize account by the end of fiscal 1988 by 
instituting differential prices, cutting consumer subsidies and improving efficiency; 
(e) government agree to a liberalisation scheme for ADMARC. 
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Due to the parlous state of ADMARC’s finances by then, the Government of Malawi 
was in a weak position to resist these conditions, even though there was considerable 
scepticism regarding their effect on farmers at the Ministry of Agriculture (Smith, 1995). 
In many ways, 1987 was rather a decisive year for agricultural policy in Malawi. The 
government with unusual haste passed the Agriculture (General Purposes) Act and the 
Agricultural Produce (Marketing) Regulation Act (Chilowa, 1998, Øygard et al., 2003) 
which between them terminated ADMARC’s monopsony purchasing power over 
smallholder crops, and opened up markets to private traders. Nevertheless quite severe 
restrictions were at that stage imposed on private trade (Chilowa, 1998; Smith, 1995): 
 
(a) private traders were to be licensed annually to operate in specific markets; 
(b) only Malawian nationals or businesses owned by Malawian citizens were to be 
eligible for licenses; 
(c) minimum producer prices were announced annually and ADMARC would buy at 
these prices; 
(d) maize exports were controlled through the export licensing system; and 
(e) traders were to submit monthly reports detailing prices paid and received, and 
amounts bought and sold. 
 
The requirements for private licensed traders were extremely restrictive in specifying 
limited times and places for trading. Traders had to pay cash, observe minimum-price 
regulations and use approved and assized weights and measures, and submit a monthly 
return of all transactions to the local Agricultural Development Division (ADD) office. 
The licensing procedure was decentralised to ADDs, with each ADD being responsible 
for licensing traders operating in their area after ensuring that they had proper weighing 
scales. Despite the restrictions, there was initial enthusiasm from the private sector with 
817 traders obtaining licenses countrywide in 1988/89, though this then fell to 543 
traders in 1989/90. In the event, diminishing numbers of traders complied with the less 
enforceable restrictions imposed upon them, especially those related to reporting times, 
places and weighing scales. These limitations were later revoked, but not until 1992 
(Smith, 1995). ADMARC remained the dominant single buyer in the market in this 
period until the end of the 1980s (Chilowa, 1998). 
 
The events of 1987 and succeeding crop seasons altered the balance of institutional 
controls over prices and markets for small-farm crops in Malawi (Smith, 1995; Chilowa, 
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1998; Harrigan, 2001; 2003; Oygard et al., 2003, Chirwa, 2006). ADMARC closed a 
number of its seasonal depots, and implemented a dual pricing policy whereby a 
minimum price was paid to farmers at sites of seasonal purchases, and a higher price 
was paid for bulk purchases from traders at regional depots. The intention was to 
offload some of the operating costs of marketing onto the private sector, while still 
enabling ADMARC to play the buyer-of-last-resort role in markets. The government 
took over ownership of the Strategic Grain Reserve (thus removing the financial 
responsibility for it from ADMARC) but left ADMARC in charge of purchase, storage 
and sale operations from the stock. In 1990, the former Special Crops Act was amended 
to allow burley tobacco to be grown by small farmers for the first time. In 1994, the 
Agricultural Produce (Marketing) Act revoked the ban on private exports of crops, with 
the exception of maize which remained controlled by the Control of Goods Act, 
requiring export licenses for maize. In 1995, there was a broad liberalisation of all crop 
prices, meaning that traders could buy and sell them according to market conditions, 
except maize. A maize price band was introduced for the producer purchase price by 
ADMARC while its sale price of maize remained pan-territorial and pan-seasonal. 
ADMARC was entrusted with defending the band, but it was free to set its maize 
producer price anywhere within the band across markets and seasons. 
 
The scale of changes in ADMARC’s position can be seen by comparing its outreach in 
the late 1980s with that in the early 2000s. In the late 1980s, ADMARC had 3 regional 
offices, 12 divisional offices, 80 area offices, 217 unit (primary) markets, and 1,300 
seasonal markets across the country (Chirwa, 2006). By 2001, the corporation had 14 
district headquarter offices (replacing the division and area offices), 10 depots, 343 unit 
markets (permanent structures able to operate through the year), and 441 seasonal 
markets. In 2002, two of its three regional offices, for Central and Northern Regions, 
were combined (Chirwa et al., 2005). ADMARC remains a large player in crop 
marketing in Malawi, a position strengthened in recent years by its responsibility in 
distributing subsidised fertilizers (see below), but its share of crop purchases from 
farmers is substantially diminished compared to the 1980s. 
 
In the 2000s, different challenges have arisen for the proper role of ADMARC in the 
maize market, and in regard to price stabilisation. As shown in Figure 1.1 and Table 1.2 
in Chapter 1, the 2000s have experienced quite extreme volatility in production 
outcomes and price instability in different parts of the decade. There have been seasons 
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when ADMARC has set out to defend a producer price range, then abandoned the 
attempt when market prices soared out of the range. In other seasons, ADMARC has 
itself joined the scramble for supplies, lifting its buying prices in line with market 
developments. For a period in 2008, ADMARC was temporarily given monopoly 
control again over maize trade, in an effort to control spiralling prices in a year with an 
apparently good harvest according to official production figures. These positions and 
events in the 2000s are explored in greater depth in Chapter 6 of this thesis, as part of an 
effort to understand the politics and public decision making that has made coordination 
between the public and private sectors in the maize market so difficult to achieve for 
market stability in recent times. 
 
No account of government regulatory behaviour in the maize market in Malawi would 
be complete without reference to fertilizer subsidies. This thesis has a focus on the 
output market and price instability for maize; nevertheless fertilizer policy is an integral 
part of overall agricultural policy, and has been a contentious and politicised part of 
Malawi government policy for many decades. Moreover, fertilizer prices and maize 
output prices are inextricably linked at the level of farmer decision making. Past history 
shows that if the ratio of fertilizer price to output price becomes unfavourable in farmers’ 
own calculations of the costs and benefits of using fertilizer, then demand for fertilizer 
declines steeply, and so, too, do crop yields. With the recent steep rise in the cultivation 
of composite and hybrid maize varieties (detailed in Chapter 1 above), this price 
relationship becomes more critical since such varieties need fertilizer in order to realise 
their yield potential above that of traditional maize varieties. 
 
From the 1960s to the 1980s, fertilizers were publicly supplied to the small farm sector 
at subsidised prices, and from 1971 ADMARC was the sole importer and distributor of 
fertilizers to the sector (Smith, 1995). In the 1970s, this subsidised distribution could be 
regarded as quite successful since ADMARC coordinated credit for purchase, supply, 
and crop purchase, ensuring a high level of recoupment of input loans (Dorward and 
Kydd, 2004). Nevertheless, by 1982, subsidies were costing 6 per cent of the 
government budget, and World Bank began to exert pressure for a phased removal of 
the subsidy (Chirwa, 2006). In 1983, the Smallholder Fertilizer Revolving Fund (SFRF) 
was created to take over the procurement of fertilizer from ADMARC, but the latter 
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remained responsible for distribution to smallholder farmers.18 SFRF later became the 
Smallholder Farmers Fertilizer Revolving Fund of Malawi (SFFRFM) an agency that 
continues to play an important role in fertilizer importation and distribution to 
warehouses to this day. 
 
In 1987, the Malawi government unilaterally withdrew from the phased fertilizer 
subsidy removal programme, instead opting to increase the subsidy to 22 per cent, 
which was a little higher than it had been in the immediately pre-reform period 
(Harrigan, 2003). The increasingly adverse fertilizer: maize price ratio is cited by 
observers as the principle reason for this decision, allied to fears regarding production 
and food security outcomes of continued removal (Chilowa, 1998). The next year, a 
fertilizer buffer stock project was funded by the EC, resulting in the construction of four 
fertilizer stores for SFFRFM with a total capacity of 140,000 tons (Smith, 1995). This 
coincided with serious disruptions to Malawi’s supply lines due to civil war in 
Mozambique. 
 
In 1990, the government signed an Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (ASAC) with 
the World Bank, which effectively restarted the process of removing fertilizer subsidies 
that had fizzled out in 1987. Additional aims were to open up fertilizer distribution to 
the private sector, and improve SFFRFM financial management (Smith 1995). The 
government agreed to this liberalization subject to ADMARC retaining a role as ‘seller 
of last resort’ at a ceiling retail price for fertilizer. Thus for the first time in post-
independence Malawi history, fertilizer subsidies were removed in 1991 (Chirwa, 2006). 
However, in 1991/92 there was a regional drought that reduced Malawi maize output by 
two thirds (see Table 1.1 above), and the immediate policy response was for the 
institution of a Drought Recovery Inputs Programme (DRIP) for the 1992/93 crop 
season (Harrigan, 2008). In 1993/94, fertilizer subsidies were once again dropped, with 
the consequence that fertilizer prices roughly doubled due to a simultaneous large 
devaluation of the Kwacha. 
 
For the 1994/95 crop season, politics entered the picture in the form of the first multi-
party elections in 1994, and a promise by the UDF party leadership (who won the 
election) to forgive outstanding credit for input purchases and to reinstate lower 
                                                 
18 This split in functions occurred due to questions over the financial integrity of fertilizer 
procurement by ADMARC (Oygard et al., 2003). 
57 
fertilizer prices. A Supplementary Inputs Project (SIP) was established with funding 
from UK ODA (soon to become DFID), targeted at 800,000 smallholder families, 
predominantly in southern Malawi. This was a fairly limited scheme, unlikely to make a 
great difference to maize output overall. It was succeeded by three seasons of complete 
subsidy removal from 1995/96 to 1997/98; however, the government was increasingly 
at odds with the World Bank about this policy stance, and acquired allies in the donor 
community and amongst the large NGOs that were particularly concerned with 
household level food security. In 1996, the Fertilizer, Farm, Feed and Seed Remedies 
Act was passed, removing many of the petty and unenforceable restrictions that had 
previously hampered private trade in fertilizer and other farm inputs (Øygard et al., 
2003). 
 
For the 1998/99 crop season, with an election coming up in 1999, a major reversal in 
fertilizer policy occurred with the introduction by the government of the Starter Pack 
scheme at a cost of US$23.5 million, with an outreach of 2.3 million smallholders, 
funded by DFID. This involved supplying farmers with small packs containing semi-
flint hybrid maize seed (2 kg), fertilizer (15 kg) and legume seeds (1 kg) to improve soil 
fertility. These packs were enough to cultivate 0.1 ha (Harrigan, 2003; 2008). The 
Starter Pack ran for a second year in 1999/2000 as a universal scheme open to all small 
farmers and with an estimated uptake of 2.8 million farmers. Yields and output jumped 
by about 40 per cent over the preceding levels; assisted by good rainfall amounts and 
patterns in those two seasons. 
 
Nevertheless, an apparently quiescent World Bank up to that point suddenly reverted to 
a harder stance, and put considerable pressure on other donors (principally DFID) to 
move away from universal coverage. The consequence was the replacement of Starter 
Pack by the Targeted Input Programme (TIP) for the 2000/01 crop year, still funded 
predominantly by DFID. TIP provided 1.5 million beneficiaries with 5kg fertilizer, 2 kg 
of open-pollinated (OPV) or hybrid maize seed and 1 kg legumes (soya, beans or 
groundnut seeds). The following year, TIP coverage was reduced to 1 million 
beneficiaries, but the size of pack was increased to 10 kg of fertilizer, and in 2003/04 
coverage was reduced still further to cover 400,000 beneficiaries with 5 kgs fertilizer, 2 
kg of OPV seed and 1 kg legume seed.19 In 2004/05, TIP coverage was planned to be 
                                                 
19  This was mainly a winter targeted programme, for maize grown out of the main cultivation 
and harvesting season. 
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reduced still further; however, at the last minute a near universal scheme was 
implemented largely with government funding to reach 2 million small farmers. The 
reasons for this were political and associated with elections in 2004 in which promises 
were made to re-introduce universal fertilizer subsidies. Looked at retrospectively, 
output in the period 2000-05 does not unambiguously demonstrate the value of TIP, 
with an average production figure of 1.5 million tons, dipping to 1.2 million tons in 
2004-05. On the other hand, there is always the counterfactual argument that production 
may have been even lower without this intervention. 
 
For the 2005-06 crop season, and subsequently, the government made good on its 2004 
election promise of re-introducing a more comprehensive fertilizer subsidy. The 
Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) has provided 1.7 million (and upwards) 
farm households with subsidised fertilizers via a coupon distribution that provides 
beneficiaries with two 50 kg bags of fertilizer at greatly discounted prices. The details 
of the AISP are set out in Dorward et al. (2008) and Dorward and Chirwa (2009).20 
Here some summary details of its functioning up to 2008/09 are provided in Table 2.1. 
Due to rising world prices of fertilizer, the subsidy rate grew steeply from an initial 
level of 64 per cent to an estimated 92 per cent 2008/09. This also increased the share of 
the subsidy in government revenue from 5 per cent to 14 per cent. The 2008/09 figures 
reflected a price spike that occurred in world fertilizer prices in mid-2008. Nevertheless, 
this is an historically unprecedented level of fertilizer and other input subsidisation for 
Malawi. The subsidy is associated with (but not necessarily entirely responsible for) an 
apparent increase in production from an average 1.55 million tons 2000-05 (5 years) to 
3.03 million tons in 2005-09 (4 years). Production outcomes in this latter period are 
explored further, in a different context, in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
 
This rather condensed history of maize market regulation and fertilizer subsidy policy in 
Malawi provides an essential background to the analysis of price instability in the maize 
market over the past twenty years, as well as to the functioning of the private maize 
market and the public-private interface in regulatory decision making that are the key 
themes of this thesis. Some key summary points that emerge are as follows: 
                                                                                                                                               
 
20  The AISP has become Government of Malawi’s flagship economic policy, but remains 
controversial on numerous grounds including its funding (ostensibly funded by the 
government, but nevertheless dependent on general budget support), targeting (who actually 
gets the coupons), secondary markets (in coupons and fertilizer), impact on food security at 
the household level, and accuracy of the maize output levels attributed to it. 
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 no. tons MK/50kg MK/50kg % MK m US$m 
2005-06 1,370,060 131,388 985a 2735 64 6,937  58.6 
2006-07 1,772,280 174,688 950 3430 72 9,067  64.8 
2007-08 1,700,000b 216,553 900 4199 79 15,018  107.3 
2008-09 1,700,000b 170,000b 800 9800 92 29,411c  210.1 
a in 2005-06 subsidised maize fertilizer was sold at MK950 and tobacco at MK1450 
per 50kg bag, this figure represents a weighted average 
b  planned figures for outreach 
c  2008-09 is an IMF estimate from January 2009 report 
 
Source: Ellis (2009) drawing on Dorward and Chirwa (2009) and IMF (2008; 2009) 
 
 
(a) since the late 1980s, policy has been highly unstable, both for maize markets and 
for farm inputs; 
 
(b) this instability has reflected considerable tension between external pressures for 
policy change from international financial institutions and internal resistance to 
change by successive Malawi governments; 
 
(c) policy switches that have occurred have reflected the often brief ascendancy of 
one side or the other in terms of leverage over the course of events, with more 
liberalisation and less subsidies occurring when the external agencies have been in 
the ascendant, and reversion to more regulation and more subsidies when the 
Malawi government has felt able to exercise more control; 
 
(d) this unstable policy progression has been exacerbated by changes of opinion and 
priority by the World Bank at different points of time, as well as tensions between 
the World Bank and other donors (Harrigan, 2003); 
 
(e) the Malawi government has had a continuous priority of securing maize self-
sufficiency at national level, and at times this has coincided with the evolving 
concerns of donors regarding household level food security, thus resulting in some 
periods of agreement over objectives and the means to secure them; 
60 
 
(f) maize policy in Malawi is understandably highly political, and many decisions can 
only be understood in terms of electoral cycles, promises made by political parties 
and their leaders prior to gaining power, and the goal of securing political support 
from important sectors of the populace in the future; 
 
(g) policy instability and political expediency are not good ingredients for reducing 
price instability in the Malawi maize market, and the way this has worked out over 
time becomes apparent in the course of the analysis undertaken in this thesis. 
 
2.4 Politics 
The preceding two points open up the important consideration of the politics of maize 
markets in countries like Malawi, and the intention here is to provide a brief overview 
of political strands that appear in the literature. Almost all contemporary observers 
emphasise the highly politicised character of maize policy decision making in eastern 
and southern African countries (Gray, 1992; Jayne et al., 2002; 2006; Poulton et al., 
2006b). The politics of marketing boards has a long history, recognising that for food 
crops they enable control to be exercised over producer prices and consumer prices 
separately; and for export crops they have often in the past represented one of the chief 
sources of government revenue for recurrent and development expenditure (Bates, 
1981a; 1981b). It is inevitable that politics should permeate a dimension of national life 
as sensitive as the price of a country’s staple food. At the farm-gate level this price can 
make farmers happy or annoyed, can affect the electoral prospects of politicians from 
rural constituencies, and directly affects the incentive to produce for the market. At the 
consumer level, it affects the well-being of consumers and, indirectly, pressure on urban 
wages since a high food price has knock on effects on minimum acceptable wage levels 
in urban areas. Even in autocratic and undemocratic states, political leaders must have 
regard to these price levels, as social unrest or even coups d’etat can happen if entire 
segments of the population consider their lives to be undermined by the level of food 
prices they confront. 
 
The politics of food prices often plays itself out in terms of claim and counter-claim 
between government and opposition parties or groups. One party will claim to have 
raising producer prices as a goal, then others must make similar claims to retain 
credibility, and the same happens (although in opposing ways) with consumer prices. 
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When a crisis occurs, politics takes the form of diverting blame from government action 
(or inaction) to other causes such as events beyond the government’s control (drought, 
world prices), or the unethical profiteering of the private sector. Private traders 
throughout history, and frequently, are made the scapegoats for food shortages and 
steeply rising prices (Ellis, 1992; p.101). 
 
However, the politics of food and food prices can go beyond partisan posturing about 
price levels and the reasons for adverse trends or events. Many countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa are considered to have so-called neo-patrimonial approaches to government and 
governance, characterised by excessive patronage, allegiance, cronyism, and rent 
seeking (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984; Sandbrook, 1986; van der Walle, 2001; Cliffe, 
2006; Kydd, 2009). Under neo-patrimonialism, politics is the art of private wealth 
generation for ‘insiders’, reward for support and allegiance, and neglect of transparency 
and rule of law. The food marketing system represents opportunities for private wealth 
creation through public office, via margins between buying and selling prices, 
subventions for particular operations, control over food security stocks, licensing of 
private traders, control over imported supplies, distribution of subsidised inputs and 
other devices. 
 
Malawi is regarded by some observers as an almost archetypal neo-patrimonial state, 
with patrimonial modes of governance deeply embedded since early in the long 
dominance of Dr Hastings Kumuzu Banda over the country (“president for life” from 
1964 to 1994) (Cross and Kutengule, 2001; Booth et al., 2006). It has been argued that 
the food crisis of 2001/02 in Malawi and other southern African countries stemmed 
partly from the neo-patrimonial character of their politics. In Malawi, this applied 
especially to the management of the Srategic Grain Reserve as the crisis gathered 
momentum (Cromwell and Chintedza, 2005; Booth et al., 2006; Takaravash, 2006; see 
also Chapter 6 below). 
 
In view of these considerations, there are at least three political dimensions that are 
likely to be present with varying force in food policy decision making in Malawi. First, 
there is the politics of keeping one step ahead of opposition politicians and groups, and 
this may result in decisions that are reactive to claims put forward in the country’s 
media, rather than based on a careful consideration of the relation between cause and 
effect (Booth et al., 2006). Second, there is the politics of shifting responsibility when 
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things go wrong, and this can again mean that attention is diverted from seeking to 
understand and address the true causes of the problem that has arisen. In some instances, 
pinning the problem on scapegoats is replaced by the even simpler (although riskier) 
political option of denying that an emerging problem exists.21 Third, there is the politics 
of keeping open the potential for patronage and reward within the staple grain trading 
sector, and this is likely to be connected to the funding of ADMARC to undertake 
designated functions, as well as the licensing regime for private traders in force at any 
particular moment in time. 
 
                                                 
21 This seems to have been the strategy adopted by President Muluzi in Malawi in 2002 when 
confronted by mounting evidence of serious famine taking hold in some parts of the country 
(Devereux, 2002) 
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Chapter 3 : Empirical Methods and Fieldwork in Malawi 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the methodological aspects of the research 
conducted for the thesis. This mainly comprises establishing the analytical and field 
methods related to the time series analysis of price instability and the cross section 
examination of market structure and conduct. However, other methods also have a 
bearing on the data used for different purposes in the thesis. Specifically, the methods 
used by Malawi government agencies to collect data on maize prices and production are 
important for the confidence that can be attached to underlying data accuracy, and 
therefore also for confidence in the findings that are obtained by analysing such data, or 
by using it to infer certain arguments about the effectiveness of policies. Therefore, this 
chapter also provides a description of these methods. 
 
This thesis is mainly concerned with ‘price analysis’ and is therefore firmly located in 
an established repertoire of descriptive statistical methods for describing price 
behaviour in agricultural markets (e.g. Goetz and Weber, 1986). Issues of deep 
epistemological complexity do not really arise here, and it will be apparent that the 
thesis travels light on post-structural or postmodern strands of thought concerning the 
relationships of knowledge to power and to personal subjectiveness (Tavares, 1998; 
Long et al.,1999). However, it is acknowledged that these latter concerns can be 
important in relation to the conduct of fieldwork, and due account of them is taken of 
them in that context. 
 
The fieldwork component of the thesis involved both qualitative and quantitative data 
collection and analysis. It has become widely understood over the past two decades that 
qualitative and quantitative investigations are complementary to each other, rather than 
substitutes or reflections of a differential scientific legitimacy, as often previously 
considered. In particular, quantitative methods are good at dealing with measurable 
entities, but are not always strong at social and cultural factors that may defy 
measurement but at the same time have a useful bearing on the interpretation of 
quantitative results (Kanbur, 2001; White, 2002). A thesis like this either implicitly or 
explicitly conforms to a methodological stance that is referred to in the literature as 
‘analytic narrative’ (Levi, 2004). In analytic narrative, a continuous interplay occurs 
between ‘known facts’ (observable or retrievable data and its analysis) and 
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interpretation of those facts according to the multiple perspectives from which they can 
be viewed (for example, researcher, farmer, government official etc.). The outcome is 
never definitive (it is always a work in progress), nevertheless an interpretation is made 
and inferences deduced, all the while trying to make as transparent as possible the 
standpoints that influence findings and conclusions (see Section 3.7.1 below for more 
detail on analytic narrative). 
 
This chapter proceeds, first, by describing the statistical methods used to examine price 
fluctuations in time-series data. This is followed, second, by a description of the 
approach and field methods involved in sample survey research of farmers and traders 
in rural Malawi that was conducted from June to August 2008. Third, the chapter 
provides summary qualitative and quantitative data on the case-study communities of 
the field research, as well as the methods for selecting farmer and trader interviewees. 
Fourth, the chapter describes ‘other methods’ that have an important bearing on the 
provenance of the data used for time series work in the thesis; in other words, the 
methods used for price and quantity data collection by agencies of the Malawi 
government. Finally, the chapter describes additional methods that are important in 
particular parts of the thesis, and one of these is cointegration for examining spatial 
market integration in the Malawi maize market; and the other is analytic narrative, 
which comes into its own in the interplay between politics and economics associated 
with maize price spikes in Chapter 6 of the thesis. 
 
3.2 Seasonal Analysis: Decomposing Seasonally Varying Time Series Price Data 
The approach that is set out here follows the work of Goetz and Weber (1986), although 
these authors were building on ideas for distinguishing different influences on price 
variation over time from earlier contributors (for example, Kahlon and Tyagi, 1983). 
The basic idea behind decomposing a price series is that there are four main components 
contributing to the series, namely, a trend, a cyclical pattern, a seasonal pattern and a 
random or disturbance component. Intuitively one can think of the trend as reflecting 
general economic factors such as inflation or rising demand as population increases. In 
an open economy, it may also reflect international price trends for a commodity, 
mediated by a country’s exchange rate. The cyclical pattern is most likely caused by 
unforeseen production fluctuations, typically ascribed to unusual weather patterns that 
may result in production being lower or higher than expected, depending on the nature 
of weather events. The seasonal pattern is the result of relatively costly storage needed 
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in order to bridge a discontinuous flow of supply with a continuous demand for a 
commodity over an annual cycle. Finally, the random component can be thought of as 
events not captured by the other three components, which might include changes in 
government policy, and that in statistical terms are captured in the error term of a 
regression analysis. 
 
The most common method for decomposing a raw price series is to assume that the four 
components are linked multiplicatively as follows: 
 
Pt   =  (Tt) x (Ct) x (St) x (Rt)                                                                     (1) 
 
Where, P is the price at time t; Tt the trend component at time t; Ct the cyclical 
component at time t; St the seasonal component at time t; Rt the random component at 
time t; and t is one month’s average price observation. The interest of the analysis is the 
seasonal component. To isolate the seasonal component, the trend and cyclical 
components need to be removed from the price series: 
 
St x Rt =  Pt                                                                                          (2) 
 Tt x Ct 
  
 = St x Rt x Tt x Ct 
   Tt x Ct 
 
Step One: Moving Seasonal Average  
The first step is to create a Moving Seasonal Average (MSA) of the Pt values, which is 
calculated by estimating Tt and Ct jointly, as Tt x Ct. A moving average removes the 
random component if the random component is truly random so that the average of all 
the random components for all the observations should be zero. The moving average 
also removes the seasonal component if the moving average is for one season in length. 
‘Moving’ average refers to the fact that the seasonal average changes with each 
observation. The strength of the MSA includes the ability to remove shorter-term 
fluctuations in the series caused by the random and price seasonality factors, which then 
allows one to concentrate on cycles (Tt) and trends (Ct) (Goetz and Weber, 1986). Each 
observation’s seasonal average includes a half-season behind and a half-season ahead. 
The seasonal average is centred on each observation. For an annual commodity with a 
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single rainy season, the season is defined as 12-months. The equation for calculating Tt 
and Ct will therefore be based on monthly average price data with a season length of 12-
months. 
 
However, an adjustment is required to this procedure since 12 months is an even 
number, and this does not allow the moving average series to be centred on individual 
months. This problem is overcome by averaging two different seasonal moving 
averages, one from Pt-6 —> Pt+5 and one from Pt-5 —> Pt+6. This results in Equation 3 
below. 
 
MSAt  =  Pt-6+2(Pt-5)+2(Pt-4)+2(Pt-3)+2(Pt-2)+2(Pt-1)+2(Pt)+2(Pt+1)+2(Pt+2)+2(Pt+3)+2(Pt+4)+2(Pt+5)+Pt+6 
   24 
 
 = Tt x Ct                                                                                                                                                                                                (3) 
 
The Pt-6 and Pt+6 values are the only values not multiplied by 2 because each of those 
months in a season loses one-half, since the season cannot be centred and the 
denominator is 24 (or 12 multiplied by 2) to take care of the half-seasons. The moving 
average technique means that values are lost at the beginning and end of the series. 
There is no moving average for the first and last six observations in the series. The 
MSA series created will then be a full season shorter than the raw price series. 
 
Step Two: Seasonal Index  
The Seasonal Index (SI) is computed as follows: 
 
St x Rt =   Pt  
Tt x Ct 
 
 = Pt                                                                                       (4) 
  MSAt 
 
Seasonal Index  =  SIt  =  (St x Rt) x 100 
 
The result is a fraction, which is standardised by multiplying by 100, creating an index 
number. If Pt equals its own MSAt, then the SIt will equal 100. There is one SIt for each 
Pt.  For an individual month in a 12-month season, a SIt value of 115 would mean that 
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month t price (Pt) is 15 per cent higher than the 12-month moving average. If the same 
calendar month in each successive season (i.e. SIt, SIt+12, S1t+24……..) registers similar 
results of 115, we can be confident that this calendar month is typically 15 per cent 
above the annual average of 100, and of course this can be statistically tested. If no price 
seasonality exists, we should expect that all calendar months SI values would not be 
significantly different from 100. The seasonal index is free of inflationary effects 
because it is calculated as a ratio of moving seasonal averages: as such, the original 
prices series does not need to be deflated (Goetz and Weber, 1986). 
 
Step Three: Grand Seasonal Index (GSI) 
The final step in the seasonality analysis is to calculate what is called the Grand 
Seasonal Index (GSI). The GSI for an individual month is the mean of the same 
month’s Seasonal Index (SI), for all the years included in the moving average time 
series. The GSI removes the random component, Rt, from the price series data. There is 
one GSI for each calendar month in the annual cycle. In this thesis, the seasonal analysis 
is conducted for 21 years of price data covering 1989 to 2009. The GSI is therefore 
represented by Equation 5 as follows: 
 
GSIm  =              It + S1t+12 + S1t+24 +SIt+36+SIt+48+--------+SIt+246 (5) 
      21 
 
Where, m is the calendar month.  
 
A curiosity of this procedure which is mentioned in all the sources is that rounding 
errors creep into the calculation such that an average taken of all the calendar months’ 
GSIs seldom equals exactly 100, which is what it should do in order for the results to 
conform to the logic of the procedure involved. In other words, whereas the expected 
value of the sum of monthly GSIs across a calendar year is 1200 (12 months X 100) it 
often deviates from this in a minor but significant way, producing a number like 1195, 
for example. The recommended procedure for correcting this error is to multiply each 
month’s GSI by a correction factor so that the adjusted total comes to 1200 as required. 
In the example just given, this correction factor would be 1200/1195 applied to all 




Test for Price Seasonality 
Price seasonality is the statistically significant deviation of any GSI from the average 
value of 100. The null hypothesis (H0) is that price seasonality is not present, implying 
that the GSI is 100. The alternative hypothesis (H1) is that the GSI does not equal 100. 
It is then a two-tailed test. The test statistic is t, which is 
 
tn-1 = GSI - 100 
    S ÷ n1/2 
 
 =  GSI – 100                                                                                      (6) 
  S.E. (Mean) 
 
Where, n is the sample size, S is the standard deviation (of that calendar month’s SI 
series), S ÷ n1/2 is the standard error of the mean, and tn-1 the Student’s test statistic for 
degrees of freedom n-1. The two-tailed tn-1 value (df = 20, 95 per cent confidence level 
or 0.05 alpha22 level) is ±2.09. Values of t above ±2.09 mean the null hypothesis of no 
price seasonality is rejected. Price seasonality is then accepted. 
 
Trend of the GSI and testing for its significance  
Examining trends in the GSI and testing for their significance gives an idea of whether 
price seasonality is increasing or decreasing over time. Each calendar month’s SI series 
can been regressed on an annual time variable representing the number of years in the 
data set. The t statistic can then be used to test the significance of the trend coefficient. 
The null hypothesis is that no trend exists and that β = 0. The regression equation is 
 
SIt  = α + β (seasons) + εt                                                                        (7) 
 
Where, SIt is the set of the entire SIs for a particular calendar month; α, the intercept 
term; β, the trend coefficient; seasons is season 1 to the maximum number of seasons in 
the data set and εt, the error term. The t-values above ±2.09 indicate rejection of the H0 
                                                 
22  Alpha is the cut-off point for determining significance. This is the proportion of the area in a 
graph that includes the critical region. Conventionally set at .05, .01, or .001 and is called a 
significance level. In the case of N-1 = (20-1) = 19, the alpha = .05 rejection region is 2.09 
standard deviation from the mean. Stated in another way, if intervals were constructed at the 
0.05 alpha levels, 95 per cent of them would contain the population value. The smaller the 
sample, the larger the value of the t ratio must be to claim significance (Walsh, 1990). 
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of no trend at 95 per cent confidence level or otherwise stated. A negative t- coefficient 
means that the GSI is declining. 
 
3.3 Fieldwork Approach and Selection of Case-Study Sites 
The purpose of the fieldwork component of the research underlying this thesis was to 
seek the researcher’s own verification of the working of the maize market that could 
contribute to the understanding of the price instability question. Specifically, a lot of 
debate has occurred for Malawi, as for other low income countries in eastern and 
southern Africa, regarding the dynamism of the private sector, its diversity and 
competitiveness, its outreach, and overall its ability to deliver spatial, temporal and form 
efficiency in crop markets (Arlindo and Tschirley, 2003; Jayne et.al., 2006; Jayne et al., 
2008a; 2008b; Myers, 2008). For this thesis of particular importance is the capability of 
the private sector to undertake seasonal crop storage, and to minimise the temporal 
margin between post- and pre-harvest prices consistent with carrying out the storage 
function effectively. In addition, the position of farmers at harvest time seems critical, in 
respect of the choices that they possess between traders and their ability to seek and 
obtain the best prices available. In this discussion, it must be borne in mind that at the 
most local level of marketing small traders are mainly farmers themselves, taking 
advantage of the volume of activity in marketing at harvest to supplement their farming 
livelihoods. In the case of Malawi, recent findings by other researchers on these 
attributes of diversity, competition and structure are summarised in Chapter 5 in the 
context of presenting the researcher’s own findings. 
 
The basic methodological concept for the research was the notion of a ‘snowball’ 
investigation (Browne, 2005), in which farmer respondents would be asked to whom 
they had sold their maize, then the trader purchasers would be asked to whom they had 
sold the maize, and so on up the marketing chain. In marketing studies, this is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘linked interview’ or ‘follow-the-bag’ methodology 
(Magrath, 1999). A significant risk of such an approach is that the trail fizzles out quite 
quickly from its starting point: for example, the farmer respondent takes his or her own 
produce to a marketplace where its identity disappears amongst all the other exchanges 
going on; or this occurs after just one stage in the chain. For this reason, ‘follow-the-bag’ 
research needs to be supplemented by separate interviews with traders of differing sizes 
operating in different segments of the vertical marketing system. 
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In the fieldwork for this research, a second major problem manifested itself. Villages 
were selected for study on the basis of early estimates of expected maize harvests in 
different parts of Malawi in the 2007/08 crop season (see below). However, in the event 
the 2008 maize harvest was not nearly as large as had been predicted earlier (as 
discussed in Chapter 6, a lot of uncertainty surrounds the true level of maize output in 
that crop season). This meant that fewer than expected farmer respondents in the sample 
turned out to have surplus maize to sell, and this affected considerably the size of the 
eventual sample that allowed vertical marketing margins to be pursued. 
 
Nevertheless, ‘follow-the-bag’ was by no means the only dimension involved in asking 
farmers and traders questions about how the maize market worked for them. Separate 
questionnaires were developed for farmer and trader interviewees, and these asked a 
spread of questions about maize output, own maize consumption, maize sales, choice in 
sales decisions, prices obtained, storage, and so on. The relevant questionnaires are 
provided as appendix I at the end of this thesis, and descriptive statistical analysis of the 
data collected from the sample surveys is provided in Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 3.1 below summarises the pyramid structure of the research as far as it turned out 
possible to pursue the follow-the-bag method. A total of 90 farmer respondents were 
interviewed, these being divided equally between 3 field sites, one each in the south, 
centre and north of the country. These 90 farmer respondents yielded 21 buyer or trader 
respondents that were followed for linked interviews. Finally, the 21 buyer or trader 
respondents either directly or indirectly led to interviews with 6 larger millers or food 
processors in the maize marketing system, and one senior government officer, who were 
interviewed using a semi-structured set of questions based on the trader questionnaire. 
 
The sampling procedure for the fieldwork component of the research began with the 
selection of one district in each of Malawi’s three regions. These districts were 
purposively chosen to represent broad criteria of geographical spread (across the 
country), engagement in maize production (true of the whole of Malawi, but with 
variations in significance in different districts), and a degree of variation in relative 
poverty or wealth, and proximity or remoteness from the main road transport network. 
The districts chosen were Mulanje in the south, Mchinji in the centre and Mzimba in the 
north (see Figure 3.2 below for the stages of sampling that occurred from this point). 
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37 villages in the section). The same procedure was followed in each EPA and section 
to arrive at the three case-study villages of Mission in the south, Chinteka 2 in the centre, 
and Jenda Theu in the north. For the sake of clarity and brevity, these villages from 
hereon are referred to as Mission, Chinteka and Jenda rather than by their full names. 
 
Figure 3.2: The Sample Selection Procedure for Villages and Households 
 
 
 Region  
Southern Central Northern 
 District  
Mulanje Mchinji Mzimba 
 EPA  
Matola 1 Chiosya Champira 
 Section  
Milonde Chinteka Jenda 
 Village  
Mission Chinteka Jenda 
 Sample  
Mission No. of HHs Chinteka No. of HHs Jenda No. of HHs 
Very Rich 0 Very Rich 2 Very Rich 0 
Rich 6 Rich 3 Rich 10 
Upper Middle 7 Upper Middle 5 Upper Middle 3 
Lower 
Middle 7 Lower Middle 6 Lower Middle 9 
Poor 10 Poor 14 Poor 8 
Total 30 Total 30 Total 30 
 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
Thus, the most important criterion in moving from a district to a village to conduct 
fieldwork was predicted maize output at the next harvest. These are forecast quantities 
at each administrative level arising from an overall method for making future harvest 
predictions in Malawi that is described later in this chapter at Section 3.6.2. For the 
selection of farm households in each village, it was decided to stratify the intended 
random sample of 30 farmers according to their relative poverty or wealth as discovered 
by a participatory wealth ranking exercise undertaken in each village (see below). This 
idea contained plausible arguments in its favour, principally the intention to capture the 
maize marketing experience of farm households of varying socio-economic status in the 
Malawi rural economy. On the other hand, a defect of the approach that came to light 
once the research got underway was that less well off farm households tended not to 
participate in grain sales at harvest, and therefore were not able to offer insights into 
marketing experiences. This compounded the problem previously mentioned that the  
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Table 3.1: Study Village Two Stage Selection Process Based on Expected 2007/08 
Maize Production 
 
1st  Stage Section Selection Chiosya EPA 2
nd Stage Village Selection Chinteka 
Section 









Chinteka 808 1098 Kwacha uname 41 85.8 
Chioko 649 882 Kanjhande 10 20.9 
Chitcha 801 1089 Dothi 31 64.9 
Chitithi 427 580 Tilinje 51 106.7 
Kamwendo West 543 638 Katewera 42 87.9 
Kasitu 561 662 Mwinjiriro 22 46.0 
Zulu East 582 737 Katundwi 18 37.7 
Zulu West 381 518 Karonga 42 87.9 
   Katakungwa 14 29.3 
   Langwana 68 142.3 
   Kasauka 33 69.0 
   Chalenga 52 108.8 
   Changata 67 140.2 
   Chinkhanga 45 94.1 
   Chikomeni 74 154.8 
   Sinosi 49 102.5 
   Zonzi 9 18.8 
   Machisa 13 27.2 
   Malizani 37 77.4 
   Simphesi 32 66.9 
   Msuzi 42 87.9 
   Mndakwa 106 221.8 
   Kaswasata 12 25.1 
   Mundina 39 81.6 
   Chingwalu 57 119.2 
   Kwawe 63 131.8 
   Kamangira 169 353.5 
   Kawala 26 54.4 
   Kabaira 80 167.4 
   Chinteka 2 211 441.4 
   Chinteka proper 58 121.3 
   Jombo 20 41.8 
   Bololo 22 46.0 
   Belo 33 69.0 
   Chikoyi 19 39.7 
   Waya 19 39.7 
   Kazambala 112 234.3 
Note:  Shaded names are names of selected section and village in Chiosya EPA and Chinteka 
Section. 
Source: Chinteka Section, MOAFS 2nd round crop estimates 2008. 
 
actual levels of maize harvest in 2008 were lower than the predicted levels so less maize 
sales were occurring all round in the 2008 harvesting season than was expected at the 
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start of the fieldwork. Figure 3.3 below shows where the case-study districts and 
villages are located on a map of Malawi. 
 
3.4 Participatory Wealth Ranking 
As already mentioned, participatory wealth ranking was used in the fieldwork as a 
means of stratifying the farmer sample in the follow-the-bag methodology. However, 
this technique has more powerful purposes in field research in poor countries than this 
rather mechanical objective (Grandin, 1988). It can be utilised to obtain a broad 
understanding, not only of social and economic difference at a particular instant in time, 
but also in terms of changes in wealth status that have been occurring over time. In 
general participatory wealth ranking can be used: 
(a) to distinguish households or families in a community by their relative poverty or 
wealth, according to criteria widely held in the community itself; 
(b) to gain information on the asset and activity patterns that distinguish different 
poverty-wealth groups; 
(c) to learn more about disadvantaged groups and social exclusion; 
(d) to find out about movements between poverty-wealth groups: how prevalent is such 
movement, are people moving up, down, or in both directions; 
(e) to discover the reasons that some people are able to move upwards and others move 
downwards. 
 
Wealth ranking typically comprises a sequence of steps (Grandin, 1988; Ellis and 
Woldehanna, 2005) which were followed in the implementation of the method in the 
case-study communities: 
 
1. Four or five key informants were selected, on the basis of their being identified as 
long-standing community members. If a chosen informant was reluctant to 
participate in the exercise, they were replaced by another person. It was sought to 
achieve gender, age and other balances amongst the informants (men and women, 
young and old, educated and non-educated, etc). 
 
2. The nature of the research was explained to the key informants, and the value of 
identifying and knowing about the different problems of rich and poor families 
through the wealth ranking exercise. 
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Figure 3.3: Map of Malawi Showing Study Areas 
 
 
Source: MoAFS, Department of Land Resources Conservation (2008)  
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3. The informants discussed and reached agreement on: 
• the local concepts and language for describing poverty and wealth (or well-
being), 
• the initial identification of different wealth groups (the number of such groups, 
and the criteria that distinguish one group from another), 
• the working definition of a household including female-headed households, 
single person households and homeless families. 
 
4. A list was compiled of all the households in the community with the help of key 
informants and village headmen in each study village. 
 
5. Households were ranked, as follows: each household’s name was written on a small 
card and the cards were shuffled. One member of the key informant group called 
out the name of the household on the card and passed the card to the rest of the 
group to add to the pile representing one or other of the wealth groups identified in 
step 3. 
 
6. The assignment of each card was followed by the question: ‘Why is this household 
in this group and not in another?’ As the reasons unfolded, they were added to the 
list of wealth and well-being characteristics attributed to the different groups and 
listed down the left-hand column of the table in which field notes of the exercise 
were being entered. 
 
7. The ranking was then verified as follows: when all cards had been assigned, the 
names in each group were read out to the key informants to verify that each 
household was in the right group. When disagreement was voiced; through 
discussion, the household either stayed in the same group or moved to another 
group as required. 
 
8. A random selection of 30 households was carried out by putting the cards for the 
households belonging to each wealth ranked group into a separate bag and 
randomly selecting from the bag the number of households (out of 30) that 
represented the proportion of that group in the community as a whole. 
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9. After household selection, the facilitator asked the key informants, for each selected 
household, whether that household ha moved between groups, or stayed in the same 
group, over the last five years. “Upward” and “downward” movements and the 
reasons for such movements were recorded against the list of selected sample 
households. 
 
It should be noted that wealth ranking is a relative exercise that yields knowledge about 
socio-economic differences at the level of each community within which fieldwork is 
conducted, but does not necessarily yield comparability across communities, especially 
when they are in different parts of the country. One obvious difficulty is that different 
numbers of wealth groups may be chosen in different research sites (typically within the 
range of 3 to 6 wealth groups). Another is that the boundaries between groups that 
determine the assignments of households into specific groups can differ, with quite 
small differences in interpretation e.g. the number of goats that signifies being rich 
compared to being middle, potentially making significant differences in the proportion 
of households assigned to different groups. Having said this, it is nevertheless true that 
patterns of commonality are frequently observed in wealth ranking, especially with 
respect to what constitutes being ‘poor’ as contrasted with what constitutes being ‘rich’. 
 
3.5 The Case Study Villages 
 
Mission Village 
Mission village is located in the Southern Region of Malawi in Mulanje district, and is 
part of the Ngara section of the Milonde EPA. The district has nine agro-ecological 
zones as follows: Chilwa Bottomlands, Phalombe Plain Uplands, Thuchila Plain, 
Nswadzi Valley, Lower Ruo Valley, Luchenza Plain, South Mulanje Plain, Mount (Mt) 
Mulanje Foot slopes and Mt Mulanje (Paris, 1991a). Milonde EPA is in South Mulanje 
Plain, which has highly acidic clay soils, which are very deep, well drained, strongly 
weathered and highly leached. It receives 1200 to over 2000 mm rainfall per year and 
for this reason is suitable for Arabica coffee, moderately suitable for tea and maize, and 
marginally suitable for a number of other crops. However, Mission village is not a tea or 
coffee growing village; it is distinguished agriculturally by the predominance of maize, 
with groundnuts and cassava making important contributions to total agricultural output. 
Of the three research villages, Mission village is the most densely populated, with a 
district population density of 254 people per sq km (Government of Malawi, 2008b). An 
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important consideration for research into maize marketing and price seasonality is the 
proximity of the village to the border between Malawi and Mozambique, since maize 
flows relatively freely across this border and maize movements from Mozambique into 
Malawi are especially prevalent early in the harvest season (since maize in the adjacent 
areas of Mozambique tends to mature earlier than in Malawi). The main language in 
Mission village is Chichewa. The village is the most food-insecure and has the lowest 
livelihood indicators of the three research villages. Figure 3.4 shows the geographical 
layout of Mission village. The administrative boundaries of the village enclose a total 
land area of 165.6 ha. The topography is undulating, bisected by streams arising from 
Mt Mulanje, the 3002m massif that lies to the north-west of the village (Paris, 1991a). 
The village is fairly spread out, with homesteads scattered along a gravel road that runs 
north to south. The location of the sample households is shown on the map. In terms of 
institutions and services, the village has one topia church, one small shop and a 
borehole. 
 
Figure 3.4: Map of Mission Village 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork in Mission Village conducted by the Author May-August 2008 
 
The participatory wealth ranking in Mission village was conducted on all of the 205 
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this instance, the key informants identified four distinct wealth groups. The criteria for 
distinguishing one group from another comprising housing quality, degree of food 
security (defined as the number of months a family could feed itself from its own 
supplies), livestock owned, land owned, whether labour was hired in or hired out by the 
household, other assets owned and the nature of non-farm enterprises engaged in by 
family members. The results of the exercise are summarised in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Characteristics of Wealth Groups in Mission Village 
 
Ranking 




(17. 6 % ) 
50 HHs 







walls, iron or 
thatch roof 
unburnt bricks, well 







food secure 7 to 
8 months of the 
year  
food secure 7 
months of the year 
food secure 3 
months of the 
year  
food deficit 12 
months  
Livestock 





5 to 8 goats, 10 to 
15 chickens, 8 to 15 
ducks, 4 turkeys, 4 
guinea fowl 






Labour market hire labour seasonally 
hire labour 
seasonally, but also 
sells labour 
rely on seasonal 
ganyu 
rely entirely on 
ganyu  
Land owned 
average 0.6 ha, 
may rent some 
land out 





metal plates, radio, 
wooden bed sleep on mats sleep on rags  
Business grocery shop, trader 
trading sugar cane, 
sweet potato, local 
beer 
no business no business 
 
Source: Fieldwork in Mission village conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
Households selected for the sample were asked whether their livelihood circumstances 
had improved, stayed the same or deteriorated over the past five years. A small majority 
of households (17 out of the 30 in the sample) said that they had stayed the same or 
improved due to improvements in the outcome of their farming activities, while the 
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other 13 households had for one reason or another experienced deteriorating 
circumstances. The main reasons given for the latter were sickness and old age, with 
being widowed while looking after small children also a factor mentioned. 
 
Chinteka Village 
Chinteka village is located in the Central Region of Malawi in Mchinji district. It is part 
of the Chinteka section of the Chiosya EPA. Mchinji district has a moderate population 
density of 136 people per sq km (Government of Malawi, 2008b). The district is 
distinguished chiefly by its five agro-ecological zones, namely the South and West 
Kasungu Plain, Upper Bua Plain, Kochilira-Kazyozyo Plain, Mchinji Hills and Mchinji 
Foothills. The district is bordered by Kasungu district to the north, Lilongwe district to 
the east and Zambia to the west. Chiosya EPA is on the Kochilira-Kazyozyo Plain and 
occupies 45,450 ha (Paris, 1991b). It has gentle slopes, slight erosion and fluvial and 
colluvial soil deposits which are mainly deep, well drained, brown and coarse textured 
with very low chemical fertility. Chinteka village grows tobacco and groundnuts. The 
area is also moderately suitable for maize and marginally suitable for cassava. An 
important consideration for research into maize marketing is that for marketed crops, 
maize takes second place to tobacco in this village. The main language in Chinteka 
village is Chichewa. The village is fairly food-secure and has better livelihood 
indicators than Mission. Figure 3.5 shows the geographical layout of Chinteka village. 
 
The administrative boundaries of the village enclose a total land area of 65.2 ha, of 
which an estimated 13.2 ha is wetland and 52.0 ha is arable land suitable for crop 
cultivation. The village is fairly spread out, with homesteads scattered throughout the 
entire village and a large wetland area that is used for winter cropping. The location of 
the sample households is shown on the map. In terms of institutions and services, the 
village has a borehole for its water supply, an agricultural office that houses the Chiosya 
EPA, a primary school, a community day secondary school, a trading centre with 
several small shops, a large private sector, agricultural produce buyers and several 
small-scale produce traders. The participatory wealth ranking in Chinteka was 
conducted on all of the 110 households in the village identified by the key informants 
and village leaders. In this village, the key informants identified five distinct wealth 
groups by their own criteria for distinguishing one group from another (Table 3.3). 
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Again in Chinteka village sample households were asked whether their circumstances 
had improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated over the preceding five years. Just under 
half the sample stated that their livelihoods had stayed the same or improved, citing 
improved returns to farming, especially for tobacco, groundnuts, tomatoes and meat. 
Interestingly, maize was not mentioned amongst these reasons, despite the presence of 
fertilizer subsidies under the AISP. Over half the sample (17 households) considered 
that their livelihoods had deteriorated, citing lack of credit, alcohol abuse, family 
breakdown, old age and sickness as the chief causes for this. 
 
Figure 3.5: Map of Chinteka Village 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork in Chinteka Village conducted by the Author May-August 2008 
 
 
Jenda Village  
Jenda village is located in the Northern Region of Malawi, in Mzimba district and is 
part of the Jenda section of the Champhira EPA. The district has a population density of 
70 people per sq km (Government of Malawi, 2008b). Mzimba district is characterised 
by undulating to rolling relief plains. The district relies on subsistence farming of maize, 
vegetables and beans for cash and food and rearing cattle and growing tobacco for cash. 
The district has four ecological zones based on different soil groups: Euthini-
Embangweni plains, Emcisweni plain, Upper South Rukuru plain and Mzimba hills. 
Champhira EPA is in Euthini Embangweni plains. The plains are gently undulating or 
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nearly flat with smooth topography, which is often interrupted by SE-NW trending-
elongated dambos or streams; and gneisses of the basement complex and old alluvial 
deposits underlie the plains. It has very deep, well-drained, medium- to fine-textured 
soils in the southern and north-western parts of the plain and very deep, well-drained, 
coarse and medium- textured brown soils in the northern part of the plains and along the 
dambos. It receives 700-900 mm of rainfall annually. The dominant land use and 
vegetation is seasonally wet grassland in upland drainage systems, with dambo 
landform and flat to almost flat topography with no cases of erosion. Champhira EPA 
has a total area of 88,300 ha of which 21 per cent is forest reserve (Paris, 1991c). 
 
Table.3.3: Characteristics of Wealth Groups in Chinteka Village 
 
Ranking 
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Source: Fieldwork in Chinteka Village conducted by the author May-August 2008 
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Figure 3.6 shows the geographical layout of Jenda village. The administrative 
boundaries of the village enclose a total land area of 590.4 ha. The topography is fairly 
flat plain with some sloppy areas. The soils are not suitable for the growing of many 
crops because of high erosion in the area, apart from some undulating areas that are 
highly suitable for Irish potatoes and moderately suitable for citrus, groundnuts, maize, 
beans, sunflower, tobacco and wheat. The village is along the M1 road. The households  
 
Figure 3.6: Map of Jenda Village 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork in Jenda Village conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
are fairly spread out throughout the entire village. The location of the sample 
households is shown on the map. In terms of institutions and services, the village has a 
borehole for water supply, a primary school, a community day secondary school, a rural 
health centre or clinic, a trading centre with several small shops including one chain 
store (the People’s Trading Centre), large private sector agricultural produce buyers, 
several small-scale produce traders, electricity, a filling station selling paraffin, petrol 
and diesel, a rural police unit and, a tarmac road and a good transport network with 
well-established bus companies connecting Jenda to Lilongwe and Mzuzu and the 
Tanzanian border which operate from Jenda and from Karonga/Mzuzu and Lilongwe, 
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The participatory wealth ranking in Jenda village was conducted on the total number of 
68 households living in the village as identified by the key informants and village 
leaders. In this instance, the key informants identified four distinct wealth groups (Table 
3.4). In Jenda village only 11 out of the 30 sample households considered that their 
circumstances had remained the same or improved in recent years, despite this being the 
wealthiest of the three villages overall. Reasons for keeping in the same position or 
 
Table 3.4: Characteristics of Wealth Groups in Jenda Village 
 
Ranking 











food secure all 
year  round  
food secure 8 to 
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food secure 2 to 7 
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year 
food secure 0 to 1 




burnt brick walls, 
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burnt bricks, iron 
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4 to 6 goats, 12 to 
15 pigs  
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year round  
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selling local beer 
 
Source: Fieldwork in Jenda Village conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
improving were almost all agriculture related and tomatoes, onions, beans, maize and 
cattle were cited as contributing to stable or improving livelihoods. Households who felt 
that their livelihoods had deteriorated cited old age, lack of capital, alcohol abuse, and 
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(interestingly) the sale of fertilizer obtained under the AISP as the reasons for their 
diminishing livelihood positions. 
 
Comparison Across Villages 
The wealth ranking provides useful insights into similarities and differences between 
the study sites that are pertinent for the interpretation of findings about agricultural 
marketing that are provided in Chapter 5 of the thesis. It is notable that relatively few 
families across all three villages are food secure in maize alone (although this is, of 
course, rather a limited view of food security). In Mission village not even the highest 
wealth group are considered by their peers to be fully food secure, while in Chinteka 
and Jenda villages the top wealth group is defined in part by its achievement of food 
security through maize but corresponds to only 8 and 32 per cent of households in each 
of those villages respectively. All remaining households, in all villages, only produce 
enough maize to last up to 8-10 months of the year, and otherwise depend on other 
strategies, principally ganyu work for cash or kind. Given that sample households were 
drawn proportionally from wealth groups, this also shows why surplus producing 
farmers who sold maize turned out to be rather a small proportion of the overall sample 
across the three villages. 
 
Aside from the food security issue, the villages follow a clear ordering in relative 
overall wealth, with Mission clearly being a poorer community than Chinteka, and the 
latter being poorer than Jenda. Many of the features of Jenda that emerge from the 
wealth ranking and are also pertinent in Chapter 5 arise from its position on the main 
north-south road running through northern Malawi, thus giving rise to a lot more non-
farm activities, and much easier access to transport and communications than the other 
two villages. In other respects, relative poverty and wealth is displayed strongly, as 
expected, through asset levels, including livestock types and numbers, land owned, 
household assets like bicycles and radios, and housing quality. On all these counts, 
wealthier households in Jenda appear to be considerably better off than their equivalents 
in the other two villages. 
 
Regarding positive or negative changes in livelihoods, it is interesting that households 
across the villages who considered that their circumstances were stable or improving 
tended to mainly cite agricultural success as the reason for this. On the other hand, 
households who felt under pressure, or deteriorating circumstances, commonly cited old 
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age, family troubles, and ill health as the principle reasons. Of particular note was the 
extent to which excessive alcohol consumption was mentioned as a reason for the 
impoverishment of households. 
 
3.6 Malawi Government Data Collection Methods 
This thesis draws heavily on official Malawi government data on various important 
variables related to maize and other crop markets. The chief such variables or data sets 
are retail prices for food commodities (especially maize), maize output estimates, and 
the national food balance sheet which brings together the demand and supply for staple 
foods. It is just as well for the methods involved in the collection or estimation of these 
data are well understood, since the methods themselves may have important bearing on 
the confidence with which the researcher can treat government data and the analytical 
results that follow from such data. In the following sections, a brief summary is given of 
the background and methods involved in government data collection of prices, 
production and the national food balance sheet. 
 
3.6.1 Crop Retail Price Collection  
In view of the central focus of this thesis on price instability, it seems appropriate here 
to provide an outline account of the collection of commodity prices by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) in Malawi, including known weaknesses in the 
long-term commodity price series. The current agricultural price data system in Malawi 
dates from 1988 when the government embarked on market liberalisation policies in the 
agricultural sector. At that time the Pricing and Marketing section of the Planning 
Department in MoAFS and the Inter-Ministerial Price Advisory Committee that used to 
set agricultural prices changed their role from setting minimum and maximum pan-
territorial and pan-seasonal agricultural prices to one of monitoring the implementation 
of market liberalisation. Price collection instead of price setting then became the major 
preoccupation of the Price and Marketing unit. Through the Agro-Economic Survey, 
MoAFS currently collects retail prices, farm gate prices, horticultural produce and 
livestock prices from 80 markets scattered across the country on a weekly basis and 
produces monthly average prices. This information is disseminated on a weekly basis 
via email to various institutions, and via SMS in partnership with the Initiative for 
Development and Equity in African Agriculture (IDEAA) and Malawi Agriculture 
Commodity Exchange (MACE). 
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The data collection that started in 1988 was funded by the World Bank as part of an 
Agriculture Marketing and Estate Development project. Price information was initially 
collected in 32 selected markets. This project ran up to 1995. The information was 
disseminated through the radio and newspapers once a week. When the project was 
phased out, the Ministry was unable to sustain the cost of dissemination, but continued 
to collect the prices. Since then, price collection has come under the umbrella of the 
Agro Economic Survey, and funding has been forthcoming from a variety of donors for 
different purposes, but not always very consistently. 
 
In 2005, some problems regarding MoAFS retail price collection were noticed. The first 
problem was the observation of unusual variations in prices between markets, and for 
the same markets at different time intervals, which did not ‘fit’ expected spatial and 
temporal patterns. A second problem was missing data. Investigation revealed that the 
main cause of the first problem was variations in units of measurement, since buyers 
and sellers in markets use a wide variety of measures in transaction (heaps, plates, kilos, 
buckets, sacks). The second problem was attributed to the fact that particular 
commodities were not always available in all markets, hence price data could not 
always be collected for them (IDEAA Malawi, 2005). In view of especially of the first 
of these challenges, MoAFS and IDEAA worked on improving the price collection 
methodology, with funding from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). In addition, the USAID project funded the provision of mobile 
phones to MoAFS enumerators, so that prices could be transmitted directly by SMS into 
the IDEAA SMS platform, with simultaneous phone transmission to the Agro 
Economic Survey. 
 
What follows next is a description23 of the actual methodology for collection of the 
retail price data in the field. The retail price survey captures retail prices of food crops 
such as maize, rice, cassava, sorghum, millet, groundnuts, beans, peas, and meat and 
meat products e.g. pork, goat meat and beef. The survey originally covered 32 markets, 
then it expanded to 38 markets and as of 2009 it covered 80 markets across Malawi of 
which 72 markets are used in the calculation of monthly average prices. A retail price 
                                                 
23  The description provided here was the price collection procedure in effect until December 




questionnaire is the tool used to collect the prices (Government of Malawi, 2003). It has 
the following sections (see Table 3.5): 
 
• Identification Panel: This captures the source of data that include ADD name, 
market name, whether it is district or a town market, enumerator name and the date on 
which the data is collected. 
• Checker Panel: The supervisor who is based at the Agro – Economic surveys office 
checks the price data collected by the field staff. 
• Column 1 Produce: This column lists all the commodities on which data for retail 
prices must be collected e.g. maize, rice, cassava, millet, groundnuts, beans, peas, goat 
meat, pork and beef. 
• Column 2 Trial: The prices are collected three times a day at each market once in the 
morning, at noon and in the afternoon at the following times: 8-9 am, 11-12pm and 3-4 
pm. 
• Column 3 Measuring Unit: The enumerator records the price of the commodity 
charged per local unit of measure as provided by the seller. He then uses the standard 
unit of measure in this case 10-litre bucket to standardise the weight by counting the 
number of local units of measure that fill the 10-litre bucket in order to calculate a 
standardised weight of the commodity for the local unit of measure. 
• Column 4 Weight: The actual weight of the commodity that fills the 20-litre bucket in 
kgs or grams is recorded. 
• Column 5 Prices: This column requires the enumerator to record the prices of the 
commodity according to the weight in column 4. The enumerator then uses the price of 
the commodity in a standardised unit of measure (10-litre bucket) and the weight of the 
same commodity to calculate the price per kg or gram, and calculates the weight of the 
commodity in a local unit of measure. The enumerator does not need to standardise the 
units every week because now when prices change on the market when the local unit of 
measure remains constant, the enumerator just calculates the new price per kg. The 
enumerator will have to do standardisation again when the local unit of measure has 
changed. Accuracy in reporting the price and weight of the sample is extremely crucial 
for this exercise. Hence, enumerators are required to ensure this data is reported 
accurately. 
• Column 6 Number of Sellers: The enumerator records the number of traders selling a 
particular item at the market in column 1. 
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Table 3.5: MoAFS Retail Market Survey Form 
 
IDENTIFICATION              Checked   
ADD          By  
MARKET          Supervisor  
DISTRICT          Office  
ENUMERATOR          Date  
















Local3 Price4 No.5 Kg6 K T7     
 Maize 8 - 9 AM                     
 11 – 12                     
  3 - 4 PM                     
  Average                     
 Rice 8 - 9 AM                     
  11 – 12                     
  3 - 4 PM                     
  Average                     
 Cassava 8 - 9 AM                     
 11 – 12           
  3-4 PM                     
 Average           
Groundnuts 8 - 9 AM           
 11 – 12           
 3-4 PM           
 Average           
Beans 8 - 9 AM           
 11 – 12           
 3-4 PM           
 Average           
Millet 8 - 9 AM           
 11 – 12           
 3-4 PM           
 
Source: (Government of Malawi, 2003) 
1 Commodity Name: Commodity being measured. 
2 Trial: Different times during which the commodity is measured 
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3 Measuring Unit Local: The unit of measure used by sellers or buyers in the market e.g. plate, heap, 
bundles etc. 
4 Measuring Unit Price: The price per local measuring unit. 
5 Measuring Unit Number: The number of times it takes the local measuring unit to fill the standard 
measure (10 litre bucket) 
6 Weight in Kg: The weight of the commodity which fills a standard measure (10 litre bucket) 
7 Price/Kg: The price per kg of the commodity (Local Measuring Unit-Price x Local Measuring Unit – 
Number)/Weight in kg e.g. Maize Grain cost MK10 per plate, 15 plates fill 10 litre bucket, total weight 
for 15 plates is 25 kg, therefore price per kg of maize grain = (MK10x15 plates)/25 kg = K6 
 
• Column 7 Type of Seller: The enumerator records the type of seller in terms of 
whether the seller is an intermediary or farmer. 
• Column 8 Source: The enumerator records the source of the commodity being sold at 
the market. The source could be across the border or any district within Malawi. The 
information helps in tracing the origin of the commodities being sold. 
• Column 9 Remarks: The enumerator records any relevant observations that could be 
on availability, quality and demand of the commodity in the market. 
 
3.6.2 Crop Estimates Methodology 
The current methodology for making crop production estimates in Malawi was 
originally designed in connection with an FAO Early Warning System project in the 
early 1990s. The methodology was tested in Blantyre, Salima, Kasungu and Mzuzu 
Agricultural Development Divisions (ADDs) and was deemed after these trials to be 
successful at providing reliable and timely crop area, output and yield estimates. It was 
therefore adopted for national use in the crop year 1992/93. Since then the technical 
manual describing the procedure has been revised several times, the latest version being 
the 2007 Field Crops Production Estimation Methodology Manual (Government of 
Malawi, 2007b). The overseeing body for the estimation process within the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Security is the National Agricultural Production Estimates 
Committee (NAPEC), which meets at least three times each year. The collection process 
has been supported over the years by several aid donors, including USAID, FAO, the 
EU and the World Bank. 
 
Excluding an extra stage for so-called ‘winter crops’, the crop estimate method involves 
three rounds of data collection conducted in November, March and May each year 
(Government of Malawi, 2005b). The first round collects data on land preparation, and 
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stated plans by farmers for the planting season just started. The second round confirms 
actual area planted, inspects the condition of the established crop and estimates the yield 
and production. The third round confirms yields by weighing the harvest. 
 
The methodology involves dividing field crops into major and minor crops. Major crops 
are defined as those crops occupying more than 5 per cent of cultivated area, while 
minor crops are those that occupy less than 5 per cent of cultivated area. This 
differentiation is disaggregated to ADD, district, section and block level so that the 
varying relative importance of different crops is picked up at the smallest area unit of 
agricultural sector administration. Before the commencement of the survey, separate 
lists of major and minor crops are prepared at each of these sub-levels. The procedural 
difference between minor and major crops lies in the sampling frame for the survey. For 
the major crops, the sampling frame involves selecting 25 per cent of blocks growing 
major crops. This is followed by selection of 20 per cent of individual farm households 
from the selected blocks in an Extension Planning Area (EPA). This selection process 
gives rise to an overall sample selection of 5 per cent of farmers who grow major crops 
in a selected EPA. For minor crops, the selection involves 25 per cent of agricultural 
blocks growing minor crops and all households in the selected blocks growing the 
minor crops, resulting in 25 per cent of households growing minor crops in an EPA 
being sampled. 
 
The first round of this procedure involves listing and selection of agricultural blocks, 
listing of the households in each of the selected blocks, selection of the sample 
agricultural households, and area measurement of the crops grown by the sampled 
households in the selected blocks. The results obtained are used to determine the 
estimated area for each crop in the Extension Planning Area (EPA), the District, and the 
ADD. Also during this round, initial estimates are made of crop yield relative to the 
previous season. The area and provisional yield estimates are combined to make a first 
forecast of production by crop. The results are presented to the first Agricultural 
Production Forecast meeting held by NAPEC towards the end of January or early 
February each year. 
 
The second round of the procedure involves the verification of, and adjustments to, the 
area measurement of crops grown by the sampled agricultural households, and results 
obtained are used to determine adjusted EPA, District and ADD crop cultivation areas. 
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New survey estimates of yield and production are also prepared at this stage for both 
summer and winter crops. The updated survey results are presented at the Second 
Agricultural Production Forecast meeting held each year by NAPEC usually towards 
end March or early April each year. 
 
The third round of the survey is undertaken at harvesting time during May or early June. 
The main activity during this round is weighing the harvest obtained by sample farmers 
in order to obtain the actual yield that was achieved. The results are used to provide 
revised production figures at EPA, District and ADD levels, and they are presented at 
the third Agricultural Production Forecast meeting held by NAPEC by mid-June every 
year. An additional, fourth, round of the survey is undertaken to weigh winter crops and 
late maturing summer crops. This is usually done in August and the results are 
presented to NAPEC in mid-September each year. The procedure just described covers 
the smallholder or customary sector only. Production estimates from agricultural estates 
are collected separately, from the estates themselves, and do not involve the same 
elaborate sample selection methodology. 
 
The undertaking of the production estimates survey involves a considerable number of 
Ministry of Agriculture field staff in every phase. The Evaluation Officer in each ADD 
is responsible for providing randomly selected blocks to Agricultural Extension 
Development Coordinators (AEDCs), and these blocks are supposed to change each 
year in order to avoid repetition of selecting same blocks. A calendar of survey 
activities for each round is given to the field staff involved. In addition, a set of Forms 
and Tabulation Sheets prepared to facilitate the collection of data are also given, 
including who is responsible for completing the forms, as set out in Table 3.6 below. 
 
Agricultural Extension Development Officer (AEDOs), AEDCs and DADOs submit 
completed and signed survey forms and tabulation sheets to their Supervisors according 
to the Survey Calendar that starts in September each year and ends in May the following 
year. DADOs are expected to ensure that AEDCs and AEDOs have sufficient copies of 
the relevant Forms and Tabulation Sheets to enable them carry out the survey in their 
selected blocks. This brief description of the methodology demonstrates that AEDOs 
are the key staff in the production of crop estimates figures. The Monitoring and 
Evaluation officer at the ADD level is the initiator of the crop estimates survey by 
providing the list of sampled blocks each year to the AEDC who in turn passes those to 
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the AEDOs to start the crop estimates work at the block level. However though the 
AEDO plays such an important role in crop estimates about 40 per cent of the vacancies 
are not filled (Government of Malawi, 2007a). 
 
While every effort seems to have been made in the design of this methodology to 
produce as accurate crop production estimates as possible, it is legitimate to consider at 
what levels biases in estimates might creep in, since, as noted earlier, disquiet has been 
expressed by various observers concerning production estimates in the 2007-09 period 
(e.g. Jayne and Tschirley, 2009). Evidently, inaccuracies may occur if there are 
insufficient trained field staffs, or a shortage of the relevant survey materials, at the 
 





Form or Table Crop Forecast/Estimates





Form   B* Yes No No 
Form   1 Yes Yes No 
Form   2 Yes No No 
Form   3 No Yes No 
Form   4 No No Yes 






Form  A Yes No No 
Tabulation Sheet  2 Yes Yes Yes 





Tabulation Sheet   4 Yes Yes Yes 
Yes = to be completed 
No = Not to be used 
* The AEDC works with form B once the AEDO has completed the listing of 
households 
Source: (Government of Malawi, 2007b) 
 
block, section and EPA levels. However, this does not mean that such inaccuracies 
would necessarily be biased in any particular direction. More dangerous (from an 
accuracy point of view) is if the process becomes overtly politicised with a general 
sentiment permeating from the top downwards that higher rather than lower estimates 
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are preferable, wherever judgements (rather than measurements) are being exercised. 
Thus first round area and yield data (which depend in part on comparisons with the 
previous year) could be biased upwards at this point, and a tendency to select higher 
productivity rather than lower productivity blocks could creep in rather than strictly 
following the random selection procedure. While this type of bias should be overturned 
when harvests come in and the output of sample farmers is weighed, nevertheless if first 
and second round surveys have provided a national figure that has gained currency in 
public discussion there may be a rather overwhelming impetus for the figure not to be 
contradicted too much when the third round estimate is published. These thoughts are 
conjectural, and this researcher is not aware of any work that has set out to examine the 
constituent elements of recent production figures in detail. 
 
3.6.3 Food Balance Sheet 
The Malawi food balance sheet published annually provides data on energy foods 
available for consumption, and estimates the overall food shortage or surplus for each 
year in kilocalories. On the availability side of the balance are the estimated total 
quantities of energy foods produced, plus imports and releases from stocks, minus 
purchases into stock, exports, and deductions to livestock feed, seed, industrial and non-
food use, and wastage. The food balance sheet represents the food available for 
consumption, or food per capita availability in terms of nutrient value (FAO, 2001; 
Government of Malawi, 2005b). On the consumption side, the balance sheet states 
energy food needs calculated from standardised per capita needs and changing 
demographic data. Ideally, all of Malawi’s six food groups (staples, animal products, 
legumes, vegetables, fruits, fats and oils) should be included in the food balance sheet 
calculation, but data limitations confine it to calculation of the gap in energy foods only 
(Government of Malawi, 2005b). Energy foods refer to staple foods and include cereals 
(maize, sorghum, rice, wheat) and root and tuber crops (sweet and Irish potatoes, and 
cassava), and these are all converted to maize equivalent. Below is a description of how 
the food balance sheet is compiled in chronological order: 
 
A. Calculates net food production by subtracting post harvest losses from gross 
production. 
B. Calculates official opening stock by adding the following stocks: on farm, 
Strategic Grain Reserves (SGR) physical stocks in silos, ADMARC, and World 
Food Program (WFP) humanitarian stocks. 
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C. Calculates domestic availability by adding food production and official opening 
stock (A+B) above. 
D. Calculates Kilocalories per kg to be derived from C. 
E. Calculates domestic requirements by adding food use, seed requirements, and 
SGR replenishment. 
F. Calculates domestic food balance by subtracting domestic requirement from 
domestic availability (C-E). 
G. Makes provision for cross substitution with other foods. 
H. Calculates shortfall/surplus for the year by adding domestic food balance and 
cross substitution (F+G). 
I. Determines total imports to meet the shortfall if any and these imports are 
broken down into commercial imports (official and informal), food aid in the 
form of confirmed pledges and those received already. 
J. Calculates committed exports broken down into actual exports (formal and 
informal) not yet exported. 
K. Calculates actual net imports by subtracting total imports from committed 
exports. 
L. Calculates actual food gap by subtracting net imports from shortfall (H-K). 
 
The food balance sheet therefore measures the domestic shortfall or surplus from own 
production, and the import requirement in case of a gap, or the potential to export in the 
event of a surplus. The data used for own food production comes from the annual crop 
estimates discussed in the previous sub-section. The NAPEC, which discusses and 
approves crop estimates also discusses and approves the Food Balance Sheet figures. 
An example food balance sheet model calculation is presented in Table 3.7. The 
example is based on the Malawi Food Balance Sheet as at 31 March 2005. The food 
balance sheet for Malawi is routinely submitted to the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) Regional Early Warning System for food security. 
 
In the event of a looming food crisis, a Joint Assessment Mission composed of the FAO, 
World Food Program (WFP) and the Government of Malawi is formed. The mission 
generates additional information that is used to compare with the crop estimates 
produced by the government through the normal crop estimates procedure described in 
section 3.6.2 above. When the food balance sheet compiled by government differs from  
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Table 3.7: Malawi Food Balance Sheet, as at 31st March 2005 
(all data in '000 tons) 
 
Item Maize Rice Sorghum /Millet Cassava 
Maize 
Equiv. 
A. NET PRODUCTION (A1-A2) 1,473.2  30.8  52.4  691.0  2,192.0  
A1. Gross production 1,733.1  49.7  58.3  767.8  2,546.7  
A2. Post-harvest losses 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
B. OFFICIAL OPENING STOCKS 
(B1+B2+B3+B4) 29.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  29.1  
B1. On-farm stocks 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
B2. SGR (physical stocks in silos) 7.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.0  
B3. ADMARC 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
B4. WFP (humanitarian aid) 22.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  22.1  
C. DOMESTIC AVAILABILITY (A+B) 1,502.3  30.8  52.4  691.0  2,221.1  
D. KILOCALORIES/KG 3.5  3.3  3.4  3.2  0.0  
E. GROSS DOMESTIC 
REQUIREMENTS (E1+E2+E3) 2,030.1  97.2  53.9  313.6  2,466.6  
E1. Food Use 1,930.9  93.4  53.4  313.6  2,363.2  
E2. Seed Requirement 39.2  3.8  0.5  0.0  43.4  
E3. SGR Replenishment 60.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  60.0  
F. DOMESTIC FOOD BALANCE (C-E) -527.8  -66.4  -1.4  377.4  -245.5  
G. CROSS SUBSTITUTION 282.3  -64.1  -1.4  347.8  0.0  
H. SHORTFALL/SURPLUS (F+G) -245.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  -245.5  
I. TOTAL IMPORTS 120.2  2.6  0.5  1.6  124.6  
I1. Commercial Imports 111.8  2.5  0.3  1.6  116.0  
I1-1. Imports Received: Official 35.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  35.6  
I1-2. Imports Received: Informal 76.2  2.5  0.3  1.6  80.4  
I2. Food Aid (Confirmed Pledges) 8.4  0.0  0.2  0.0  8.6  
I2-1. Prog/Emergency Food Aid 
Received (31/03/05) 8.4  0.0  0.2  0.0  8.6  
L. COMMITTED EXPORTS (as of 
1/04/04) (L1+L2+L3) 0.7  0.7  0.0  0.0  1.4  
L1. Actual Exports 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
L2. Not Yet Exported 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
L3. Actual Exports(Informal) 
(31/03/05) 0.7  0.7  0.0  0.0  1.4  
M. ACTUAL NET IMPORTS (I-L) 119.5  1.9  0.5  1.6  123.2  
N. PROJECTED NET IMPORTS 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
O. TOTAL FOOD GAP (MAIZE) (Mar 
05) -245.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  -245.5  
P. ACTUAL FOOD GAP (31/03/05) -126.0  1.9  0.5  1.6  -122.3  
 
Source: (Government of Malawi, 2005b) 
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the FAO/WFP, the latter’s figures tend to be used. The FAO is the institution that has 
been assisting Malawi with food balance sheet calculation expertise for years. 
 
Any food balance sheet, and Malawi’s is no exception to this rule, is a provisional 
statement based on the accuracy of its constituent underlying components. On the 
production side, certain caveats regarding the potential for inaccuracy to arise in 
production estimates have already been mentioned in the preceding section. Estimates 
of the share of output that is used in food industries depend on a national food survey 
that is undertaken rather intermittently, depending on donor funding. Estimates of 
informal imports that occur through unregulated border trade are rough and ready in any 
year (by definition these imports are not accurately measured by customs control 
procedures), and estimated variations that occur from year to year may differ 
considerably from the true volumes of cross-border trade that occur. On the 
consumption side, figures for the population and demographic structure are revised at 
the decennial population census, but the accuracy of even this exercise is sometimes 
disputed depending on the conduct and resourcing of the census itself. Intercensal 
population data is projected, and may after seven or eight years from the previous 
census become increasingly unrepresentative of underlying trends. Also on the 
consumption side, changes in relative prices affect consumption between different foods, 
and this is so the bigger the changes in relative prices that occur. The food balance sheet 
is not an econometric model of food demand, and therefore does not incorporate 
substitutions in consumption that may occur with changing prices. 
 
3.7 Additional Methodological Aspects of the Research 
It was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that an approach that combines 
quantitative fact finding with recognition that both the generation of ‘facts’ and their 
interpretation are located in historical, social and political contexts is called by some 
authors ‘analytic narrative’. Much of this thesis does not especially require an appeal to 
analytic narrative, in that findings are reported from methods and analytical techniques 
that are reasonably free standing on their own terms. However, Chapter 6 of the thesis, 
in particular, has a form and mode of argumentation that fits the methodological 
position described as analytic narrative, and for this reason a brief summary of this 
approach is provided here. In addition, Chapter 5 contains a section that explores spatial 
integration between markets for maize in Malawi using an econometric technique called 
cointegration, so this method is also briefly described here. Finally, this section of the 
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chapter describes instances of difficulties encountered in fieldwork, especially in the 
understanding of respondents regarding the purpose of the research, which need to be 
mentioned because they affect the quality of data obtained from the fieldwork 
component of the research. 
 
3.7.1 Analytic Narrative 
The approach to enquiry called analytic narrative is associated particularly with the 
political scientist Robert Bates who has already been mentioned in Chapter 2 in relation 
to the politics of staple food markets, and is well known in African studies for his early 
work on the political analysis of marketing boards (Bates, 1981a). Bates and others have 
sought to overcome the difficulty of deriving substantive findings from situations where 
politics and history result in different outcomes from the projections and estimations 
that might be deduced from the economic analysis of a policy problem, or sequence of 
events or trends (Bates et al., 1998; 2000). The approach is called narrative because it 
combines analytical tools that are commonly employed in economics and political 
science with the narrative form, which is more commonly employed in history. It 
therefore explores concrete, historical cases, and examines the choices made by 
government, and traces the sequences of actions, decisions, and responses that generate 
events and eventual outcomes. 
 
In this thesis, the analytic narrative approach is deployed in particular in Chapter 6 to 
examine recurrent food price crises in Malawi in the 2000s, and the interplay of politics 
and economics that resulted in specific outcomes with respect to those crises. When 
prices begin to rise, certain political responses begin to form, and these can be traced 
especially through press releases and media stories as the events unfold. Statements 
about causality are made (for example, that private traders are hoarding grain), decisions 
are taken in a certain sequence (for example, banning imports, setting maximum retail 
prices, building up or running down public stocks), these decisions are provided with a 
logic in the public domain and may cause debate between political parties vying to 
establish themselves as championing the cause of particular segments of the electorate. 
The sequence of events has a cumulative momentum that may result in extreme 
measures that have little to do with the underlying economic factors that policy is 
supposedly attempting to address. 
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Analytic narrative may be strongly informed by theory, or seek to verify a theoretical 
construct, or may be problem driven in the sense of being primarily motivated by a 
desire to account for particular events or outcomes. The analytical part of the term 
corresponds to a theoretical line of reasoning; for example, in the Malawi maize market 
case, certain deductions about markets and prices and trends can be made using 
microeconomic models of varying complexity, and these might reach conclusions for 
appropriate policy action that are distinct from the messy, contextual, politicised 
sequence of decision making that actually occurs. Nevertheless, these two (or more) 
dimensions interact with each other in the production of outcomes. The analytic 
narrative approach seeks to understand decision makers preferences,  their perceptions, 
evaluation of alternatives, the information they possess, the expectation they form, the 
strategies they adopt, and the constraints that limit their actions. If through the narrative, 
a representation of the problem is achieved that seems to do better at explaining 
outcomes than other methods, then the approach is justified; and, moreover, in some 
instances may lead to better theory as well as better explanation. 
 
3.7.2 Investigating Spatial Market Integration Using Cointegration 
As a way of strengthening the empirical analysis, it was decided to explore the spatial 
relationship between prices in different markets using time series econometrics. Spatial 
market integration occurs when markets work sufficiently well to move stocks from 
places in surplus (with low relative prices) to places in deficit (with high relative prices), 
until prices equalise taking transport costs into account. This process of trading across 
space to take advantage of price differentials is called spatial arbitrage. 
 
There are different methods, varying in statistical complexity, for examining spatial 
market integration (see Trotter, 1992 for a discussion). One common method that is 
very accessible is to examine correlations of time-series price statistics between pairs of 
markets, showing the extent to which prices in different markets seem to track each 
other. The simple correlation method has several weaknesses, including inability to 
demonstrate the direction of price changes, and the possibility of capturing spurious 
correlations if the prices are non-stationary series.24 If time series variables are non-
stationary simple regression may provide highly significant coefficients even though the 
relationship is spurious. If a linear combination of two non-stationary series provides a 
                                                 
24  Time-series data are non-stationary if the mean and variance of the data varies. Most 
economic time-series like GDP figures and prices are non-stationary since generally they 
increase stochastically with time. 
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stationary series, the two variables are said to be cointegrated. If so, the cointegrating 
equation between the two captures long-term equilibrium. 
 
While the cointegrating equation captures the long-term relationship, the short-term 
dynamic is captured by the error correction model. Even though the two variables (in 
our case, maize prices in different markets) may be in long term equilibrium, they may 
deviate from the equilibrium level in the short run which is captured by the error 
correction model (for details see Johansen, 1995; Stata Corp, 2009). 
 
Here the nature of the cointegration equations and error correction models empirically 
to be implemented in Chapter 5 (Section 5.3) is outlined. Let Pjt be the price of maize in 
market j at time period t. Then the cointegrating equation between the price in market j 
and k is: 
 
_ce = Pjt + βPkt                                                                                                                                                                       (1) 
 
Here, _ce is the error term in the cointegrating equation representing the deviation from 
long-term equilibrium and β is the cointegrating coefficient (vector) which represents by 
how much prices in market k change for a unit price change in market j in the long-run. 
If the market is in long-run equilibrium, then _ce = 0; otherwise, _ce ≠ 0 and an ‘error 
correction’ should be made to eliminate this short-term equilibrium. This is represented, 
as indicated above, by the error correction model which in this case will appear as 
follows (for simplicity these describe only one lag period and two price series): 
 
dPjt = α_ce + γLdPjt + δLdPkt                                                                       (2a) 
dPkt = π_ce + λLdPkt + θLdPjt                                                                                                                                 (2b) 
 
Where d and L are the difference and lag operators and α, γ, δ, π, λ and θ are parameters 
to be estimated. The above two error correction models estimate the price changes as 
functions of lagged own and other prices and deviation from long term equilibrium. If 
the two markets are out of long-term equilibrium _ce will be different from zero, and, 
correspondingly, α and π indicate how much the two prices will change to correct this. 
How much current price changes are affected by previous month’s price changes in the 
same market is captured by γ and λ. Similarly, how much current price changes are 
affected by previous month’s price changes of the other market is captured by the 
parameters δ and θ. 
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In Section 5.3 the cointegration equations and error correction models for markets that 
are found in the north, centre and south of Malawi are estimated by using monthly 
maize price data for 13 markets from 1989 to 2009. 
 
3.7.3 Challenges in the Fieldwork 
The researcher and her enumerators confronted three main challenges in conducting 
fieldwork on the Malawi maize market, all of them related in one way or another to 
government maize policies, and to the sensitivity that surrounded the varying and 
unpredictable stance of government towards private traders and the regulation of the 
maize market in 2008. The three challenges were confusion in communities between the 
research and input subsidies; sudden changes in the agricultural trading regulatory 
environment; and reluctance of larger scale private operators to discuss price formation 
in 2008 due to the sensitivity of the topic as a public policy issue at that time. 
 
The main exposure to government and administrators that farmers and villagers had 
encountered during the four years preceding the research was the Agricultural Ιnput 
Support Programme (AISP). In Mission village the community thought the team had 
arrived to register beneficiaries of the inputs program in readiness for the next season, 
and for that reason community members asked for their names to be put on the list, as 
also the names of their friends and neighbours who were not around. This may have 
distorted upwards the household population from which sample households were drawn 
in Mission village. In Chinteka village, some households had been left out of the 2007/8 
AISP but were selected to take part in the research, and this inadvertently caused bad 
feeling between interviewees and enumerators until the non-connection of these events 
was properly established. 
 
The timing of the fieldwork, May to August 2008, was a period that experienced much 
government interference in the maize market in the form of rapidly changing 
prohibitions and regulations (see Chapter 6). The first of these was the imposition of an 
import and export ban on maize in May 2008, just a week before the research 
commenced. The research started at Mission Village adjacent to an area well known for 
informal cross-border trade with Mozambique. Many traders thought the research team 
had come to enforce the import ban, and for this reason chose not to identify themselves 
to the team (and therefore could not be included in the follow-the-bag sequence, or in 
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other trader interviews). Similar difficulties were experienced at other sites as new 
government regulations, such as minimum buying prices, came into effect. In most 
cases, these difficulties got resolved through patience and persistence; however, they 
undoubtedly affected the overall willingness of traders to answer honestly to questions, 
given that severe penalties were promised by the government on anyone caught 
breaking the evolving new rules. 
 
Broadly, similar considerations affected interviews or attempted interviews with larger 
traders and processors, and with ADMARC. The rapidly changing regulations, and an 
atmosphere of distrust towards the private sector, meant that discussions with key 
informants tended to be guarded and lacking in explicit operational detail. This problem 
was doubtless not helped by the researcher’s own position as a senior official in an 
agricultural marketing related role,25  of which many prospective interviewees were 
aware. This did not prevent useful interviews from taking place, but it did inhibit the 
range and frankness of discussion. The extent of upheaval in this period was unusual 
even by Malawi standards of frequent changes in import, export and minimum buying 
price policies, and could not have been envisaged when the research was planned. It 
needed to be worked around in a lot of the key informant interviews conducted. 
 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter has set out the range of methodological considerations that were involved 
in structuring the research underlying this thesis, and that were also important in 
deriving findings, and interpreting those findings. The main methods comprise a 
toolbox of descriptive statistical techniques useful for analysing seasonal price 
behaviour in crop markets (deployed in Chapter 4) and qualitative and quantitative 
fieldwork methods used for data collection in Malawi villages (with results reported in 
Chapter 5). These methods are set loosely in a broader methodological approach 
sometimes referred to as ‘analytic narrative’ that seeks to combine quantitative data 
with knowledge of the historical, social and political context that both generates the data 
and lends force to particular interpretations of quantitative findings. Chapter 6 in 
particular relies on this approach since it brings together known ‘facts’ about the 
functioning of the Malawi maize market in the 2000s with an interpretation of how 
history and politics affected that functioning over time. Finally, the chapter also 
                                                 
25  The researcher works for the IDEAA and MACE projects which are co-financed by 
MOAFS. 
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identified and described other pertinent methods that are relevant to the research and 
analysis, and these include Malawi government methods for collecting data sets used in 
the thesis, and the econometric method of cointegration, which is used to examine 
spatial market integration in one of the sections of Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4 : Price Seasonality in Maize and Other Food Crops in Malawi 
 
4.1.Introduction 
This is the main thesis chapter reporting the analysis of, and findings about, price 
seasonality in food markets in Malawi, with a central emphasis on seasonality in the 
maize market. It is recalled from earlier chapters that price seasonality is not a trivial 
issue in a country with a poverty rate over 50 per cent, and where a single staple grain 
dominates the food consumption of the poor. While there may be debates about how 
best to deal with food price seasonality, there is no debate at all about the devastating 
consequences of excessive price instability for food insecure poor people. It is the social 
and distributional consequences of food price instability that in the end form the 
strongest reasons for devising policies that can keep such instability within tolerable 
bounds, consistent with accomplishing the marketing function of inter-temporal storage 
between harvests. 
 
The analysis presented here in the main covers a 21-year period from 1989 to 2009. As 
described in Chapter 2 above, maize and other crop markets in Malawi were liberalized 
in 1987, at least to the extent that the monopoly powers of ADMARC were removed, 
and a legislative framework created for the licensing of private traders. While 
enthusiasm for private trading has ebbed and flowed in subsequent policy actions by 
government, there have been significant periods during which the regulatory 
environment for private trade was relaxed in favour of traders, and actions were taken to 
make maize market management more of a partnership between private trade and 
government than solely a government role. Interspersed within this broad trajectory 
allowing the private sector to expand and strengthen, there have been intermittent 
government decisions that have worked in the opposite direction, even to the extent of 
banning private traders from operating in the maize market altogether as occurred for a 
time between 2008 and 2009. 
 
Thus the time period covered here occurs wholly in the post-liberalization phase of 
Malawi food market history. It might be expected that an expanding private sector at all 
the different stages and scales found in liberalised crop markets would result in seasonal 
price changes gravitating towards a temporal price margin that would just cover the 
costs of inter-temporal storage, consistent with a competitive market environment in 
which no single trader would be able to manipulate market circumstances in their 
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individual favour (for example, by keeping stock off the market in order to force prices 
upwards). The analysis provided here and in Chapter 5 may provide useful pointers as 
to whether this has in fact been occurring. In the meantime, what we so far have is the 
seasonal pattern of maize prices as shown for the 2000s in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1. In 
Figure 4.1 below, this same pattern is extended backwards to 1989, so that the whole 
period under investigation can be seen. 
 
Figure 4.1: Trend in Real Maize Prices 1989-2009 
(nominal prices deflated by CPI base-year 2000=100) 
 
 
 Note: the linear trend is fitted using ordinary least squares 
  Source: MoAFS monthly maize price data, average for all Malawi 
 
Figure 4.1 needs to be interpreted with caution. This is because price spikes associated 
with ‘shocks’, i.e. major weather-induced shortfalls in production, should not be 
confused with routine seasonal instability in a ‘normal’ production year. Seasonality is 
primarily shown with annual price peaks coinciding with the vertical dashed lines, 
which are drawn at January of each year. January or February are the two months in the 
lean season when prices are at their seasonal highest, before prices begin to decline in 
anticipation of the next harvest, occurring mainly in May and June. It is rare for any 
year not to show a seasonal peak, although this peak can be muted following an 
exceptionally good harvest; as occurred for example in 2006/07, following an excellent 





















then it is likely that a poor harvest is responsible, and in the 2008 instance the 
magnitude and direction of price changes are at odds with official production figures 
(Jayne and Tschirley, 2009). 
 
Superimposed on the monthly real price pattern shown in Figure 4.1 is a linear trend, 
fitted using ordinary least squares. This trend is statistically significant, the null 
hypothesis of no trend is rejected at the 99 per cent confidence level.26 The linear trend 
confirms what is visually apparent in the raw data, that real maize prices have been 
rising over the twenty years 1989-2009. Overall, the graph conveys an impression of 
rising real prices and increasing price instability over time. The occurrence of rising real 
maize prices in Malawi has been recognized by other researchers, including the 
emergence of seasonal price spikes that go significantly above import parity (Tschirley 
and Jayne, 2008; Jayne and Tschirley 2009,). The task of this chapter is to affirm the 
accuracy or not of these first impressions, and to consider factors that might modify or 
help to interpret the findings that are derived. 
 
The procedure for analyzing price instability in crop markets has been described in 
Chapter 3 above (Section 3.2). A significant feature of this procedure is to isolate the 
‘pure’ seasonality effect in time-series price data by removing cyclical, trend and 
random effects. Since one of the trend effects that is removed by the procedure is 
inflation, the analysis is conducted using nominal price data. This avoids non-trivial 
issues concerning whether official rates of inflation represent true price changes in the 
economy, and what the appropriate deflator (in terms of components of the CPI) should 
be to deflate the price series of a single food commodity. The question might be asked 
why an econometric method is not used here in preference to the descriptive statistical 
technique that is applied. The answer to this is choice of the appropriate method for the 
purposes to which it is to be put. As is well known price time-series are beset with 
autocorrelation problems, and the econometric methods used to overcome these 
problems (distributed lags; first- and second-order differences etc.) take us a long way 
from what we wish to demonstrate in this chapter which are the descriptive analytics of 
                                                 
26  The trend coefficient is 0.037 and standard error 0.003, resulting in a t-value of 12.245. It is 
recognised that such a trend is provisional. The existence of autocorrelation in price time 
series means that descriptive statistics of this kind may not provide an accurate picture of the 
pattern of sequential change being observed. 
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seasonal price variations.27 In the next chapter time-series econometrics in the form of 
cointegration analysis is used in a context where it is the appropriate tool for the 
purpose of the analysis, which is to examine the extent of spatial integration between 
markets for maize in Malawi. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 examines maize price seasonality on a 
national scale, describing the average seasonality that is found for the observation 
period as a whole, as well as any trends in the extent or ‘depth’ of seasonality that can 
be detected. Section 4.3 examines price seasonality in other food crops in Malawi to see 
whether the findings for maize are replicated across other crop markets or are peculiar 
to the maize market itself. It is recognized in doing this that there are many reasons that 
crops may differ in the degree of price seasonality that they exhibit; nevertheless, for 
any individual crop the direction of change in price seasonality is rather different from 
its absolute level, and comparing crops in this regard may yield useful insights into 
factors in the maize market that differ from other food crops. Section 4.4 extends the 
analysis of maize price seasonality to major district and rural markets spread across the 
country in order to gain a first indication of whether similar or different experiences of 
seasonal price instability occur in different parts of the country (this is followed up in 
Chapter 5 by the cointegration analysis already mentioned). Section 4.5 interprets the 
results of the preceding sections. It does this by reference to the findings of other 
researchers in three main areas: gross and net storage margins for maize; maize supply 
considerations that affect the degree of seasonal price instability experienced; and the 
influence of international maize prices on Malawi domestic price levels in the short and 
long term. 
 
4.2.Seasonality in the National Maize Market 
As described in Chapter 3, the national monthly maize price series in Malawi is derived 
from price data in markets across the country collected by the Agro-Economic Survey 
Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS). This data has been 
collected and collated since 1988. It initially provided price information once a week 
from 32 markets, and nowadays provides price information weekly from 80 markets 
(Government of Malawi, 2003) with 72 markets used for calculation of monthly average 
prices. Consolidated prices are obtained using simple averages of the underlying data, 
                                                 
27  The procedure used in this chapter has been utilized by many economists studying 
seasonality and is not considered any less valid for being relatively straightforward in 
statistical terms (see, for example, Sahn and Delgado, 1989) 
108 
and are not therefore corrected for relative volumes traded at different times or in 
different markets. It is recognised that this data is not perfect, and some price patterns 
may reflect changes over time in methods and coverage, rather than ‘true’ price trends. 
On the other hand, this is a 21-year period with 246 monthly data points, so most 
incidental events should turn up in the standard errors of price index variables. 
 
The steps in the seasonal price analysis are described as follows (Table 4.1 refers): 
 
(a) The procedure starts with the time-series nominal monthly price per kg of maize 
grain, from July 1989 to December 2009 (Table 4.1 only shows the prices for 1989-
1991, for illustrative purposes, but the full price series is provided at Annex 1 to 
this chapter). 
 
(b) A 12-month moving seasonal average (MSA) is applied to this data, using the 
formula set out in Chapter 3, such that each new data point represents a 12-month 
mean centred on an individual month. In terms of data points, this procedure means 
that six months are lost at the beginning and end of the period, reducing the data 
points from 246 to 240. The effect of this procedure is to isolate the seasonal 
component of price changes from trend and cyclical components, since each MSA 
is an entire season in length (again, Table 4.1 shows the MSA for 1989-1991 for 
illustrative purposes). 
 
(c) The seasonal index (SI) is calculated by dividing each nominal monthly price by 
the MSA centred on the same month, multiplied by 100, thus converting nominal 
prices into an index representing the relative (percentage) degree to which each 
nominal price is above or below the MSA. For example, the SI for June 1990 is 
84.4, meaning that the June price is 15.6 per cent below the 12-month average price 
centred on June 1990 (Table 4.1 again). 
 
(d) In this procedure, arithmetically, the average seasonal index (SI) for any 12-month 
period should equal 100; however, it does not do so exactly due to the averaging 
procedure that enables a 12-month period to be centred on an individual month (see 
equation (3) in Section 3.2, Chapter 3). This means that a small arithmetical error 
occurs at this stage that needs to be corrected later in the analysis; however, the 
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correction method for dealing with this error does not alter the degree of seasonality 
that results from the analysis (Trotter, 1992 p.10; and see below). 
 
(e) The grand seasonal index (GSI) for a particular month (e.g. January) is obtained by 
taking the mean of all January SIs available (20 of them in this time series covering 
1989 to 2009). In Table 4.1 the GSI for the entire data series is set out in the last 
two columns of the Table. In the unadjusted GSI column, each index number 
represents the mean of all the SIs available for that month in the entire series. 
 
(f) The final aim of this procedure is to obtain a set of index numbers in which a 12-
month set of data has a mean of 100, and each individual month’s degree of 
seasonality is expressed as a percentage departure from this mean. Due to the small 
averaging errors that occur at the point of dividing nominal price data by the 
moving seasonal average, the initial ‘raw’ GSI data has to be corrected in order to 
satisfy the requirement that the sum of all GSIs should equal 1200 and their average 
should equal 100. Therefore a correction factor is applied to the raw GSI data, in 
which each GSI is multiplied by 1200 divided by the unadjusted sum (in this 
instance 1185.7, so that the correction factor is 1.012). Note that this correction 
does not alter the relative seasonality positioning of each month compared to other 
months, nor does it alter the percentage degree of seasonality represented by the 
index for the month being divided by the mean index for the year. All it does is 
multiply all GSIs by a constant thus leaving relative values exactly as they were. 
 
(g) Table 4.1 shows both the unadjusted and adjusted GSI values for this analysis. On 
average over a 20-year period the month of March, say, has a seasonal price that is 
12 per cent above the annual average; while July has a seasonal price that is 11.9 
per cent below the annual average. Cyclical, trend, and random components are 
purged from the nominal price series in this procedure, and the GSIs represent as 
accurately as possible the pure seasonal effect. 
 
Table 4.1 shows both the unadjusted and adjusted GSI values for this analysis. On 
average over a 20-year period the month of March, say, has a seasonal price that is 12 
per cent above the annual average; while July has a seasonal price that is 11.9 per cent 
below the annual average. Cyclical, trend, and random components are purged from the 
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nominal price series in this procedure, and the GSIs represent as accurately as possible 
the pure seasonal effect. 
 
Table 4.1: Grand Seasonal Index Computation 
(showing only part of the full data series) 




MSA SI GSI Unadjusted 
GSI 
Adjusted 
1989 Jul 0.27 
Aug 0.29 
Sep 0.31 
Oct 0.31 Average Average 
Nov 0.36 All Years All Years 
 Dec  0.36   1989-2009 
1989-
2009 
1990 Jan 1 0.37 0.34 110.4  118.4 119.8 
Feb 2 0.36 0.34 105.5  123.0 124.5 
Mar 3 0.39 0.35 112.0  117.8 119.2 
Apr 4 0.35 0.36 98.6  96.6 97.8 
May 5 0.31 0.36 85.9  80.8 81.8 
Jun 6 0.31 0.37 84.4  77.0 77.9 
Jul 7 0.33 0.37 88.1  83.7 84.7 
Aug 8 0.38 0.38 99.1  85.0 86.0 
Sep 9 0.39 0.39 99.6  89.7 90.8 
Oct 10 0.39 0.40 98.2  95.6 96.7 
Nov 11 0.42 0.40 104.9  104.2 105.5 
Dec 12 0.45 0.40 112.0  113.7 115.0 
1991 Jan 13 0.46 0.40 114.5  1185.7 1200.0 
Feb 14 0.48 0.40 119.8  Sum  Sum  
Mar 15 0.47 0.40 117.9  Unadjusted Adjusted 
Apr 16 0.40 0.40 101.1  
May 17 0.34 0.39 86.4  
Jun 18 0.31 0.39 79.1  
Jul 19 0.33 0.39 84.7  
Aug 20 0.36 0.39 93.1  
Sep 21 0.36 0.38 93.8  
Oct 22 0.35 0.38 91.3  
Nov 23 0.40 0.39 103.1  
Dec 24 0.43 0.40 108.4  
Note: this table shows the raw data and its transformation into MSA and SI just for Jul 1989 to 
Dec 1991. For the complete monthly price data series to December 2009 see Appendix IIa,IIb. 
The final two columns show the monthly unadjusted and adjusted GSI for the entire time series. 
See text for an explanation of the procedure involved. 
Source: monthly maize price data published by MoAFS, Government of Malawi 
111 
The adjusted GSIs tell us a considerable amount about the extent of seasonal price 
swings in the Malawi maize market. By reference to Table 4.1, the peak GSI occurs in 
February with an adjusted index value of 124.5, while the lowest GSI occurs in June 
with a value of 77.9. The difference between these indices is 46.6 index points. This 
seasonal gap can be interpreted as a gross storage margin, since it represents the 
difference between trough maize prices at harvest time and peak prices at the height of 
the following lean season. For this reason the gap is more appropriately expressed as a 
percentage increase above the lowest index level i.e. 46.6/77.9 which is 59.8 per cent. 
The first key finding of this analysis is, therefore, that over a 21-year period, the average 
gross seasonal margin for maize in Malawi has been 59.8 per cent. Much of the rest of 
this chapter is concerned with placing the size of this seasonal margin in context, and 
this includes discussion in Section 4.5 that relates the gross seasonal margin to storage 
costs. 
 
The variation in GSIs for an individual month permits statistical analysis to verify 
whether the mean GSI can safely be regarded as significantly different from 100. In this 
analysis, a t-test value is calculated from the standard error and the estimated monthly 
means. The Ho is that the GSI index number is not significantly different from 100. A t-
value greater in absolute terms than 2.09 indicates that the H1 of significant price 
seasonality in that month’s price can be accepted with a 95 per cent degree of 
confidence. As shown in Table 4.2, April is the only month for which the GSI is not in 
statistical terms significantly different from 100. For the annual cycle as a whole, 
significant price seasonality is statistically verified. 
 
The verification and pattern of price seasonality is given more precision by examining 
the width of the band represented by one standard error either side of the mean. This is 
tabulated in Table 4.3 and illustrated in Figure 4.2. The figure shows that one standard 
error in general represents a narrow band either side of the mean GSI, implying that 
annual variation in seasonal prices relative to annual means is quite small. The peak 
price season (Jan-Mar) exhibits a widening of this band, indicating more variation from 
year to year in the height of that peak. Overall, the data seems to suggest a reasonable 
degree of predictability in seasonal price changes, once cyclical and other factors have 




Table 4.2: Statistical Incidence of Seasonality by Month 1989-2009 
 
Month GSI Unadjusted SE Mean T-test value 
January 118.4 3.02 6.09 
February 123.0 4.31 5.35 
March 117.8 3.46 5.16 
April 96.6 2.17 -1.54 
May 80.8 1.92 -10.00 
June 77.0 1.53 -15.02 
July 83.7 2.23 -7.31 
August 85.0 1.87 -8.02 
September 89.7 1.67 -6.14 
October 95.6 1.40 -3.14 
November 104.2 1.56 2.72 
December 113.7 2.76 4.95 
 
Source: monthly maize price data published by MoAFS, Government of Malawi 
 
Table 4.3: Variation around GSI Values for Maize 1989-2009 
 
Months GSI Corrected GSI + 1SE GSI -1SE 
January 119.8  122.9  116.8  
February 124.5  128.8  120.2  
March 119.2  122.7  115.8  
April 97.8  100.0  95.6  
May 81.8  83.7  79.9  
June 77.9  79.4  76.4  
July 84.7  87.0  82.5  
August 86.0  87.9  84.2  
September 90.8  92.5  89.2  
October 96.7  98.1  95.3  
November 105.5  107.0  103.9  
December 115.0  117.8  112.3  
 Source: calculated from monthly maize price data published by MoAFS, Government 
of Malawi 
 
The seasonal analysis also allows investigation of whether seasonal price spreads are 
increasing or narrowing over time. This is done here in two main ways. The first is to 
examine whether statistically significant trends can be detected in the GSI for the 
particular months that represent the peaks and troughs in the annual price cycle. If the 
113 
trend coefficient for the peak price index is getting higher over time and/or the trend 
coefficient for the trough price index is declining over time, this implies a widening of 
the seasonal price margin and indicates that the ‘problem’ of price seasonality is 
growing rather than remaining stable or declining over the years. 
 
Figure.4.2: Variation Around Maize Index Values 1989-2009 
Source: data contained in Table 4.3 
 
The data contained in Table 4.4 display the results of applying a simple linear trend to 
the GSI values across 21 years 1989-2009 for the two peak and two trough months. The 
H0 in this instance is the absence of a statistically significant trend. A t-test value above 
±2.09 would indicate rejection of the H0 at a 95 per cent level of confidence (Walsh, 
1990). None of the selected months shows a statistically verified trend in GSI levels 
over this period, therefore the null hypothesis of no significant trend in these index 
values is accepted. The same is true if the difference between the peak month (Feb) and 
the trough month (June) is examined for the presence of a trend: the trend coefficient is 
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Table 4.4: Trend Analysis of Maize GSI for Peak and Trough Months, 1989-2009 
 
Months Mean GSI Trend coeff. SE (coeff.) t (coeff.) 
January Peak 119.8 0.55 1.05 1.05
February Peak 124.5 0.70 0.75 0.93 
June Trough 77.9 -0.27 0.29 -0.94 
July Trough 84.7 -0.36 0.41 -0.88 
 
 Source: calculated from monthly maize price data published by MoAFS, Government 
of Malawi 
 
A second method for assessing whether seasonal price spreads are increasing or 
narrowing over time is to divide the 21-year period of the price time series into two sub-
periods and examine whether GSI levels differ from each other for these sub-periods, 
and in what direction, for the critical months. The period is divided into 1989 to 1999, 
and 1999 to 2009, with each period comprising an equal period of 10.5 years for ease of 
comparison. It is possible to have year 1999 appear in both periods because each period 
loses a half year in the computation, so that 1989-1999 loses the half year from January 
to June 1999 at the end of the period, while 1999 to 2009 loses July to December at the 
beginning of the period. These periods are not chosen for any reason related to changes 
in the policy environment that may have occurred between them. They are merely a 
division of the overall observation period into two equal time periods, and offer an 
alternative representation of change, if it is occurring, to the preceding examination of 
trends. Equally, the period could be sub-divided into three or four sub-periods, however 
the GSI values then obtained would contain fewer observations, compromising their 
statistical accuracy. 
 
The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 4.5 and graphed in Figures 4.3 and 
4.4. The peak GSI values are higher in the second period than the first, while the trough 
GSI values are lower between the two periods. This causes the overall gap between 
highest and lowest GSI values to rise from 43.5 to 49.8, which in turn means that the 
gross seasonal margin grows from 54.9 per cent to 65 per cent. An additional feature 
that is brought out in Figure 4.3 is the apparent tendency for the price decline at harvest 
to occur earlier and more steeply in the later rather than earlier period. Finally, Figure 
4.4 reveals distinctions in the patterns and variability of seasonality between the two 
periods. The first period exhibits much greater annual variability around mean GSI 
values than the second period. It also reveals a curious elongation of the trough price 
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season (spread over three months) compared to the sharper and more decisive 
turnaround of the later period (spread over two months). 
 Table 4.5: Maize GSI for Sub-Periods 1989-99 and 1999-09 
 
Months 1990-1999 1999-2009 
January 117.7 122.0 
February 122.8 126.3 
March 116.5 122.0 
April 100.2 95.4 
May 85.9 77.7 
June 79.3 76.5 
July 86.6 82.2 
August 85.3 87.1 
September 89.6 92.0 
October 94.9 98.6 
November 104.5 106.9 
December 116.7 113.3 
High-Low (Seasonal Price Spread) Difference 43.5 49.8 
High-Low (Seasonal Price Spread) % 54.9 65.0 




Figure 4.3: Comparison Maize GSI Sub-Periods 1989-99 and 1999-09 
 










































Figure 4.4: Comparison of Variation around Mean GSI in Two Sub-Periods 
 
Source: calculated from monthly maize price data published by MoAFS, Government 
of Malawi 
 
Comparing these mean differences between highest and lowest price months in the two 
sub-periods, using a variety of statistics for small sample comparisons, fails to yield a 
significant difference in seasonality between the periods. The most that can be said 





























































seasonality can be verified for this 21-year period, despite the apparent presence of such 
a change in the graph with which this chapter started (Figure 4.1 above). 
 
4.3 Seasonality in Other Food Crops 
The price seasonality analysis conducted for maize was also undertaken for rice, 
cassava, beans and groundnuts. These crops of course differ considerably from each 
other with respect to their agronomy, growing season, harvesting options and roles in 
food security in Malawi. For example, a significant proportion of rice is grown under 
irrigated conditions and its harvests are not therefore as closely tied to the annual 
rainfall cycle as maize. Some of these crops (rice and beans) have shorter growing 
seasons than maize; others (cassava) can be left in the ground for varying durations, and 
are lifted for different purposes in food consumption at different points in the seasonal 
calendar. For these reasons it is to be expected that the different food crops will display 
different patterns and overall degrees of price seasonality from each other. Nevertheless 
it is interesting, in comparative terms, to see how these differ from maize. It is also 
interesting to discover whether seasonality for these crops has been changing over time 
in a different way from maize, leading to a discussion about why this may be so. 
 
The analysis of seasonality in other crops follows the same procedure as for maize. The 
price data originates from the same price collection system conducted by MoAFS as 
maize, and therefore the same caveats about changes over time in the number of 
markets and their geographical coverage applies. The results of the GSI analysis for 
other crops are shown in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.5. Maize is also included in the table 
and graph for comparative purposes. The results reveal that maize displays the most 
price seasonality and cassava the least. Price seasonality patterns vary according to crop 
growth cycles and harvesting periods. In this regard, cassava has distinct patterns of 
price change through the year, compared to those for maize or beans. This is particularly 
due to variations in harvesting times. Harvesting of other crops is strongly seasonal, 
with the partial exception of rice due to the proportion of the annual harvest that occurs 
under irrigated conditions (Malawi, 2004). However, cassava as a staple food for flour 
processing is harvested throughout the year, while harvesting as a snack crop and for 
fresh root sales occurs mainly between June and February, when the water content of 
the root is low. Low water content of the root contributes to improved cooking quality. 
Cassava plays a particularly important role as a dietary substitute for maize in the peak 
price months of the lean season. 
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Table 4.6: GSI for Other Crops in Malawi (1990-2009) 
 
Months Maize Rice Cassava Beans Groundnuts 
January 119.8 106.0 101.8 119.2 114.3 
February 124.5 109.1 105.0 120.7 119.8 
March 119.2 108.1 101.3 106.3 117.7 
April 97.8 106.4 99.7 97.7 111.6 
May 81.8 101.9 98.1 95.6 100.1 
June 77.9 93.8 96.5 95.3 91.4 
July 84.7 89.5 96.9 91.4 84.8 
August 86.0 91.0 99.6 90.7 83.6 
September 90.8 93.4 98.4 91.6 85.9 
October 96.7 96.8 99.5 93.2 90.3 
November 105.5 101.2 102.6 99.1 95.9 
December 115.0 102.9 100.6 99.3 104.7 
High-Low Difference 46.6 19.6 8.5 30.0 36.2 
High-Low % above 
GSI Trough 59.8 21.9 8.8 33.1 43.3 
Source: calculated from monthly food crop price data published by MoAFS, 
Government of Malawi 
 
All crops reach their peak GSI in February and start declining in March. The pattern of 
price decline depends on the timing of harvests. For example, the price of beans 
declines earlier than other crops since the main rainfed bean crop is harvested in March. 
The prices of other crops do not fall as precipitously, nor reach their lowest point as 
early as maize. While the lowest seasonal prices for maize and cassava typically occur 
in June, for other crops this occurs in July (rice), or August (beans and groundnuts). 
These food markets do not, of course, work independently from each other. Maize, rice 
and cassava are substitutes in energy foods, and beans and groundnuts are substitutes in 
protein foods. All food crops are affected by the overwhelming dominance of maize in 
food markets, such that a shortage of maize leading to higher prices in the maize market 
has the effect of raising the prices of all other foods, and a surplus of maize has the 
opposing effect across all food markets. Beans and groundnuts might be expected to 
conform less to this maize price effect than the starchy staples, but are nevertheless 





Figure 4.5: Comparison Seasonality Patterns Selected Food Crops 1989-2009 
 Source: calculated from monthly food crop price data published by MoAFS, 
Government of Malawi 
 
In specific terms, maize exhibits the now familiar gross seasonal margin of 59.8 per 
cent, compared to groundnuts 43.3, beans 33.1, rice 21.9 and cassava 8.8 per cent.  
These differences reflect factors already described; however, duration of storage is also 
a critical factor. Cassava displays the lowest price seasonality not just because its 
harvesting can be spread more evenly across the calendar year but because cassava is 
typically not stored for any duration, either in the household or by traders. As discussed 
in relation to maize in the previous section (and again in section 4.5 below), in a 
competitive market the seasonal price change is a storage margin, reflecting the cost of 
carrying stock for a particular duration between purchase and sale. By far the biggest 
cost of storage is the rate of interest accruing to the finance tied up in the stock. Since 
maize has the longest duration between harvest (May-June) and anticipation of the next 
harvest (Feb-Mar), i.e. 8 months, it is to be expected that the seasonal margin for maize 
should be higher than for the other crops. 
 
Figure 4.6 displays the degree of variation around the mean GSI pattern for the four 













































Figure 4.6: Comparative Patterns and Variability Seasonality in Other Food Crops 
 
 Source: calculated from monthly food crop price data published by MoAFS, 




































































































































































standard error either side of the mean GSI is used to capture this variation. It is seen that  
the degree of stability in seasonal price patterns from year to year is greatest for rice and 
least for cassava. Beans and groundnuts represent an intermediate case with more 
stability revealed in the downswing of prices from their peaks than in the upswing of 
prices in the lean season. 
 
As was done for maize, the GSI values for the other food crops was examined in 
different ways to see whether any tendency towards narrowing or widening price 
seasonality could be detected in the data. The first way involved applying a simple 
linear trend to the GSI values for each individual month, in which the main focus of 
interest is whether a trend exists in the peak months or trough months, and in what 
direction. The results of this exercise are tabulated in Table 4.7, including the figures for 
maize that were discussed before. All the crops with the exception of maize display an 
upward trend in their trough (lowest price) GSI values. When this is combined with 
small downward trends in peak GSI values, the result, as shown in the final row of 
Table 4.7 is an apparent narrowing of seasonal margins (shown by negative values) for 
all crops except maize. The strength of this effect is largest for beans (for which both 
the decline in peak GSI and rise in trough GSI are significant at the 90 per cent 
confidence level. The individual peak and trough trends are not significant for the other 
crops. 
 
Table 4.7: Comparative GSI Trend Coefficient Values (1989-2009) 
 
Trend Variables Maize Rice Cassava Beans Groundnuts 
Peak GSI 
Trend 
Coeff. 0.70 -0.25 -0.07 -0.39* 0.15 
SE 0.75 0.19 0.50 0.22 0.46 
T 0.93 -1.30 -0.13 -1.77 0.34 
Trough GSI 
Trend 
Coeff. -0.27 0.37 0.21 0.47* 0.30 
SE 0.29 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.23 
t -0.94 1.60 1.16 2.03 1.34 
Combined Coeff. Change 
(direction of change in 
seasonal margin per year) 
0.97 -0.62 -0.28 -0.86 -0.15 
 
*significant at 90%; p < 0.10 
Source: calculated from monthly food crop price data published by MoAFS, 
Government of Malawi 
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This approach can be refined by examining trends in the difference between peak and 
trough level SI levels for the 21-year period. As already noted, while February is 
consistently the peak month in the annual price cycle for all food crops, the trough 
month varies between them. For beans and groundnuts, the lowest price month tends to 
be August, while for rice it is July, and for cassava it is June, as in the case for maize. 
The application of simple linear trend regressions to these differences yields some 
interesting findings (see Table 4.8). Beans and rice display significant trends at the 95 
per cent confidence interval; while groundnuts and cassava do not do so, and nor does 
maize. 
 
Table 4.8: Linear Trends Applied to Peak-Trough Index Differences, Selected Food 
Crops 
 










coeff. 0.879 -0.754** -0.551 -0.895** -0.166 
SE coeff. 1.052 0.317 0.583 0.325 0.519 
t-statistic 0.835 -2.380 -0.945 -2.749 -0.263 
Signif. 0.415 0.029 0.358 0.014 0.796 
 
**significant at 95%; p < 0.05 
Note: months in brackets are the peak and trough months for that crop 
Source: calculated from monthly food crop price data published by MoAFS, 
Government of Malawi 
 
The second way that changes in price seasonality over this observation period are 
examined is by dividing the period into two equal sub-periods and examining whether 
seasonality differs in its characteristics between them. For this exercise, the overall 
time-series data from 1989 to 2009 was split into the two sub-periods, 1989-1999 (up to 
December, and 1999 (from July) up to 2009. The results for peak and trough GSIs in the 
two periods are provided in Table 4.9. This displays some similar and some distinct 
results compared to the preceding method. Cassava, beans and rice display substantial 
drops in the GSI index gap between peak and trough values, from the first period to the 
second period, ranging from a fall of 34.2 per cent for cassava, to 30 per cent for rice, 
and 29.5 per cent for beans. 
 
For cassava, this produces a stronger outcome than that obtained from using linear 
trends; while for groundnuts the reverse is the case. Nevertheless, the direction of 
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change is not contradicted for any of the crops, between these two ways of trying to 
capture such change. Especially for beans and rice, the evidence points in the direction 
of a declining gross margin to storage over the past two decades. Possibly, this is 
because private marketing of such crops has become more competitive and efficient 
over this time interval. An ensuing conjecture is that crops that receive less attention 
from government than maize may be able to benefit more from the widening and 
deepening  of private trade that has occurred in Malawi. This thesis returns to this point 
later, especially in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Table 4.9: Selected Food Crops GSI Comparison Sub-Periods 1989-99 and 1999-2009 
 
GSI Variables Maize Rice Cassava Beans Groundnuts
1989-99           
Peak GSI 122.8 110.7 108.2 121.2 115.9 
Trough GSI 79.3 87.0 93.6 90.0 84.3 
Difference 43.5 23.7 14.6 31.2 31.6 
1999-09 
Peak GSI 126.3 107.9 105.7 114.7 119.0 
Trough GSI 76.5 91.3 96.1 92.7 88.8 
Difference 49.8 16.6 9.6 22.0 30.2 
% Change in 
Differences 14.5 -30.0 -34.2 -29.5 -4.4 
 
Source: calculated from monthly food crop price data published by MoAFS, 
Government of Malawi 
 
4.4 Seasonality in Different Maize Markets 
Having examined seasonality descriptively for the comparison between maize and other 
food crops, the section turns to comparisons between different regional maize markets. 
In a competitive domestic market with spatial arbitrage taking place between areas with 
maize surpluses and areas with maize deficits, the expectation might be that all markets 
across the country would display similar patterns and depths of seasonality to the 
average for the country as a whole. However, there are several factors that might cause 
this not to be the case, some of which are relatively straightforward to examine, while 
others considerably less so. 
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A first consideration is variation in transport costs and times between markets that may 
mean that prices adjust only with a lag, and imperfectly, even in an otherwise 
reasonably competitive setting. In a very poor country, such differences in the ‘friction’ 
of commodity movement between different areas might be expected to cause 
differences in seasonality between markets located on major trunk routes and markets 
located in more remote rural areas, with the latter being prone to greater seasonal 
fluctuations than the former.  In Malawi, these variations in the ease and speed of 
transport between markets are also affected by restrictions on movement applied 
unevenly at police roadblocks (often located at major road intersections down the length 
of the country), with barriers to internal movement tightened in some periods and 
relaxed in others. 
 
A second consideration is difference in timing of harvest in different parts of the 
country, and in Malawi maize ripens first at the southern end of the country (late April, 
early May) and last at the northern tip of the country (late May to July). A third 
consideration is the relative abundance of surplus grain at harvest time, with high 
surplus producing rural areas likely to encounter the steepest plunge in prices at harvest 
time, especially if they are also remote with respect to good access roads or urban 
centres. Cross-border trade in maize also affects these patterns, since it mainly occurs at 
border points adjacent to maize surplus rural areas. Table 4.12 (section 4.5 below) 
provides some estimated figures for the volume of cross-border imports in recent years. 
High volumes of cross-border imports coincide with the advent of large harvests in 
production zones close to the Malawi border in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. 
Traders take advantage of higher maize prices in Malawi than in these adjacent zones 
(Jayne et al., 2009), but their effect in Malawi itself may be to lower harvest prices 
further by increasing the volume of surplus grain available in harvest months. 
 
A fourth consideration is government action in terms of a host of different policy levers 
including formal imports, exports, releases from stores, purchases into stores, food aid 
and so on. Government action tends to be more piecemeal than the other considerations 
discussed here. These different considerations interact with each other in very 
complicated ways across the length and breadth of Malawi, and, for government action, 
at different points in time. It is not considered likely that their relative importance will 
be resolved just by looking at seasonality descriptively across different regional markets, 
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but it may nevertheless be possible to lend support or otherwise to some of the 
hypothesized effects suggested. 
 
The seasonality analysis for local markets comprises selecting markets for which 
complete, or nearly complete, monthly price time-series exists from 1989 to 2009. This 
rules out markets that have only recently been included in the price collection system. In 
the end, ten markets were utilized for the analysis, and these are shown on the map 
provided at Figure 4.7. The markets, running from north to south down the country, are 
Chitipa, Rumphi, Mzuzu, Lilongwe, Mitundu, Chimbiya, Lizulu, Lunzu, Limbe and 
Bangula. 
 
These markets exhibit important locational differences. Chitipa and Bangula are notably 
extreme geographical outliers, at the northern and southern end of the country 
respectively, and they are district markets located in rural areas. Mzuzu, Chimbiya, 
Lilongwe, Lizulu, Lunzu and Limbe are large rural or urban markets, located on the 
main north-south road spine of the country, and they include the capital city (Lilongwe), 
as well as Lunzu rural market and Limbe city market that are located 20 km to the north 
and 10 km to the southwest of Blantyre respectively. Other markets are Mitundu, 
located about 40 km from Lilongwe, and Rumphi located off the main M1 road, but an 
important rural centre in northern Malawi. The seasonal analysis of these markets is 
provided in Table 4.10 below, which includes a comparison with the national average 
results already discussed in detail. 
 
The table reveals considerable variation in the pattern and depth of maize price 
seasonality across the country. The lowest seasonality is exhibited in Lilongwe, Limbe 
and Bangula in the south of the country (45 per cent gross seasonal margin), while the 
highest occurs in the rural markets of Lunzu in Blantyre and Mitundu (in Lilongwe 
district), at 90 per cent gross seasonal margin. The finding that over a 21-year period 
some markets can exhibit twice the gross seasonal margin of other markets in a small 
country suggests that there are indeed significant frictions in the spatial evening out of 





Figure 4.7: Map of Malawi Showing Location of 10 Selected Maize Markets 
 
 
 Source: MoAFS Land Resources Department  
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Table 4.10: Maize Seasonality Analysis (GSI) for 10 Regional Markets 1989-2009 
 
Months National Average Chitipa Rumphi Mzuzu Lilongwe Mitundu Chimbiya Lizulu Lunzu Limbe Bangula 
 Jan 119.8 111.6 116.0 114.2 112.8 127.1 113.6 121.9 130.4 115.4 119.9 
 Feb 124.5 132.3 118.2 113.3 113.8 139.5 124.6 132.1 129.3 116.7 120.9 
 Mar 119.2 134.4 128.7 116.3 118.1 140.8 127.9 124.3 120.7 109.6 105.3 
 Apr 97.8 110.3 104.9 110.6 103.1 90.1 112.8 111.9 88.9 92.5 85.8 
 May 81.8 82.3 84.3 91.5 81.7 74.6 92.4 85.3 67.9 86.7 83.1 
 Jun 77.9 74.8 79.9 85.2 83.6 74.1 79.9 74.5 72.7 80.5 85.9 
 Jul 84.7 74.7 82.7 78.1 87.1 79.5 84.1 73.5 77.7 99.8 102.7 
 Aug 86.0 83.8 84.5 88.0 90.8 83.7 82.1 76.5 86.8 95.7 91.6 
 Sep 90.8 91.3 93.6 91.7 92.6 85.5 83.4 87.3 91.3 94.2 96.7 
 Oct 96.7 95.4 97.1 97.9 96.1 89.0 97.3 92.8 97.8 93.2 95.5 
 Nov 105.5 101.2 101.2 104.3 105.6 100.7 100.1 105.3 111.8 106.1 106.3 
 Dec 115.0 107.8 108.8 108.8 114.6 115.4 101.9 114.6 124.8 109.7 106.4 
High-
Low 46.6 59.7 48.8 38.2 36.4 66.7 48 58.6 62.5 36.2 37.8 
% 
Margin 59.8 79.9 61.1 48.9 44.6 90.0 60.1 78.7 92.0 45.0 45.5 
Source: calculated from monthly market maize price data published by MoAFS, Government of Malawi 
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Patterns of price seasonality in different markets are indeed seen to exhibit influences of 
some of the factors listed above. In particular, seasonality differs moving from south to 
north in correspondence with the changing timing of the maize harvest on the south-
north axis. In Bangula, Limbe and Lunzu in the south, the price peak is reached in 
January, is held in February, and the price trough occurs in May (Bangula and Lunzu) 
and June (Limbe). In Chitipa, Rumphi and Mzuzu in the north, the price peak occurs 
decisively in March, and the lowest price occurs in June or July (Chitipa). These 
locational effects can be seen strongly in Figure 4.8 which compares the price patterns 
in Bangula and Chitipa with a middle location, Lilongwe. The graph also shows the 
greater seasonality in the Chitipa market (80 per cent gross seasonal margin) compared 
to the other two markets. 
 
Figure 4.8: GSI Comparison Bangula, Lilongwe and Chitipa Markets 1989-2009 
Source: calculated from monthly maize market price data published by MoAFS, 
Government of Malawi 
 
In the set of ten markets, there are four that exhibit strikingly high seasonal variations in 
prices relative to the average for the country as whole. These are Chitipa, Mitundu, 
Lizulu and Lunzu. The factors that these markets have in common is their location in 
surplus producing rural areas, and their proximity to transport routes or entry points that 
bring imported maize in from adjacent countries. This suggests that it is the size of the 
maize surplus at harvest time that is a key determinant of the depth of trough prices 










































such as Chitipa or Mitundu, high peak prices also occur since a reverse flow of maize 
from urban storage centres out to remote rural areas is required when those areas run out 
of available maize three or four months before the next harvest. This explanation is 
reinforced by comparisons to the low seasonality markets of Mzuzu, Lilongwe, Limbe 
and Bangula that are places that neither experience the immediacy of harvest surpluses, 
nor the problem of remoteness from stocks later in the lean season. It is perhaps not 
surprising that Lilongwe displays the lowest price seasonality in this set of markets, 
being adjacent to the biggest maize storage facility in the country, and at the intersection 
of several of the most important road routes in the country. 
 
Figure 4.9 captures some of this variation by comparing seasonal price patterns for 
Limbe (low seasonality), Lunzu (high seasonality) and Rumphi (medium seasonality). 
Limbe market is located on the outskirts of the commercial city of Blantyre and has a 
seasonality pattern affected by proximity to the urban centre, excellent transport routes, 
and nearby public grain storage facilities. Lunzu, by contrast, is in a high maize harvest 
zone with a trough price in June that has the lowest GSI value for any market in the set. 
Rumphi represents a mixed picture and consequently a medium seasonality position. It 
is in the middle of a rural area that is important for crops other than maize, and therefore 
does not experience the big maize surpluses at harvest of some other rural areas; it does, 
 
Figure 4.9: GSI Comparison Limbe, Lunzu and Rumphi Markets 1989-2009 
 
Source: calculated from monthly maize market price data published by MoAFS, 












































however, exhibit a high peak GSI index in March reflecting its position off the main 
north-south access road, and away from major maize storage facilities. 
 
As expected, this examination of differences in seasonality between regional markets 
makes some additions to the understanding of maize price seasonality overall in Malawi, 
but leaves many questions unanswered. The degree of statistical integration between 
markets is left to later in the thesis (Chapter 5), and this has also been examined by 
other researchers (see Section 4.5 below). The key discoveries of this section are the 
occurrence of very considerable variation between the least seasonal and most seasonal 
markets (45 per cent against 90 per cent gross seasonal margin), and the discerning of 
seasonal patterns that follow the timing of the maize harvest from south to north. There 
also emerges some indication that cross-border trade may be an important factor altering 
the depth of seasonality in some parts of the country, although this is a provisional 
observation only, and is not subject to more penetrating investigation in this thesis. 
 
4.5 Interpreting the Findings 
This chapter has so far emerged with four key findings concerning price seasonality in 
the Malawi maize market in the period 1989 to 2009: 
 
(1) the maize price in Malawi is highly seasonal; on average the highest price month 
(February) experiences a retail price in markets that is 60 per cent above the lowest 
price (June); 
 
(2) for maize, there has been no detectable decline in price seasonality over this twenty 
year period, despite a considerable body of evidence that crop market functioning 
in Malawi in terms of competition and efficiency has been improving (see 
discussion below, as well as in Chapter 5); 
 
(3) a comparison with other food crops reveals that all the selected crops (rice, cassava, 
beans, groundnuts) display lower seasonality overall than maize (seasonal margins 
vary between 8.8 and 43.3 per cent); moreover, price seasonality for them seems to 
be diminishing over time, and this is confirmed especially for beans and rice; 
 
(4) the pattern of seasonality for maize is similar across maize markets in different 
parts of the country; however, the timing of seasonal troughs and peaks vary by 
roughly one month running from the south to the north of the country, and surplus 
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producing rural areas exhibit substantially greater seasonal margins than urban 
markets or markets close to urban areas or on main transport routes. 
 
These findings can be interpreted in the light of work done by other researchers on the 
maize market in Malawi. A particular pattern and depth of price seasonality reflects 
numerous agricultural and economic factors. The single harvest for maize is an 
important agronomic reason explaining the difference in average seasonality between 
maize and other food crops, although this does not help with the apparently diminishing 
depth of seasonality for the other crops, not experienced by maize. The other food crops 
have harvests that are more spread out during the calendar year, or are multiple in 
character (shorter growing seasons, irrigation in the case of rice). However, the main 
concern here is not with these agronomic aspects, but with factors in markets that may 
help to explain the findings for maize. Three such factors are considered here: first, the 
relationship between seasonality and storage costs; second, the relationship to domestic 
supply and demand considerations; and third, the relationship to international maize 
prices. 
 
It was stated earlier that the difference in GSI levels between high seasonal price 
months and low seasonal price months represents a gross margin to storage. More 
precisely, when this index difference is expressed as a percentage mark up on the lowest 
price month, it represents a percentage gross storage margin. This can be interpreted as 
a gross real return to storage (see Trotter, 1992, p.13). This is because the derivation of 
the GSI values involves removing the long-term trend component of a price time-series. 
The seasonal real gross storage return (GRSR) then can be set out as follows: 
 
GRSR = Highest GSI – Lowest GSI   X 100 
 Lowest GSI 
As examined in preceding sections, the gross storage margin for maize in Malawi has 
averaged 60 per cent across the decades of the 1990s and 2000s. Interestingly, this is 
almost identical to the gross return to storage in maize found by Timmer (1986a) in 
Indonesia where a margin of 59 per cent was measured, using a similar calculation to 
that used here. This contrasted in the Indonesia case, around the same historical period, 
with an 11 per cent gross seasonal margin for rice (Trotter, 1992). A gross storage 
margin must be interpreted in terms of the duration of grain in store that it represents, 
and the costs of storage. In Malawi, the overall margin of 60 per cent pertains to 
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purchase of maize in June and its sale in February, an 8-month storage period. Therefore, 
on average the gross return to storage is 7.5 per cent per month. Whether such a margin 
represents a competitive return to storage is a matter to which this discussion returns 
shortly. 
 
In the meantime, the GSI analysis allows the pattern of monthly gross returns to storage 
to be examined in more detail, and this is done in Table 4.11. The table shows the 
changing aggregate size of the margin if maize purchased at the lowest prices in June is 
sold in successive downstream months – July, August, September etc. The cumulative 
margin clearly increases for stocks held through to February, after which it declines to 
March and disappears quickly through April and May. The final column of the table 
shows the average margin per month represented by the cumulative margin figures. This 
provides a high gross margin rate (8.3 per cent) for holding maize for just one month (to 
July), with this figure then diminishing to 5+ per cent through August to October, and 
rising again for the period November to February. The highest average monthly return 
(other than July) is obtained by holding maize until December. In principle, if this 
pattern of returns were known to traders, they would either go for a ‘quick return’ 
strategy by selling in July, or hold maize to obtain strong average returns towards the 
end of the calendar year and after. In fact some seasonal patterns observed in the 
preceding analysis do seem to correspond to a wave of ‘sell in July’, as one storage 
strategy (see, for example, the GSI pattern for Limbe market in Figure 4.9 above). 
 




No. Months since 
June 
Gross Seasonal 
Margin from June 
Gross Seasonal 
Margin per Month
Jul 1 8.3 8.3 
Aug 2 10.0 5.0 
Sep 3 16.1 5.4 
Oct 4 23.7 5.9 
Nov 5 35.0 7.0 
Dec 6 47.2 7.9 
Jan 7 52.7 7.5 
Feb 8 58.6 7.3 
Mar 9 51.9 5.8 
Apr 10 25.5 2.5 
May 11 5.3 0.5 
 
Source: calculated from monthly maize price data published by MoAFS, Government 
of Malawi 
133 
So far costs of storage have not been considered with respect to this gross margin. The 
principle costs of storage comprise the interest rate on the loan required to purchase 
crop from farmers (or from other traders); losses in store; rent of storage space (for 
traders who do not possess their own storage); chemical treatment of crop in store to 
prevent infestation by pests; and transport costs into and out of store. Data on these 
different variables for Malawi is fragmentary, with partial insights offered in various 
sources. Information compiled in Jayne et al. (2008a) is quite helpful in gaining some 
purchase on the difference between gross and net monthly returns to storage. 
 
In Malawi, there are wildly varying estimates of losses in store: researchers often use 10 
per cent as a rule-of-thumb, while the Malawi government tends to invoke a high figure 
such as 30 per cent (Jayne et al., 2008a). On the basis of an admittedly fairly limited 
(but at least properly measured) sample, Jayne et al. (2008a) came up with a range of 
farmer and trader values for losses that average out at 14 per cent. At a retail maize 
value in June 2009 of 32 MK/kg, a 14 per cent loss is equivalent to a cost to the storage 
agent of 4.5 MK/kg. The same document provides evidence on rental costs of storage, 
chemical treatment and transport (2007-08 data). These average out at roughly 3.2 
MK/kg (rental cost), 0.5 MK/kg (chemical treatment), and 1.8 MK/kg (transport), over 
an 8-month storage period. If we take the June 2009 price of 32 MK/kg as a starting 
point, then a 60 per cent gross margin on this would equal 19 MK/kg, and the 
implication of these figures would look something like: 
 
Net margin = 19 MK/kg minus (4.5+3.2+0.5+1.8) = 9.0 MK/kg = 28.1% over 8 months 
= 3.5% per month. 
 
These are very rough back-of-the-envelope calculations, but their limited purpose is to 
demonstrate that once storage costs are taken into account, an apparently quite large 
gross margin can shrink quickly to one that looks plausible in terms of the cost of 
servicing the loans required for crop purchase. None of the figures cited so far include 
the financing costs of the storage function. These latter costs apply even if a trader or 
storage agent is able to fund crop purchases from their own resources of capital. This is 
because money tied up in the stock has an opportunity cost in terms of what that same 
money could earn if placed in an alternative investment. During the period under 
discussion, formal (government) interest rates in Malawi varied between 20 per cent and 
60 per cent, with a mean of 36.8 per cent over two decades from 1990 to 2009 (IMF, 
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International Financial Statistics, various years). The latter figure is 3.1 per cent per 
month, so a relatively small upward adjustment to account for differences between 
market and state interest rates would coincide with the net margin derived above. 
Sources such as Jayne et al. (2008a) demonstrate the great heterogeneity and variation 
in the various different elements of storage costs. For this reason, the derivation of an 
average, as partially done for illustrative purposes above, has to be treated with due 
circumspection. Traders differ widely in how long they hold stock (small traders for 
short periods, bigger traders for longer periods), in the transport costs they incur 
(distance from purchase to storage points varies over a wide range), in the losses they 
incur in store (depending on the quality of the storage infrastructure), and in the amount 
they pay for loans (the less formal the loan and the higher risk the borrower, the greater 
the interest rate on loans). In principle, sufficient information could allow proper 
averages to be calculated for these various cost components, but the cost of acquiring 
such information could become prohibitively large. Efficiency in the temporal function 
of crop marketing therefore tends to be assessed through more indirect means, and one 
alternative chosen by Myers (2008) is to examine the gross storage margin 
econometrically by comparing price adjustments across a range of markets. 
 
Myers uses a technique called threshold auto regression (TAR) to examine both spatial 
price adjustments and seasonal storage margins in Malawi. This technique allows for 
non-linearity in adjustments, and specifically for price switching in pairs of markets 
when the flow of trade reverses between them. The spatial integration aspects of Myer’s 
analysis are taken up later in this thesis in Chapter 5, in connection with a broader 
discussion and examination of market conduct, structure, and spatial arbitrage. In the 
context of the discussion here, Myers uses weekly price data to examine deviations 
from mean prices over time over a period of 378 weeks (Myers, 2008, pp.18-27). The 
model used by Myers measures the speed with which gross storage margins return to 
mean levels when they deviate above or below this level. If the speed of this adjustment 
is rapid, then inter-temporal storage can be interpreted as competitive and efficient, 
since the advent of ‘excess margins’ results quickly in price adjustments that reduce the 
margin towards the underlying equilibrium level. Myers finds that the adjustment lag in 
10 maize markets is less than one week, a figure comparable to that found in grain 




The second important dimension of maize market seasonality in Malawi reflected upon 
here is the influence of production and supply fluctuations on the degree of seasonality 
experienced. It is most important in this context to distinguish production from supply, 
and to consider the separate influences on supply of exports, imports and domestic stock 
changes (purchases into stock or sales out of stock). If external trade in maize were 
relatively frictionless (maize could be ordered today, and would arrive reliably in the 
required quantities in a week’s time) and if stock changes were quickly responsive to 
changing market conditions, then the huge price fluctuations observed in Figure 4.1 
would not occur, or be substantially dampened relative to what has occurred historically 
in practice. 
 
The seasonality analysis of this chapter is designed to remove cyclical, trend and 
random elements from long run price trends so that just the seasonality effect of price 
changes is captured. However, given the size of the fluctuations which have occurred 
historically, the removal of cyclical effects from the time-series is incomplete, and the 
GSI index changes between high and low price months to some degree reflect these 
intermittent price shocks. This is shown in Figure 4.10 that provides a bar chart of the 
difference in gross seasonal margin between the February SI and the June SI for each 
year in the period 1989 to 2009. The mean difference (the GSI gross margin of 60 per 
cent) is also shown on the graph. The big spikes in the seasonal margin shown on the 
graph coincide with the largest spikes shown in Figure 4.1 for raw prices expressed in 
real terms. In other words, 1992/93, 1995/96, 1997/98, 2001/02 and 2005/06 were all 
crop seasons displaying most unusually large seasonal margins due to production falls 
in those years, and the size of these cyclical margins comes through in the SI and GSI 
analysis. 
 
This pattern of variation suggests that traders are probably able to capture temporary 
rents to storage in seasons when maize is in short supply. However, Figure 4.10 also 
shows, equally, that there are seasons when the gross storage margin is squeezed down 
to extraordinarily low levels that would seem to be insufficient even to cover the 
financing cost of storage. For example, the gross (Jun-Feb) margin is under 30 per cent 
in 1990, 1992 and 2005. Several different trends and behaviours occur in these differing 
circumstances. In years of abundant supply from domestic production, the volume and 
duration of carryover necessary to satisfy demand in the lean season is reduced due to 
the greater number of months during which food-deficit farmers are able to supply 
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themselves with maize for consumption. Traders adjust their own storage durations and 
amounts to these circumstances accordingly. In shortage years, opposing forces apply. It  
becomes worthwhile to store larger quantities of grain for longer, and speculative  
 
Figure 4.10: Gross Seasonal Margin Between June and February, 1989-2009 
 
Source: calculated from monthly maize price data published by MoAFS, 
Government of Malawi 
 
behaviour regarding the scale of future shortages is bound to creep in. Nevertheless, the 
unpredictability of later outcomes (for example, a decision by government to flood the 
market from store if it is in a position to do so) increases the risk of taking ‘long’ 
positions in maize storage, so ‘hoarding’ in order to reap unusual rewards to storage is a 
high risk strategy. 
 
As discussed already in Chapter 2, the supply of maize from domestic production in 
Malawi is a ‘thin’ market, where the term ‘thin’ refers to the small proportion of total 
production and consumption that is available to exchange in markets. Jayne et al. 
(2008a, p.12) report data from an Agricultural Inputs Support Survey (AISS) conducted 
in 2007 that suggest that maize sales only comprise 14-15 per cent of total output, and 
that only 18-21 per cent of all farmers sell maize in a typical harvest season. The 
thinness of the maize market in Malawi is on its own a substantial explanation for the 
massive price fluctuations that occur when there is a cyclical production shortfall, for 
the reasons described in Chapter 2. However, shortages from domestic supply are 





















moderated to some degree by informal cross-border imports from neighbouring 
countries, and these have been highly significant in recent years as shown in Table 4.12 
(Jayne et al., 2008a). In the 2000s, the norm has been for Malawi maize prices to be 
higher than the country’s neighbours after harvest, with the result that these informal 
inflows occur. While these are approximate estimates obtained from monitoring cross-
border grain movements at obvious crossing points, their importance in the context of a 
domestic maize supply fluctuating around 300-325,000 tons (Jayne et al., 2008a) can be 
seen to be quite large. 
 
Table 4.12: FEWSNET Estimates of Informal Cross-Border Maize Imports 2004/5-
2008/9 
 
Crop Year Tanzania Zambia Mozambique Total 
 ------------------------------metric tons-------------------------- 
2004/05* 2,656 2157 71,229 76,206 
2005/06 84,862 419 71,218 165,451 
2006/07 1,888 378 77,394 79,525 
2007/08 1,886 1,779 56,078 60,466 
2008/09**    49,723 
Notes: * April of 2004 to March 2005. ** only includes the first 5 months of the 
2008/09 season (April-August). 
Source: Jayne et al. (2008a) 
 
The response of government to anticipated or actual changes in maize availability is 
critical both for explaining how severe maize availability deficits in practice occur, and 
for considering in what ways these might be avoided in the future. Most of the 
discussion of this occurs in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis, which examine maize 
availability crises in the 2000s in considerable detail, including the political dimension 
of such crises. Here, it can be noted that the record of government decision making is 
mixed in this regard, and when confronted with an emerging or potential maize market 
crisis, on occasions decisions have been taken that have reduced the severity and the 
duration of the crisis, while on other occasions the opposite has been the case. An 
impending crisis can be forestalled by release of strategic stocks, rapid purchase of 
imports, or appeal for food aid, and sometimes combinations of such actions have 
indeed helped to prevent a market crisis turn into a humanitarian disaster. On the other 
hand, as will be seen in Chapter 6, on other occasions, government has exacerbated an 
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emerging shortage of supply by attempting to ban informal imports, preventing the free 
interior movement of grain, and delaying formal imports. 
 
The final dimension of maize price seasonality in Malawi considered here is that of the 
relationship between domestic and international maize prices. In general, in an open 
economy, the domestic price of a staple food commodity might be expected to follow 
international prices allowing for transport costs and lags, and changes in a country’s 
exchange rate. However, Malawi along with several other countries in eastern and 
southern Africa is considered to be largely decoupled from international prices for 
maize for a variety of reasons (World Bank, 2006; Conforti et al., 2009; IMF, 2009). 
Being landlocked with high transport costs from the nearest commercially available 
stocks of maize or ports of entry is one such factor. Malawi and Zambia are similar in 
this respect, and for Zambia the average transport cost for maize purchased in South 
Africa has been estimated at US$120 per ton in recent years (Jayne and Tschirley, 2009). 
The cost to Lilongwe from the same origin is thought to be close to this amount (Ibid.). 
A second factor is a strong preference in consumption for local white maize over yellow 
maize which is the predominant type available in the world market. A third reason is the 
variation of domestic supply around long run domestic demand, so that recourse to 
international markets is infrequent, and does not occur routinely and smoothly along 
well-established channels. 
 
The key factor in this is transport costs, as well as other frictional costs associated with 
imports and exports. Countries like Malawi have a huge gap between import and export 
parity prices due to these costs, and this provides a wide margin within which domestic 
prices may fluctuate without reference to international prices. More recently, however, 
both Malawi and Zambia have experienced periods in which domestic prices have risen 
above import parity, yet there has not been a smooth market response to this occurrence, 
and critical issues of the degree of control that governments retain over import decisions, 
coupled with the lack of trust between governments and private traders, lie behind the 
incidence of such events (Jayne et al., 2009; Tschirley and Jayne, 2008). 
 
Figure 4.11 below demonstrates the divorce between Malawi domestic and international 
prices in the period January 2007 to June 2009. The graph compares Malawi average 
retail prices converted to US$ at official exchange rates, with the price trend for white 
maize in South Africa (SAFEX) and the international maize price at South African ports. 
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The South Africa and international maize prices are raised by a transport cost constant 
of US$120 per ton, as mentioned above. The graph shows the price spike that occurred 
in world maize prices in June 2008, in which prices had doubled in six months over 
their levels of mid- to late-2007 (the global food price crisis). In this period, Malawi 
maize prices display a seasonal peak in advance of the international price spike,  
 
Figure 4.11: Maize Price Comparison: Malawi, South Africa and World 
 (monthly data, US$ per kg, Jan 2007 to Jul 2009) 
 
Source: FAO-GIEWS 
Government of Malawi: Lilongwe, Retail, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
South Africa: Randfontein, Wholesale, SAFEX Agricultural Products Division 
World: yellow maize, FOB Gulf Ports, UNCTAD Commodity Price Statistics 
 
followed by a decline to low levels while international prices reached their peak. Then, 
as international prices fell sharply from their highest levels through the second half of 
2008 and into 2009, the price in Malawi rose to unprecedented levels above import 
parity through late 2008 and early 2009. It should be noted that the exact vertical 
placement of the Malawi prices on this graph relative to the other prices is dependent on 
the constant transport cost assumption made, which may be inaccurate. However, that 
Malawi breached import parity in these periods is not in doubt according to other 
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The consensus view is, then, that Malawi is somewhat decoupled from the world maize 
market, especially in the short term and with respect to seasonal price fluctuations. The 
movement of prices over an interval such as that shown in Figure 4.12 generally display 
little evidence of world and Malawi prices moving together, and for periods in the range 
of 3-6 months they are more often than not seen to be moving apart from each other. 
However, the short and medium term trends may differ from the long term in this 
respect, and this is examined econometrically using a method called vector auto 
regression (VAR) in a recent paper by Rapsomanikis (2009). Rapsomanikis examines 
price time-series relationships between the world price (yellow maize),  South Africa 
SAFEX price (white maize), and eight maize markets in Malawi. 
 
The VAR analysis found that short-run effects between maize prices in Malawi and the 
international and SAFEX prices were statistically insignificant. In the short run prices 
may drift apart ‘due to local market conditions and policies’ (Rapsomanikis, 2009, p.30). 
However, in the long run prices were found to converge. South African SAFEX prices 
converge to US yellow maize No.2 Gulf prices in approx. 7-8 months. Malawi prices in 
different markets converge to the SAFEX price in 5-6 months and to the world price in 
4-8 months. The results are reproduced in Table 4.13 below. In this table the figures in  
 
Table.4.13: Estimated Lags in Price Adjustment between Malawi and World Markets 
 
Chitipa Karonga Rumphi Bangula 
Co-movement with     
International price (yellow) strong strong moderate Strong 
South African price (white) strong strong strong Strong 







Months to full adjustment 
to International (South 
Africa) price 
6.6 (5.0) 4.7 (4.8) (8.3) 3.8 (4.7) 
 Salima Mitundu Liwonde Mzuzu 
Co-movement with     
International price (yellow) weak strong strong strong 









Months to full adjustment 
to international (South 
Africa) price 
-(5.3) 5.8 (5.0) 7.7 (6.4) 5.5 (6.1) 
 
Source: Rapsomanikis (2009, p.30) 
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brackets are statistically significant time lags for adjustment to the SAFEX white maize 
price, while the figures not in brackets (if there) are significant time lags for adjustment 
to world yellow maize price. The conclusion is that long run convergence between 
domestic and world prices does take place, confirming also the finding of Jayne et al. 
(2006) that maize prices in countries like Malawi converged towards import parity 
during the 2000s. 
 
To summarize this discussion, the seasonality analysis for Malawi shows that, on 
average, peak seasonal prices for maize, occurring in February, are 60 per cent above 
the lowest seasonal prices, occurring in June. There is no verifiable change taking place 
over time in maize seasonality, whereas for beans and rice there is moderately firm 
evidence that price seasonality declined during the period 1989-2009. Regional maize 
markets in Malawi display similar patterns but differing intensities of seasonality, 
compared to the national average, some of which can be explained by proximity to rural 
surplus-producing zones or to cross-border trade. The 60 per cent gross seasonal margin 
cannot be taken as evidence of non-competitive storage margins on the part of traders 
and storage agents. For one thing, similar gross margins have been observed for maize 
elsewhere; for another, storage costs can be shown to take up a substantial proportion of 
such a margin; and finally econometric analysis of short run price movements indicate 
that margins in different markets converge with less than a one week lag towards an 
equilibrium level (Myers, 2008). The seasonality analysis does not wholly eliminate the 
effects of unusual price spikes on average margins, and the fairly frequent occurrence of 
these spikes is caused by severe imbalances between available supply and demand. The 
patterns of events that result in these outcomes are explored in Chapter 6 below. 
International price trends are ruled out as being responsible for cyclical and seasonal 
price changes in the Malawi maize market, but in the long run domestic prices do 




Chapter 5 : Maize Market Conduct, Structure and Spatial Integration 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter has two main purposes. The first is to report the findings of the fieldwork 
on maize marketing conducted in three villages in Malawi in May-August 2008, just 
after the maize harvest. The methodology of this fieldwork has already been described 
in Chapter 3, as also some basic information on relative poverty and wealth in the case-
study villages as discovered from participatory wealth ranking conducted in each village. 
The second is to summarise the findings of a cointegration analysis undertaken on 
monthly price data in 13 markets, in order to test spatial maize market integration in 
Malawi. These two objectives play important roles in this thesis in understanding 
competition, the strength and diversity of the private sector, and the degree of efficiency 
exhibited in Malawi maize markets. These aspects have been examined by other 
researchers (for example, Jayne et al., 2008a; Rapsomanikis, 2009); however, not in the 
specific context of a focus on price seasonality. In particular, the results reported here 
help to shed light on the central problem investigated in this thesis that is the 
conjunction of events, market functioning and public decisions that result in the 
repeated occurrence in Malawi of severe seasonal price shocks out of all proportion to 
the average price seasonality observed in the long term. 
 
In marketing studies, the structure of the market is concerned with the number, diversity 
and size of market participants in different stages of marketing chains leading from the 
producer to the consumer. The conduct of these participants refers to their honesty (e.g. 
with weighing scales), timeliness, adherence to quality standards, reliability in purchase 
and delivery, ability to meet contracts (where such are required), and other attributes 
that result in trust in market transactions and the emergence of arms-length rather than 
personalised exchanges (Ellis, 1990: Ch.5; Timmer et al., 1983; Baumol and Blinder, 
2003). The structure and conduct of the Malawi maize market is tackled in this chapter 
by reference to the fieldwork undertaken in 2008. Market performance i.e. the overall 
efficiency of the marketing function is a combination of structure and conduct attributes 
with observable outcomes in terms of spatial and vertical price formation. The 
cointegration analysis specifically tackles price adjustment between different markets, 
and therefore provides an indirect insight into spatial arbitrage (the movement of maize 
in response to price signals indicating surpluses or deficits in different places). 
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There is a broad consensus amongst those who have studied maize marketing in Malawi 
that the private sector has expanded substantially in terms of the number and diversity 
of traders in the years since liberalisation was initiated in 1987 (e.g. Chilowa, 1998). 
This has especially occurred on the small scale at local levels where in the harvest 
season daily and weekly markets spring up across the country to facilitate the rapid 
throughput of maize offered by farmers for sale at harvest time. Small-scale traders are 
mainly unregistered, and many of them operate only during the period when there is 
produce immediately available to trade. According to Jayne et al. (2008a) the number of 
small-scale traders has multiplied rapidly, while medium-scale traders have remained 
relatively stable and large-scale traders have declined in numbers slightly over the past 
two decades. These authors estimate that in 2008, ADMARC purchased only 8 per cent 
of maize sold by farmers, with the private sector accounting for all other maize sales 
(Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1: Estimated Proportion of Maize Sold by Farmers to Different Buyers in 2008 
 
Area 
Category of Buyer 





Blantyre 14.4 38.1 46.5 0.0 100.0 
Mulanje 0.0 19.9 34.7 45.4 100.0 
Lilongwe 16.6 16.7 41.7 25.0 100.0 
Dowa 5.0 0.9 1.0 88.1 100.0 
Mchinji 4.0 7.0 21.6 67.4 100.0 
National 8.0 16.5 29.1 45.2 100.0 
Source: (Jayne et al., 2008a, p.12 ) 
 
The private sector comprises both informal and formal sub-sectors. The informal private 
sector mostly comprises one-person businesses typically using their house as the 
warehouse, tending to be opportunistic and mobile, and buying as little as one 50 kg bag 
of maize or less in a transaction. In Malawi, medium-scale buyers are typically defined 
as traders handling quantities up to 2,000 tons maize per year; and the majority of these 
are unregistered. By comparison, formal private sector buyers are mostly large, 
registered companies that operate in the domestic market at a national scale handling 
thousands of tons of maize per year. Examples of such companies are Mulli Brothers, 
Export Trading and Rafik, any of which can handle transactions exceeding 1,000 tons in 
a single contract. Such traders often enter into firm advance commitments for sale to the 
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National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA), non-governmental organisations involved in 
food security operations (NGOs), the World Food Program (WFP), or large state 
purchasing institutions like the health service (Jayne et al., 2008a: pp.17-19). 
 
The Grain Traders and Processors Association of Malawi (GTPA) has a classification 
system for its members, in which traders who have the capacity to supply 1,000 metric 
tons or more in a single lot belong to the gold category, and those whose capacity is less 
than this belong to the silver category, which is thus composed of the medium and the 
smaller sized registered traders. In May 2008, the association had 83 private traders 
registered in its gold category, and 90 private traders in its silver category. A proportion 
(estimated at 12 per cent) of registered private traders are also processors and engage in 
assembly, transportation, storage and repackaging of maize. Membership of GTPA is, 
however, voluntary, so some significant private actors are not captured in the 
association’s data. The head offices of association members are concentrated in 
Lilongwe (66 percent) and Blantyre (25 per cent). 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section reports the findings of the maize 
marketing fieldwork conducted in May to August 2008 in three villages, but also 
involving interviews with key informant traders at various stages in the vertical 
marketing chain. This covers in sequence: maize inputs and harvesting; sales decisions 
and proportions; food security position of farm families; farm level maize storage and 
local level flour processing; sales prices and trader types; maize marketing chains; 
medium and large traders; marketing margins; and marketing problems prioritised by 
farmers and traders respondents. Section 5.3 reports the results of the cointegration 
analysis on spatial market integration for selected 13 markets scattered across the 
country. Section 5.4 provides a synthesis and interpretation of the findings of the 
chapter. 
 
5.2 Fieldwork Findings 
 
5.2.1 Inputs, Harvesting and Production 
This and subsequent sub-sections of this chapter provide descriptive statistics about a 
wide variety of different aspects of maize marketing at farmer level, and in trader 
operations beyond first point of purchase. The data is reported by individual villages: 
Mission village in the Southern Region; Chinteka village in the Central Region; and 
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Jenda village in the Northern Region; as well as for averages or totals across all villages. 
In general, the sample size is 30 farm households in each village; therefore providing a 
total sample of 90 households across all three villages. However, this number is 
sometimes drastically reduced with respect to trading since fewer farmers than expected 
undertook maize sales in the harvest season in question. 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 3, the maize harvest season in 2008 in Malawi turned 
out to be much weaker in terms of surplus sales by farmers than had been predicted by 
advanced crop estimation procedures (on the basis of which research sites had been 
selected). In addition, there was a recognised flaw in the decision to stratify the sample 
by relative wealth, since this meant that village samples contained a high proportion of 
non-surplus producing maize farmers (the author has learned from this mistake). 
Nevertheless, and despite these difficulties, a lot of valuable information was collected 
from farmers and traders contributing to the understanding of the working of the 
Malawi maize market at local levels. 
 
Some basic pre-harvest data regarding land ownership and maize cultivation in the three 
sample villages is provided in Table 5.2. This reveals substantial differences in the 
mean land ownership of sample households at 0.45, 1.45 and 1.11 ha respectively for 
the Mission, Chinteka and Jenda sample. There is considerable variation around these 
mean figures as shown by the coefficient of variation (CV). It is recalled that the wealth 
ranking exercise suggested high rates of landlessness in these villages, corresponding to 
58, 47 and 26 per cent of households in the three villages. Nevertheless, the sample did 
not pick up on this landlessness, and it is thought that villagers and respondents replied 
differently to questions about land, depending on how they (the respondents) 
contextualised the question being posed. This was particularly evident in Mission 
village where in group discussions about relative poverty and wealth, respondents 
clearly wanted to impress on researchers how poor the village was; however, when they 
mistakenly thought that the sample survey was to do with eligibility for subsidised 
fertilizer coupons, suddenly it turned out that all villagers did have access to at least 
some land (possessing land for maize production is a prerequisite for receiving the 
fertilizer subsidy). This reveals the value of triangulating results using different 
methodological approaches, as well as the necessity to be wary about how respondents 
interpret the reasons for the presence of researchers. 
 
146 
Table 5.2: Farm Size and Area Cultivated to Maize, Sample Households 
 
  Mission Chinteka Jenda Total 
 Total FHHs No. 205 110 68 383 
 Sample FHHs No. 30 30 30 90 
(a) Area Owned Sample (ha)1     
 Total land 13.56 40.67 32.27 86.50 
 Mean land 0.45 1.45 1.11 0.99 
 CV 0.67 0.67 0.59 0.58 
 Mode land 0.40 0.81 0.40 0.40 
 Min land 0.10 0.40 0.20 0.10 
 Max land 1.21 4.05 2.83 4.05 
(b) Maize Area Sample (ha)     
 Total area 11.43 19.77 17.00 48.20 
 Mean area 0.38 0.66 0.57 0.54 
 CV 0.60 0.34 0.65 0.78 
 Mode area 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
 Min area 0.10 0.04 0.20 0.04 
 Max  area 1.21 3.24 1.62 3.24 
(c) Maize share total land  (%) 84.3 43.6 52.6 55.7 
 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
1  Chinteka and Jenda had one and two households respectively who did not own land 
but grew maize 
 
The mean area cultivated with maize of sample households was a lot more similar than 
their total land area at 0.38, 0.66 and 0.57 across the three villages respectively (0.54 for 
all sample respondents taken together). Again, there is quite a lot of variation around 
these means. The modal land cultivation was practically identical across all villages at 
0.40 ha (about 1 acre). The proportions of farming area given over to maize cultivation 
varied from 84.3 per cent (Mission) to 43.6 per cent (Chinteka) and 52.6 per cent 
(Jenda). Clearly, Mission is the case study village most dependent on maize, as well as 
being the poorest village and having the smallest farm size. In Chinteka, farmers also 
specialise in tobacco; while in Jenda they practice diverse cropping systems in which 
maize, tobacco, horticultural crops and livestock play diverse roles. 
 
It was noted in Chapter 4 that the main maize harvesting period varies in Malawi 
running from south (earlier harvests) to north (later harvests). This feature is picked up 
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strongly in the sample survey (Figure 5.1). In the most southerly of the villages, Mission, 
29 of the 30 respondents reported harvesting their maize in March. This is well ahead of 
what is considered the main harvest month of May in Malawi. For Chinteka village, 
maize harvesting occurred between April and June, with the majority of harvest 
occurring in May. For Jenda, the most northerly village, the maize harvest began in 
March (in fact, it turned out that this was mainly green maize for roasting), and the 
harvesting period extends to July, with the main volume being harvested in June. 
 
Figure 5.1: Proportion of Sample Households Harvesting Maize in Different Months 
 (March to July 2008) 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
Table 5.3 provides data on the maize harvest of sample households in the three villages. 
This displays patterns that are helpful for interpreting later data on maize sales 
behaviour. The Chinteka village sample produced collectively the largest maize harvest, 
and the highest level of output per household, but did not exhibit the highest yield per 
ha, an accolade that firmly belonged to Mission village. Interestingly, the Jenda sample 
experienced the lowest yield, indeed around half the yield observed in Mission village, 
despite this being the best off and most cash-based village of the three. Of course, 
agronomic, fertilizer or rainfall factors could have contributed to this outcome, and this 
is examined in the next paragraph. 
 
 


















Jenda N = 29 Chinteka N = 28 Mission N = 30
148 
Table 5.3: Maize Production by Sample Households 
 
Output and Yields Mission Chinteka Jenda Total 
Total output (50 kg bags)         403.5          567.5          299.1       1,270.1  
Total output (kg grain)    20,175.0     28,375.0     14,955.0     63,505.0  
Total area (ha)           11.4            19.8            17.0            48.2  
Mean yield/ha (kg/ha)      1,764.7       1,509.5          879.9       1,317.5  
Mean output/FHH (kg)           11.4            19.8            17.0            48.2  
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
Maize output and yield levels are influenced by access to improved seeds and fertiliser. 
Households access seed from their own previous crop (recycling) or from purchase. For 
open-pollinated maize varieties (OPV), recycling is only recommended up to a 
maximum of three years. For hybrid varieties, new seed is produced and purchased by 
farmers annually (Smale, 1993). In the sample villages, access to seed through cash 
purchase is significant for both open-pollinated and hybrid maize seeds (Table 5.4). 
Coupons issued by the AISP are however, the major means by which sample 
households accessed hybrid maize seed in the 2007/08 maize season. Transfers from 
relatives or other households also play a limited role as a means of accessing seed. In 
considering what sets Jenda apart in maize output and yields, both seed and fertiliser 
may be implicated. In particular, hybrid seed requires good growing conditions and 
prescribed applications of non-organic fertiliser in order to achieve its full yield 
potential. 
 
The Jenda sample was found to utilise the highest proportion of hybrid seed while at the 
same time their total and per household fertiliser use was lowest. It would seem that 
relatively poorer fertilizer use could provide an explanation for the lower yields in Jenda. 
This is confirmed statistically by the Pearson product moment ‘r’ test that shows a 
strong positive relationship of amount of fertiliser used and quantity of maize harvested 
for Mission and Chinteka. The significance value of 0.00 for both villages is less than 
0.05. The computed ‘r’ of 0.727 for Mission and 0.732 for Chinteka exceeds the critical 
value at the 0.01 level (r =0.463, d.f.=28) (Cohen and Holliday, 1982 p.146). 
 
It is concluded that the observed relation between the amount of fertiliser used and the 
amount of maize harvested by sample households in Mission and Chinteka villages are 
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related to the population from which the sample was drawn. However, for Jenda the 
results show that there is no significant relationship between the amount of fertiliser 
used and quantity of maize harvested since its ‘r’ value is below the critical value  
(r=0.463 d.f =28), therefore the results do not apply to the population from which the 
sample was taken. 
 
Table 5.4: Means of Access and Type of Maize Seed and Fertiliser Used, 2007/08 
Season 
 
  Variable Mission Chinteka Jenda Totals 
a Hybrid Maize Seed n = 22 n = 18 n = 21 n = 61 
Total kg 187.5 171.0 219.0 577.5 
  Mean kg 8.5 9.5 10.4 9.5 
  Purchased %  44.5 49.1 43.8 45.8 
  Coupon %  26.7 21.6 48.9 32.4 
  Recycled %  27.7 29.2 6.9 21.3 
  Gift %  1.1 0.0 0.5 0.5 
b OPV n = 10 n = 17 n = 8 n = 35 
  Total kg 125.0 222.5 92.0 439.5 
  Mean kg 12.5 13.1 11.5 12.6 
  Purchased %  63.2 13.3 27.2 34.5 
  Coupon %  0.0 0.0 2.2 0.7 
  Recycled %  36.8 80.0 70.7 62.5 
  Gift %  0.0 6.7 0.0 2.3 
c Fertiliser n = 30 n = 30 n = 30 n = 90 
  Total 50kg bags 57.7 62.9 52.3 172.9 
  Mean 50 kg bags  1.9 2.1 1.7 1.9 
  Purchased %  0.0 52.3 54.5 35.6 
  Coupon %  100.0 47.7 44.9 64.2 
  Gift %  0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
5.2.2 Retention and Sales Decisions by Sample Households 
Across the three villages, most sample households did not engage in maize sales. The 
relevant data on sales behaviour is provided in Table 5.5. Overall, only one third of 
households sold maize at harvest or announced their intention to sell maize later. This 
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proportion varied greatly in different places, however, with 74 per cent of Mission 
households engaging in sales while this proportion was only 19 per cent and 7 per cent 
in Chinteka and Jenda respectively. Since Mission was the poorest village of the three, 
with the smallest farm sizes, this finding seems counterintuitive. However, qualitative 
probing in a focus group revealed that the reason for this was ‘desperation selling’ 
connected with a dire lack of cash by harvest time, and the need to make essential 
purchases or repay loans. In the better off villages, farm families had broader options for 
raising cash resources, either from agriculture (tobacco, horticulture), or from wage 
work (ganyu) or other activities (e.g. petty trading, livestock sales). The important 
consequence of this finding is that the occurrence of sales does not necessarily mean 
that farmers are surplus producers. As shown shortly, in the Mission case, the sale of 
maize at harvest reduces the food security of families, making them have to resort to the 
market to cover their food gaps in the lean season. 
 
Table 5.5: Maize Output and Sales, Sample Households 
 
Aggregate Sample 









Total harvest  403.5 567.5 299.1 1270.1 
Planned consumption 253.9 452.5 287.1 993.5 
Consumption % 62.9 79.7 96.0 78.2 
Total intended sales 149.6 115.0 12.0 276.6 
Sales  % 37.1 20.3 4.0 21.8 
Immediate sales 140.6 24.0 9.0 173.6 
Deferred sales 9.0 91.0 3.0 103.0 
HHs selling maize No. 23 6 2 31 
HHs selling maize % 74.2 19.4 6.7 33. 4 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
As shown in Table 5.5, overall 78 per cent of maize harvested was retained for home 
consumption, while 22 per cent was sold immediately or represented intended (deferred) 
sales. This proportion is higher than the average sales proportion typically estimated for 
maize in Malawi at around 15 per cent (Jayne et al., 2008a); but then these villages were 
selected for their potential to be maize surplus producing research sites. Again there is a 
difference between villages in this proportion, with the better off villages displaying 
higher consumption shares than Mission village. However, this is explained by the same 
considerations already noted. In Mission village, desperation sales leave households 
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more exposed to food insecurity problems later in the year. By contrast, in Jenda village 
households are able to assign nearly all their maize production to a food security role 
since their cash needs can be met from other sources. In general, the findings here are 
similar to those discovered by previous researchers on this aspect of the maize market in 
Malawi (Smale, 1995; Nyirongo et al., 2001; Lall et al., 2009). Maize is typically 
retained for own consumption for food security purposes, and sales only occur either for 
desperation reasons (small, very poor farmers in locations with few other activities) or, 
more obviously, when a surplus above consumption requirements is produced (larger 
farmers and especially good production seasons). 
 
The Pearson product moment test was applied to see if there was a statistically 
significant relationship between the amount of maize harvested and sold at harvest time 
in Mission, and Chinteka, and the pooled data of the three sample villages. Jenda was 
included only in the pooled data because of the limited number of FHHs who sold 
maize at harvest (only two) which could not allow further analysis. The results show 
that the amount of maize harvested and sold at harvest is positively correlated (Mission 
0.893, Chinteka 0.706, and aggregate data 0.652). The relationship is significant, 
Mission and aggregate data have the significance value of 0.00 that is less than 0.05, 
and all are significant at 0.01. The ‘r’ value is above the critical value at 0.01 level 
(r=0.526, d.f.= 21), and for the pooled data the ‘r’ value of 0.652 exceeds the critical 
value at the 0.01 level (r=0.0.456, d.f.=29). The observed relationship is therefore 
applicable to the population from which the sample was taken for Mission and pooled 
data. Chinteka results show that the amount of maize harvested is not related to amount 
of maize sold since the significance value of 0.12 is more than 0.05 , the ‘r’ value of 
0.706 is below the critical value at 0.05 level (r=0.811, d.f.=4), therefore the Chinteka 
results do not relate to the population from which the sample was taken. An explanation 
which accords with these results is that although Chinteka farmers harvested more 
maize than in the other villages, they sold little because they preferred to keep the maize 
for food security purposes and cultivated tobacco for cash sales. 
 
Further analysis was carried out on the Mission data to examine whether the various 
household wealth groups identified during the participatory wealth ranking exercise had 
an influence on participation in the maize market in terms of quantity of maize sold. It 
can be recalled that Group 1 in Mission wealth ranking represented the well off 
households and Group 4 the poorest households, with the other groups falling in 
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between. The results show that the wealth group with the largest proportion of families 
participating in selling maize soon after harvest was surprisingly Group 4 (Table 5.6). 
This finding contrasts with that of other researchers who found that the largest 
proportion of a sample of targeted input beneficiaries who sold maize in 2001 were the 
wealthiest category (Nyirongo et al., 2001). In terms of amount of maize sold, the 
results show that a large number of poorer farmers sold small amounts of maize, while a 
few well-off farmers sold large quantities. This is consistent with IHS-2 findings that 
the largest maize sellers, accounting for 50 per cent of total sales, were undertaken by 
1.2 and 1.5 per cent of the total sampled households in 2002/03 and 2003/04 
respectively (Jayne et al., 2008a p.10). The finding means that markets at harvest time 
in the type of context represented by Mission comprise very large numbers of small 
transactions. Relative village wealth does not necessarily correspond to high maize 
market participation, as illustrated by Jenda, because alternative sources of cash income 
means that maize is primarily retained for home consumption. The same considerations 
apply in a rather different way in the ‘middle’ village, Chinteka, which has elements of 
both high maize yields and alternative cash income sources, again leading to low maize 
sales at harvest. 
 
Table 5.6: Mission Village Participation in the Maize Market by Wealth Group 
 













1 6 4 17.4 58.0 41.3 
2 7 5 21.7 30.0 21.3 
3 7 6 26.1 20.6 14.7 
4 10 8 34.8 32.0 22.8 
Total 30 23 100.0 140.6 100.0 
Source: Fieldwork in Mission conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
Most of the sample households that sold maize in Mission (87 per cent) and Chinteka 
(50 per cent) did so immediately after harvest in order to generate cash to buy consumer 
goods (Table 5.7), while the few who deferred sales did so, on average for three months, 
with wide variation between individuals with respect to this behaviour. The other 
reasons mentioned for harvest sales were to meet school fees, to pay off debts, all with 
equal incidence in the Mission and Chinteka samples. The results are consistent with 
Jayne, et al. (2008a p.8) who report that in sample areas of Blantyre, Mulanje, Lilongwe, 
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Dowa and Mchinji districts, many households sold their maize to meet immediate cash 
needs. 
 
Table 5.7: Reasons Given for Maize Sales Immediately After Harvest 
 
Category of Reason 
Mission Chinteka Pooled 
n =23 % n = 6 % n = 29 % 
Surplus maize 0 * 1 16.7 1 3.5 
Cash needs (debts) 1 4.4 1 16.7 2 6.9 
Cash needs (school fees) 1 4.4 1 16.7 2 6.9 
Cash needs (purchases) 20 87.0 3 50.0 23 79.3 
Capital needs (business) 1 4.4 0  1 3.5 
Total 23 100.0 6 100.0 29 100.0 
Source: Fieldwork in Mission conducted by the author May-August 2008 
Note: Jenda did not respond. 
 
Turning now to transactions at point of sale by those sample households that did sell 
maize, 95.7 per cent and 100 per cent in Mission and Chinteka respectively did not 
always sell their maize to the same buyer, implying that households felt that they had a 
choice between buyers to whom they could sell. The main deciding factor for 
households regarding to whom to sell the maize was price, with the buyer offering the 
best price being the one selected. The few households who reported always selling their 
maize to the same buyer (in Mission village), stated that they did so, not because the 
buyer was a relative or friend, but because they gave the best price (Table 5.8). Price 
was therefore overwhelmingly the priority consideration in selecting the buyer to whom 
to sell the maize. In general, the results of both household interviews and focus group 
discussions suggested that at the farm-gate level the maize market is highly competitive 
with many buyers and sellers participating. Jayne et al. (2008a) also reach this same 
conclusion. 
 
5.2.3 Annual Food Security of Farm Families after Sales 
The annual food security position of sample households is approached through 
triangulation of three parameters: per capita maize consumption, equivalent family size 
and own farmer calculation of food security position. For sample households, maize 
retained for home consumption was 134.9 kg per capita across all three villages, with 
Mission at 99.4, Chinteka at 175.3 and Jenda at 130.0 kg per capita. These figures are 
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Table 5.8: Households Choice of Buyers and Reasons 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
Note: only 2 households in Jenda sold maize, so Jenda is not included here 
 
substantially below the estimated national average maize consumption per capita of 
201.6 kg for 2007/08 (Table 1.2 in Chapter 1). The results seem surprising given the 
selection of the case study villages for their expected maize production potential; 
however, as already discussed in Chapter 3 and other places in this thesis, the 2008 
maize harvest came in well below expectations across the country, and its true level 
relative to published production statistics remains the subject of doubt and conjecture. 
In focus group discussions in Chinteka and Jenda villages, dry spells in the mid-
growing season were cited as reasons for lower than expected harvests. 
 
These average per capita maize retention figures are indicative of potential food security 
stress in farm families, especially in Mission village with its relatively undiversified 
agriculture and few other opportunities for gainful employment available. The food 
security picture can be refined further by adopting an adult equivalent unit (AEU) 
approach to maize consumption that takes into account age and gender differences in 
households (Government of Malawi and IFPRI, 2001). The adult equivalent is a weight 
that is assigned to individual members of a household based on age and sex 
characteristics relative to that of an adult male. The adult equivalent family size (AEFS) 
maize requirements for sample households (Table 5.9) has been constructed using 
weights and formula compiled by the Instituto Nacional de Nutrition (of Mexico) in 
 Choice and Reasons 
Mission Chinteka Pooled 
n= 23 % n= 6 % n= 29 % 
A. Options of Buyers   
Same buyer 1 4.4 0  1 3.5 
Different buyers 22 95.7 6 100.0 28 96.6 
Total 23 100.0 6 100.0 29 100.0 
B. Buyer Choice 
(Reasons)        
Best price 13 56.6 6 100.0 19 65.5 
Check market first 4 17.4 0  4 13.8 
Different buyers (best price) 6 26.1 0  6 20.7 
Total 23 100.0 6 100.0 29 100.0 
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1987 as follows (Skoufias et al., 1999 p.78; Government of Malawi and IFPRI, 2001 
p.60): 
 
AEHS = (0.41)*children0-4 +(0.80)*children5-10 + (1.15)*males11-14 + 
(1.05)*females11-14 +(1.38)*males15-19 + (1.05)*females15-19 + (1.26)*males20-34 
+ (0.92)*females 20-34 + (1.15)*males35-54 + (0.85)*females35-54 + 
(1.03)*males>=55 + (0.78)*females>=55 
 
The top of Table 5.9 contains data for each village sample as a whole, and across all 
samples, on total household members, mean household size, mean adult equivalent 
household size, and adjusted total household members using the adult equivalent 
approach. The aggregate quantity of maize retained for home consumption for all 
sample households is also provided. The middle and bottom segments of the table 
contain two alternative measures of the degree to which households meet their food 
security requirements from maize. The first of these measures assumes that 55 per cent 
of dietary calories for household members are obtained from maize (Jayne et al., 2008a).  
However, there are reasons associated with the balance between production and 
consumption in MoAFS’ time-series to suspect that this figure is much too low. For this 
reason, the alternative share of maize in dietary calories of 71 per cent (discussed in 
Chapter 1) is used as an alternative measure, in order to provide a range. 
 
The calculations proceed as follows. The daily adult calorie requirement for Malawi is 
2,366 calories, and one kg of maize supplies 3,578 dietary calories. Therefore, if 55 per 
cent of required calories are met by maize, each adult equivalent unit will need to eat 
0.364 kg of maize per day; and if 71 per cent of calories are met by maize, each AEU 
will need to eat 0.470 kg of maize per day. These requirements can then be multiplied 
up to an annual basis (based on 365 days in the year), and this sets the maize needs per 
year for the sample households (taken together) as shown for each alternative in Table 
5.9. Then the degree to which retained maize meets these requirements is shown as a 
percentage. For example, at 55 per cent calories from maize, the farm households in the 
Mission sample retained enough maize to satisfy 73.3 per cent of their annual 
requirement; while at 71 per cent calories from maize, the equivalent figure was 56.8 
per cent. Such percentage figures can also be converted into months’ duration of the 
family maize stocks. Thus 56.8 per cent represents 6.8 months of coverage of dietary 
calories from maize for the average sample family. 
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Table 5.9: Sample FHHs Food Security Position from Own Production Using AEFS 
 







Total HH members 138 136 136 410 
Mean HH size  4.60 4.47 4.53 4.53 
Mean AEFS 4.35 4.15 4.21 4.24 
Total AEFS members 130.4 124.5 126.2 381.1 
Maize retained (kg) 12,695 22,625 14,355 49,675 
55% calories from maize     
Maize needs per year (kg) 17,322 16,542 16,762 50,626 
Mean coverage % 73.3 136.8 86.6 98.1 
HHs achieving coverage:     
<80% 17 13 21 51 
80-90% 5 0 1 6 
90-100% 2 0 0 2 
>100% 6 17 8 31 
71% calories from maize     
Maize needs per year (kg) 22,367 21,360 21,643 65,369 
Mean coverage % 56.8 106.0 67.0 76.0 
HHs achieving coverage:     
<80% 25 14 23 62 
80-90% 0 1 0 1 
90-100% 3 0 0 3 
>100% 2 15 7 24 
 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
Table 5.9 also shows the number of households that fall into different coverage ranges, 
deriving from these calculations. Less than 80 per cent coverage means that maize 
supplies will last a maximum of 9.6 months in that group, and so on. Only in Chinteka 
village do the majority of households retain enough maize to be more than self-
sufficient, indeed between 50 and 60 per cent of sample households in that village were 
truly self-sufficient in maize based on these calculations. By way of contrast, 57 per 
cent of the sample households in Mission village fell into the ‘less than 80 per cent’ 
group at the lower maize contribution to dietary calories, rising to 83 per cent at the 
higher maize contribution to dietary calories. Jenda village also displayed a majority 
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proportion of the sample falling into the ‘less than 80 per cent’ category. As pointed out 
earlier, the estimated contribution of maize to dietary calories is only half the picture 
with respect to understanding household food security. The other half of the picture 
comprises the other options by which households can generate resources that would 
enable them to purchase maize (or other sources of calories) when they are lacking in 
maize. Moreover, here there is substantial difference between Mission and Jenda, with 
the former having few other options, whereas the latter is a relatively well off village in 
which most household have access to other sources of income in cash or in kind. 
 
The third way of examining food security at the household level is to use farmers’ own 
assessment of their food security position post-harvest. This is done in Table 5.10, 
which groups farmers’ responses to questions about how long their maize stock was 
expected to last at the 2008 harvest into 3-month bands. Farmers’ own views are 
notably more pessimistic than the food security picture indicated in the preceding 
exercise. However, there may be interviewee bias in this outcome, since respondents do 
tend to make their situation seem as difficult as possible if they perceive that 
interviewers are connected in some way to future government action on their behalf. 
Nevertheless, the results shown in Table 5.10 conform in relative positioning between 
villages to the other findings on food security. Both Mission and Jenda villages are 
insecure on the basis of own maize available for consumption, with 73 per cent of 
Mission respondents and 77 per cent of Jenda respondents reporting that their own 
maize would last six months or less. In Chinteka, by contrast, this proportion is 33 per 
 















No. % No. % No. % No. % 
0-3 7 23.3 5 16.7 17 56.7 29 32.2 
3-6 15 50.0 6 16.7 6 20.0 27 30.0 
6-9 6 20.0 1 3.3 0 0.0 7 7.8 
9-12 1 3.3 5 16.7 3 10.0 9 10.0 
>12 1 3.3 13 46.7 4 13.3 18 20.0 
Total HH 30 100.0 30 100.0 30 100.0 90 100.0 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
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cent. At the other end of the scale in Chinteka, 47 per cent of sample households had in 
excess of one year’s maize needs available following harvest, and this also chimes with 
the much greater prevalence of later market sales in Chinteka compared to the other 
villages. 
 
5.2.4 Farmer Storage of Maize 
For small farmers in Malawi, the chief method of storing maize is in bags in their 
houses, and this comes through clearly in the fieldwork in answer to questions about the 
type of storage that respondents utilised (Table 5.11). Overall, 60 per cent of households 
stated bags as their main form of storage, and a majority stated this in Mission and 
Jenda villages. This is followed by traditional nkhokwes (granaries), which were the 
most prevalent storage facility amongst respondents in Chinteka village. A traditional 
nkhokwe is a raised cylindrical structure made from poles and grass, and has a 
removable thatched roof (Heisey and Smale, 1995). 
 
Table 5.11: Maize Storage Practices, SampleHouseholds 
 
Type of Storage Mission n = 30 
Chinteka 
n = 30 
Jenda 
n = 30 
Total 
n = 90 
Brick roofed granaries No. 0 1 0 1 
Brick roofed granaries % 0.0 3.3 0.0 1.1 
Traditional Nkhokwe No. 2 19 3 24 
Traditional Nkhokwe % 6.7 63.3 10.0 26.7 
Store in bags No.  23 9 22 54 
Store in bags % 76.7 30.0 73.3 60.0 
Kitchen Sanja No. 5 0 0 5 
Kitchen Sanja % 16.7 0.0 0.0 5.6 
Did not respond No.  0 1 5 6 
Did not respond % 0.0 3.3 16.7 6.7 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
With regard to losses in store, the majority of sample farmers did not report storage 
losses that were important enough for them to draw the attention of enumerators to 
losses as a critical problem. This is interesting given the discussion at the end of 
Chapter 5, in which maize storage losses in Malawi are put at anything from 15 to 30 
per cent. It is recalled that Jayne et al. (2008a) estimated moisture related storage losses 
at farmer level as around 14 per cent. One consideration relates to the duration of 
storage. Clearly, if maize stocks are going to run out in 4 or 5 months, then losses from 
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deterioration in store are likely to be considerably less than for grain stored for 7 or 8 
months or even up to a year from harvest. Another reason for low losses is broader 
uptake of preservative technologies by farmers than in the past. Actellic dust is the 
preservative treatment method commonly used by households in Chinteka and Jenda 
villages (Table 5.12). In Mission village, some sample households used actellic dust, 
while others used a traditional method called sanja (also noted as a storage method in 
Table 5.11). Sanja is a method of treating maize against insect infestation by hanging 
the unhusked maize cobs above the top of the fireplace in the kitchen (hence ‘kitchen 
smoked’). Sanja is an inexpensive form of preservative treatment, but is severely 
limited in terms of the quantities of maize that can be treated in this way. Its popularity 
in Mission village is yet another reflection of the poverty of the village, and the low 
number of months food security from own maize production for most villagers. 
 
Table 5.12: Maize Treatment in Storage, Sampled Households 
 
Type of Treatment Mission n = 30 
Chinteka 
n = 30 
Jenda 
n = 30 
Total 
n = 90 
None No. 3 13 9 25 
None % 10.0 43.3 30.0 27.8 
Actellic dust No. 19 13 5 37 
Actellic dust % 63.3 43.3 16.7 41.1 
Liquid Actellic No. 4 3 11 18 
Liquid Actellic % 13.3 10.0 36.7 20.0 
Kitchen Smoked No. 4 0 0 4 
Kitchen Smoked % 13.3 0.0 0.0 4.4 
Did not respond No. 0 1 5 6 
Did not respond% 0.0 3.3 16.7 6.7 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
All the maize used for home consumption in the study villages is processed locally to 
produce the socially preferred, fine white flour (ufa woyera), with the exception of one 
household in Mission who processed mgaiwa (whole maize meal flour). White flour 
processing involves dehulling shelled maize with a mortar and pestle or hammer mill, 
winnowing, soaking the dehulled grain in water for fermentation, drying, milling into 
flour using hammer mill, and sun drying the flour (Smale 1993, p.35). The cost of 
milling per kg varies, in Mission it was MK2.00, Chinteka MK2.75 and Jenda MK2.50. 
The number of times maize is processed varies depending on the size of the family, and 
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the quantity processed at a time. Sample households in Mission and Jenda on average 
processed flour more than twice a month, while in Chinteka this was less twice a month 
despite sample households having over three times the quantity of maize processed 
compared to the other study villages. The large quantity of flour processed by Chinteka 
families reflected the larger amount of maize kept in store by households. The losses in 
weight from flour processing for the sample households averaged 23.5 per cent in 
Mission, 24.7 per cent in Chinteka and 16.5 per cent in Jenda. This finding compares to 
the findings of other researchers that farm level processing losses can be as high as 25 
per cent for dent hybrids (Smale and Heisey, 1997, p.26). It is notable that whole maize 
flour (mgaiwa) results in negligible weight loss in processing. Flour processed at village 
level is almost entirely for home consumption, and not for sale as a processed farm 
product. 
 
5.2.5 Sales Prices at the Farm Gate or Nearest Market 
Prices received by farmers for maize sold soon after harvest varies over time and space, 
but did not vary much among households in the same location (Table 5.13). In Mission 
village, where a moderately good sample of sales behaviour was captured, the most 
prevalent maize price reported by farmers was MK20 per kilo, with some variation 
(probably competition related) over the range MK15 to MK27 per kilo. Maize prices in 
Mission village were low relative to the other locations for reasons already discussed in 
the thesis. Mission represents a deep rural situation, also adjacent to important border  
 











Mean 20.5 28.5 30.0 22.6 
Std. Deviation 2.6 3.2 0.0 4.6 
Median 20.0 30.0 30.0 20.0 
Mode 20.0 30.0 30.0 20.0 
Minimum 15.0 24.0 30.0 15.0 
Maximum 27.0 32.0 30.0 32.0 
 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
Note: In Mission N = 22 because one household did not remember the price. 
 
crossing areas for maize coming into Malawi from Mozambique; therefore maize prices 
there reflected the two factors of surplus maize being available in volume in the fairly 
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compressed time period of the maize harvest (also occurring simultaneously across the 
border in Mozambique), and road distance to larger markets or urban areas. Chinteka 
and Jenda both reported most prevalent maize prices at MK30 kg; however, sample 
numbers are low in these two markets due to the lack of sales encountered amongst 
sample farmers. 
 
Farmers were asked a variety of questions about their sales decisions to traders, and a 
sample of traders were in turn asked questions about their buying and selling prices and 
institutional links. It is recalled that it was originally intended to conduct a ‘follow-the-
bag’ marketing research methodology (Chapter 3); however, two factors in practice 
rendered this idea rather implausible when it came to conducting the research. One of 
these was the low proportion of farmer interviewees who engaged in market sales in the 
2008 harvest season; the other was that even one or two weeks after the harvest, farmers 
were no longer able to recall the names of traders to whom they had sold their harvest. 
Indeed, a striking finding of the research that arose from both household and 
community level interviews was farmers’ complete indifference to who they sold their 
output. In effect, transactions were conducted at arms length with total strangers, with 
price being the sole feature of interest to the farmers. This is on its own quite an 
important finding. It is often supposed that very poor small farmers have a preference 
for selling to relatives and friends with whom they have previously built up a 
relationship of trust, and which they hope will avoid exploitation by middlemen who 
know more about true market conditions than the farmers know themselves. However, 
this was not found to be true at all in this study. The prevalence of anonymous arms 
length transactions is recognised by economists as an important ingredient of 
competition in markets and the formation of a ‘market price’. In its absence, 
transactions are personalized and each exchange represents its own individual 
peculiarities in terms of price setting rather than a reference to the larger domain of the 
market. 
 
Households in the study villages have various options for marketing their maize: selling 
at local open markets, direct purchase by buyers at homesteads, depot-delivered at 
premium price with minimum deliverable quantities at designated depots, and formal 
contract buying. Due to the collapse of the follow-the-bag methodology, alternate 
buyers from farmers were interviewed, on the basis of capturing a representative range 
of different stages and chains in maize marketing. A total of 28 institutions were 
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interviewed in the categories of local maize trader, long distant maize trader, district and 
national buyer, processor and service provider (government). The majority of buyers 
interviewed were local maize traders (Table 5.14) directly interfacing with farmers at 
the local level. The traders, processors and service providers interviewed (Appendix III) 
were those that were mentioned during the survey and were involved directly with 
maize marketed from the study villages. Local traders are sometimes referred to here as 
‘mobile traders’. This is because they do not possess permanent structures or have fixed 
purchase itineraries. Rather they arrive for a period, set up a weighing scale on a tripod, 
buy maize while it is on offer, and then move on. In most cases, they come from outside 
the community (they are unknown mobile traders). 
 
Table 5.14: Categories of Trader Interviewed by the Researcher 
 
Category No. % 
Local Maize Trader  11 39.3 
Long Distance Maize Trader 8 28.6 
District or National Buyer 2 7.1 
Food Processing Companies 6 21.4 
Public Service Providers 1 3.6 
Total 28 100.0 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the author May-August 2008 
 
In Mission, mobile traders were predominant; while in Chitenka a mixture of mobile 
and distant traders were present in the village at harvest time. Large scale buyers, for 
example registered members of the GTPA, typically have agents purchasing on their 
behalf at village level, and the maize purchased then feeds into a national network at 
higher levels of aggregation (Figures 5.2 to 5.4 below). Traders from outside dominate 
in Jenda because it is situated on the M1 road linking the north and the south of Malawi, 
with a good road infrastructure that attracts long distance buyers. The unknown mobile 
traders bought maize from 83 per cent of farmers who sold maize in the sampled 
villages in 2008, followed in importance by ADMARC at 7 per cent. 
 
The prevalence of small, opportunistic traders in the Malawi maize market is important 
for debates about market functioning, and how important market imperfections are for 
explaining poor agricultural performance. A key feature of such traders is that they are 
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unregistered, and for this reason they would not appear in any market structure data 
based on trader registration by the authorities (Chilowa, 1998). Interviews with farmers 
and traders did not suggest that the bigger players were able to outbid small traders in 
order to secure more maize, as is suggested by Chirwa (2009). Rather, there are a wide 
variety of different operators occupying different niches in the primary level marketing 
function. If larger traders and processors are prepared to pay higher prices, then this just 
feeds through to the mobile traders, who in turn will end up paying farmers higher 
prices, too. Mobile traders do not engage in a storage function, except in a minimal way 
(they might rent a hut for temporary storage overnight, if they have a transport 
bottleneck). They purchase and sell as soon as they can, creating a margin due to their 
ability to move rapidly to the next place where sellers are present. The larger operators 
tend to buy from markets, or from the mobile traders, using purchasing agents, who are 
again numerous and try to drive a hard bargain in their transactions. The overall picture 
at village and local market levels is a highly competitive one. 
 
Almost all the buyers and processors interviewed in this study were not registered 
members of the GTPA. An important exception at the larger end of the scale was Mulli 
Brothers. The system of registration of private traders that was created in 1988 
following liberalisation of the maize market had all but collapsed by 2006, due to an 
inability to keep up with the spread of small scale trading, and weakening enforcement 
by MoAFS (Sjaastad et al., 2007 p.20). The government’s support of the formation of 
the GTPA in 2006 represented an attempt to reverse this lack of control by drawing 
private traders themselves into the enforcement regime. However, this effort was set 
back seriously in mid-2008 by the sudden decision to exclude private trade from the 
maize market in August 2008. In general, and especially at local levels, unregistered 
traders predominate, and this includes agents as well as mobile traders, since agents are 
no less ‘informal’ than other small traders, it is merely that in exchange for a fee they 
agree for a period, or in a particular location, to purchase for a principal rather than on 
their own account. Fifty per cent of the local maize traders interviewed were buying as 
agents. 
 
Amongst larger players, ADMARC, Farmers World and Mulli Brothers were the most 
prevalent large buyers of maize across the study sites. ADMARC was absent in Mission 
itself, but had a permanent storage structure at Chinteka known as the Kariba 
ADMARC branch, and in Jenda ADMARC rented two temporary structures during the 
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buying season, that were then closed when volumes traded began to tail off. Jenda 
differed from the other study villages in having permanent facilities along the main road 
belonging to a number of different larger scale traders including Export Traders, 
Farmers World, Mulli Brothers, Kulima Gold, NASFAM and Jenda Market Resource 
Centre, a local produce buyer. 
 
In the harvest season, buyers operate almost continuously with most of them reporting 
6-days a week and a few of them working the full 7-days. It was found in a study 
written up by Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin (2006, p.13) that traders operated on 
average 6.1 days per week in the buying season. In the small sample of traders in this 
fieldwork, purchases volumes varied between 3 and 55 bags of maize per day, on 
average, and in the Muloza area (of which Mission village is a part), traders had 
purchased, again on average, 2,444 bags in the season (these are 50 kg bags of maize 
grain) per trader. In general, as shown in Table 5.15, there is great heterogeneity in the 
scale of operations in this small sample of traders. In the three villages, traders 
interviewed were operating in the scale of over 5,000 bags on average in the season to 
date. The quantities of maize bought in the Mission-Muloza area seem to far exceed the 
small quantities of maize sold by local farmers, and this is due to cross-border traffic 
from Mozambique during the harvest season. FEWSNET estimated that informal cross 
border trade into Malawi in July 2008 was 15,100 tons of husked maize (FEWSNET, 
2008a). This then collapsed to 8,516 tons in August 2008 due to a government ban on 
private maize trading that was imposed that month. Mozambique was the main supplier 
of maize, but also in 2008, Malawi imported significant quantities from Zambia towards 
the end of July 2008. 
 
Table 5.15: Purchase Transactions and Volumes, Sample Traders, 2008 Season 
 







HHs purchased from per day  39 24 26 29 
HHs purchased from per week. 231 155 179 151 
Days trading per week 6.3 6.0 6.3 6.2 
Maize bought per day (bags) 325 28 17 188 
Maize bought per week (bags) 2,017 182 105 768 
Maize bought this season (bags) 14,667 603 337 5,202 
 
Source: Fieldwork in three villages conducted by the Author May-August 2008 
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5.2.6 Maize Marketing Chains from Sample Villages 
The principal maize consumer markets in Malawi are the cities of Lilongwe in the 
centre of the country, Blantyre in the south, and the somewhat smaller urban area of 
Mzuzu in the north. In Malawi post-independence history, Blantyre has traditionally 
been the commercial centre of the country with the most vigorous urban and industrial 
economy. In 1975, the administrative capital was moved to Lilongwe. In the past ten 
years or so, Lilongwe has been the fastest growing city, attracting substantial migration 
from other parts of the country. The population census conducted in 2008 gives 
Lilongwe city a population of 674,448, with Blantyre at 661,256, Mzuzu 133,968, and 
Zomba (like Blantyre, in the south) 88,314 people. Much of the border trade with 
Mozambique that has been discussed in this and the previous chapter is to do with 
supplying Blantyre, Zomba and other towns in the south with maize. Central Malawi is 
often more or less self-sufficient in maize. The annual population growth rate for 
Lilongwe and Mzuzu cities is 4.4 per cent, Zomba city 3.0 percent and Blantyre city 2.8 
percent (Government of Malawi, 2008c). 
 
Tracing vertical marketing chains for the study villages is a useful exercise because it 
helps in identifying clearly the processes of aggregation that occur from the farm level 
towards the larger traders and processors in the marketing system (including 
government agencies such as ADMARC and the National Food Reserve Agency 
(NFRA). Marketing chains are reconstructed on the basis of triangulating evidence from 
farmer interviews, focus group meetings in villages, and trader interviews conducted 
during the fieldwork period. The chains are presented in Figures 5.2 to 5.4. These do not 
attempt to assign maize volumes to the various components of the marketing structure. 
The picture for Mission village is most complete, since it is here that the greatest 
number of farmers had sold maize and a great deal of trading activity was taking place 
at the time of the fieldwork. The following paragraphs describe the findings for each 
village in turn: 
 
Mission Maize Marketing Chain 
The active main maize trading areas close to Mission are Ndala, Nanchidwa and 
Ntambalika villages that are 7 km from Mission and the larger trading centre of Muloza. 
Most of the buyers in the sample were full-time buyers, engaged in maize buying for the 
duration of the harvest season; all were men, buying and selling on their own account. 
Their mode of transport was bicycle; they paid cash for the maize bought and financed 
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the purchasing from own resources. During the period of the survey, the government 
had just imposed a ban on maize imports and exports. However, despite the ban a lot of 
maize was still entering Malawi via informal cross-border traders, with unofficial entry 
at Mtambalika Village, which is along the Phalombe road. The maize entered Malawi 
on bicycles, with one bicycle carrying up to four 50 kg bags at once and offloading was 
every minute with, each collection site mobilising over 30 tons of maize in a day. Large 
buyers in Blantyre (Rab Processors, Chibuku Products) buy maize from the mobile 
traders. The ban on maize imports therefore affected buyers in both Blantyre and 
Muloza. The ban increased the loading time of a 30-ton truck in Muloza from less than 
a few hours to 24 hours because with the ban meant that maize was carried to the 
loading point in small volumes by bicycle, rather than by pickup trucks. However, the 
government lifted the ban on individual maize import volumes of less than a ton within 
two weeks of putting it in place, thus allowing the open transport of quantities up to the 
one ton ceiling to proceed as normal. This sudden switching of policy is an important 
reminder of the unpredictability of government actions on maize, even over quite short 
time horizons. Figure 5.2 provides a summary of the marketing chain through which the 
maize in Mission in Mulanje and from Mozambique reaches the processors and 
consumer in Blantyre and Lilongwe, though the majority of those farmers who sold 
could not remember the buyers of their maize. 
 
Chinteka Maize Marketing Chain 
Few of the sample farm households in Chinteka sold maize in the 2008 season and those 
that did most were able to name the buyers who bought their maize. From the trader 
interviews, it transpired that all local buyers were men with one exception. In Chinteka, 
the majority of small traders were operating in the market as agents for private 
companies based in Lilongwe. Chinteka had a mixture of full-time and part-time buyers, 
and most of these were locally resident. The majority of the maize was transported 
onwards using pickups and trucks, but bicycles were also observed to be an important 
means of maize transportation within the area. Figure 5.3 summarises the marketing 
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consumer to be disaggregated into its component parts. Due to a lack of farmers selling 
maize in the 2008 survey, however, it was not possible to construct margins in quite this 
way, although Mission village yielded sufficient information at the farmer and local 
trader level to go quite a long way in this direction, and Chinteka somewhat less so. 
Interviews with traders at different stages and scales in the marketing system allowed 
many of the gaps to be filled in, especially in the case of Mission village. 
 
Analysis of price formation through marketing margins has the objective of seeing 
whether such margins represent a competitive return to capital deployed (Timmer et al., 
1983). In the absence of own data on storage costs, the findings of Jayne et al. (2008a) 
were used to estimate costs for the storage component of the vertical margin. In relation 
to competitive returns to capital, the official bank lending rate is used as a benchmark 
with which to compare percentage net margins. The National Bank of Malawi lending 
rate of 19.5 per cent per annum (1.63 per cent per month) in 2008 was used, and some 
traders confirmed borrowing at this rate. In general, however, it is expected that private 
borrowing will have occurred above this rate, since commercial suppliers of credit build 
their own margin into the difference between their borrowing rate from the Reserve 
Bank of Malawi and their loan rate to private clients. 
 
The analysis of prices and margins for Mission village is presented in Table 5.16. This 
table begins with an average purchase price from farmers at the top of the first column. 
This farm-gate price is compared successively to various city prices in other columns, 
as well as (last column) the official purchase price from farmers set by the government 
for ADMARC in March 2008. The city prices refer to the prices that various private and 
public organisations stated that they would pay for maize delivered to their premises. 
The vertical information in the first column of the table displays various margins, based 
on information obtained from private traders, for specific purchases and sales. In 
Mission village farmers received 41-53.9 per cent of the buying prices of various traders 
in Blantyre, and 73.2 per cent of the official NFRA buying price for maize in Lilongwe. 
In interpreting this table for the harvest season of 2008, it needs to be borne in mind that 
Mission harvested early in what subsequently became a crisis season in which prices 
began to spiral upwards from late July onwards. At the time of the Mission harvest, 
farmer prices were relatively low. In that period, ADMARC remained free to set its 
buying prices according to local circumstances, and its prices varied in different parts of 
the country rather than being pan-territorial. Later in the same harvest season, the  
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Table 5.16: Sequential Marketing Margins, Mission Village, end-May 2008 

































(1) Purchase in 
Mission        
Price paid to farmer 23.50 61.8 58.8 47.0 61.5 83.9 
Transport to 
Nachindwa 1.00           
Price sold at 
Nanchidwa 26.00 68.4 65.0 52.0 68.1 92.9 
Net Margin 1.50 2.6 2.5 2.0 2.6 3.6 
Margin % 6.4           
(2) Storage in 
Nachindwa            
Purchase Price into 
Store 30.00 78.9 75.0 60.0 78.5 107.1 
Period of storage 
(days) 30.00           
Storage Costs  0.39 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.4 
Onward Sale Price 32.00 84.2 80.0 64.0 83.8 114.3 
Net Margin  1.61 4.2 4.0 3.2 4.2 5.8 
Margin % 5.4           
(3) Nanchidwa Buyer            
Price Paid  32.00 84.2 80.0 64.0 83.8 114.3 
Price Sold to Buyer 33.00 86.8 82.5 66.0 86.4 117.9 
Time Taken to Sell 
(Hrs) 3 to 4           
Net Margin 1.00 2.6 2.5 2.0 2.6 3.6 
Margin % 3.1           
(4) Mtambalika 
Buyer            
Price Paid   33.00 86.8 82.5 66.0 86.4 117.9 
Transport  to Blantyre 2.00 5.3 5.0 4.0 5.2 7.1 
Price sold in Blantyre 37.00 97.4 92.5 74.0 96.9 132.1 
Time Taken to Sell 
(Hrs) 3 to 4           
Net Margin 2.00 5.3 5.0 4.0 5.2 7.1 
Margin % 6.1           
Source: Fieldwork in Mission village conducted by the author May 2008, storage and chemical 
costs for Mulanje (Jayne et al., 2008). 
1 Retail prices are monthly average prices collected by MoAFs retail prices  
 
172 
ADMARC purchase price was raised to MK45, and this was a pan-territorial price, and 
private traders were banned from purchasing maize from farmers. 
 
The table contains the successive trading margins of three linked buyers at Mission, 
Nanchidwa and Mtambalika markets respectively. In these stages, the price rose from  
MK23.5 (paid to farmers in Mission) to MK37 (sale price in Blantyre). Margins after 
deducting particular costs (storage, transport) vary between 3.1 and 6.4 per cent for each 
trader. However, these margins do not account for other marketing expenses including 
losses, nor do they take into account the opportunity cost of capital which can be put at 
a minimum of 1.63 per cent per month (at the National Bank lending rate). Overall, it 
seems that traders operate within narrow margins, and the estimated aggregate margin 
to retail in Blantyre at around 43 per cent is not high for a vertical marketing margin. 
 
For the other villages, it was more difficult to construct this type of marketing chain. 
This was partly due to the turmoil in the market that began to occur in July 2008. For 
example, by the time interviews with traders were being conducted in Chinteka village, 
the price that several Lilongwe traders (Central Poultry, Export Trading) were prepared 
to pay for maize was MK60 per kg, more than double the official ADMARC price of 
MK28 per kg. This was just before the ADMARC price was then adjusted upwards to 
MK45 per kg. In this situation, asking traders about buying and selling prices was 
something of a moving target. For example, one trader had purchased maize into store 
in Jenda at MK50 per kg, but after only two weeks was expecting to sell at MK65 kg. In 
this situation, there is no doubt that private traders can potentially gain excessive profit 
margins as prices move up. However, traders are merely responding to opportunity 
created by a real, underlying, shortage of supply. It is unfortunate that governments tend 
to ascribe spiralling prices to deliberate intent on the part of private trade (or, at least, 
this is sometimes the message to put across to consumers and voters), because this fails 
to address the cause of the rising price trend. In particular, a shortage of supply is not 
solved by banning private trade and inhibiting informal cross-border imports. The thesis 
returns to this problem of cause and effect in the 2008 maize price crisis in Chapter 6. 
5.2.8 Key Informant Interviews with Traders and Processors and Government 
In addition to the farmer level household survey and interviews with small and medium 
traders, key informant interviews were also conducted with larger private trading 
companies and government agencies involved in the maize market. These included 
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NFRA, GTPA, ADMARC and Chibuku Products, and this section first briefly outlines 
the role and activities of these bodies. 
 
The NFRA is the government emergency food stocking agency, and in order to fulfil 
this function it must buy grain when prices are low, and have stocks available to meet 
maize shortfalls either for the market as a whole, or in specific areas that turn out to be 
maize deficit, and that can vary in location from year to year around the country. NFRA 
typically begins buying maize in July and finishes in November depending on the 
volume of stock it is seeking to build. NFRA purchases are funded partly from 
government revenue and also by donors, amongst which the European Union and UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) are the most important. The maize 
purchased must meet NFRA maize standards of non genetically-modified white maize 
from the current production year, with 12.5 per cent maximum moisture content, 3 per 
cent maximum breakage, 1 per cent shrivelling, 2 per cent maximum grain of other 
colour, 0.3 per cent maximum extraneous matter and trash, 1 per cent maximum rotten 
or mouldy grains, 0 per cent maximum germinated grain, 4 per cent maximum aflatoxin, 
and free of contaminants or live insects. In 2008, NFRA purchase contracts were 
awarded to ADMARC and several private traders through the GTPA. The purchase of 
maize from private traders was stated as providing an opportunity to build the capacity 
of the private sector. 
 
NFRA loses some maize in storage due to moisture loss from further drying, breakage 
when recycling it from one bin to another, and dust and chaff from broken grain. The 
maize is stored in bins for a duration that can last as much as 30 months. Losses in store 
were very high in the late 1990s estimated at 46 per cent in 1999/2000 (NFRA, 2008). 
Almost certainly this reflected unofficial disposals out of store, since after considerable 
publicity and a crackdown, the loss purportedly fell to less than 1 per cent in 2007/08, 
an achievement attributed by the government to applying good maize purchase 
standards, and improved storage management. NFRA’s main role is to distribute maize 
to food deficit households for humanitarian purposes. However, in 2006 NFRA also 
started keeping commercial maize stocks, related to the excellent harvest achieved in 
the 2005/06 season. In 2007, on behalf of the government, NFRA exported some maize 
to Zimbabwe and donated maize to Lesotho at a time when Malawi had an estimated 
maize surplus of over 500,000 tons. 
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The GTPA is an association of private traders, not a direct maize buyer. Its formation 
was encouraged by the government through MoAFS in order to carry out certain roles 
that had originally been undertaken by government, but had deteriorated in effectiveness 
over the years. These included sourcing maize for NFRA, as well as the registration of 
traders and the issue of produce-buying licenses. GTPA is evidently put in an 
ambiguous position by these functions, and some important private traders have not 
joined the association. One of the members of GTPA interviewed was Mulli Brothers. It 
operates 30 maize-buying points, one in each district, and buys from over 1,000 farmers. 
Mulli Brothers sell maize to NFRA under contract, as well as to processors such as 
Blessings Campus, Chibuku Products and Central Poultry. 
 
The research conducted an interview with ADMARC at its Mzimba premises in the 
north of the country. The Mzimba ADMARC covers an area comprising most of four 
districts: Rumphi South, Nkhatabay, Nkhotakota and Mzimba itself. The boundary for 
an ADMARC ‘area market’ is determined by geographical setting and accessibility. 
ADMARC buys maize and re-bags it as an agent for NFRA, for commercial sales to the 
public. Most of the maize bought in Mzimba in 2008 came across the border from 
Zambia, through Kapopo police post, Ntocha, Kasichi, Edingeni and Engalaweni. Maize 
bought in Mzimba is transported to ADMARC’s Mzuzu Depot for storage. In 2008, 
ADMARC financed its maize purchases with loans from international as well as local 
banks. At the time of interview ADMARC was not behaving as a monopoly, and was 
not using pan-territorial pricing. According to interview, ADMARC started buying as 
early as it could in the 2008 season, while elsewhere its difficulties have been ascribed 
to entering the market rather late (Jayne et al., 2008a). 
 
Chibuku Products is a large private processor in the Malawi maize marketing system. It 
purchases maize from April to August every year, mostly from medium-sized traders 
with whom it has developed long-term business relationships. The company uses the 
maize to make a cloudy local beer called chibuku. Traders deliver the maize to the 
premises of the company. Another large company, Rab Processors, participates in the 
maize market horizontally through opening buying points, and vertically through 
processing. It buys maize from farmers directly through 70 shops called Kulima Gold 
shops, and at its depots in Lilongwe and Blantyre. The company’s main maize suppliers 
in Jenda included local traders from the area, Jenda MRC, and households in Khosolo 
and Luwerezi areas that are relatively remote from Jenda. Rab’s maize is processed into 
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likuni phala (vita meal or nutritious flour) and ordinary maize flour for sale in 
supermarkets such as Shoprite, People’s Trading Centre, Metro and other outlets. The 
company also sells maize as grain to WFP, NFRA and NGOs like World Vision, 
Church Action in Relief and Development (CARD), German Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ) and Mary Mills, all of which buy maize for relief purposes. Theft of maize while 
in storage and transit was stated as a big problem for the company. 
 
Demand by big formal institutions is a significant factor in the maize market. Blessings 
Campus in Lilongwe buys maize grain and produces likuni phala and maize flour. It 
distributes the vita meal free to the Ministry of Gender, Child Welfare and Community 
Services (MGCWCS), Ministry of Disability, the Nkhoma Synod and other 
organisations dealing with HIV/AIDs. Maize flour is used by Blessings Campus’s own 
institutions: the orphanage village, the hospital and an agricultural school in Dowa 
district. The company buys maize from farmers as well as from big traders such as 
Mulli Brothers. When they involve purchases by government and NGO agencies, these 
deliveries are often using donor funds. It also finances maize production inputs to some 
farmers through an interlocking arrangement that involves Blessings Campus providing 
households in Dowa and Kasungu with fertiliser and maize seed on loan repaid at 
harvest time through sales of maize to it at market prices. One further private company 
worth mentioning, Central Poultry, buys maize to process into chicken feed for use by 
the company in the production of broiler chickens and eggs, and feed sales to small-
scale local broiler chickens and eggs producers. Another large buyer, Export Trading 
Company in Lilongwe buys maize directly from farmers through 36 rural buying 
centres and from traders. It processes maize into maize flour (ufa) and likuni phala, 
which it sells to NGOs and other consumers through supermarkets. It also sells maize to 
the NFRA. 
 
Interviews with market participants centred on price formation in the maize market, the 
regulatory environment, and what respondents regarded as problems and challenges in 
the market. Here, the results of these interviews are synthesized in the form of a 
narrative, rather than being presented on an interview-by-interview basis. In the view of 
most respondents, maize price formation in Malawi nowadays reflects what is expected 
of a liberalised market. Maize prices vary within markets, between markets and across 
seasons, but are continuously adjusting rather than staying in fixed ratios in relation to 
each other. Unusually wide variation is typically a good indication that the market is for 
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some reason not functioning well in that season. In 2008, most private sector buyers 
started off treating the ADMARC purchase price as the benchmark in setting their own 
prices, as was also reported by Jayne et al. (2008a, p.18). In general traders set their 
buying price just above the ADMARC buying price; however, ADMARC retaliated by 
adjusting its buying price upwards. Interviewees confirmed that until August 2008, 
ADMARC maize prices varied from area to area depending on the competition. 
 
For the large private sector buyers, price formation at the farmer level involves 
continuous interaction by mobile phone between local-level agents and district or 
regional offices. In the view of respondents, the reason that farmers and small traders 
stopped selling to ADMARC in July 2008 was because the large private operators 
perceived the direction the market was heading well ahead of public agencies or the 
government. Moreover, by definition private traders are accustomed to making 
instantaneous adjustments in the light of emerging market conditions, which public 
bodies are unable to do. In 2008, both ADMARC and those private sector buyers with 
institutional contracts used a differentiated approach to maize prices involving the 
delivery of minimum quantities of maize to designated warehouses at premium prices 
higher than local markets prices. It was stated by respondents that collusion among 
buyers on price formation was not feasible due to the incredibly diverse array of 
different traders in the market, and their varying interest in securing grain for different 
purposes. Of course traders would talk to each other about the direction they thought the 
market was going (whether stable, up or down), but this did not in any sense amount to 
collusion, which would require strict agreement to buy at fixed prices, not evident 
anywhere in Malawi. Nevertheless, the government invoked collusion as one of its 
reasons for banning private trade in August 2008 (Jayne et al., 2008a p.5). 
 
On government regulation, respondents affirmed that although agricultural marketing 
was liberalised, they still had to conform to government business regulations including 
licenses. The Ministry of Trade and Private Sector Development administers the 
licensing of all businesses in Malawi under Chapter 46 of the Business Licensing Act. 
However, the Ministry delegates the licensing of small local indigenous businesses to 
the district assemblies, and MoAFS is responsible for issuing buying licenses for 
agricultural produce. The produce-buying license, which was reintroduced in March 
2008 by MoAFS, was issued under the provisions of the Agriculture (General Purposes) 
Act, 1997 and the Smallholder Agricultural Produce (Marketing) Regulations of 1987. 
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There was a lot of discussion about the August 2008 ban on private trade, imports and 
exports. Some of the private sector interpreted the ban as the government making 
private maize trading an unwanted (even illegal) activity. Some private sector 
respondents also emphasized that the ban on maize imports contributed to rising maize 
prices as it created widespread anxiety regarding the sufficiency of maize supplies in the 
country. The major worry of processors interviewed was the failure of communication 
regarding regulatory changes between the government and the private sector. The 
private sector heard about policy changes through the radio. The private sector would 
prefer to have adequate notice of such extreme changes so that they can adjust 
operations to avoid costs such as charges by owners of trucks for holding their trucks at 
the borders when they are caught up in new policy prohibitions while in transit. More 
consistent government policy statements and commitment to a stable long-term policy 
environment would enhance private sector participation in markets, and reduce hurting 
of the private sector because of sudden policy reversals (refer discussion in Chapter 2 
above and especially Jayne et al., 2002; 2006). 
 
The maize market is also subject to three types of taxation: a withholding tax, a surtax 
and a corporate tax. Withholding tax is charged at 7 per cent on maize sales of more 
than MK60,000 and is paid at the point of purchase, with the buyer deducting it from 
the seller’s proceeds on behalf of the Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA), the institution 
responsible for tax collection on behalf of the government. Surtax is charged on 
processed maize products only. Large companies are also subjected to corporate tax by 
the MRA at 30 per cent of profits. Turning to the issue of how difficult it is to start a 
maize trading business, the private sector view was that it was easy enough to do, but 
surviving unpredictable changes in policy could make the early years after start-up high 
risk. The established operators have learnt from experience the way the government 
tends to respond to crisis events, and therefore is able to anticipate some of the effects. 
Before the August 2008 ban on private maize trading there were no restrictions on 
anyone’s entering maize marketing and trading, subject to having access to sufficient 
financial resources to undertake buying and selling. 
 
In March 2008, MoAFS set a maximum maize buying price from farmers of MK28 per 
kg, and the logic of this was publicised by the government as being to do with 
discouraging farmers from selling too large a proportion of their maize, and leaving 
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themselves with insufficient supplies at household level. This suggests that even as 
early as March, some in government envisaged a short supply situation might develop, 
even though official predictions were for a bumper harvest (discussion in Chapter 3 
refers). It was also a departure from previous practice throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
when securing a minimum harvest price for smallholder farmers was the government 
priority (Harrigan, 2003). That the majority of the poor smallholder farmers are also net 
maize buyers is not in dispute (Government of Malawi, 2005a; Chirwa 2009), however, 
the idea that a maximum buying price would encourage greater crop retention by 
farmers is an unorthodox one, the economic logic of which is rather doubtful. In the 
event, the government failed anyway to defend the maximum buying price, and prices 
rose inexorably from July onwards to reach a record level in nominal terms of MK68 in 
Limbe by the end of the year in December (further examination of the price rise in 
2008-09 is provided in Chapter 6). 
 
Most of the traders interviewed at various levels in the marketing chain stated that they 
experienced a buoyant maize market in 2008, indicated especially by their preparedness 
to increase the number of buying points that they maintained in rural areas during the 
harvesting season. As already discussed in other contexts, part of this buoyancy 
occurred due to competition between the public and private sectors for supplies in a 
market that turned out not to be as over-supplied as indicated by the government maize 
production estimates. In particular, NFRA was trying to build stocks early in the harvest 
period, providing an important outlet for maize procured by private traders, and 
ADMARC was in the market trying to procure maize both for the NFRA and to rebuild 
its own stocks. 
 
Interviews with traders on problems of maize marketing in Malawi involved 
prioritization of a list of maize  marketing problems that had already been identified in 
pre-testing. Each trader who was interviewed ranked the problems individually, and the 
prioritisation yielded the following list in descending order of importance: achieving 
good sales prices, finding buyers, inadequate storage capacity, lack of transport, poor 
quality of crop purchased from farmers, loss of crop in storage, poor rural roads, 
difficulty of securing credit, use of inaccurate weighing scales, and theft. Other 
agricultural marketing problems mentioned included lack of use of grades and 
standards, poor security in rural areas, and inconsistent government policy. These 
problems are consistent with the ‘weak private markets’ view of staple food marketing 
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in eastern and southern Africa (Dorward et al., 2009a; 2009b, and also see discussion in 
Chapter 2 above). 
 
The category ‘finding buyers’ was also encountered in discussions with farmers about 
marketing problems, and is difficult to interpret. The problem is not so much a lack of 
individuals or enterprises with whom transactions can be carried out, but rather a lack of 
confidence that the best price (or the desired price) can be secured in the deal. In other 
words the complaint about ‘finding buyers’ is more akin to a trader saying ‘it would be 
nice to get a guaranteed high price ensuring my profit margin’ than to a true statement 
about the lack of buyers and sellers in the market. Many traders prioritised insufficient 
storage capacity as a serious problem, especially at more aggregate stages of the 
marketing chain between small buyers at farmer level and large scale purchases by 
formal sector trading enterprises. 
 
The marketing problems that attracted most discussion with private traders can be 
grouped as done in the following list: 
(a) theft in storage and in transit, part of a broader problem of growing lack of 
security in some rural areas; 
(b) lack of grades and standards, so that most transactions, especially at the local 
level, depend on the visual inspection of maize, with high risks for buyers that 
price bargains do not represent the true quality of the produce purchased; 
(c) inconsistent and unpredictable government maize policy, as manifested 
especially in 2008 with the sudden decision to ban private trade in maize and 
prohibit imports; 
(d) lack of access to credit on reasonable terms, an essential requirement for traders 
of all sizes, and a constraint to the pace of the growth in trader numbers and 
participants in the market; 
(e) the generally very low volume of maize supply from individual sellers at local 
level increases the transaction costs of procurement for larger traders further up 
the system (also cited as a significant issue by Jayne et al., 2008a p.17). 
 
The main reason given by the government for intervening in the maize market through 
ADMARC and NFRA was the inability of the private sector to provide maize to 
consumers at competitive prices reflecting the underlying marketing costs. This 
reasoning has resulted in frequent changes in direction by the government regarding the 
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status of ADMARC as a market player. At times since the start of market liberalisation, 
the role of ADMARC has been severely downgraded, even becoming a residual and 
minor force in Malawi maize marketing. At other times, especially when supply 
shortages have caused rising prices, ADMARC has been resurrected and given special 
powers over supply and prices. In August 2008, as we have seen, this was taken to an 
extreme with the issue of the directive that made ADMARC the monopoly buyer and 
seller of maize for the first time in 21 years. 
 
Despite the private sector being generally found to be efficient in maize storage (e.g. 
Myers, 2008), they are faced with constraints of available storage facilities, especially at 
larger scale. ADMARC still owns most of the crop storage capacity in Malawi, and 
historically has not necessarily made this capacity available to the private sector, even 
during periods when ADMARC itself has been playing a relatively small role in the 
market. This problem has been addressed recently by the establishment in April 2009 of 
the Malawi Agricultural Warehousing and Trading Company (MAWTCO), a public 
limited liability company incorporated under the Companies Act whose responsibility is 
to enhance agricultural marketing efficiency and transparency for the benefit of farmers 
by providing traders, processors and other stakeholders with reliable and well-
maintained storage services. Under this arrangement, ADMARC is expected to pass on 
excess warehouse space in and around urban centres to MAWTCO that in turn would 
lease to the private sector (Jayne et al., 2008a p.4). It remains to be seen, however, 
whether MAWTCO is successful in achieving this objective, and in particular, whether 
it will make ADMARC storage capacity routinely and predictably available for rent to 
the private sector. 
 
5.3 Spatial Integration in the Maize Market 
The method of cointegration for examining whether prices in different markets adjust to 
each other was discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.7.2) above. The purpose of the method 
is to examine if prices of geographically separate markets are systematically related to 
each other in the long-run and to understand the dynamics of how these prices adjust in 
the short-run. 
 
The analysis was done for 13 maize markets in Malawi (listed in Table 5.17 below). 
These are the same markets as those used to examine differences in seasonality in 
Chapter 4, with the addition of Karonga, Nkhotakota and Luncheza markets. The data 
181 
covered the period 1989-2009 for the 13 markets providing 3,276 data points. From 
these 478 missing values were replaced using exponential smoothing (the statistical 
software Stata was used for this and for the whole cointegration analysis). 
 




Source: Price data is from MoAFS 
 
The first step in the analysis is to test whether the maize prices are stationary or non-
stationary. The graphs of maize prices in the different markets, grouped by region, are 
given in Figures 5.5 -7; the overall pattern of prices imply that they are non-stationary. 
The formal test of non-stationarity was conducted using the Dickey-Fuller unit root test. 
The null hypothesis (H0) in this test is that the price series are non-stationary (have unit 
root). The results in Table 5.17 demonstrate that all market price series are non-
stationary; the test statistics all fall within the region for accepting the null hypothesis at 





















Chitipa 207 0.306 -2.586 -1.950 -1.617 
Karonga 182 -0.055 -2.589 -1.950 -1.615 
Rumphi 214 -0.245 -2.585 -1.950 -1.618 
Mzuzu 225 0.255 -2.583 -1.950 -1.618 
Nkhotakota 209 0.254 -2.585 -1.950 -1.617 
Lilongwe 193 0.405 -2.588 -1.950 -1.616 
Mitundu 249 -0.216 -2.580 -1.950 -1.620 
Chimbiya 230 0.382 -2.583 -1.950 -1.619 
Lizulu 242 -0.095 -2.581 -1.950 -1.619 
Lunzu 217 0.113 -2.584 -1.950 -1.618 
Blantyre 132 0.047 -2.596 -1.950 -1.612 
Luncheza 165 -0.486 -2.591 -1.950 -1.614 
Bangula 177 0.003 -2.590 -1.950 -1.615 
182 
Figure 5.5: North Markets Price Timeline Trends 
 
 
Source: computations based on MoAFS monthly maize prices 
 
 
Since the maize prices are non-stationary series, a simple regression is bound to be 
spurious unless the series are cointegrated. First, we test whether the 13 maize price 
series are cointegrated using Johansen’s test for cointegration. Before testing for  
cointegration, the appropriate lag for the underlying vector autoregressive model (VAR) 
was selected using different information criteria (like Hannan–Quinn information 
criterion (HQIC), Schwarz–Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), final prediction error 








Figure 5.6: Centre Markets Price Timeline Trends 
 









Figure 5.7: South Markets Price Timeline Trends 
 
 
Source: computations based on MoAFS monthly maize prices 
 
A time lag of 4 months, which was the longest lag, was identified. Applying the 
Johansen tests for cointegration to all the 13 markets no cointegration was found (Table 
5.18). The results therefore suggest that all the price series data taken together at the 
same time are not cointegrated; hence it is necessary to look at cointegration for subsets 
of prices. 
 
The price data from the 13 markets were therefore divided into three groups by region 
as follows: (i) north (Mzuzu main market with Chitipa, Karonga and Rumphi), (ii) 
centre (Lilongwe main market with Mitundu, Chimbiya, Lizulu and Nkhotakota), and 
(iii) south (Limbe main market with Lunzu, Bangula and Lunchenza). Following the 















SBIC HOIC AIC 
0 . 535.172* . 0.180* -4.221* -7.187 
1 0.284 452.229 . 0.402 -4.211 -7.319 
2 0.252 380.246 277.71 0.623 -4.185 -7.424 
3 0.238 312.946 233.13 0.818 -4.167 -7.526 
4 0.226 249.434 192.89 0.985 -4.162 -7.629 
5 0.200 194.073 156 1.139 -4.151 -7.715 
6 0.185 143.241 124.24 1.268 -4.149 -7.799 
7 0.145 104.487 94.15 1.400 -4.126 -7.851 
8 0.122 72.245 68.52 1.515 -4.105 -7.892 
9 0.106 44.493 47.21 1.603 -4.093 -7.931 
10 0.074 25.374 29.68 1.682 -4.074 -7.952 
11 0.057 10.723 15.41 1.734 -4.064 -7.971 
12 0.040 0.565 3.76 1.760 -4.064 -7.987 
13 0.002     1.779 4.052 -7.982 
 
Source: MoAFS monthly price data 
 
 











Time Lag 2 4 2 4 
Rank of 
cointegration 3 4 3 0 
 
Notes: 
(1)  Time lag for north, centre and south markets was selected by LR, FPE, AIC, 
while the centre and all markets together the time lag was selected by LR. 
(2)  Integration order for north, centre and south and all markets together was 
selected by the three selection criteria - trace statistic, SBIC, and HQIC 
 
The estimation of the vector error-correction models and the cointegrating equations 
was undertaken. The vector error-correction models capture the short-run dynamics 
while the cointegrating equation estimates the long run equilibrium relationship 
(StataCorp LP, 2009). The results of the long run equilibrium relationship are presented 
in Tables 5.20, 5.21, and 5.22 one for each regional group of markets. 
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The results suggest the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between 
monthly maize prices of the different markets as evidenced by the highly significant (all 
significant at 1% level) coefficients of the cointegration equations for all the three 
regions. As can be seen from the value of the coefficients, there are strong long-term 
relationships between the prices, a one unit change in price in a market in most cases 
bringing about also an almost equivalent change in prices in other markets. The least 
cointegration coefficient is between Limbe and Bangula in the south where a one (log) 
unit change in Limbe is accompanied by a 0.90 change in Bangula. The cointegration 
equations capture long run equilibrium. The existence of this long term relationship 
 
Table 5.20: North Markets Long Run Equilibrium Relationships 
 
Market  Coef Std.Err z p > P>|z| 95% Confidence interval range
_ce1  
Mzuzu 1 . . . . 
Chitipa -2.78e-17 . . . . 
Karonga -2.78e-17 . . . . 
Rumphi -0.9149 0.0115 -79.26 0.000 -0.9376 -0.8923
-cons -.2600 . . . . 
_ce2  
Mzuzu (Omitted)  
Chitipa 1 . . . . 
Karonga (Omitted)  
Rumphi -0.9521 0.0184 -51.76 0.000 -0.9881 -0.9160
a-cons -0.0209 . . . . 
_ce3  
Mzuzu (Omitted)  
Chitipa 1.11e-16 . . . . 
Karonga 1 . . . . 
Rumphi -0.9283 0.0192 -48.40 0.000 -0.9659 -0.8907
-cons -0.1664 . . . . 
 








Table 5.21: Centre Markets Long Run Equilibrium Relationships 
 
Market  Coef Std.Err z p > P>|z| 95% Confidence interval range
_cel   
Lilongwe 1 . . . . 
Nkhotakota -1.11e-16 . . . . 
Mitundu -5.55e-17 . . . . 
Chimbiya (Omitted)   
Lizulu -1.0004 0.0274 -36.53 0.000 -1.054 -0.9468
– cons -0.3350 . . . . 
_ce2   
Lilongwe -5.55e-17 . . . . 
Nkhotakota 1 . . . . 
Mitundu (Omitted)   
Chimbiya (Omitted)   
Lizulu -0.9771 0.0197 -49.59 0.000 -1.0157 -0.9385
-cons -0.2609 . . . . 
_ce3   
Lilongwe -2.78e-17 . . . . 
Nkhotakota -5.55e-17 . . . . 
Mitundu 1 . . . . 
Chimbiya (Omitted)   
Lizulu -1.0541 0.0190 -55.34 0.000 -1.0914 -1.0168
cons 0.1891 . . . . 
_ce4   
Lilongwe -1.25e-16 . . . . 
Nkhotakota 2.78e-17 . . . . 
Mitundu -6.94e-17 . . . . 
Chimbiya 1 . . . . 
Lizulu -1.0309 0.0150 -68.82 0.000 -1.0602 -1.0015
-cons  0.0454 . . . . 
 
Note: The cointegration coefficients indicate by how much maize prices in the 
long run change in the second market when they change by one (log) unit in the 
first market. 
 





Table 5.22: South Markets Long Run Equilibrium Relationships 
 
Market  Coef Std.Err z p > P>|z| 95% Confidence interval range
_ce1   
Limbe 1 . . . . 
Lunzu -5.55e-17 . . . . 
Luchenza (Omitted)   
Bangula -0.8987 0.0416 -21.59 0.000 -0.9802 -0.8171
-cons -0.3691 . . . . 
_ce2   
Limbe (Omitted)   
Lunzu 1 . . . . 
 Luchenza (Omitted)   
Bangula -0.9267 0.0440 21.07 0.000 -1.0129 -0.8405
-cons -0.3411 . . . . 
_ce3   
Limbe (Omitted)   
Lunzu (Omitted)   
Luchenza 1 . . . . 
Bangula -0.9470 0.0426 -22.25 0.000 -1.0304 -0.8635
-cons -0.2729 . . . . 
 
Source: MoAFS monthly price data 
 
doesn’t mean that prices will always be in equilibrium even in the short run. To capture 
the short-term dynamics, error correction models are also estimated. As indicated in 
Section 3.7.2, the error correction model captures how deviations from long-term 
equilibrium are corrected. In addition, the error correction model captures how changes 
in prices of maize in a market are correlated to its own lagged price changes and the 
price changes of other towns. The main results from the error correction models are 
summarised below. 
 
Markets in the North 
Mzuzu market: Price changes in Mzuzu market are significantly affected in the short-
run when the Mzuzu-Rumphi and Karonga-Rumphi markets are out of long-term 
equilibrium; in contrast, disequilibrium in Chitipa-Rumphi does not significantly 
change prices in Mzuzu. For example, a 1 unit deviation from long-term equilibrium in 
Mzuzu-Rumphi and Karonga-Rumphi markets change Mzuzu price by -0.21 and 0.18 
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respectively. The results also suggest that the price change in Mzuzu is significantly 
affected by price changes in Rumphi market one month ago but is not affected by 
lagged price changes in the other town including Mzuzu itself (Table 5.23). 
 
Chitipa market: Price changes in Chitipa market are significantly affected in the short-
run when the Chitipa-Rumphi and Karonga-Rumphi markets are out of long-term 
equilibrium; in contrast, disequilibrium in Mzuzu-Rumphi does not significantly change 
prices in Chitipa. For example, a 1 unit deviation from long-term equilibrium in 
Chitipa-Rumphi and Karonga-Rumphi markets change Chitipa price by -0.35 and 0.25 
respectively. The results also suggest that the price change in Chitipa is not significantly 
affected by any lag price changes. 
 
Karonga market: Price changes in Karonga market are significantly affected in the 
short-run when the Mzuzu-Rumphi and Karonga-Rumphi markets are out of long-term 
equilibrium; in contrast, disequilibrium in Chitipa-Rumphi does not significantly 
change prices in Karonga. For example a 1 unit deviation from long-term equilibrium in 
Mzuzu-Rumphi and Karonga-Rumphi markets change Karonga price by 0.16 and -0.12 
respectively. The results also suggest that the price change in Karonga is not 
significantly affected by any lag price changes. 
 
Rumphi market: statistically significant adjustment parameters are observed for Mzuzu-
Rumphi with 0.34 and Karonga-Rumphi with 0.12. The results also suggest that the 
price change in Rumphi is significantly correlated to one month lagged maize price 
changes in Chitipa, Karonga and Rumphi. 
 
Markets in the Centre  
Lilongwe market: statistically significant adjustment parameters are observed for 
Lilongwe–Lizulu with -0.24 and Chimbiya-Lizulu with 0.27 meaning that for a unit 
deviation from long-run equilibrium Lilongwe prices decline by 24 per cent (the 
corresponding figures for Chimbiya-Lizulu being 27 per cent increase). The results also 
suggest that maize prices changes in Lilongwe market are affected by maize price 
changes in Lilongwe market one month and three months ago, Mitundu market maize 





Table 5.23: North Malawi Maize Markets Short Run Market Dynamics 
 
Market Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
Change in Mzuzu price  
_ce1 L1 -0.2076 0.0597 -3.48 0.001 -0.3246 -0.0906
_ce2 L1 0.0041 0.0492 0.08 0.934 -0.0923 0.1004
_ce3 L1 0.1765 0.0460 3.83 0.000 0.0862 0.2667
Lagged own prices   
Mzuzu LD -0.0517 0,0694 -0.75 0.456 -0.1876 0.0842
Lagged other markets  
Chitipa LD  0.0914 0.0604 1.51 0.130 -0.0270 0.2097
Karonga LD 0.0229 0.0602 0.38 0.704 -0.0952 0.1409
Rumphi LD 0.1735 0.0655 2.65 0.008 0.0450 0.3019
  
_cons 0.0144 0.0095 1.52 0.128 -0.0042 0.0330
Change in Chitipa price  
_ce1 L1 0.0875 0.0748 1.17 0.242 -0.0592 0.2342
_ce2 L1 -0.3463 0.0616 -5.62 0.000 -0.4672 -0.2255
 _ce3 L1 0.2515 0.0577 4.36 0.000 0.1383 0.3646
Lagged own prices  
Chitipa LD 0.0739 0.0757 0.98 0.329 -0.0745 0.2222
Lagged other markets  
Mzuzu  LD 0.0473 0.0870 0.54 0.586 -0.1231 0.2178
Karonga  LD 0.050 0.0755 0.66 0.508 -0.0980 0.1980
Rumphi  LD 0.115 0.0821 1.40 0.162 -0.0461 0.2760
  
_cons -0.0032 0.0119 -0.27 0.788 -0.0265 0.0201
Change in Karonga price  
_ce1 L1 0.1624 0.0790 2.05 0.040 0.0075 0.3174
_ce2 L1 -0.0711 0.0651 -1.09 0.275 -0.1987 .0565
_ce3 L1 -0.1205 0.0610 -1.98 0.048 -0.2400 -0.0009
Lagged own prices  
Karonga LD 0.0528 0.0798 0.66 0.508 -0.1035 0.2092
Lagged other markets  
Mzuzu LD -.145814 .0918457 -1.59 0.112 0.3258 0.0342
Chitipa LD 0.0788 0.08 0.99 0.324 -0.0779 0.2355
Rumphi LD 0.0296 0.0868 0.34 0.733 -0.1405 0.1997
  
_cons 0.0163 0.0126 1.30 0.194 -0.0083 0.041
Change in Rumphi price  
_ce1 L1 0.3417 0.0683 5.00 0.000 0.2078 0.4755
_ce2 L1 -0.0021 0.0562 -0.04 0.970 -0.1123 0.1081
_ce3 L1 0.1222 0.0527 2.32 0.020 0.0189 0.2254
Lagged own prices  
Rumphi LD 0.1271 0.075 1.70 0.090 -0.0198 0.2741
Lagged other markets  
Mzuzu LD -0.1002 0.0793 -1.26 0.207 -0.2557 0.0553
Chitipa LD 0.1496 0.0691 2.17 0.030 0.0142 0.2849
Karonga LD 0.1706 0.0689 2.48 0.013 0.0355 0.3056
Rumphi LD 0.1271 0.0750 1.70 0.090 -0.0198 0.2741
  
_cons 0.0018 0.0109 0.17 0.87 -0.0195 0.0231
Source: computations based on MoAFS monthly maize prices  
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and three months ago, and Lizulu market maize price changes one month and two 
months ago (Table 5.24). 
 
Table 5.24: Centre Malawi Maize Markets Short Run Market Dynamics 
 
Market Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf. Interval
Change in Lilongwe prices   
_ce1 L1 -0.2420 0.0477 -5.08 0.000 -0.3355 -0.1486
_ce2 L1 0.0085 0.0648 0.13 0.896 -0.1185  0.1355
_ce3 L1 0.0356 0.0671 0.53 0.60 0.0959 0.1671
_ce4 L1 0.2666 0.0723 3.69 0.000 0.1250 0.4083
Lagged own prices   
Lilongwe LD -0.1802 0.0682 -2.64 0.008 -0.3139 -0.0465
L2D 0.0099 0.0680 0.14 0.885 -0.1235 0.1432
L3D -0.1151 0.0629 -1.83 0.067 -0.2384 0.0081
Lagged other markets   
Nkhotakota   
LD 0.1271 0.0783 1.62 0.104 -0.0263 0.2806
L2D 0.0575 0.0738 0.78 0.436 -0.0871 0.2020
L3D 0.0191 0.0717 0.27 0.790 0.1214  0.1595
Mitundu   
LD 0.1376 0.0694 1.98 0.047 0.0016 0.2736
L2D -0.0197 0.0657 -0.30 0.764 -0.1486 0.1091
L3D -0.0700 0.0602 -1.16 0.244 -0.188  0.0479
Chimbiya   
LD -0.2665 0.0756 -3.52 0.000 -0.4147 -0.1182
L2D -0.2985 0.0699 -4.27 0.000 -0.4355 -0.1615
L3D -0.1881 0.0628 -3.00 0.003 -0.3111 -0.0651
Lizulu   
LD 0.2562 0.0810 3.16 0.002 0.0974 0.4150
L2D 0.2419 0.0797 3.03 0.002 0.0857 0.3981
L3D 0.0745 0.0694  1.07 0.283  -0.0615  0.2104
  
_cons 0.0074  0.0108 0.69 0.492 -0.0138 0.0286
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Change in Nkhotakota 
prices Coef.
Std. 
Err. z P>|z| 
95% Conf. Interval
_ce1 L1 0.0351 0.0509 0.69 0.490 -0.0646 0.1347924
_ce2 L1 -0.2714 0.0691 -3.93 0.000 -0.4069 -0.1359
_ce3 L1 0.0478 0.0716 0.67 0.504 -0.0925 0.1881
_ce4 L1 0.1586 0.0771 2.06 0.040 0.0075 0.3097
Lagged own prices   
LD 0.0844 0.0835  1.01 0.312 0.0793  0.2481
L2D -0.1225 0.0787  -1.56 0.120  -0.27679 0.0317
L3D -0.0067 0.0765 -0.09 0.930 -0.1565 0.1432
   
Lagged other markets   
Lilongwe   
LD 0.0756 0.0728 1.04 0.299 -0.0671 0.2182
L2D 0.0307 0.0726 0.42 0.672 -0.1116 0.1729
L3D -0.0291 0.0671 -0.43 0.665 -0.1605 0.1024
Mitundu   
LD 0.1343 0.0740 1.82 0.069 -0.0107 0.2794
L2D -0.0284 0.0701 -0.40 0.686 -0.1658 0.1090
L3D -0.0529 0.0642 -0.82 0.410 -0.17878 0.0729
Chimbiya   
LD -0.1179 0.0807 -1.46 0.144 -0.2760 0.0402
L2D -0.0715 0.0746 -0.96 0.338 -0.2176 0.0746
L3D -0.0948 0.0670 -1.42 0.157 -0.2260 0.0364
Lizulu   
LD 0.2006 0.0864 2.32 0.020 0.0312 0.3700
L2D 0.0189 0.0850 0.22 0.824 -0.1478 0.1855
L3D 0.0222 0.0740 0.30 0.764 -0.1228 0.1673
   
_cons 0.0154 0.0115 1.33 0.183 -0.0072 0.0380
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Change in Mitundu prices Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
95% Conf. Interval
_ce1 L1 -0.0154 0.0659 -0.23 0.815 -0.1446 0.1138
_ce2 L1 0.2218 0.0896 2.48 0.013 0.0462 0.3974
_ce3L1 -0.3211 0.0928 -3.46 0.001 -0.5029 -0.1393
_ce4L1 0.0941 0.1000 0.94 0.346 -0.1018 0.2899
Lagged own prices   
LD 0.1481 0.0959 1.54 0.123 -0.0399 0.3361
L2D -0.0820 0.0909 -0.90 0.367 -0.2601 0.0961
L3D -0.1325 0.0832 -1.59 0.111 -0.2956 0.0305
Lagged other markets   
Lilongwe   
LD -0.0161 0.0943 -0.17 0.864 -0.2010 0.1687
L2D 0.0014 0.0941 0.01 0.989 -0.1830 0.1857
L3D 0.0949 0.0869 1.09 0.275 -0.0755 0.2653
Nkhotakota   
LD 0.0526 0.1082 0.49 0.627 -0.1595 0.2647
L2D -0.2471 0.1020 -2.42 0.015 -0.4469 -0.0472
L3D -0.0981 0.0991 -0.99 0.322 -0.2923 0.0961
Chimbiya   
LD -0.0793 0.1046 -0.76 0.448 -0.2842 0.1257
L2D -0.0465 0.0966 -0.48 0.630 -0.2359 0.1429
L3D -0.1442 0.0868 -1.66 0.097 -0.3143 0.0259
Lizulu   
LD 0.3489 0.1120 3.11 0.002 0.1293 0.5685
L2D 0.2198 0.1102 2.00 0.046 0.0039 0.4358
L3D 0.1694 0.0959 1.77 0.077 -0.0185 0.3574
   
_cons 0.0207 0.0149 1.39 0.166 -0.0086 0.0500
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Change in Chimbiya 
prices Coef.
Std. 
Err. z P>|z| 
95% Conf. Interval
_ce1 L1 0.0501 0.0558 0.90 0.370 -0.0593 0.1595
_ce2 L1 -0.0481 0.0759 -0.63 0.526 -0.1968 0.1006
_ce3 L1 0.1992 0.0785 2.54 0.011 0.0452 0.3531
_ce4 L1 -0.3383 0.0846 -4.00 0.000 -0.5041 -0.1724
Lagged own prices   
LD -0.1042 0.0885 -1.18 0.239 -0.2778 0.0693
L2D -0.0799 0.0818 -0.98 0.329 -0.2402 0.0805
L3D -0.1137 0.0735 -1.55 0.122 -0.2577 0.0304
Lagged other markets   
Lilongwe   
LD 0.1119 0.0799 1.40 0.161 -0.0446 0.2685
L2D -0.0198 0.0796 -0.25 0.804 -0.1759 0.1363
L3D 0.0413 0.0736 0.56 0.575 -0.1030 0.1856
Nkhotakota   
LD 0.1515 0.0916 1.65 0.098 -0.0281 0.3311
L2D -0.1593 0.0864 -1.84 0.065 -0.3286 0.0099
L3D 0.1165 0.0839 1.39 0.165 -0.0480 0.2809
Mitundu   
LD 0.0915 0.0812 1.13 0.260 -0.0677 0.2507
L2D -0.0550 0.0769 -0.72 0.474 -0.2058 0.0958
L3D -0.0487 0.0704 -0.69 0.490 -0.1867 0.0893
Lizulu   
 LD 0.1861 0.0949 1.96 0.050 0.0002 0.3720
L2D 0.0859 0.0933 0.92 0.357 -0.0969 0.2688
L3D 0.0562 0.0812 0.69 0.489 -0.1030 0.2153
   
_cons 0.0228 0.0127 1.80 0.071 -0.0020 0.0476 
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Change in Lizulu prices Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
95% Conf. Interval
_ce1 L1 0.0459 0.0506 0.91 0.364 -0.0532 0.1450
_ce2 L1 0.0647 0.0687 0.94 0.346 -0.0700 0.1994
_ce3 L1 0.1169 0.0711 1.64 0.100 -0.0225 0.2563
_ce4 L1 0.1436 0.0766 1.87 0.061 -0.0066 0.2938
Lagged own prices   
LD 0.1796 0.0859 2.09 0.037 0.0112 0.3480
L2D 0.2085 0.0845 2.47 0.014 0.0429 0.3742
L3D 0.1075 0.0735 1.46 0.144 -0.0366 0.2517
Lagged other markets   
Lilongwe   
LD -0.0605 0.0723 -0.84 0.403 -0.2022 0.0813
L2D 0.0291 0.0721 0.40 0.687 -0.1123 0.1705
L3D 0.1272 0.0667 1.91 0.056 -0.0035 0.2579
Nkhotakota   
LD 0.1232 0.0830 1.48 0.138 -0.0395 0.2859
L2D 0-.0456 0.0782 -0.58 0.560 -0.1989 0.1077
L3D 0.0368 0.0760 0.48 0.628 -0.1122 0.1857
Mitundu   
LD 0.2607 0.0736 3.54 0.000 0.1165 0.4049
L2D -0.0225 0.0697 -0.32 0.747 -0.1591 0.1141
L3D -0.0046 0.0638 -0.07 0.942  -0.1296 0.1204
Chimbiya   
LD -0.0318 0.0802 -0.40 0.692 -0.1890 0.1254
L2D -0.1613 0.0741 -2.18 0.030 -0.3065 -0.0160
L3D -0.1986 0.0666 -2.98 0.003 -0.3290 -0.0681
   
_cons 0.0095 0.0115 0.82 0.410 -0.0130 0.0319
 
Source: computations based on MoAFS monthly maize price data 
 
Nkhotakota market: statistically significant adjustment parameters are observed for 
Nkhotakota-Lizulu market with -0.27, and Chimbiya-Lizulu with 0.16. The results also 
suggest that Nkhotakota market price changes are affected by one month ago maize 
prices in Mitundu and Lizulu. 
 
Mitundu market: statistically significant adjustment parameters are observed for 
Mitundu-Lizulu with -0.32 and Nkhotakota-Lizulu with 0.22. Maize price change in 
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Mitundu are significantly affected by price changes in Nkhotakota two months ago, 
Chimbiya three months ago, Lizulu one month, two months and three months ago maize 
price changes. 
 
Chimbiya market: statistically significant adjustment parameters are observed for 
Mitundu–Lizulu with 0.20 and Chimbiya-Lizulu with -0.34. Maize price change in 
Chimbiya is affected by the price change in Nkhotakota one months and two months 
ago, and the price change in Lizulu one month ago. 
 
Lizulu market: statistically significant adjustment parameter is observed for Lizulu-
Chimbiya with 0.14. The maize price change in Lizulu is affected by the price change 
three months ago in Lilongwe, price change one month ago in Mitundu, price change 
two months and three months ago in Chimbiya, and price change one months and two 
months ago in Lizulu. 
 
Markets in the South 
Limbe market: statistically significant adjustment parameter is observed for Limbe-
Bangula with -0.14. The price change in Limbe is significantly influenced by the price 
change in Limbe itself one month ago (Table 5.25). 
 
Lunzu market: statistically significant adjustment parameters are observed for Lunzu-
Bangula with -0.19 and Luchenza-Bangula with 0.08. Maize price change in Lunzu is 
significantly affected by the price change in Luchenza and Bangula one month ago in 
both cases. 
 
Luchenza market: statistically significant adjustment parameters are observed for 
Luchenza-Bangula with -0.33 and Lunzu-Bangula with 0.21. The maize price change in 
Luchenza is however not statistically affected by price changes in other markets in the 
south (Limbe, Bangula, and Lunzu) including the maize prices in Luchenza itself. 
 
Bangula market: statistically significant adjustment parameter is observed for Limbe-
Bangula with 0.09 and price changes in Bangula are not significantly affected by price 





Table.5.25: South Malawi Maize Markets Short Run Market Dynamics 
 
Market Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z 95% Conf. Interval
Change in Limbe 
prices   
_ce1 L1 -0.1416 0.0368 -3.85 0.000 -0.2137 -0.0696
_ce2 L1 -0.0185 0.0507 -0.36 0.716 -0.1179 0.0810
_ce3 L1 0.0530 0.0485 1.09 0.275 -0.0421 0.1480
Lagged own prices   
LD -0.1761 0.0638 -2.76 0.006 -0.3012 -0.0510
Lagged other markets   
Lunzu   
LD  0.1033 0.0660 1.56 0.118   -0.0262 0.2327 
Luncheza   
LD 0.0789 0.0536 1.47 0.141 -0.0263 0.1840
Bangula   
LD -0.0125 0.0589 -0.21 0.832 -0.1280 0.1030
   
_cons 0.0172 0.0132 1.31 0.190 -0.0086 0.0430
Change in Lunzu 
prices    
_ce1 L1 0.0165 0.0363 0.46 0.648 -0.0546 0.0877
_ce2 L1 -0.1903 0.0501 -3.80 0.000 -0.2885 -0.0921
_ce3 L1 0.0793 0.0479 1.66 0.098 -0.0145 0.1732
Lagged own prices   
LD 0.0365 0.0652 0.56 0.576 -0.0913 0.1643
Lagged other markets   
Limbe   
LD 0.0674 0.0630 1.07 0.285 -0.0567 0.1909
Luncheza    
LD 0.1627 0.0529 3.07 0.002 0.0590 0.2665
Bangula   
LD 0.1987 0.0582 3.42 0.001 0.0847 0.3127
   
_cons 0.0130 0.0130 1.00 0.317 -0.0125 0.0385
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Change in Luchenza 
prices Coef.
Std. 
Err. z P>|z 95% Conf. Interval
_ce1 L1 0.0056 0.0477 0.12 0.907 -0.0880 0.0991
_ce2 L1 0.2053 0.0659 3.12 0.002 0.0762 0.3345
_ce3 L1 -0.3332 0.0630 -5.29 0.000 -0.4566 -0.2098
Lagged own prices   
LD -0.0098 0.0696 -0.14 0.888 -0.1463 0.1266
Lagged other markets   
Limbe   
LD 0.0750 0.0829 0.91 0.365 -0.0874 0.2375
Lunzu   
LD 0.0801 0.0857 0.93 0.350 -0.0880 0.2481
Bangula   
LD 0.0403 0.0765 0.53 0.598 -0.1096 0.1903
   
_cons 0.0081 0.0171 0.48 0.634 -0.0254 0.0416
Change in Bangula 
prices   
_ce1 L1 0.0891 0.0427 2.09 0.037 0.0054 0.1727
_ce2 L1 0.0459 0.0589 0.78 0.436 -0.0695 0.1614
_ce3 L1 0.0319 0.0563 0.55 0.580 -0.0792 0.1415
Lagged own prices   
LD -0.0181 0.0684 -0.27 0.791 -0.1522 0.1159
Lagged other markets   
Limbe   
LD -0.1182 0.0741 -1.59 0.111 -0.2634 0.02717
Lunzu   
LD 0.0659 0.0767 0.86 0.390 -0.0843 0.2161
Luncheza   
LD 0.0411 0.0623 0.66 0.510 -0.0810 0.1631
   
_cons 0.0245 0.0153 1.60 0.109 -0.0055 0.0544
 
Source: computations based on MoAFS monthly maize price data 
 
The results demonstrate that some markets’ maize prices are strongly affected by lagged 
prices in other markets while others are not. The determining factors seem to be the 
proximity between cointegrating markets, the quality of the road network, and vehicle 
trucking capacity linking those markets. For example, in the northern group of markets, 
Mzuzu maize prices are more affected by lagged prices in Rumphi than Karonga or 
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Chitipa because Mzuzu is only 64 km away from Rumphi with a good road and 
transport connection, while Karonga and Chitipa are each more than 150 km away and 
for Chitipa the road connection is additionally very poor. Similar considerations apply 
to the strength of price adjustments found in the other groups of markets. 
 
Within the country as a whole, price adjustment are found to be strongest between the 
centre markets at almost 1 to 1 for all market combinations. This is perhaps not 
surprising given that the Central Region has the best road networks in Malawi, which 
facilitates the movement of maize from areas of surplus with low prices to areas of 
deficit with high prices. Moreover, other infrastructure (storage capacity, 
communications) associated with the capital city, Lilongwe, contributes to lower 
transport costs between markets, and more rapid adjustment of prices between them. 
 
Overall, these results strongly indicate that maize markets in Malawi are spatially 
efficient in the three regions if not for the whole country. It should be borne in mind that 
stringent econometric conditions underlie these findings, deriving from the multivariate 
specification of the relationships between maize markets across Malawi. An 
intermediate step that examined markets in paired combinations found long run 
integration between markets right across Malawi; however, this is a weaker and less 
accurate method than the multivariate approach adopted here. The results support 
similar findings from other econometric analyses undertaken for the Malawi maize 
market. For example, Myers (2008) reaches a similar conclusion for the country as a 
whole by applying threshold auto regression techniques to weekly price data from July 
2001 to October 2008, a time period of 378 weeks. Similarly, Rapsomanikis (2009) 
finds strong integration and rapid adjustment between eight Malawi maize markets, in 
the context of exploring relationships between those markets and international maize 
prices. 
 
5.4 Summary of Key Findings 
This chapter set out to provide the market conduct, structure and spatial integration 
aspects of maize marketing in Malawi that lies behind the maize seasonality findings of 
Chapter 4. In particular, evidence of poorly working and imperfect private markets 
could contribute to the explanation of high price seasonality, and to the proneness of the 
market to wild swings in prices when small imbalances occur in supply. The chapter 
reports the findings of fieldwork on farmers and traders conducted in three villages 
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during the 2007/08 harvesting season. It also summaries the results of cointegration 
analysis conducted on time series maize prices in 13 markets. 
 
It is fair to say that the findings of the fieldwork do not provide startling new insights 
into the working of the maize market in Malawi. Much of what was discovered has been 
observed by other researchers, although as is always the case, individual studies have 
tended to alight on one particular aspect or another to prioritise, and many studies are 
limited in geographical scope or in the aspect of marketing that they have examined. 
The most important finding of all is that the maize market in Malawi at the height of the 
harvesting season is highly competitive. There are numerous traders of every 
conceivable size, scope and capitalisation, from the casual bicycle trader to national 
level food manufacturers, operating in the market, and the sheer diversity of the 
structure makes it impossible for private traders to collude or ‘corner the market’. It also 
seems unlikely that maize constitutes a ‘missing market’ in any but the most remote 
rural areas of the country (it is conceivable that there are a few villages at the end of 
such poor dirt tracks, and with so little to sell, that traders do not bother to go there). Of 
special interest was the finding that farmers are entirely indifferent to who they sell and 
are solely motivated by price offered, ensuring that arms length rather than personalised 
transactions are the norm. The fieldwork also emphasised more than many other writers 
have done the significance of informal imports from adjacent countries in adding to 
market supply at the height of the harvest. Since Malawi is a long thin country, in which 
few places (except central Lake Malawi towns) are more than about 100 km from a 
border with Mozambique, Zambia or Tanzania this means that whenever domestic 
prices in Malawi are out of line (upwards) relative to nearby countries, this flow of 
imports occurs. 
 
The significance of this competitiveness finding is that it is not possible to explain high 
seasonal price instability by reference to ‘poor market functioning’. The market 
functions fine; there must be other reasons for the intermittent recurrence of extreme 
price volatility, as well as for the Chapter 4 finding that alone amongst food crops, 
average seasonal price swings in the maize market have not declined in magnitude over 
the past 21 years. It is a proposition of this thesis (and of several leading researchers) 
that this volatility lies at the intersection of government action and the private sector, 
and does not rest with the private sector on its own in any meaningful sense. The next 
201 
chapter looks more closely at this problem. In the meantime, a brief summary of other 
key points emerging from the maize market fieldwork is provided as follows: 
 
(a) food security is a complex notion to pin down: it does not just reside in the number 
of months maize consumption coverage that households have after the harvest, but 
also depends on the other farm and non-farm options that are available to 
compensate for a maize shortfall; 
 
(b) in this study, the village that sold the most maize, was also the village most deficit 
in maize from a food security standpoint at the household level, and also the village 
with the fewest alternative options for generating output or income that could 
compensate for this weak food security position; 
 
(c) the principle reason for this seems to have been the dire need of very poor 
households for cash the instant that their maize harvest came in, causing them to sell 
maize even though this would definitely compromise their food security later in the 
lean season; 
 
(d) interestingly, the position of such households was weakened further by free flowing 
informal imports in cross-border trade from Mozambique, since this adds to the 
volume of market supply at the same time as the Malawi harvest, and depresses 
prices in maize growing communities close to those border areas. 
 
The sense of competitiveness in the maize market derived from the fieldwork in three 
maize producing villages, as also from key informant interviews with an array of market 
stakeholders, is reinforced strongly by the findings of the cointegration analysis 
conducted in Section 5.3 of this chapter. This analysis essentially shows that not only is 
the maize market in Malawi competitive, it also functions efficiently in terms of spatial 
arbitrage, with rapid adjustments of prices between markets that are close enough to 
each other for spatial arbitrage to take place between them. The cointegration analysis 
undertaken here is not the only such analysis undertaken on the performance of the 
maize market in Malawi (although the method applied varies in matters of detail 
between different researchers) and all concur on the efficiency finding. 
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Chapter 6 : Episodes of Extreme Seasonal Maize Price Instability 2000-2009 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In preceding chapters, this thesis has examined four interlocking dimensions of seasonal 
price instability in the maize market in Malawi. The first is the statement of the price 
seasonality problem in Malawi, and why it is a critical factor for vulnerability to food 
insecurity in the country (Chapter 1). The second is setting out the causes and effects of 
seasonality, and its relationship to the history of the maize market in Malawi (Chapter 
2). The third is measuring the average magnitude of seasonal price instability in the 
Malawi maize market, and contextualising this in relation to different district maize 
markets and different food crops (Chapter 4). The fourth is examining the structure, 
conduct and spatial integration of the Malawi maize market, from which it is inferred 
that private trade in maize exhibits competitive market behaviour, and carries out spatial 
arbitrage in an efficient manner (Chapter 5). 
 
All along, a key area of interest of the thesis is the occurrence of extreme price 
instability episodes, as seem to happen every 3-4 crop seasons in Malawi, and in the 
2000s occurred in 2001-02, 2005-06 and 2007-09 (Figures 1.1 and 4.1 above). These 
episodes have devastating consequences for food deficit small farmers and poor 
consumers, and in some instances they result in large scale humanitarian operations in 
order to restore the food entitlement of poor people. To put them in perspective, the 
seasonal price margin they represent can be compared to the long run average margin of 
roughly 60 per cent that characterises the Malawi maize market in the long run. In  
2001-02 the gap between the seasonal low and seasonal high real price (adjusted for 
inflation) was 280 per cent, in 2005-06 it was 165 per cent, and in 2007-09 285 per cent 
(in this case across two seasons). While the proximate cause of such events is often a 
lower level of production than had been predicted, the severity and duration of the 
subsequent price spike suggests serious dysfunction in the public policy response to 
early signs of a shortage of maize in the market. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine the reasons for this dysfunction. In the process, it explores the ‘Jayne 
hypothesis’ (Jayne et al., 2006; 2008b; Tschirley and Jayne, 2010) that the government 
tends to exacerbate rather that dampen down these price episodes, because its actions 




The chapter uses the analytic narrative method described in Section 3.7.1 above to 
construct a ‘political economy’ analysis of maize market events in Malawi in the 2000s. 
In interpreting such events, the interplay between private and public sector behaviour is 
examined carefully, as well as the sequencing of decisions made in the public domain. 
The significance of political factors in determining the timing and direction of public 
responses to emerging maize market imbalances is given special attention. At the centre 
of the chapter is the problem of public-private coordination failures which are 
recognised as the source of adverse welfare outcomes by both the ‘coordination failure’ 
(Dorward et al., 1998; 2004a; 2009a; Kydd et al., 2002) and ‘partial liberalisation’ 
(Kheralla et al., 2000; Jayne et al., 2002; 2006) branches of ideas about the functioning 
of food crop markets in eastern and southern Africa. 
 
The chapter begins by examining price behaviour during each of these extreme episodes 
in more detail, and comparatively, to see if common patterns occur in each of them. 
This is followed by a consideration of the trends and events in maize volume data that 
help to explain price trends, including production, consumption, stock and import 
information. The chapter then examines each of the three price episodes as a detailed 
sequential narrative, in order to reveal the stances taken by key actors, the decisions 
taken, and the consequences of those decisions for stabilising the maize market. Finally, 
the chapter returns to the comparative picture, and draws out the repeated sequences of 
events that recur predictably in each such episode. 
 
6.2 Prices, Production and Supply in Episodes of Excessive Maize Price Instability 
Some writers have suggested the usefulness of separating political, natural and technical 
aspects of maize price crises from their policy and political dimensions (Devereux, 
2002). The natural and technical aspects can be considered to cover climate events 
(deficit or excess rainfall), the output instability to which this gives rise, and the price 
behaviour in the market that then ensues. The policy and political aspects cover the 
sequences of public decision making associated with each crisis, and the political 
factors that seem to guide the character, speed and direction of such policy responses. 
There is also an important institutional dimension on the policy and political side, 
including private-public coordination problems. 
 
This separation of the technical from the political is not, of course, watertight. For 
example, production figures are themselves political, and have become even more so in 
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Malawi since the advent of the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme in 2005/06 and 
the expectation both inside and outside the country that the AISP has moved Malawi 
sustainably from maize deficit to maize surplus on the basis of domestic production. 
This is an aspect to which this chapter has cause to return at several points as its 
argument develops. In the meantime, the separation is considered to have some merit 
for organising the discussion, and it is followed here to some degree. 
 
The discussion begins with a closer look at price behaviour in the Malawi maize market 
in the 2000s, centred on the three extreme price events that characterised the decade. 
The relevant data is set out in Table 6.1, which provides the complete time-series of 
national maize prices from July 2000 to June 2009, in both nominal and real terms. Real 
prices are nominal prices deflated by the Malawi CPI, with base-year 2000. Certain 
particular prices are highlighted by shading in the table for ease of reference. These are 
key seasonal minimum and maximum prices and switching points between upward and 
downward trends. 
 
Figure 6.1 displays the maize price trend as it occurred in the 2001-02 crisis. In the pre-
crisis season of 2000-01, the seasonal price rise from June 2000 to March 2001 was 
fairly routine. Prices rose from a low of MK5.25 kg in June to a high of MK7.53 kg in 
March (a rise of 43 per cent in nominal terms). However, prices then held at the same 
level in April 2001, then declined for one month only to MK7.16 kg in May 2001, 
before beginning on a steep upward trajectory. This was most unusual, and might have 
provided an early alert that available maize supply was in deficit. A price decline from 
peak to trough of just 7 per cent is so rare in the historical patterns of Malawi maize 
prices that urgent further investigation was indicated just on the basis of this indicator. 
Prices rose steeply from May to Feb (9 months), a lengthy and devastatingly adverse 
trend for rural households already exposed to insufficient food due to heavy rains and 
floods pre-harvest in 2001. Once extra imported supplies began to arrive in early to 
mid-2002, prices came off their peak sharply. However, as shown in Figure 6.1, prices 
did not return to former levels, and this applies in real as well as nominal terms. The 
nominal price increase from June 2001 to June 2002 was 51.2 per cent, while in real 






Table 6.1: Malawi Average Nominal and Real Maize Prices 2000-2009 
 
 
Note: Real prices are nominal prices divided by the CPI (2000 = 100) 
Source: MoAFS, Agro-Economic Survey Unit 
Month 
2000-2003 2003-06 2006-09 
Year Nom. Real Year Nom. Real Year Nom. Real 
Jul 2000 5.49 5.87 2003 10.17 6.95 2006 18.76 8.35 
Aug 5.15 5.67 10.44 7.09 19.30 8.36 
Sep 5.36 5.39 10.83 6.95 20.39 8.62 
Oct 5.51 5.28 12.62 7.41 21.32 8.58 
Nov 6.32 5.61 14.05 8.25 22.19 8.67 
Dec 6.45 5.57 13.83 7.88 22.24 8.74 
 Jan 2001 7.21 5.96 2004 15.97 9.13 2007 21.18 8.50 
 Feb 7.35 5.94 16.61 9.67 19.22 7.89 
Mar 7.53 6.16 19.12 11.32 18.21 7.75 
Apr 7.53 6.21 16.66 10.20 16.03 6.89 
May 7.16 5.94 13.44 8.20 14.26 6.28 
Jun 7.94 6.80 12.96 7.50 14.61 6.11 
Jul 9.27 7.88 13.63 7.79 15.63 6.49 
Aug 13.14 11.19 14.00 7.78 16.86 6.80 
Sep 17.11 13.87 15.73 8.53 18.04 7.09 
Oct 18.91 15.73 15.86 8.17 20.76 7.76 
Nov 19.67 16.74 17.29 8.63 24.11 8.72 
Dec 24.60 21.30 17.53 8.72 28.67 10.41 
Jan 2002 31.00 22.17 2005 17.88 9.03 2008 34.18 12.68 
Feb 32.48 22.57 17.61 9.03 39.69 15.09 
Mar 28.96 20.21 17.36 9.17 43.53 17.08 
Apr 18.62 13.23 15.93 8.46 35.41 14.00 
May 15.16 10.89 16.39 8.67 32.83 13.25 
Jun 14.10 10.45 18.00 9.00 37.94 14.50 
Jul 15.16 11.26 18.68 9.22 48.72 18.47 
Aug 16.15 11.95 20.55 9.83 55.52 20.43 
Sep 16.29 11.42 23.15 10.78 53.38 19.08 
Oct 16.74 11.76 29.11 12.85 54.33 18.45 
Nov 18.42 12.67 32.77 13.97 57.81 19.07 
Dec 19.94 13.51 34.34 14.65 63.47 21.04 
Jan 2003 18.34 11.51 2006 41.68 18.20 2009 69.22 23.50 
Feb 19.03 11.74 50.67 22.44 70.57 23.28 
Mar 17.22 10.90 45.95 21.06 65.27 21.63 
Apr 13.39 8.67 27.46 12.68 45.36 15.41 
May 10.51 6.93 19.07 9.00 34.08 11.92 
Jun 9.47 6.47 18.31 8.19 32.98 11.93 
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Figure 6.1: The 2001-02 Maize Price Spike 
  
    
Source: monthly maize price data published by MoAFS, Government of Malawi 
 
The parallel set of price circumstances that occurred in the 2005-06 crisis is shown in 
Figure 6.2. Here again, the pre-crisis season (2004-05) displays a rather subdued 
seasonal price spike, with prices rising from a low of MK12.96 in June 2004 to a high 
of MK17.88 in Jan 2005, an increase of 38 per cent. Prices then declined modestly to 
MK15.93 in April 2005, before starting an extended upward trajectory lasting 10 
months. As in 2001-02, the warning signs of future shortage were apparent in the low 
and short price decline at the time of the 2005 harvest (this is aside from a low forecast 
for the 2005 harvest that was available to decision makers long before the harvest 
arrived). In the 2005-06 crisis, prices rose to MK50.67 in February 2006, representing 
an increase of 218.1 per cent in nominal terms or 165.2 per cent in real terms. Prices 
then fell extremely sharply to MK18.31 in June 2006, associated with an excellent 
growing season and harvest, and the first implementation year of the AISP. The real 
price of maize in June 2006 was the lowest it had been since June 2004, but 
nevertheless represented a 9.2 per cent real increase when comparing seasonal lows in 
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Figure 6.2: The 2005-06 Maize Price Spike 
 
  Source: monthly maize price data published by MoAFS, Government of Malawi 
 
The 2007-09 price crisis is interesting for several reasons. As will be seen shortly, this 
was a period when Malawi was supposedly comfortably in maize surplus from domestic 
production throughout. The nature of the price spike also differs from the two preceding 
examples. It occurs across two crop seasons, rather than one, with a dip in prices in the 
middle of a sustained and steep upward trend (Figure 6.3). In this instance, the starting 
point is May 2007 when the exceptionally low nominal price of MK14.26 is recorded. 
Indeed prices in the post-harvest period in mid-2007 were only 6 per cent in real terms 
above those of the year 2000. However, these unusually low prices were followed by a  
steep rise through the 2007 lean season to reach an initial peak of MK43.53 in March 
2008 (a nominal rise of 205.3 per cent). There was then a moderate harvest season fall 
back to MK32.83 in May 2008, followed by a further steep rise to MK70.57 in February 
2009. The short-term ‘wobble’ in this rise that occurred in September-October 2008 is 
explained in due course. Overall, nominal prices rose by 115 per cent in the 2008-09 
season and by 395 per cent across the two seasons. The equivalent real increases were 


















































Figure 6.3: The 2007-09 Maize Price Spikes 
 
  Source: monthly maize price data published by MoAFS, Government of Malawi 
 
The nominal price patterns described above are summarised and compared in Table 6.2 
below. These extreme price episodes share much in common, although the ‘double’ 
price hike of 2007-09 makes the latter differ in some respects. In all cases, the trends 
preceding the price crisis are distinguished by the relative small drop in prices that 
occurs at harvest time, and often by relatively low price seasonality overall in the 
preceding season. One could go as far as to say that when the drop from peak to trough 
at harvest is small and curtailed in duration, then a very serious adverse situation is 
going to develop in the ensuing lean season. In these cases, the seasonal lowest price is 
earlier (occurring in March or April) than the typical trough in June. Also in these cases, 
the lean season price increase is steeper and lasts for a longer time (9-10 months) as 
compared to the typical 6-7 months price rise from the lowest to the highest month. In 
2007-09, these factors are effectively ‘chained’ in two successive seasons, making the 














































These price trends are of course mainly explained by the physical quantity of maize 
available in markets, which in turn depends on domestic production levels, net stock 
changes, and net import levels. A starting point for considering the underlying maize 
supply position is to examine trends in the ‘maize balance sheet’, in other words the 
extent to which domestic production satisfies domestic demand for maize. This is done 
in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.4. This also provides an opportunity to talk about ‘natural 
factors’ in the occurrence of maize price crises in Malawi. 
 




Pre-Crisis Season Crisis Season 
Low High Rise Low Fall Duration High Rise Duration
MK/kg MK/kg % MK/kg % months MK/kg % months 
2000-02 Jun Mar May Feb 
5.25 7.53 43.4 7.16 -4.9 2 32.48 353.6 9 
2004-06 Jun Jan Apr Feb 
12.96 17.88 38.0 15.93 -10.9 3 50.67 218.1 10 
2007-09 Jun Mar May Feb 
14.61 43.53 197.9 32.83 -24.6 2 70.57 115.0 9 
 
Source: derived from MoAFS price data provide in Table 6.1 
 
Table 6.3: Maize Balance Sheet 2000-2009 
 





1999/00 2,290,018 1,806,993 483,025 26.7 
2000/01 1,589,437 1,857,201 -267,764 -14.4 
2001/02 1,485,272 1,908,805 -423,533 -22.2 
2002/03 1,847,476 1,961,842 -114,366 -5.8 
2003/04 1,608,349 2,016,353 -408,004 -20.2 
2004/05 1,225,234 2,072,378 -847,144 -40.9 
2005/06 2,611,486 2,129,960 481,526 22.6 
2006/07 3,226,418 2,189,142 1,037,276 47.4 
2007/08 2,634,701 2,249,969 384,732 17.1 
2008/09 3,661,732 2,312,485 1,349,247 58.3 
Average 2,218,012 2,050,513 167,499 8.2 
  Note: consumption trend is not the same as that given in official 
MoAFS maize balance sheet. 
 Source: production data MoAFS crop estimates; consumption trend 
as explained in the text. 
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The maize balance sheet set out in Table 6.3 is not the same as the ‘official’ Malawi 
maize balance sheet that is produced by MoAFS. The latter has certain quirks in the 
consumption side figures that occur from one year to the next that are not explained, and 
on close examination are sometimes rather unsatisfactory. The production figures are 
the official (final) maize production estimates as published by MoAFS. The 
consumption needs figures are based on an annual population growth rate of 2.78 per 
cent (this is the intercensal rate between the 1998 and 2008 censuses), and a constant 
maize requirement per capita of 172.2 kg person per year (which is the mean figure for 
the decade derived from the MoAFS balance sheet). This procedure is consistent with 
the approach adopted by FEWSNET, which assumes that the contribution of maize to 
dietary calories in Malawi is constant at 73.8 per cent on a per capita basis (FEWSNET, 
2007). The consumption needs trend can be lowered or elevated by making a different 
assumption about the calorie contribution of maize, and hence about the annual kg 
needs per person. The size of surplus or deficit can also be affected by assumptions 
about physical losses between harvest and consumption. However, the purpose here is 
not to seek pinpoint accuracy about these levels (an impossible task in any case), but to 
identify the chief imbalances giving rise to observed price behaviour. 
 
Figure 6.4: Estimated Maize Surpluses and Deficits from the Maize Balance Sheet 
 
  




































































From a production standpoint, Table 6.3 characterises the 2000s as a decade of two 
distinct main phases. There is a variably low output phase lasting five years from 
2000/01 to 2004/05, and a variably much higher output phase lasting so far for the years 
2005/06 to 2008/09. While the average maize output for the entire decade was 2.2 
million tons, the ‘low output phase’ is associated with a mean annual harvest of just 
over 1.5 million tons, while the ‘high output phase’ displays a mean annual harvest of 3 
million tons. In other words, maize harvests in Malawi, on average, doubled between 
the first and second of these two phases, according to official production figures. 
 
The surplus or deficit column in Table 6.3 helps to explain price events in the 2001-02 
and 2005-06 price episodes, but not so the long run up in prices that occurred across 
2007 to 2009. In 2000-01 there was a sharp drop in output compared to the preceding 
two years, leading, as shown, to a shortfall of around 270,000 tons. A further poor year 
in 2001/02 exacerbated this deficit. The main cause of the drop in harvest in 2001 was 
excessive rain and flooding that occurred in February-March 2001, causing a proportion 
of the new crop to rot on the stem, as well as seriously disrupting rural transport 
networks. In 2002, widespread dry spells in the growing season reduced yields and the 
final harvest. 
 
In 2004-05 there was a very poor harvest indeed, possibly resulting in a gap of over 
800,000 tons between production and consumption. The critical factor here was again 
lack of rainfall in the planting and growing seasons. It is easy to see how this would 
have triggered a run up in prices in the succeeding lean season in 2005-06 (depending, 
of course, also on any ameliorative action taken). In 2007-09, by contrast, Malawi was 
supposedly floating on huge maize surpluses. Even allowing for restocking food 
security reserves, and a decision to export about 400,000 tons (on which more in due 
course), there is no trigger on the production side that can explain the run up in prices 
that occurred from mid-2007 to early 2009. 
 
Maize available for consumption depends on food security stock changes and net trade 
quantities in addition to production. These cannot be examined very satisfactorily on an 
annual basis, since it is the timing of these additions to, or subtractions from, maize 
availability that determines whether incipient price pressures are prevented, lessened in 
intensity or duration, or allowed to run their course. Unfortunately, monthly data on 
many of these key variables is almost impossible to reconstruct for a variety of reasons. 
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On the stock side, there are different institutional entities and different categories under 
which public stocking of maize occurs. There is ADMARC which is responsible for 
sales of stock to consumers (usually at prices prescribed by the government), and 
purchase of grain from farmers both for its own operational purposes and for the 
National Food Reserve Authority (NFRA). The NFRA purchases grain from ADMARC, 
from private traders, and from abroad (when given a directive to do so by the 
government). It also holds grain on behalf of bodies like WFP who with the agreement 
of government and funding from donors bring in food aid for various purposes. In 
addition, NFRA stocks are allocated between commercial stocks (intended for sale to 
the public via ADMARC) and the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) held for purely food 
security purposes. On the import side, informal (unlicensed cross-border) trade plays a 
critical role, and the volumes involved are estimates subject to wide margins of error. 
Also formal imports may be undertaken by government or private traders (under 
license), or by food aid agencies like WFP. 
 
A digression is useful at this point on the status and function of NFRA. The latter was 
created in 1999 under donor pressure as a means of taking out of ADMARC the 
management of the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR), due to a conflict of interest 
perceived by the donors between ADMARC’s buying and selling activities and its 
national grain reserve obligations. NFRA early encountered difficulties. It was not 
provided at inception with a capital fund to conduct purchases, and therefore borrowed 
money commercially in order to build up stocks. By June 2000, it had incurred a debt of 
approximately MK1 billion while building up a stock of over 180,000 tons. It is in this 
context that the IMF then recommended to the government that its stocks should be 
reduced to a strategic level of 60,000 tons, by commercial sales at market prices, in 
order to pay down a significant proportion of its debt (Devereux, 2002). The 
significance of this event becomes apparent in the narrative account of the 2001-02 food 
crisis that follows shortly. 
 
Due to continuing ambiguity between transfers out of stock for sales to consumers 
through ADMARC, and its ‘pure’ food reserve role, in 2005, NFRA stock operations 
were formally split between a commercial stock and the SGR. The commercial stock 
comprises purchases (via ADMARC) from farmers, or imports under government 
license, for the purpose of sales (via ADMARC) to consumers at government fixed 
prices. The SGR represents a stock held for humanitarian distribution in the event of a 
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crisis, the level of which at 60,000 tons is often assisted by donor contributions. In 
theory, the commercial operations should yield a sufficient margin to cover the 
management and operating costs for both the commercial and SGR branches of NFRA 
operation. 
 
With regard to imports, initial evidence was provided in Table 4.12 (Chapter 4) to show 
the significance of informal border trade for maize supply in Malawi. The volume of 
such trade varies according to the size of harvests in adjacent countries, and also 
according to the price differential for maize between countries. Here, the picture of 
informal imports is expanded, with data being provided on estimated quarterly cross-
border flows where available (Table 6.4). Estimates provided by Whiteside et al. (2003) 
suggest that the famine of 2001-02 would have been very considerably worse without 
informal imports, put at 155,000 tons in 2001-02 and 246,000 tons in 2002-03. A steep 
rise in Malawi prices during and immediately after the maize harvest tend to bring in 
greater volumes of cross-border maize, and this occurred again in 2005-06 when it is 
thought 156,300 tons was imported this way. On average, over a period of 9 years, 
informal trade may have been responsible for around 106,000 tons of maize a year, 
equivalent to 5 per cent of mean production over the decade of the 2000s. 
 
Table 6.4: Annual and Quarterly Data on Informal Cross Border Maize Imports 
 
Year Apr-Jun Jul-Sep Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Full Season 
2001/02 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 155,000 
2002/03 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 246,000 
2003/04 49,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. 49,000 
2004/05 10,949 33,864 21,585 20,593 86,991 
2005/06 29,621 28,090 42,603 55,948 156,262 
2006/07 27,482 27,069 15,910 9,120 79,581 
2007/08 21,637 19,827 7,731 8,389 57,584 
2008/09 25,909 26,627 6,251 3,734 62,521 
2009/10 19,970 20,941 11,305 8,817 61,033 
 
  Note: n.a. = data not available for these quarters.  
Source: (Whiteside et al., 2003;FEWSNET, 2009; 2010) 
 
Informal imports play a critical role, not just due to their estimated volume, but because 
they represent a significant addition to marketed supplies available for purchase by 
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consumers. It is recalled that various estimates suggest that only around 15 per cent of 
maize produced in Malawi is sold by those who produce it. This means that in an 
average year of the 2000s (see Table 6.3) marketed supply from domestic harvests is 
around 330,000 tons. In this light, 110,000 tons of informal imports increases available 
market supply by one third. And this can also be seen in relation to restocking policies 
by ADMARC and NFRA. When these agencies have been ordered by the government 
to secure a certain proportion of their stocks from domestic production, the places they 
send their agents to procure grain are the border crossing points where private traders 
are often able to deliver large quantities at the required prices. 
 
A further most important finding of the monitoring of cross-border trade that has been 
in place since 2004/05 is that informal exports are scarcely significant in the overall 
picture, even in years when Malawi has a healthy maize surplus. Estimated export 
volumes in the four seasons 2004/05 to 2007/08 were 571, 1,158, 3,721, and 7,115 tons 
in each season respectively (FEWSNET, 2009). In 2008/09 volumes were so low as to 
be recorded as negligible. This becomes interesting later in this chapter, since placing a 
ban on exports is one of the predictable responses by government to steeply rising 
domestic maize prices, occurring in every price crisis in the 2000s. Yet rising maize 
prices in Malawi increases the incentive for traders in adjacent countries to export to 
Malawi, while making it less attractive for Malawi traders to export maize. 
 
Formal imports and exports are also relevant to interpreting the sequence of events that 
occurred at times of price crisis. Data on formal maize trade for the calendar years 2000 
to 2007 are provided in Table 6.5, including the calculation of net formal imports after 
deducting export outflows of maize. Formal foreign trade in maize varies considerably 
from one year to the next, depending especially on government decisions to enter into 
specific import contracts. The table reveals some data pertinent to interpreting price 
spikes, their antecedents, and their aftermath. For example, there was a huge rise in 
maize imports recorded for 2002, a year in which the government took late receipt of 
the majority proportion of a delivery contract for 150,000 tons of maize, as well as 
trying to fulfil another contract for 240,000 tons. In the end 363,000 tons were imported 
under these two contracts. Most of this maize arrived too late as far as the 2001-02 
maize crisis was concerned, but it did help to head off a continuation of that crisis in 
2002-03. It also resulted in excessive maize stocks that were sold off at a loss, partly in 
the domestic market, and also to exports (as shown by the larger than usual export 
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figure for 2003). As might be expected imports were again substantial in 2005, and 
were an important reason, other than good weather and the fertilizer subsidy, for the 
substantial decline in maize price that occurred from the 2005-06 peak (Figure 6.2 
above). Finally, a very substantial export figure of 390,000 tons occurs in 2007. These 
exports are discussed later in relation to the politics of the 2007-09 price episode. 
However, it can be noted here that 390,000 tons exports should have been well within 
the capability of Malawi to supply without disrupting its internal market, if the 
production figure for 2006/07 (Table 6.3) is to be believed. In principle, this was 
considerably less than half the excess of production over consumption in the period in 
which the exports took place. 
 
Table 6.5: Malawi Maize Formal Imports and Exports 1999-2007 
 
 
Year Imports Exports Net Imports 
1999 28,163  90  28,073  
2000 7,879  11,000  -3,121  
2001 9,326  9,879  -553  
2002 348,365  1,644  346,721  
2003 61,836  54,604  7,232  
2004 54,300  12,607  41,693  
2005 113,300  467  112,833  
2006 55,808  1,160  54,648  
2007 20,180  391,255  -371,075  
 
  Source: (FAO, 2009a) 
 
As already stated, these technical relations of supply and prices, and the annual 
aggregates of much of the foregoing discussion, are only half the story of the recurrent 
adverse price episodes that Malawi experienced in the 2000s, and in some ways they are 
not even the most interesting half from an explanatory viewpoint. Extreme price spikes 
are a manifestation of market forces escaping the ability of public decision makers to 
take successful counteractive measures. A range of possible explanation could account 
for this. Governments may be reluctant for political reasons to admit a crisis, and then 
act too late. They may deploy instruments that prove ineffectual at halting price rises. 
They may inadvertently exacerbate the trend through actions that intensify the shortage 
of maize supply (the ‘Jayne hypothesis’). While any or all of these reasons may play a 
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part (and a few others besides), a narrative examination of the three extreme price 
episodes during the 2000s helps to provide traction for distinguishing the more from the 
less important factors in such events, and it is to this task that this chapter now turns. 
 
6.3 A Narrative Account of the Three Adverse Price Episodes in the 2000s28 
In this section of the chapter, each of the three episodes of excessive price instability in 
the 2000s is examined in the form of a narrative of events as they occurred, in which the 
focus shifts to the actors involved in decisions, the interpretations they placed on the 
evidence before them, and the role of political factors in determining certain reactions to 
events. Where possible, the chapter also comments on the role of the private sector in 
these events, and on the shifting interaction between public and private sectors that 
occurs as events unfurl. Ultimately, it is hoped to shed light on the central issue of 
public-private coordination, and how and when it goes seriously wrong. 
 
The 2001/02 Famine 
This is the only one of the three episodes examined here in which there were a high 
number of visible casualties of the shortage of maize in the market, and several 
thousand people are known to have died of starvation. The 2001/02 episode is often 
therefore referred to as the Malawi famine of those years. It is also the episode about 
which most has been written, and has been analysed and thought about (especially in 
terms of lessons to be learnt) by many researchers (Devereux, 2002; IMF, 2002; Stevens 
et al., 2002, Oygard et al., 2003; Whiteside et al., 2003; Takavarasha, 2006). The 
severity and duration of the maize shortage (and accompanying spiralling prices) is 
ascribed in these sources, with differing amounts of emphasis, to the following factors: 
 
(a) flood damage to the 2001 maize crop (already noted); 
 
(b) inopportune (and almost certainly corrupt) sell off of the national maize stock 
during the first six months of 2001; 
 
(c) persistent optimism regarding the high level of output of substitute foods, especially 
cassava, originating in data supplied by MoAFS but diffused widely by FEWSNET; 
                                                 
28  This section of the chapter makes extensive use of FEWSNET Food Security Updates 
(monthly) for Malawi, found on the website http://www.fews.net/Pages/default.aspx. Reports 
are only mentioned individually where a particularly significant insight is obtained from 
their analysis. 
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(d) a reluctance by donors to engage with government on potential maize shortages, due 
to the corrupt sale of the maize stock, and other governance issues; 
 
(e) slow and late decisions to import maize, predicated in part on the preceding 
optimism about maize substitutes, but also due to political unwillingness to admit to 
a maize crisis; 
 
(f) late arrival of maize ordered, due to shortage of supply in neighbouring countries 
and transport bottlenecks (most of the maize arrived in 2002); 
 
(g) the sheer poverty of the Malawian rural population, giving them no resilience in the 
face of rising maize prices, and creating ‘a crisis of exchange entitlement’ for maize. 
 
In terms of the sequence events, more detail on some of these explanations is useful, 
and this also eventually begins to provide some idea of underlying political factors that 
caused certain positions to be taken at particular points in time. It needs to be borne in 
mind that Malawi had two excellent maize harvests in the two years preceding the crisis, 
1998/99 and 1999/00, when 2.2 and 2.3 million tons were produced respectively. The 
government of President Bakili Muluzi had attained power for a second term in 1999, 
and success in maize production was a main pillar of its appeal to the electorate. In 
March 2000, national maize stocks held by the NFRA and other agencies stood at 
186,369 tons (FEWSNET, 2001a). In February and March 2001, Malawi experienced 
widespread heavy rains and flooding, in a period when the rainy season is typically 
tailing off allowing maize to ripen for the harvest occurring from late March onwards. 
The government was quite quick to declare the floods a national disaster, which the 
President did on 22 February and an appeal to donors for US$6.7 million for relief and 
rehabilitation was made by the government on 6 March. 
 
The stance of the government then, and for many months to follow, was that Malawi 
was food secure. Even though the final crop estimate for maize was revised down, 
suggesting a possible 270,000 tons maize consumption gap, Ministry of Agriculture 
figures for other crops displayed record estimates for rice, cassava, and sweet potatoes, 
such that FEWSNET declared in July 2001 that there was food surplus in the country of 
263,145 tons maize equivalent. Much has been made in reviews of the crisis of the 
position taken in successive months by FEWSNET food security reports that remained 
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steadfastly optimistic about food availability in Malawi through 2001. However, it is 
apparent on re-reading these reports a decade later that FEWSNET was mainly 
synthesising data and interpretations about the food position supplied by MoAFS. 
Rising maize prices in the period August to October 2001 were treated rather casually, 
and not as evidence of a severe deficit of food emerging. Indeed, ADMARC was 
permitted to increase its sales price to consumers from MK5 to MK17 per kg in August 
2001 (a 240 per cent nominal increase), and this was couched in the food security 
reports as a manoeuvre to try to outwit private traders (preventing them buying maize at 
MK5 from ADMARC and re-selling at much higher market prices), rather than as a 
massive change in the affordability of maize for poor consumers. 
 
In the early part of this sequence, and indeed for many preceding months, the national 
maize stock had been gradually and inexorably depleted until it ran out completely in 
August 2001. The factors surrounding this run down is well-trodden ground (Devereux, 
2002; Stevens et al., 2002; Cromwell and Chintedza, 2005, Takaravash, 2006). NFRA 
was holding a huge maize stock that it did not have the financial capability to maintain, 
and the IMF had pressured the government during 2000 to reduce this stock to the 
NFRA mandated level of 60,000 tons, partly so that NFRA could pay off some of its 
debt, and partly to avoid mounting losses in store (due to deterioration and theft). Sales, 
however, went far beyond this requirement, and the manner in which they took place, 
involving combinations of non-transparent decisions by ADMARC and NFRA 
management, suggests that a cycle of collusive actions took place involving senior 
government leaders, big private traders and the decision makers in the storage agencies. 
As shown in Table 6.6 below, total public stocks of maize fell from 116,165 tons at the 
start of January 2001 to zero stocks by August 2001, and remained at zero until August 
2002, when they began to pick up again in volume rapidly due to the arrival of imports. 
 
Presumably as much to do with the stock depletion as anything else (because no one in 
government was admitting a food crisis at that stage), in August 2001 the government 
entered into a contract with a South African agency to import up to 150,000 tons of 
maize over the period to the end of the year. However, this contract was slow to be 
fulfilled for a variety of commercial and logistical reasons. Other countries of the region 
were also experiencing maize deficits and were trying to source from South Africa, the 
price for South African white maize was rising, and transport bottlenecks on main 
routes to Malawi were prevalent. Instead of obtaining 50,000 tons per month in 
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October-December 2001, just 2,594 tons had arrived by end-October and a cumulative 
27,355 tons by end-December. On arrival, this maize was not going into store, but 
straight out to consumers at ADMARC outlets at the official selling price of MK17 per 
kg. 
 
Table 6.6: Evolution of NFRA Stocks 2001-03, Monthly 
(all figures in tons maize) 
 
Month 2001 2002 2003 
Jan 116,165 0 261,023 
Feb 85,640 0 258,000 
Mar 64,727 0 266,000 
Apr 53,778 0 250,000 
May 40,331 0 258,000 
Jun 35,174 0 212,936 
Jul 14,411 0 210,538 
Aug 0 79,553 208,139 
Sep 0 122,285 205,741 
Oct 0 164,653 203,342 
Nov 0 209,778 168,251 
Dec 0 264,045 118,321 
 
  Note: figures for Jul-Sep 2003 are interpolated from adjacent months 
  Source: FEWSNET Food Security Updates (monthly) for this period 
 
The government remained steadfast in its refusal to recognise a food crisis through to 
February 2002, when on 22 February the President eventually declared a national 
disaster. By then, as we have seen, the market price of maize had risen to MK32.5, a 
rise in real terms of 280 per cent over the preceding May. International NGOs and civil 
society groups in Malawi were instrumental from late 2001 in forcing this change of 
stance, however, it is the case that as late in the sequence as November 2001, when 
Save the Children made a presentation to government and donors verifying the 
emergence of famine in Mchinji and Salima districts, their appeals for emergency action 
were rejected (Devereux, 2002). The donors were not helpful. They were distrustful of a 
government that had wilfully permitted the national reserve stock to be sold off, and did 
not wish to signal that assistance would be as readily forthcoming as usual. In fact, by 
late February 2002, it had become almost beside the point to declare disaster. The next 
harvest was in prospect, and hungry rural people had begun to eat ‘green maize’ (unripe 
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maize on the cob) to compensate for the lack of food available in rural areas. ADMARC 
was distributing maize from the import contract (now coming in at 20,000 tons per 
month) but rationing individual sales to either 10 kg or 25 kg in different parts of the 
country. A ban on private traders purchasing from ADMARC had been announced in 
January 2002. 
 
From March 2002, and for many months afterwards, the political stance on food 
security in Malawi switched to an entirely opposing view from the ‘denial’ position of 
2001 and 2002. In April 2002, the NFRA announced a 240,000 ton purchase 
programme to replenish food security stocks and provide for maize sales through 
ADMARC. Since predicted maize output in the 2002 season was another low of 1.5 
million tons, FEWSNET began forecasting the emergence of a 400,000 ton food gap, at 
one point even rising to a 570,000 ton gap (June 2002). Also in June 2002, the WFP 
announced an ‘emergency operation’ (EMOP) to distribute 54,426 tons of food 
commodities to 2.1 million targeted beneficiaries. The donors piled in, and the EU 
agreed in August 2002 to fund the local purchase of 40,000 tons to replenish the SGR. 
By end-December 2002, NFRA and other public stocks contained 264,045 tons of 
maize, cumulative food aid during 2002 had reached 122,625 tons, and NFRA had 
procured (mainly from imports) 226,801 tons of its intended 240,000 purchases for 
commercial sale. In the meantime, ADMARC was distributing maize at MK17 through 
late 2002 and early 2003, and the peak national market price in the 2002-03 lean season 
was just MK19.94 in December 2002. 
 
Politically, 2002 was the year when President Muluzi tried and only narrowly failed to 
force through the Malawi parliament a change in the constitution that would have 
permitted him to stand for a third term in office. By the 2002/03 maize season, the next 
general election to be held in 2004 was also on the horizon. During the second half of 
2002 and into 2003, the maize stock and availability position overshot just as extremely 
in the abundance direction as it had failed to meet minimum acceptable food security 
requirements in 2001. The NFRA stock peaked in March 2003 at 266,000 tons; however, 
by then market prices were drifting below the ADMARC selling price of MK17 so it 
was not possible to reduce this stock through public sales. In June 2003, the government 
announced a reduction in the ADMARC selling price to MK10 per kg, a price that was 
then held until Sept 2004, when it reverted back to MK17. The period from early 2003 
to mid 2004 saw a massive sell off of the stocks accumulated during the 2002-03 
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restock. By January 2004, for example, the NFRA had sold 226,385 tons of these 
previous purchases. This explains the low price seasonality that occurred in the 2003-04 
and 2004-05 seasons (see Table 6.1 above) despite the harvests in these two years being 
rather poor (especially the 2004 harvest at 1.6 million tons). 
 
The 2001-02 famine and its aftermath have important lessons for the intersection of 
politics and food security to carry forward, as also for the intersection of the private and 
public sectors in maize trading. These are explored in more detail, comparatively, when 
the other price spikes of the 2000s have been examined. However, one notable political 
feature that is worth drawing attention to at this point is the reluctance of governments 
to change their mind from a firmly stated position, notwithstanding accumulating 
evidence to the contrary. This is of course a political phenomenon (an admission of 
being wrong as a sign of weakness etc.) that is common to governments (elected or not) 
the world over, and is by no means unique to Malawi. Also not unique to Malawi, but 
manifested in a rather extreme form in this food insecurity episode was the adoption of 
calculated stances that seemed partly to do with electoral considerations, and partly to 
do with patrimonial ones associated with loyalty and personal gain. While irrefutable 
evidence will no doubt never be found, the coincidence of the complete sell-off of 
180,000 tons of public maize stock with an ever more vigorous political defence of the 
abundant food available in the country seems to suggest rather powerfully that 
patrimonial considerations entirely overruled alternative arguments put forward as the 
crisis deepened (Cromwell and Chintedza, 2005). 
 
The 2005-06 Food Crisis 
Very little has been written about the 2005/06 food crisis compared to 2001/02 famine 
and the 2007-09 price spike. This is possibly because this was the first year of the AISP, 
and the 2006 maize harvest turned out to be a historical record at 2.6 million tons. The 
price spike at February 2006 had, of course, its antecedents in the previous year’s very 
poor harvest (1.2 million tons) and in the stock position and import ordering associated 
with the lead up to that harvest (Dorward et al., 2008; FEWSNET, 2005a; 2005b; 
Menon, 2007). An important consideration in early 2005 was the avoidance of the 
excessive supplies that had characterised the maize market through 2003 and 2004, and 
which had involved selling substantial quantities of stock at prices only a fraction of 
their import cost. For example, a substantial proportion of NFRA imports in mid-2002 
had a landed cost of US$285 per ton, equivalent to MK28 per kg, compared to the 
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ADMARC sales price to consumers of MK17 reducing to MK10 in June 2003 
(FEWSNET, 2003). 
 
In January 2005, the government and donors concluded a review of the humanitarian 
assistance programme that had run through 2004, and decided that a few outstanding 
import contracts that had not yet been fulfilled should be cancelled since the food 
security situation did not warrant the potential financial losses that might be involved. 
However, the growing season of 2004/05 was encountering widespread and lengthy dry 
spells, and by February 2005 it was becoming apparent that the 2005 harvest might not 
be as high as at first predicted. At this stage prices were relatively low (the price peak in 
January 2005 was MK17.88), and the SGR had just been replenished to its 60,000 ton 
target with assistance from the EU. ADMARC was selling grain out of store at MK17 
(the price since Sept 2004), and there were 80,000 tons commercial stocks available for 
sale at the NFRA. In addition, various food aid operations were going on in maize 
deficit areas scattered across the country. 
 
In March 2005, MoAFS second round crop estimates forecast a 25 per cent drop in the 
2005 maize harvest, resulting in a national cereal gap upwards of 300,000 tons. The 
donors and government consulted in April 2005 and made the decision to import in 
good time as opposed to the 2001/02 crisis when donors had been reluctant to support 
the government, and the government itself, as we have seen, was unprepared to admit 
the existence of a food security problem. At the end of March 2005, SGR stocks had 
dropped to 27,000 tons, commercial stocks to 23,000 tons, and ADMARC was carrying 
about 3,000 tons in operational stocks. The government, with assistance from DFID and 
the EU issued a tender for 29,000 tons to replenish the SGR. In addition, government 
announced its intention to purchase 100,000 tons of maize with 30,000 tons for sale to 
the public and the rest intended for relief purposes. However, no maize import contract 
had been issued by the end of May 2005. 
 
In July 2005, the President established and launched the Feed the Nation Fund, a 
voluntary trust into which charitable donations could be put to feed households affected 
by a food shortage. The government also announced an export ban on maize and 
fertilizer. Data on cross-border movements of maize suggest, however, that the export 
ban on maize was irrelevant since the flow was almost entirely inward (estimated 
40,000 tons inflows vs. 260 tons outflows). Moreover, the increased prevalence of 
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official inspection of trucks that accompanied the ban, acted as an inhibition to the 
informal import flow that was helping the local supply situation remain under control. A 
further decision in this period was to encourage farmers to grow winter maize in the 
hope that a significant addition to domestic supply could be made towards the end of the 
calendar year from winter sowing. To this end the government distributed 60,000 
treadle pumps free to farmers who signed up to try to grow off-season maize. 
 
Later in July 2005, the government issued important restrictions on the origin of the 
100,000 tons of maize it had announced it was going to procure back in April. The 
maize had to originate from the SADC region, excluding Malawi. The reason given for 
this by the government was that it did not wish to further tighten domestic supply by 
trying to procure locally in a short market. However, plainly what was intended here 
was to catch out private traders that had procured maize (including in cross-border 
trade) during the peak harvest months of April-June, and by not allowing them to 
respond to the government tender force them to sell quickly in local markets. However, 
prices were by then beginning their upward surge, and the size of trader stocks after a 
poor harvest was probably lower than government thought might be the case. The maize 
crisis was worsening and demand for maize from ADMARC at MK17 far outstripped 
the agency’s ability to supply, so rationing was once again brought in at 10kg or 25kg 
per household. Various food aid relief distributions were going on, but these had little 
impact on the overall market, and prices continued to rise. 
 
By August 2005, informal cross border trade which had to some extent been holding the 
market in check during and after the harvest began to dry up. This is because adjacent 
countries had themselves had relatively poor harvests, and their own prices were rising 
to reflect local shortages. Meanwhile the imported supplies under the 100,000 ton 
tender were slow in being mobilised and faced transport bottlenecks. As had occurred 
back in 2001-02, Malawi was not the only country in the region seeking to secure 
additional supplies, and competition for supplies and for trucks slowed the delivery 
process down, as did the failure of some SADC contractors to fulfil their obligations. 
By December 2005, the national average market price had reached MK34, while 
ADMARC was selling its dwindling stocks at half this price. In January 2006, the 
government banned private traders from selling maize in local markets, leaving 
ADMARC as the sole maize seller at a moment when it had no further stocks of maize 
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to sell. In response, prices rocketed, reaching MK42 in January and peaking at MK51 in 
February. 
 
One ameliorating factor in this situation was an experimental call option that the 
government had put in place with the assistance of DFID and the World Bank, which 
was used to import 60,000 tons of maize that was entirely distributed as humanitarian 
assistance and did not enter either public or private marketing channels. The delivery 
performance of this maize was significantly better than that of the other 100,000 tons 
that the government was trying to procure, and, moreover, the call option saved the 
Malawi government between US$50 and 90 per ton, due to price rises for South African 
white maize that had occurred by the time the call option was exercised (Slater and 
Dana, 2006). In March 2006, prices began to fall. By then it was clear that the 
forthcoming harvest was going to be very good, and, of course, harvest starts in late-
March in the south of the country. Moreover, by then also, some of the government’s 
100,000 ton import tender was beginning to arrive in the country. Prices fell steeply 
through the harvest season, reaching amongst the lowest prices in real terms of the 
entire decade in June 2006. The abundant supply that then prevailed also meant that the 
seasonal price spike in 2006-07 (peaking Dec 2007) was one of the lowest on record 
(prices rose just 21 per cent in nominal terms from June 2006 to Dec 2007). 
 
One of the reasons that the 2005/06 price episode did not result in a famine as in 
2001/02 is that considerably more prevalent and diverse humanitarian operations were 
going on throughout the country in 2005, as compared to 2001. The Malawi 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) had come into existence, and was using 
household economy assessment (HEA) methods to predict food balances in different 
zones according to the production and purchasing power of local populations. Moreover, 
the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) was conducting widespread food-for-work or 
cash-for-work programmes in parts of the country thought to be food insecure. This 
allowed many families to cope slightly better with spiralling prices than would have 
been the case in 2001. Nevertheless, the adverse effect on food intake and nutritional 
outcomes of allowing prices for the main staple to spiral in this way should not be 
underestimated. In addition, many of the same mistakes were made as in 2001: 
complacency and slowness on the part of government in responding to early signs of 
likely shortage, implementing a ban on private maize sales that caused prices to shoot 
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up, and discounting the usefulness to the country of the free movement of maize in 
border areas (from which Malawi gains far more than it loses in every season). 
 
One perhaps unexpected outcome of the events of 2005-06 was the formation of a Grain 
Traders and Processors Association (GTPA) in 2006. This was an initiative encouraged 
by donors to create a forum where larger-scale private traders, the government, donors 
and NGOs could engage in constructive dialogue about maize policy (GTPA, 2006). 
The association was registered under the Trustees Incorporation Act of Malawi, and 
received some initial funding from the Technical Secretariat of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Security, and the Regional Agricultural Trade Expansion Support 
(RATES) Program. The GTPA is an association of agricultural suppliers, processors 
and traders in food commodities, especially maize (WFP, 2008). It also has non-trader 
‘individual’ members from stakeholder groups, including members of parliament. The 
government has worked in harmony with the association on some occasions, but not on 
others (examples follow). It has on occasions utilised the GTPA to manage the tender 
process for contracts of maize delivery to NFRA. 
 
The Maize Price Spikes of 2007-09 
A number of researchers have examined the maize price spikes of 2007-09 (Jayne et al., 
2008b; Revenga, 2008; Wodon and Zaman, 2008; Jayne and Tschirley, 2009; 
Rapsomanikis, 2009). Events began with the government lifting the export ban on the 
maize that it had imposed in July 2005. At this point predicted production for 2007 was 
3.4 million tons (later revised down to 3.2 million), and prices were falling towards their 
lowest level in real terms since the year 2000. Indeed, the price trough in 2007 at 
MK14.61 was just 8 per cent in real terms higher than the lowest price in 2000. Initially 
the government issued licenses to private traders for 80,000 tons of maize to be 
exported. This was followed in May 2007 by a contract to supply Zimbabwe with 
400,000 tons maize by the end of February 2008. If production figures were accurate 
these quantities should have been accommodated easily from the surpluses of the two 
seasons, roughly estimated at 1.4 million tons (Table 6.3 above). 
 
NFRA signed supply contracts with private traders close to 240,000 tons in May, and by 
the end of the month some 50,000 tons of the contract had been fulfilled. ADMARC 
began buying maize at MK17 in June, but lacked financial resources to expand 
purchases rapidly. At this point the ADMARC price was above the market price, and 
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traders and farmers would gladly have sold to ADMARC as much grain as the agency 
could take. In June also the government declared that it would supply 40,000 tons maize 
to Swaziland. By the end of July, a cumulative total of 114,085 tons of maize had been 
supplied to Zimbabwe and prices were just beginning to start their rise into the lean 
season. In ensuing months, exports remained a key feature of the market, with WFP 
purchasing 32,363 tons to deliver to Zimbabwe, the government donating 10,000 tons to 
Swaziland and Lesotho, and the main Zimbabwe contract reaching 267,000 tons at the 
end of November. 
 
However, in the domestic market prices were indicating that surplus maize was not as 
prevalent as the headline figures would suggest. Prices moved up sharply, and 
ADMARC reverted to rationing maize at 25kg per person since it had been unable to 
procure sufficient maize at MK17 to cover demand at this price. ADMARC began 
bidding for maize against private traders, upping its purchase price to MK20. By 
January 2008, the market price was MK34 and ADMARC was permitted to raise its 
selling price to consumers to MK30. Exports to Zimbabwe continued and stood at 
298,292 tons on 13 January 2008. Domestic prices continued to rise for the following 
two months, peaking at MK43.53 in March 2008, just before the next harvest. By then, 
too, supplies to fulfil the Zimbabwe contract had dwindled, and in the end just 302,000 
tons of the original 400,000 ton contract was fulfilled. 
 
It is difficult to reach any other conclusion around these circumstances than that the 
production level of the 2007 harvest was seriously overestimated. If all known export 
obligations are summed (taking Zimbabwe at its final level of 302,000 tons), then 
export volumes were not more than about 425,000 tons. This compares with an 
estimated maize surplus of roughly 1.4 million tons over two seasons. It would take 
enormous adjustments in consumption or loss figures to account for a ‘missing one 
million’ tons, and of course if these were done for a single year, the manner of doing 
them would also have to apply to previous years, for which no such massive 
discrepancies in figures have been detected. 
 
The 2007-09 story is not, however, complete. The second round 2008 harvest figure 
was lower than previous forecasts, but nevertheless came in at an estimated 2.9 million 
tons (later revised down to 2.6 million tons). By this time, of course, the critical 
comparison was with the preceding year estimate of 3.4 million tons, rather than with 
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past years, and the 15 per cent predicted decline was significant for both government’s 
and traders’ views of the market. In April 2008, the Ministry of Trade and Industry re-
imposed an export ban on maize and maize products. Prices at that stage were still 
falling as the harvest came in, but not steeply, and they levelled out at MK32.8 in May 
2008. When ADMARC entered the market at around this time, it adopted a competitive 
maize price system in which it procured maize at differing prices at different buying 
points depending on trader prices. This initiated an initial scramble for supplies, and an 
early start to the lean season upward price trend. 
 
In May 2008, the government decided to enforce a maximum buying price for maize of 
MK28 per kg, and required all buyers of maize to purchase a license. The license was to 
be procured from MoAFS upon the recommendation of the GTPA. The license was 
commodity specific in that if any company or individual was interested in buying maize, 
or any other crop, they had to buy a license specifically designated for that crop. The 
license stipulated the name and address of the buyer of the license. It was valid from the 
date of issue until 31 March 2009 and was issued under the provisions of the 
Agriculture (General Purposes) Act 1997 and the Smallholder Agricultural Produce 
(Marketing) Regulations 1987. The buying license was subject to the following 
conditions: the minimum price to be paid for one kilogram of food maize under the 
license was MK28 per kg, the weighing scales used were those assized by the Malawi 
Bureau of Standards, and were to be made available for inspection at the market point, 
the buyer was to provide fortnightly food maize purchase returns to GTPA, the buyer 
was to use properly identifiable farmer cash sale receipts and was to display a GTPA 
membership certificate at each market centre. The license was liable to suspension if the 
holder failed to comply with its terms and conditions. The use of GTPA as an institution 
to endorse the issue of licenses effectively gave discretionary powers to a trade body, 
which was somewhat unusual. The government justification for doing this was that it 
wanted to monitor the statistics of produce purchasing; however, since not all traders 
were members of GTPA, the conditionality essentially forced market participants to 
become members of the trade body if they wished to continue trading. 
 
However, in the same month, the average maize price in Malawi was MK32.83 and in 
June it moved sharply upwards to MK37.94. In addition, in June 2008 ADMARC 
started buying maize from traders at between MK50 and 60, and NFRA was in the 
market procuring maize at MK65. In rural markets, ADMARC was purchasing from 
228 
farmers above the stipulated maximum price, and selling maize at MK40 kg. By early 
August 2008, despite strenuous efforts, ADMARC and NFRA combined had procured 
only 60,000 tons, which by previous experience was far too low a stock to meet demand 
through the lean season to March or April 2009 (Jayne et al., 2008b, p.16). 
 
On 21 August 2008, the government revoked its previous licensing agreement with the 
GTPA, and outright banned the private purchase and sale of maize, making ADMARC 
in effect the sole buyer and seller of maize at fixed prices of MK45 and MK52 
respectively. The idea was to force private traders to release their stocks (by sale to 
ADMARC) causing prices to fall to these levels. Private traders were given one month 
to sell their grain stocks to ADMARC; however, it is unclear how failure to do this 
would be policed. An inadvertent effect of the ban was to curtail the flow of cross-
border imports, thus reducing potential maize supply in the market further. Between 
August and September 2008, informal cross border trade was estimated by FEWSNET 
monitors to fall by 67 per cent from 8,540 to 2,185 tons. In September, a clarification 
was issued exempting small-scale traders from the ban (The Daily Times 15 Sept 2008; 
FEWSNET, 2008b); however, for cross-border trade this still meant that imports and 
onward sales could only be done by bicycle or cart, or using back roads and small 
pickup trucks. Small-scale traders were expected to abide by the minimum buying and 
selling prices set for ADMARC. 
 
These actions failed of course to stem the rise in prices, although they did create a slight 
dip in the weeks immediately after the measures were taken, presumably because some 
trade occurred in this period within the ADMARC price range. However, institutions 
trying to procure maize for food security purposes such as large international NGOs and 
WFP found they were unable to secure grain below the ADMARC selling price. The 
GTPA requested permission from the government for licenses to undertake commercial 
imports, but these requests were turned down even though domestic prices were by then 
above the border cost of imported supplies. By November 2008, the average market 
price of maize had risen to MK57.8, and a familiar sequence of events occurred in 
which ADMARC started rationing its diminishing stocks to 10-25kg per transaction at 
its official sales prices. In available data, there is something of a disjuncture between 
what was occurring to prices, which eventually rose to MK70.6 in February 2009, and a 
claim that the stock position of ADMARC and NFRA was robust with holdings of 
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23,500 and 96,000 tons respectively. If the stock position was this strong, it is difficult 
to see why these stocks were not urgently released to market in the Nov-Feb period. 
 
In March, not surprisingly in view of harvest forecasts, prices began to decline from 
their peak, but this only gathered momentum in April 2009 by which time the new 
harvest was well under way. The forecast from MoAFS was for a 2009 production level 
of 3.7 million tons, a new record in a period of four years that had already seen all 
previous records broken twice. Nevertheless, on 6 April MoAFS issued a press release 
informing the public that the ban by government on private maize purchases from 
farmers was still in force, and ADMARC was the sole buyer and seller of maize. The 
release also advised all agricultural dealers, processors, school and hospitals to buy only 
from ADMARC markets. Any maize not bought from ADMARC risked to be forfeited 
and handed to ADMARC without compensation (Malawi, 2009a). In 17 April 2009, 
MoAFS issued another release stating official buying and selling prices of maize at 
MK50 and MK60 respectively. However, ADMARC did not enter the market as a 
purchaser itself at these prices. Instead, another directive occurred in July 2009 that set 
these official prices at MK40 and MK50. However, average market prices were lower 
than these official prices throughout this period. 
 
Again, as was commented for the 2005-06 price spike, the fact that famine did not occur 
in the 2007-09 run up of prices, does not mean that these extraordinary price levels did 
not have distressing and harmful effects on the rural poor in Malawi. In fact, quite the 
contrary, for every one of the price hikes in the 2000s, FEWSNET reports the same 
pattern of adverse coping strategies occurring in each case: diminishing daily food 
rations (if necessary down to one meal a day), recourse to unconventional and wild 
foods (including maize husks), desperate search for ganyu work at low wage rates, sales 
of livestock at low prices and so on. A famine, when very large numbers of people die 
of starvation, is an extreme event; but there are plenty of gradations in terms of severity 
of food insecurity that people may have to confront before the situation deteriorates to 
famine status, and each one of these adverse price episodes in Malawi is likely to have 
taken significant proportions of the rural population to the brink of disaster. 
 
The 2007-09 price spikes in Malawi were highly political. The government had 
essentially staked its political reputation at home and abroad on the success of the 
fertilizer subsidy under the AISP from 2005 onwards. After reporting two successive 
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record harvests in 2006 and 2007, President Bingu wa Muthalika received several 
awards from the international community: the United Nations Global Creative 
Leadership Award; and the first Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy 
Network (FANRPAN) for food security policy award. He was also honoured at the 
August 2008 African Green Revolution Conference for the country’s success in 
promoting food security (Jayne and Tschirley, 2009). In the light of these accolades, as 
well as domestic politics and an impending election in May 2009, it was inconceivable 
for the government during 2008 to have admitted miscalculating the size of recent 
harvests, or permitting commercial imports into the country. 
 
Recurring Patterns of Crisis and Response 
All three extreme price episodes in the 2000s exhibit remarkable patterns of similarity 
between them in the way crises arise, and the format of the policy responses that occur. 
These patterns are helpful for discerning the public-private coordination problems that 
result in crises that are exacerbated rather than ameliorated by actions taken. They are 
also helpful for understanding the political reasons why such crises arise and recur. The 
basic configuration that occurs seems to be much as follows: 
 
(a) a fully supplied market is declared, or exists from a previous good harvest; 
 
(b) politically, there is an unwillingness to shift from this position, especially when 
substantial political capital has been expended ‘solving’ the maize supply problem 
in preceding crop seasons; 
 
(c) this political obstinacy becomes exaggerated when national elections are at stake, 
and any admission of having failed to achieve the maize food security goal or 
having to modify the approach to achieving it, is regarded as a fatal sign of 
weakness that would be exploited by political opponents; 
 
(d) when market prices fail to concur with the declared abundance of supply, the first 
fallback position is to blame private traders for hoarding, and to seek to curtail 
their operations; 
 
(e) typically also, NFRA and ADMARC are asked to redouble efforts to procure 
grain in a tightening market; 
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(f) when prices continue to rise, exports are banned, and private trade in maize is 
banned (this occurred in all three price episodes of the 2000s); 
 
(g) ADMARC/NFRA are reinstated as monopoly buyers and sellers of maize at fixed 
prices decreed by government; 
 
(h) ADMARC/NFRA fail to procure sufficient maize to cover lean season deficits 
because prices rise above the official purchase price level, and anyway surplus 
maize is not actually available to procure; 
 
(i) ADMARC resorts to selling in small quantities, partly to conserve limited stocks, 
and partly to prevent private traders from purchasing large quantities at official 
sales prices to sell onwards at the much higher market prices; 
 
(j) eventually, imports are ordered when the situation becomes so dire that this 
cannot be avoided (this did not occur in all episodes); 
 
(k) imports arrive late due to procurement and delivery delays; 
 
(l) in the background, there are persistent long run problems with the size of public 
stocks, including the appropriate strategic level of the stock, the turnover of the 
stock to keep the grain edible, and the avoidance of theft and corruption on the 
part of stock managers; 
 
(m) in nearly all crises, the stock turns out to be much lower than was formerly 
thought; 
 
(n) in nearly all crises, the stock after the crisis is  substantially too high, due to either 
(late) imports or domestic procurement vastly exceeding target stock quantities; 
 
(o) prices typically begin to fall when the next harvest is in prospect, and the 
steepness of the fall is intensified if late imports are arriving at the same time as 
the new harvest comes in. 
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In seeking to understand how this particular pathology keeps replicating itself every few 
years in Malawi, a first point to note is that market prices are the most accurate single 
indicator of the true maize availability position in Malawi at different points of the year. 
As we have seen in Chapter 5, and is confirmed by many other researchers, the maize 
market in Malawi is fundamentally a competitive market, with plentiful and diverse 
traders operating in it, and efficient spatial arbitration going on reflecting local surpluses 
or scarcities. The market price is a more accurate predictor than production estimates 
that seem to have performed variably in indicating the volume of maize available from 
the domestic harvest from year to year. However, the market price is not seen as a 
critical indicator in the food security policy conversation in Malawi. Rather the 
emphasis is on the maize harvest figure, the crop estimates for substitute foods (rice, 
cassava), the stock position, food aid operations, and localised vulnerability identified 
by MVAC investigatory procedures. 
 
Second, most government reflex action exacerbates rather than ameliorates market 
scarcity, as indicated by prices, lending some support to the ‘Jayne hypothesis’. 
Aggressive procurement by ADMARC or NFRA in a short market, sometimes even 
trying to outcompete traders on price, just stokes prices up further. Banning traders from 
the market likewise, since this reduces spatial arbitration, and, crucially reduces the 
volume of informal cross-border trade (which is handled entirely by private traders). In 
every single maize shortage episode of the 2000s, cross-border import trade has helped 
a crisis from turning into a catastrophe. In every single episode except, perhaps, the last, 
the government has held an exaggerated view of the volume of stock holding 
(‘hoarding’) by the private sector, and efforts to get this stock released through punitive 
action have not added much to supply. This is because such stocks are small relative to 
the size of the market, and almost certainly much less important than cross-border trade 
volumes. In September 2008 there was a short-lived price reduction effect of the 
outright trader ban, probably because some traders did decide to sell their stocks to 
ADMARC at MK45 rather than face disposal difficulties later in the year. However, this 
did not alter the underlying maize shortage position, and prices resumed their steep 
upward rise in November. 
 
Third, the ambivalent understanding of the private sector within the public sector 
domain is a powerful thread running through all crises. This is partly political (the 
private sector provides a convenient scapegoat when things are going wrong), and partly 
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the result of misjudgement of private sector capability to manipulate stocks and supplies 
in a competitive market. It is difficult to see that there can be much collusion in the 
Malawi maize trade private sector (Myers, 2008). There are too many players, even at 
the large end of the market, and these actors have differing interests and objectives 
depending on whether they are traders, millers, or food processors, and in what 
combination they undertake different activities. Of course private traders take informed 
bets on future prices in deciding how rapidly they release purchases from farmers into 
the market. Of course, also, private traders will take advantage of price differentials 
created by public decisions (if they can secure maize from ADMARC at a low price and 
sell at a high price in the open market, they will do so). But none of this means that the 
private sector can ‘create a shortage’ if there is actually sufficient maize around to 
satisfy consumption needs at prices that reflect intra-seasonal storage costs. It follows 
that the only way to bring steeply rising prices to a halt is to increase market supply (by 
releasing stocks or importing), not by banning private trade. 
 
Fourth, maize stock holding for food security purposes in Malawi has an unhappy 
history. It has never worked particularly well, and the separation of powers between 
ADMARC and NFRA seems to have done little to improve the situation. The suspicion 
has to be that maize stocks are just too enticing a target for neo-patrimonial 
manipulation to operate in an entirely technical role in the food security landscape. The 
public stock history of the 2000s veers erratically between excessive stocks that then 
run down and disappear in a matter of months, and strangely low stocks at the start of 
seasons that turn into food security crises because there is not enough maize in the 
market. It is recognised that stock management is a difficult balancing act, especially 
given uncertainties regarding the ease of domestic procurement, and the difficulty of 
securing import permissions. Nevertheless, there seem to be unresolved factors at work 
regarding the stock operations of both ADMARC and NFRA that are not just to do with 
technical competencies. 
 
Fifth, the organisation FEWSNET seems to play a curiously compromised role in the 
food security debate and opinion forming that occurs around maize availability in 
Malawi. FEWSNET is an independent regional organisation, funded by USAID. As its 
name suggests it has its origins in earlier famine early warning systems (FEWS) in 
southern African countries, but it takes advantage of new technologies to collate and 
analyse food security data rapidly, and to post the latest information on its website. 
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FEWSNET has offices in each of its member countries, and therefore one in Malawi. It 
produces monthly Food Security Updates, as well as Outlooks covering six months 
ahead, and alerts if a food security crisis seems to be looming. FEWSNET provides an 
excellent sequential source of information on the evolving food security situation in a 
country like Malawi, and its documents are the primary source for much of the evidence 
compiled in this chapter (as is also true for other researchers). Yet examining 
FEWSNET monthly reports in sequence across a decade, it is striking how rarely their 
analysis is prepared to differ in its interpretation from whatever is the government 
stance at that moment in time. 
 
It becomes apparent that FEWSNET rather uncritically synthesises data and briefing 
notes issued by MoAFS (in the Malawi case) and adopts the line that is transmitted by 
the source Ministry. This is most evident in the period 2001 to 2003, where FEWSNET 
was still saying that ‘maize is readily available in the local markets’ in December 2001 
(FEWSNET, 2001b). This switched in January 2002 to ‘even though Malawi has a 
national food surplus in 2001/02, it has a large maize shortage’ (FEWSNET, 2002, 
italics as in original). This was the origin of the widespread misconception in early 2002 
that Malawians only had themselves to blame if they were going hungry, because they 
were unwilling to switch to other foods (this is debunked neatly in Devereux, 2002). 
Then later, in 2002 and for the following year, the story switched to a 600,000 ton food 
deficit, which was also the government line, and eventually resulted in an enormous 
oversupply and the sale of stocks at huge losses. 
 
6.4 Brief Summary and Some Observations on Maize Production Estimates 
In summary of the principal findings here, this chapter examines three episodes of 
extreme seasonal price instability that were experienced in the Malawi maize market in 
the first decade of this century. Prices, maize volumes, and sequences of events are 
carefully traced (to the extent this is possible to do), and patterns of experience common 
to these episodes are identified. The strongly political character of maize policy decision 
making is emphasized, and this is plain to see not just in the character of decisions taken, 
but in public statements made. There seems to be quite a marked pathology to these 
price crises, in the sense that rather predictable stances are almost always adopted in the 
same direction, and with the same deleterious consequences. The chapter provides 
diverse evidence to support the ‘Jayne hypothesis’ that governments have a tendency to 
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stoke up incipient price crises by implementing policies that exacerbate supply 
shortages in markets. 
 
It also seems that despite enormous efforts on the part of donor organisations to 
improve food security information (including support to the MVAC), lessons around the 
fundamentals of how markets work, and how they can be better managed, are not 
properly drawn from each episode, so the same mistakes are made again and again. At 
the centre of this state of affairs is a fundamental public-private coordination problem, 
based in part in politics but also in a misunderstanding about how the private sector 
works and the most appropriate way to set limits around the outcomes of private 
decisions. The next and final chapter of the thesis considers this problem in greater 
detail. 
 
However, before moving to the conclusions of the thesis, a comment is warranted at this 
point on the veracity of production data in Malawi. It is recalled from the preceding 
narrative account of the 2007-09 price spikes, that these occurred despite, on paper, 
there being abundant quantities of maize available in the domestic market in that period. 
It is also recalled that a quantum step up apparently occurred between the first and 
second half of the 2000s, in which average maize harvests jumped from 1.5 to 3.0 
million tons, with the new much higher production levels being associated with the 
Agricultural Input Support Programme. Prices, however, tell a different story. They 
suggest that the 2005/06 harvest may have been ballpark accurate (Table 6.3 above 
refers). However, it seems highly likely that the 2006/07 harvest, rather than 
representing a drive to new record levels, was about the same or perhaps even slightly 
lower than the preceding harvest (perhaps 2.5 million tons). This in turn would mean 
that the 2007/08 harvest may have been lower still at 2.1 or 2.2 million tons, and the 
2008/09 harvest perhaps a new record at around 2.8 to 3.0 million tons. Taking all these 
admittedly rather crude inferences together, it is possible that the average annual harvest 
in the late 2000s was around 2.6 rather than 3.0 million tons, and therefore there has 
been 400,000 tons per year less maize in the market than has been suggested by the 
official production figures. 
 
An alternative explanation is that the consumption trend for maize is higher than 
predicted in the maize balance sheet. However, if the consumption trend is raised far 
enough to recreate the shortage conditions in the Malawi maize market in 2007 and 
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2008, then this creates irresolvable problems for the size of deficits earlier in the decade 
(they become so large that the build up of maize surpluses in 2002-04 becomes 
impossible to explain). It is not an objective of this thesis to attempt to pin these 
circumstances down further, but the careful examination of year to year events and 
trends during the 2000s of this chapter does suggest a substantial exaggeration in the 
absolute level of recent maize harvests (see also Jayne et al., 2008b; Jayne and 
Tschirley, 2009), which in turn has implications for the costs and benefits of the AISP. 
If these inferences have any merit, the situation they describe could also create problems 
for managing adverse food security events in the future, since a persistent overstatement 




Chapter 7 : Findings and Interpretation 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis set out to examine seasonal price instability in the maize market in Malawi 
over the 21-year period from 1989 to 2009. The thesis does not suggest that this is a 
new topic, or that other researchers on food policy in Malawi have neglected the price 
seasonality dimension. However, seasonal price instability is rarely the central focus of 
attention in the work of other researchers. It is commonly one amongst several factors 
that are taken into account when examining another topic, for example, spatial price 
efficiency (Myers, 2008), or international price instability (Rapsomanikis, 2009), or 
price variation in relation to regulatory regimes (Chapoto and Jayne, 2009). The 
contribution of this thesis is to provide a systematic exploration of seasonal price 
instability of the kind that can provide benchmarks or reference points against which to 
compare maize market behaviour in a particular year or sub-period both contemporarily 
and in the future. 
 
That seasonal price instability is a significant food policy issue in Malawi is without 
dispute. As discovered in Chapter 4 of the thesis, the seasonal margin between the 
lowest and highest maize prices across the crop year averages 60 per cent in Malawi. 
However, there are recurrent extreme price volatility episodes when lean season high 
prices can be 2-300 per cent above post-harvest trough prices. There were three such 
extreme price episodes in each of the decades of the 1990s and 2000s, meaning that in 
the recent past they have occurred roughly every three years. Extreme price volatility 
has long been recognised as a problem for agricultural efficiency and growth because it 
makes production planning by farmers more difficult, and it reinforces a subsistence 
orientation in food agriculture due to the high risks it implies for engagement in the 
market. More recently, however, it is the deleterious consequences of such episodes for 
the food security of food-deficit small farmers that is regarded as the most serious 
adverse economic impact (Byerlee et al., 2006; Myers, 2006). In Malawi, extreme 
adverse price episodes are associated with widespread food insecurity in rural areas, 
hunger, and in at least one episode in the 2000s, starvation and famine (Devereux, 2002). 
 
The thesis is situated in a body of literature about food markets and how they work in 
eastern and southern Africa, and it is one of the purposes of these conclusions to 
consider the implications of the findings of the thesis for the arguments put forward in 
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that literature. As discussed earlier in the thesis (Chapter 2) there are two broad groups 
of ideas about the post-liberalisation working of food markets in these regions; although 
it is also worth emphasising that these groups have fuzzy boundaries, and they overlap 
regarding many specifics about markets and policy. One group deploys new 
institutional economics ideas in order to emphasize the transaction cost and 
coordination failures of privatised markets in weak institutional settings (Dorward et al., 
2005b; 2004a; 2009a). The policy emphasis that follows is a continuing important role 
for the state in strengthening institutions and facilitating coordination before private 
markets can be relied upon to deliver agricultural services effectively and efficiently. 
The other group emphasises the partial character of liberalisation, with private actors 
being hampered in market development by unpredictable short term policy switches by 
public decision makers (Jayne et al., 2002; 2006; Jayne and Tschirley, 2009). The 
policy emphasis that follows is that the state should withdraw further, and should seek 
to make its interaction with the private sector rule-based, consistent, and predictable. 
 
This chapter returns to these ideas in due course, as part of the purpose of interpreting 
the thesis findings. Specifically, the thesis ends up by having quite a lot to say about 
public-private coordination failures, and the chapter seeks to link this to recent papers 
by Jayne and Tschirley (2009) and Tschirley and Jayne (2010) that set out a framework 
for achieving a better understanding of such failures. However, before turning to these 
matters of interpretation, the chapter first provides a summary of the main findings 
emerging from the empirical research of the thesis. 
 
7.2 Findings about Seasonal Maize Price Instability in Malawi 
It is recalled from Chapter 1 that the thesis put forward an overall objective of achieving 
a detailed understanding of maize price instability in Malawi, broken down into a 
number of subsidiary research questions. These questions are reproduced here for 
convenience. In terms of the structure of the thesis, questions (a) to (c) are grouped, and 
are all treated in Chapter 4 of the thesis. Research question (d) is examined in Chapter 5, 
and question (e) in Chapter 6. 
 
The research questions were: 
 
(a) what is the underlying, long term, character of seasonal maize price instability in 
Malawi, during the 21-year period 1989-2009? 
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(b) is there a detectable trend in the extent of such instability, and does the degree of 
instability vary between markets in different parts of the country? 
 
(c) how does maize price instability compare to that of other food crops over the same 
historical period? 
 
(d) what lessons can be learnt from the functioning of private maize trade in Malawi 
that may shed light on patterns of price instability, especially with respect to 
competition, choice, market structure, and spatial price behaviour? 
 
(e) examining ‘events’ of extreme maize price fluctuations in Malawi in the 2000s, 
what can be learned about the influence of world markets, state regulatory behaviour, 
public-private coordination, and the politics of public decision making in helping to 
explain the prevalence and intensity of such events? 
 
The difference between trough and peak prices in an agricultural season for an annual 
crop is regarded in marketing analysis as the gross storage margin. It corresponds to the 
intertemporal function of crop marketing in which the sale of the commodity to 
intermediate or final consumers takes place in a different period to the purchase of the 
commodity from farmers. The gross storage margin represents coverage of the costs of 
holding the commodity in stock for varying periods, together with a competitive net 
margin representing a rate of return on the capital deployed. 
 
Finding 1 
The gross storage margin for maize in Malawi averaged 60 per cent in the period 1989-
2009. This finding is robust; the seasonal peaks and troughs expressed in index form 
have low standard errors and represent statistically significant departures from a null 
hypothesis of no price seasonality. A storage margin for maize of this magnitude has 
also been observed in other settings (Timmer, 1986a). 
 
Finding 2 
Maize price seasonality has neither increased nor decreased in the observation period. 
The price index and gross margin data were examined for the presence of trends, and no 
significant trends were detected using two alternative methods. 
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The period under consideration was one of very substantial change in the policy 
environment for food crops in Malawi (documented in Chapter 2). Food crops were first 
opened up for private trading in 1987, after more than two decades of being confined to 
the state trading corporation ADMARC or its predecessor organisation. During the 
1990s, initial quite strict limitations on the flexibility to engage in private trade were 
lifted, and small scale trading at the local level blossomed. Inevitably, due to its 
strategic importance, the maize market has continued to receive a lot of attention from 
politicians and civil servants, and the rules governing private trade in maize have been 
altered frequently, including outright trading bans in some crop seasons. Other food 
crops liberalised at the same time have been less prone to frequent rule changing, and it 
is germaine to the study of maize price instability to examine how these other crops 
have fared with respect to price seasonality. 
 
Finding 3 
Other food crops exhibit less price seasonality than maize. For the same historical 
period, groundnuts were found to have an average seasonal gross margin of 43 per cent, 
beans 33 per cent, rice 22 per cent and cassava 9 per cent. 
 
Finding 4 
Other food crops display evidence of declining price seasonality. Specifically, beans 
and rice exhibit significant downward trends in the size of their gross storage margins, 
utilising two different descriptive methods for measuring this. 
 
In terms of the size of average seasonal gross margins, these contrasts with maize are 
due in part to differences in the growing seasons and harvesting options for other food 
crops. These offer more leeway than maize for varying the harvest period and obtaining 
more than one crop across the calendar year. For rice this is due to irrigation in some 
important rice growing areas. Cassava tends to be harvested at different points in 
calendar for different purposes, and fresh cassava is not stored for any significant 
duration. With respect to declining price seasonality, a possible explanation for the 
findings on beans, rice and (less firmly) groundnuts and cassava is that private 
marketing of these crops has become more competitive and efficient over the past 21 
years, while not incurring the same erratic and disruptive policy interventions as maize 
(such as total bans on private trade). 
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An important dimension of price seasonality in maize is variation in gross seasonal 
margins in different locations in Malawi. On grounds of microeconomic theory, it is not 
expected that seasonal margins would converge towards the same magnitude in 
different parts of the country. The size of the margin will vary according to the relative 
abundance of maize offered for sale at harvest time (causing low trough prices) and the 
relative lack of maize available to purchase at the height of the lean season (causing 
high peak prices), mediated by transport cost considerations. According to this logic, the 
highest seasonal margins are likely to occur in remote rural areas (thus, high transport 
costs) that both produce a high surplus at harvest time and experience a food deficit in 
the lean season. In Malawi, a significant factor adding to downward price pressures at 
harvest time in some locations is informal cross-border maize imports, estimated to 
have averaged 106,000 tons per year in the 2000s. 
 
Finding 5 
Price seasonality for maize varies considerably between different locations, in the range 
of 45 per cent for markets near cities or on main roads, to 90 per cent for surplus 
producing remote rural areas. In other words, the basic economic deductions are 
corroborated. A vulnerability implication is that maize-deficit small farmers located in 
high maize harvest areas confront considerably worse terms of trade between their 
selling and buying prices than do farmers in maize deficit areas or those located near 
cities or main roads. 
 
Finding 6 
In all probability, informal cross-border maize trade exacerbates seasonal price troughs 
in maize growing rural areas close to border crossing points. This finding is not strictly 
verified, but it follows from the logic underlying Finding 5, and was observable in 
maize price behaviour in one of the case-study villages, Mission village, described in 
Chapter 5. The biggest and most consistent border maize import flows into Malawi 
occur from adjacent maize growing areas in Mozambique. 
 
In view of the ‘global food price crisis’ that occurred in 2007-08, the question arises 
whether seasonal maize price instability in Malawi is influenced by trends and events in 
the international maize market. The answer to this seems to vary between the short- and 
long-term, with short-run price behaviour occurring independently of international 
market trends, but convergence occurring with a lag of six months or more 
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(Rapsomanikis, 2009). It has been noted for Malawi (as well as for Zambia) that in the 
2000s domestic maize prices have been rising towards import parity, such that undue 
upward seasonal price spikes can go measurably above import parity (Jayne et al., 
2008b). 
 
Chapter 5 of the thesis examined the conduct, structure and performance of the maize 
market in Malawi, utilising fieldwork with farmers and traders for the first two 
dimensions, and the econometric method of cointegration in order to study spatial 
market efficiency. The fieldwork components of this empirical research possessed 
recognised limitations. It comprised a one visit survey in three purposively selected 
maize producing villages in each of Malawi’s three regions, as well as key informant 
interviews with actors in maize marketing chains. The 2008 harvesting season, which is 
when the fieldwork was conducted, turned out to have substantially lower harvests than 
had been predicted by official crop forecasting procedures, and some aspects of the 




Maize trading in Malawi is highly competitive at local levels. The research found 
numerous and diverse traders occupying every conceivable niche in the primary 
procurement of maize from farmers; and farmer respondents nearly unanimously stated 
their sales behaviour as spot selling to the highest bidder. This contrasts with an 
alternative scenario quite often found in rural areas of low income countries where 
farmers are locked into pre-arranged sales agreements with traders to whom they are in 




Overall, private maize trading in Malawi is competitive, with neglible prospects for 
collusion by traders, even at more aggregate levels of market participation. The research 
triangulated observations about the working of the maize market through key informant 
interviews with a range of larger market participants. Larger operators are not a uniform 
group. Some are purely traders and storage agents, some are millers who depend on 
sales of maize flour, and some are specialist food or drink manufacturers (for example, 
Chibuku Products Ltd.). 
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According to Myers (2008), speculative hoarding is a most unlikely occurrence in a 
competitive market with few barriers to entry. This is because it is difficult to make 
excess (collusive) profits by holding additional stocks. Buying maize to build such 
stocks bids up current prices, and the additional stocks themselves represent risky 
outlays that may not be recouped in later sales. Later, when the stocks are sold, the 
stock releases will depress prices below what they would otherwise have been. Thus too 
much storage (i.e. hoarding) has the effect of reducing returns to storage, not increasing 
them, and only those who sell early, before the majority of stocks are released, are likely 
to profit. 
 
The fieldwork yielded other insights, subject to reservations about their generality due 
to limitations already stated above and in Chapter 5. One pertinent insight was the 
significance of distress sales for creating conditions in which poor farm households in 
maize surplus areas get into food security difficulties later in the year. Another was the 
near absence of losses in storage as an issue at farm household level, despite claims to 
its considerable significance in government and FAO documents (wherein figures as 
high as 30 per cent losses in store can be found) (Jayne et al., 2008a). A high degree of 
competition does not necessarily translate into efficiency of maize marketing across 
geographical space. This requires spatial arbitrage by traders (the unimpeded transport 
of maize from places of surplus to places of deficit until price differences become too 
small to make this worthwhile). In the absence of knowledge about trade flows, market 
integration i.e. the adjustment of prices to each other across markets is regarded as the 
best indicator of spatial market efficiency. The econometric method of cointegration 
was applied to time-series monthly price data in 13 different markets for the same 
period as the seasonality analysis (1989-2009). 
 
Finding 9 
Cointegration analysis demonstrates that the maize market in Malawi is spatially 
efficient. This corroborates the findings of other researchers, in particular Myers (2008) 
who obtained the same result using threshold auto regression methods applied to weekly 
price data. In the analysis conducted for this thesis overall cointegration between 
markets was established; however, with weaker links between distant markets. 
Grouping of markets regionally, between northern, central and southern markets 
displayed strong market integration within each group, and price behaviour in market 
pairs consistent with spatial arbitrage. 
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The findings demonstrate that private maize trading in Malawi works well have 
substantial policy significance, and are central to the problem of private-public 
coordination in the management of the market. In particular they mean that maize price 
responses to shocks are not caused by market failures resulting in imperfect market 
functioning in different places or times. Rather they reflect real underlying shortages of 
maize supply, and the duration and intensity of unusual seasonal price spikes reflects a 
failure on the part of decision makers to grasp and to address the magnitude of the 
overall lack of maize in the market. In order to obtain a better understanding of the role 
of non-economic factors in contributing to extreme seasonal price episodes, Chapter 6 
of the thesis examines the three such episodes of the 2000s in detail, including a 
sequential narrative account of the unfolding of each price crisis as it occurred. 
 
Finding 10 
Extreme seasonal price spikes in Malawi follow similar patterns, distinguished by the 
dominance of political over economic considerations, and a pervasive distrust of the 
private sector on the part of politicians and civil servants. Each price spike contains the 
following elements: political unpreparedness to acknowledge a maize shortage; state 
agencies (NFRA, ADMARC) redouble efforts to secure supply in a short market; 
private traders accused of hoarding; maize exports banned; private trade in maize 
prohibited; ADMARC reinstated as monopoly with fixed buying and selling prices; 
failure to rebuild public stocks; delays in ordering imports. 
 
Finding 11 
The market price is the single most accurate indicator of the underlying maize supply 
situation in Malawi (a conclusion that should follow anyway from findings about 
competition and efficiency in the maize market). However, the market price is not seen 
as a critical indicator in the food security discussion within government; and between 
government, donors and NGOs in Malawi. Rather the emphasis is on the maize harvest 
figure, the crop estimates for substitute foods (rice, cassava), the stock position, food aid 
operations, and localised vulnerability identified by MVAC investigatory procedures. 
 
The narrative investigation of price spikes in the 2000s leads to serious doubts being 
cast on the size of maize harvests in the late 2000s, since the AISP was introduced. The 
official production data shows a near doubling of maize output between the early- and 
late-2000s, from 1.5 million tons (average 2001 to 2005 harvests) to 3.0 million tons 
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(average 2006 to 2009 harvests). Since consumption trends for a staple food like maize 
tend to be fairly stable, any feasible consumption trend for the 2000s results in a balance 
between production and consumption that veers from huge deficits in the early-2000s to 
huge surpluses in the late-2000s. The deficits seem reasonably plausible, given the size 
of import operations needed to recover from a deficit market in particular years in the 
mid-2000s. However, the surpluses indicated since 2006, cumulatively amounting to 3.2 
million tons, do not seem plausible given that maize prices rose from MK15 to MK70 
from June 2007 to February 2009. 
 
Finding 12 
Price behaviour in the late-2000s suggests a substantial overestimate of the size of 
maize harvests in Malawi, dating from the 2007 harvest. This probable overestimation 
of production has been hypothesised by other researchers (Dorward et al., 2008; Jayne 
et al., 2008a; Jayne and Tschirley, 2009). It has important implications for future food 
security policy discussion, since the entire baseline for year-to-year comparisons has 
undergone a quantum upward shift. 
 
In brief summary of these findings, the thesis verifies a mean seasonal price change for 
maize in Malawi of 60 per cent. There are individual years when the gross seasonal 
margin is many times this level. Private maize trade is found to be competitive and 
efficient, and therefore cannot be cited effectively as a reason for the prevalence of 
extreme seasonal price events. These instead seem to occur due to a particular pathology 
in the relationship of public decision making to the private maize market, characterised 
by politics, mistrust and persistent coordination failures. 
 
7.3 Interpreting these Findings in the Context of other Research 
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to link the findings of this thesis to those of 
other researchers on food markets in eastern and southern Africa, and to see what 
additional light, if any, is shed on the way forward for managing the maize market in 
Malawi in the future. A key feature of maize policy in Malawi throughout the past two 
decades has been the unpredictable character of government policy action, with severe 
repercussions for the risk confronted by private traders in carrying out commercial 
operations (purchases, storage, transport, sales). Some components of this 
unpredictability are as follows: 
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(a) changing licensing regulations for imports and exports; 
 
(b) banning imports by private traders; 
 
(c) banning exports; 
 
(d) banning private trade altogether, including in the domestic market; 
 
(e) instructing NFRA to source outside the country, so that imported supplies can 
drive down domestic prices and force traders to sell stocks; 
 
(f) ADMARC sales at prices below market prices; 
 
(g) ADMARC entering the market to procure in competition with private traders; 
 
(h) NFRA and ADMARC redoubling efforts to procure maize domestically when 
prices have already begun to rise steeply; 
 
(i) ADMARC limiting size of individual sale transactions to consumers, in order to 
exclude traders from purchasing in volume for resale. 
 
The narrative account of exceptional price spikes provided in Chapter 6 of the thesis 
showed how many of these ad hoc policy decisions exacerbate rather than ameliorate a 
shortage of maize supply in the market. This is because they act to curtail market 
volumes, either by trying to procure more maize in a short market, or by preventing a 
flow of maize into the market from informal or formal imports. Chapoto and Jayne 
(2009) put forward a hypothesis that the greater the degree of such market intervention, 
the more unstable will be domestic prices. They test this hypothesis by reference to 
price time series data in eight countries: South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda, Zambia, 
Malawi, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Kenya. They find that the less interventionist countries 
(in terms of frequent changes in maize market regulation) have the lowest price 
volatility (South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda) while the most interventionist countries 
have the highest price volatility (Malawi, Zambia). Malawi exhibits the greatest price 
instability of all the countries examined, on the two separate measures of overall price 
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variation and price variation corrected for average seasonal margins (Ibid., Table 1, 
p.12). 
 
The findings of this thesis would tend to support the view that it is unpredictable or 
poorly considered government action that explains episodes of extreme seasonal price 
volatility in Malawi. Given that almost all researchers agree that private trade in maize 
in Malawi is competitive and fairly efficient (Jayne et al., 2008a; Myers, 2008), it is 
difficult to sustain an alternative hypothesis that problems in the maize market are due 
to weakly functioning private markets with serious coordination defects (between 
private actors), high transaction costs, and high private risk in thin markets (Dorward et 
al., 2005a; 2005b; 2009a; 2009b).29 Rather, private risk is seen predominantly to be 
increased by state action. Nevertheless, one most important dimension of the 
‘coordination school’ becomes critically important in the policy discussion of the maize 
market in Malawi, and that is public-private coordination in market management. In 
particular, the coordination literature points to lack of trust as a critical feature of market 
failure problems under a wide variety of circumstances (Dorward et al., 2004a; Poulton 
et al.,2006a; 2006b); and in this instance it is lack of trust between public and private 
sectors that results in persistent and frequent failures in the orderly management of the 
Malawi maize market. 
 
A framework has been proposed to take forward this problem of lack of trust and 
coordination failure in the interface between the public and private sectors in food 
markets (Jayne and Tschirley, 2009; Tschirley and Jayne, 2010). This is referred to as 
the ‘credible commitment problem’, and is based on the following five premises: 
 
(a) “government and traders interact in the same political and economic space but 
with differing objective functions; 
 
(b) the two are dependent on each other in that the behaviour of each affects the 
outcome of the other; 
 
                                                 
29  This is not to dismiss or downplay the existence of transaction cost factors such as lack of 
trust, absent quality standards, or inaccurate weighing scales; it is just to propose that, 
weighed in the balance, these are not the factors responsible for major malfunctions of the 
maize market in the Malawi case. 
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(c) trust between government and traders is difficult to develop because of differing 
objectives, values, and world views; 
 
(d) information about the other’s behaviour is imperfect, and the effects of some 
behaviours are seen only with a time lag; and 
 
(e) as a result, each must base their own behaviour in part on expectations about the 
behaviour of the other.” (Jayne and Tschirley, 2009, p.6). 
 
According to this framework, the government has a political objective which is to 
remain in power (Ibid., p.6). Given the importance of maize to both producers and 
consumers in the country, being seen to have been responsible for improving the maize 
market for its participants is critical to political success. These political arguments were 
rehearsed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, and arose in a significant way in the narrative of 
food price crises provided in Chapter 6. In particular, gaining political credit for having 
overcome a previous maize market problem is crucial, as also is not providing political 
opponents with ammunition to attack the government’s record in this area (which often 
comes down to not admitting a maize shortage, even when one is evident). 
 
By contrast, private traders have the objective to maximise their profits. In pursuit of 
this objective, they take informed positions regarding future market developments, 
including decisions as to how much grain to purchase into stock, how long to maintain 
the stock holdings, and when to release supplies into the market. In a rising market, 
private traders will seek to procure large volumes early (when prices are still low), and 
will hold the ensuing stocks while prices continue to rise at a rate that is above weekly 
or monthly storage costs. This is not bad behaviour and is not collusive hoarding. 
Private traders will also (if given the opportunity) buy from ADMARC at low prices 
and sell at high prices when a gap opens up between official and market prices. Again, 
this is not bad behaviour; it is an opportunity created by a particular form of market 
management (subsidised sales to consumers by ADMARC). Offsetting these 
opportunities to make profits in particular market circumstances, private traders also 
face considerable risks from changes in government behaviour (such as being banned 
from trading altogether). 
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The gap between government and trader objectives, and the dynamic of the interaction 
between them that makes matters worse in a crisis (either traders taking advantage of 
windfall opportunities to make a profit; or the government deliberately trying to 
undermine traders’ ability to operate successfully in the market) results in the credible 
commitment problem. This is described as ‘the inability of parties to make credible 
commitments to each other precludes a course of action that would resolve a conflict’ 
(Jayne and Tschirley, 2009, p.6). Examples of this impasse abound in the history of the 
maize market in Malawi in the 2000s (Chapter 6). For example, in 2005, the 
government deliberately decided to source imports rather than procure domestically, in 
order to persuade traders holding stocks to sell or risk future losses when the imports 
arrived. In 2008, government reneged on an agreement to use traders to supply 
ADMARC’s requirements when market prices rose above the fixed ADMARC 
procurement price, then promptly banned private trade altogether. 
 
The credible commitment framework seems a useful way of organizing ideas about the 
public-private coordination problem in food markets in countries like Malawi. It 
appears to fit the evidence on how this relationship has tended to develop in the post-
liberalisation era, and it is consistent with the patterns of experience that occurred at 
times of maize price crisis in Malawi in the 2000s. Yet, there is something 
unsatisfactory about the even-handedness with which ‘government objectives’ are 
opposed to ‘trader objectives’ in this framework. After, all private traders are merely 
doing what entrepreneurs are supposed to do in all branches of the economy, which is to 
provide an output or service requiring an investment, and with the intention of making a 
profit. The weight of the empirical evidence suggests that private maize traders in 
Malawi do this quite well, and are not able to any significant degree to exercise 
monopoly or monopsony control over market outcomes. The government, by contrast, 
does have choices regarding the decisions it makes and their effects on the public good. 
 
Jayne and Tschirley (2009) set out three alternative ‘models’ of staple food market 
development that arise from their deployment of the credible commitment framework. 
The first model is the private sector-led model in which responsibilities for procurement, 
wholesaling, storage, transport, milling, retail, imports and exports is left entirely to the 
private sector. In this model, the state has a limited role to provide public goods (e.g. 
roads; market places), property rights, and light-touch regulations (e.g. quality 
standards). The second model allows for rule-based state operations of a more 
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substantive kind. Specifically, the state would make clear in advance of each crop 
season precisely the quantity of stock it intended to procure or import (for food security 
or market operations purposes), the purchase price, the ceiling price to consumers, and 
its intent to use the private sector to import or export in defence of the acceptable 
domestic price range. The third model is the discretionary state intervention model that 
the authors consider is the dominant model in many eastern and southern African 
countries, and describes the type of maize market management that has prevailed in 
Malawi over the past two decades. 
 
For these authors, the preferred future policy discussion is about shifting from the third 
model to the second model; not from the third to the first model. In this it seems that 
they probably concur with the critique of the neo-liberal stance expressed by the 
coordination school (Dorward and Kydd, 2004; Kydd and Dorward, 2004; Dorward et 
al., 2005a; 2005b). However, moving from the third to the second model is a significant 
challenge in view of the historical adherence to the third model in countries like Malawi 
and Zambia. The GTPA experience in Malawi (Chapter 6) shows that merely setting up 
a forum in which private operators and government decision makers exchange views is 
nowhere near sufficient on its own. Indeed, there is a risk, also illustrated by the Malawi 
GTPA experience, that such a forum comes to be used by individual politicians to 
secure grain trading contracts on their own behalf. It is perhaps the neo-patrimonial 
dimension of the politics of the maize market that represents the most formidable barrier 
to making progress in this direction. 
 
Several authors have argued that, objectively, circumstances should be quite propitious 
for an individual government to move closer to the rule-based way forward in policy 
decision making. For example, in the 2000s maize production across countries in the 
southern African region has shown little covariance in year to year trends, in contrast to 
the 1990s when covariance in production trends was quite marked (Tschirley and Jayne, 
2010). The implication is that elimination of maize trade barriers between southern 
African countries and free cross-country private trading in maize, would, in many cases 
on its own prevent the extreme imbalances between domestic supply and demand that 
occur every few years in Malawi. The extent of informal cross-border trade into Malawi 
is now well substantiated, and banning private trade has no other effect than to prevent 
or steeply curtail the beneficial impacts on maize supply of this trade. Then there are 
technology changes such as the spread of mobile phones and internet that have made 
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price information in different locations considerably more uniformly available and 
instantaneous than in the past. Finally, there is the scope discussed in Chapter 2 and also 
pursued in Tschirley and Jayne (2010) to use market-based risk management 
instruments such as call options to help governments take precautionary forward 
positions to protect future maize supplies in the event of production shortfalls. 
 
This thesis stops short of making recommendations for policy change. There is no 
shortage of advisory admonitions regarding the way forward for improved management 
of the maize market in Malawi in the literature. The need for an eventual transition to a 
more predictable rule-based exercise of government market management is recognised 
in almost all policy writing on this topic. The intractable problem is not the destination, 
but the means of getting there. 
 
7.4 Concluding Summary 
This thesis has examined in considerable detail price instability in the maize market in 
Malawi. Price instability in staple food markets historically and contemporarily (in poor 
countries) is a critical policy problem because for extremely poor and vulnerable people 
their ability to afford food when their own supplies run out is literally a matter of life 
and death. After examining the literature on food price instability, and the history of 
market regulation in Malawi, the thesis sought first to reach a detailed understanding of 
the various dimensions of maize market instability in Malawi. This provides some 
useful ‘benchmarks’ for the policy discussion: average price seasonality is 60 per cent 
and has not been diminishing in the recent era; other food crops display signs of 
diminishing seasonality; and there is quite a lot of locational variation in the magnitude 
of seasonality in different maize markets around the country. An examination of market 
competition and efficiency suggests that imperfections in private maize markets are not 
the reason for the average degree of price seasonality in maize, nor for the recurrence of 
extreme price spikes in the maize market. A narrative examination of extreme price 
spikes reveals the role of politics and private-public coordination failures in generating 
them. Finally, the private-public coordination problem takes central position in the 
policy interpretation of these findings. This thesis would concur with the prognosis of 
other researchers that unless and until the government adopts a rule- rather than 
discretion-based approach to maize market management, episodes of excessive 
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Appendix I: Farmer and Trader/Processor Questionnaires 
 
I. Farmer Questionnaires Maize Form 
 
Consent form to participate in the survey on maize marketing in Malawi. 
The maize farmer survey questionnaire is designed to discover a range of information 
concerning maize production inputs, this season’s harvest of maize, maize sold at 
harvest, marketing costs, later sales of maize, farmers’ sales behaviour, own maize 
consumption, storage of maize, maize milling for home consumption, and marketing 
problems and means to overcoming them. It is also designed to identify the kinds of 
markets and buyers who purchase maize from farmers. Both men and women farmers 
will be interviewed. 
It is your choice if you want to take part or not. If you do choose not to take part there 
will be no negative consequences for you to participate in maize marketing because of 
this decision. The information you give during the research will be kept confidentially 
and will be used for research purpose only. All information you share is private and 
confidential which means that no body will know about what you share. Your individual 
responses will not be made public, so no one will ever know what you have said during 
the interviews. In case after signing the consent form you decide to withdraw the 
consent to participate you are free to do so and can stop the interview any time you wish. 
 
To accept to participate in the study: Sign and date this form where indicated below. 
 
To decline to take part in the study: Sign and date this form where indicated below. 
 
(A) Consent to take part in the study 
by signing and dating this form below, I,………………………… accept to take part in 
the study. 
Signature: ……………………………………..Date: …………………………………… 
(B) Decline to take part in the study 
by signing and dating this form below, I, ……………………………….., decline to take 





Name of Respondent……………………………………Sample No……………………... 
Gender  Male |____| 1; Female = |____| 2 
Contact details: (Address and Telephone number)………….…………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Village of Respondent…………………………………………………………………….. 
Section…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
EPA……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
District Name …………………………………………………………………………….. 





BASIC HOUSEHOLD DATA  
Household 
Code:                  Village               
                             
Members of HH currently 
resident  Enter code and short description, as underlined       
Id 
  
Name Age  (yrs) Sex 
Relationship 





Status Main  Occupation 
                                        
                 1 = Head    1 = None    1 = Single   1 = Child 2 = School 
                
 2 = 
Wife/husband   2 = Std IV    2 = Married   3 = House/farm    




       1 = M  3 = Child    3 = Std VII    3 = Divorced  4 = Farmer 
5 = 
Fisherman 
             2 = F 
 4 = Other 
relation 
 4 = Form IV 
   4 = Widowed 
 6 = Govt./Parastatal 
employee 
               
 5 = Other 
permanent 
 5 = Form VI 
   5 = Widower 
 7 = Private sector 
employee 
                      6 = Higher   6 = Separated 
 8 = Self-employed (non-
farm) 
                                     
                  CODE CODE  CODE  CODE  CODE  
1                                                     
2                                                     
3                                                     
4                                                     
5                                                     
6                                                     
7                                                     
8                                                     
9                                                     
If more than 9 HH residents, continue on a second form B
Total resident HH 




Maize Production Inputs 
 
1. What is the total land owned by the household? ….………………………..Acres 
2. How much land did you cultivate maize this season?....................................Acres 
 
3. Inputs used in maize production 
 
 Type of Input Quantity 
Used 
(incl. units) 
How did you obtain this input? 
(ENTER CODE & 
DESCRIPTION) 
Price Paid for Each 
Input (incl. unit of 
purchase) 
   code description  
1 OPV maize seed     
2 Hybrid maize seed     
3 Fertilizer Base 
Dressing 
    
4 Fertilizer Top 
Dressing 
    
5 Agro-chemicals     
6 Hired labour or 
ganyu 
    
CODES: 1=purchased at full price; 2=purchased at coupon price; 3=provided free; 
4=paid wage; 5=paid in-kind; 6=kept from last harvest. 
4. When did you harvest your maize? ……………………………………………………. 
 
This Season’s Harvest (This Season – 2007-08) 
5. Total maize harvest and how it is divided: 
 
Category Quantity Unit of Measurement 
Total Maize Production   
Amount Sold at Harvest   
Amount Kept to Sell Later   




NOTE: Maize sold and kept is expected to add up to total maize production figures. 




(CHECK – this should equal the sum of the two amounts kept in the table; if not, then 
further questioning about the harvest and how it is divided were necessary) 
Subsequent questions follow-up on these different components of the total harvest: 
harvest sales, later sales, own maize consumption. 
 
Maize Sold At Harvest 
7. Where and to whom did you sell this maize? 
a) At the farm (or in the village), 
























8. In the case of travel to market or town: 
a) How far is the market or town (km)? …………………………………………... 
b) What form of transport was used  
i. pick-up, 
ii. bus,  
iii. ox-cart, 
iv. donkey 
v. Other specify …………………………………………………………………..... 
c) How much was carried for one trip (quantity/unit of measurement)?.................... 
................................................................................................................................ 
d) How many trips were made?.................................................................................. 
e) What was the cost per trip (if someone else was paid for the transport)?.............. 
9. Price of Maize sales: 
(a) What was the price you obtained, for maize sold soon after harvest? ………….. 
(b) Quantity sold at this price. ……………………………………unit of 
measurement (on the cob, or as maize grain). (CHECK – is this the same as the 
quantity stated in the table above for maize sold at harvest; if not the same, 




(c) Total cash income obtained from this maize sale or each maize sale?.................. 
……………………………………………………………………………….MK 
10. Reasons for sale immediately after harvest (circle the answer that gives the best 
description of the farmer’s reason for selling maize after harvest): (circle the correct 
answer) 
(a) I had extra maize that I did not need for family consumption 
(b) I needed cash in order to pay off debts (e.g. to a trader or moneylender) 
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(c) I needed cash in order to pay school fees 
(d) I needed cash in order to buy consumer goods (e.g. clothes, shoes etc.) 
(e) None of the above – I sold maize after harvest for the following main 
reason:…………………………............................................................................ 
Later Sales of Maize 
11. Do you plan to sell some of your maize stocks later in the year? YES/NO (circle the 
correct answer) 
12. If YES, 
(a) How much (what quantity) of the amount that you have stored do you intend to 
sell later? (quantity and measurement unit) ……………………………………... 
(b) Do you expect prices to be higher later in the year (YES/NO) (circle the correct 
answer) 
(c) What is the price of maize now MK……………………/kg grain, what do you 
expect the price to be in November  MK………………………............/kg grain. 
If YES, will this still leave you with sufficient maize to last your family for the year? 
YES/NO (circle the correct answer) 
13. If NO to this last question, how many months family consumption will you keep in 
store? …………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Farmer Sales Behaviour 
14. Do you usually sell to the same buyer? YES/NO (circle the correct answer) 
15. If YES, circle the answer which best describes the reason why this is so? 
(a) This is the only buyer who comes to this village to buy maize. 
(b) This buyer is a relative or friend and I trust him/her to give me a good price. 
(c) This buyer is not a relative/friend, but always gives me the best price so I 
prefer to sell to him/her. 
(d) I am in debt to this buyer, and that is why I sell to him/her 
(e) Other reason, specify………………………………………………...................... 
16. If NO, circle the answer which best describes the reason why this so? 
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(a) I sell to the buyer who gives me the best price, and the person can be different 
each time. 
(b) I check the price in the market first, and then sell to the person who offers the 
best market price. 
(c) Different buyers come to this village at different times, so it is normal to sell to 
different buyers. 
(d) Other reason, specify ……………………………………………......................... 
................................................................................................................................ 
 
Own Maize Consumption 
17. Just to check again, you are keeping …...………………………………………maize 
(quantity, units of measurement) for family consumption during this year? 
Conversion rates: 
18. Maize on the cob to maize grain (for example, if someone has 20 bags of maize on 
the cob, how many bags/kg of grain is this?................................................................... 
19. Maize grain to maize flour (if this farmer takes maize grain to the mill to make flour, 
how much flour does he or she expect to get – 50 kg grain give how many kg flour?). 
……………………………………………………………………………………..kgs 
20. With the farmer, calculate and verify the expected total flour equivalent to the maize 
that is stored for home consumption: so the maize that you have in store should give 
you ………………………………………………………………(kg of flour in total) 
21. To feed the family, on average how much maize flour do you need: 
(a) per day………………………and for how many people?........................................ 
(b) per week……………...and for how many people?.................................................. 
22. Therefore you are keeping enough maize to last the family for…………………….... 
………………………. ………………………………months from the last harvest? 
CHECK -  verify this calculation with the farmer e.g. if 7 kg maize is required per 





Storage of Maize 
Description of maize storage methods  
23. Storage facilities/equipment (circle the correct answer) 
a) Brick roofed improved maize granaries  
b) Small Metal silos 
c) Traditional Nkhokwe 
d) Bags stored in the home 
e) Other Specify …………………………………………………………………....... 
24. Maize treatment during storage (circle the correct answer) 
(a) None 
(b) Actellic dust 
(c) Liquid Actellic 
(d) Fumigation 
(e) Other specify………………………………………………………………………. 
25. Do you normally lose some of your maize in store? YES/NO (circle the correct 
answer) 
26. And if YES to above for what main reason  (circle the correct answer) 
a) Rot due to moisture, 
b) Insect infestation 
c) Rodent infestation 
d) Other specify …………………………………………………………………….... 
27. Approximately how much of the maize that you have in store do you expect to lose 
for these reasons: quantity or rough proportion………………………………............ 
28. How do these losses affect the length of time you can feed your family? (Go through 
the previous calculation allowing for losses). Adjusted months coverage of maize in 





Milling Maize Kept for Home Consumption 
29. What is the cost per kg of input or output that is charged for milling?.......................... 
30. Is payment by cash or in kind i.e. sometimes a proportion of the output is kept by 
the miller? (circle the correct answer) 
(i) Cash 
 (ii) In kind 
(a)    How often do you take maize for milling? …………………………………….. 
(b) What quantity is typically milled each time you go for milling? …………….............. 
 
Key Food Marketing Problems and Means to Overcoming Them 
31.Please, rank the following problems and costs of trading, in order of important 
(highest cost) to the least important (lowest cost). Rate one the most important or 
highest cost 
a. Finding out selling prices (market search) =|____| 
b. Finding out buyers (market search) =|____| 
c. Transport from the farm to the point of sale (transport) =|____| 
d. Storage costs (storage) =|____| 
e. Loss of crop in storage (losses in storage) =|____| 
f. Lack of credit (credit) =|____| 
g. Use of inaccurate weighing scales by buyers (weighing) =|____| 
h. Theft (theft) =|____| 
32 What policy changes are required towards markets? Please rank the following policy 
options in order of the most important to the least important. Rate 1 the most important. 
(i) Market linkage =|____| 
(ii) Transport brokerage =|____| 
(iii) Grading and packaging services =|____| 
(iv) Warehouse/storage service =|____| 
(v) Weighing services  =|____| 
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(vi) Credit linkage services =|____| 
(vii) Building entrepreneurial, business management, contract supply obligations 
including supermarket marketing, and leadership capacity of farmers and 
traders =|____| 
(viii) Improving the rural feeder roads infrastructure and general security =|____| 
(ix) Promotion and introduction of Information Communication Technologies 
(ICT) within easy reach distance for fast communication of information 
including agriculture marketing information =|____| 
(x)  Other Specify…………………………………………………………………... 





II Trader/Buyer/Processor Questionnaire Maize Form 
Consent Form to Participate 
The trader/buyer and miller/processor form is designed to obtain data concerning the 
different kinds of traders/buyers and millers/processors who purchase maize from 
farmers, size of their operations, financing of purchases, use of purchased maize, 
storage of purchased maize, key food marketing problems and means to overcoming 
them. 
This questionnaire applies to all types of persons who buy from farmers including 
millers and processors who buy direct from farmers and including farmers who buy off 
from other farmers. In cases where there is more than one intermediary between farmer 
and miller/processor, then the second or further intermediary will be interviewed using 
the parts of this questionnaire that are relevant in the particular case. 
It is your choice if you want to take part or not. If you do choose not to take part there 
will be no negative consequences for you to participate in maize marketing because of 
this decision. The information you give during the research will be kept confidentially 
and will be used for research purpose only. All information you share is private and 
confidential which means that no body will know about what you share. Your individual 
responses will not be made public, so no one will ever know what you have said during 
the interviews. In case after signing the consent form you decide to withdraw the 
consent to participate you are free to do so and can stop the interview any time you wish. 
 
To accept to participate in the study: Sign and date this form where indicated below. 
 
To decline to take part in the study: Sign and date this form where indicated below. 
 
(A) Consent to take part in the study 
by signing and dating this form below, I, ……………………………………..., accept to 
take part in the study 
Signature: …………………………………….Date: …………………………………… 
(B) Decline to take part in the study 
by signing and dating this form below, I……………………………………….decline to 







1. Location ……………………………2.Sample No.......................................................... 
3. Name of Buyer/Trader/Miller/Processor……………………………………………….. 
4. Gender  Male = |____| 1; Female = |____| 2 (Tick the correct answer) 
5. Contact details: (Address and Telephone number)……………………………………... 
6. District Name………………………………………………………………………….... 
7. Date of Survey………………………………………………………………………….. 
Type of Buyer/Trader or Miller/Processor and Size of Operation 
8 Type of Buyer/Trader or Miller/Processor (Circle the description that most closely 
corresponds to this trader). 
Local maize trader – trades maize only in his district/area 
Long-distance maize trader – trades across districts 
Other: Specify……………………………………………………………………………... 
9. Are you a full time or part time buyer or trader? (Tick the correct answer) 
Full time = |____|1; Part time = |____|2 
10. If part time then what is your main other occupation? (Tick the correct answer) 
Farmer = |____| 1, Farm labourer = |____| 2, Non-farm wage earner = |____| 3, Non-
farm self-employed = |____| 4 Civil Servant = |____| 5, Multiple occupation = |____| 
6 
11. Do you buy and sell on your own account = |____| 1, or as an agent for another 
trader = |____| 2 (Tick the correct answer) 
12. If you are an agent for another trader, then what is the name and contact details of 







13. How do you transport the maize that you buy from farmers? 
Bicycle = |____| 1 
Donkey = |____| 2 
Ox-cart = |____| 3 
Pick-up truck = |____| 4 
Other (specify) = |____| 5. …………………………………………………………….. 
14. Size of operation – number of farmers (the current or immediately past harvest 
season) 
In a typical day, from how many farmers do you buy maize ……………… (No. of 
farmers) 
How many days in the week do you buy maize ………………………. (Days of the 
week) 
[During the harvest season] 
In a typical week, from how many farmers do you buy maize …………….… (No. 
of farmers) 
(CHECK that these figures make sense i.e. daily, weekly, no of day’s operation) 
Add additional notes here if necessary:………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………................................................... 
………………………………………………………………………………………... 
15. Size of operation – quantity of purchases (the current or immediately past harvest 
season) 
Typical (or average) quantity of maize purchased per day…………………… (unit) 
Typical (or average quantity of maize purchased per week…………………...(unit) 
(CHECK that these figures make sense i.e. daily, weekly, no of day’s operation) 
Add additional notes here if necessary:………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………................................................... 
………………………………………………………………………………………... 




17. How much maize do you expect to buy this season?.........................................(units? 
 
Purchases from Farmers 
(Questions here refer to the most recent transactions and prices undertaken by this 
trader, even those of the same day or yesterday) 
18. Details of the most recent purchase of maize 
19. When was your last purchase of maize from a farmer?.................................................. 
20. How much maize did you buy (and in what form?): ……………………...50 kg bags 
Form (physical)………………….………………………………………..50 kg bags 
21. What price did you pay for that maize……………………………….(CHECK units) 
22. What was the cost of transport………………………………………...…MK per unit 
23. What is the name and location of the farmer? 
Name:………………………………………………………………………………... 
Place…………………………………………………………………………….…… 
(Note: the price can be checked with the farmer, if the location is nearby) 
 
Verification of Price (Farmer) 
24. Can you verify that you sold maize to trader………………………………..YES/NO 
25. What was your price of sale to that trader………….……..........(……..………..units) 
 
 
Finance of Purchases (Buyer/Trader) 
Payment of farmers: 
26. Do you pay farmers in cash? YES/NO) 







Finance of purchases 
28. Do you obtain a cash advance or loan in order to make crop purchases? YES/NO 
29. If YES, from who (circle the correct answer) 
(a) from a moneylender 
(b) From a credit institution (name of credit institution…………………………) 
(c) From a bank (name of bank…………………………………………………..) 
(d) from a relative or friend 
(e) from another bigger trader or miller, for whom he is acting as agent 
(f) Other, specify………………………………………………………………….. 
Rate of interest on loan (Specify rate of interest and period applicable e.g. 10% over 
3 months) …………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Sales of Last Maize Purchased 
30. What did you do with the last maize you bought? ………………………………….... 
(e.g., stored, transported, sold) 
31. If you sold the maize, where and to whom did you sell it? Provide contact details if 
available. 
Place of Sale: ……………………………………………………………………….... 
Details of Purchaser: …………………………………………………………………. 
..………………………………………………………………………………………. 
a. Quantity of Maize sold: …………………………………………………………. 
b. Price at which the maize was sold: ……………………………………………... 
c. Cost of transport to market:……………………………………….…………...... 




d. other specify 
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33. How long did it take to sell? …………………………………………...(Hours, days) 
34.  Why did you choose to sell in this market, or to this buyer? Circle the answer which 
best describes the reason why this is so? 
a. There is only one trader who comes to this village to buy maize. 
b. This buyer is a relative or friend and I trust him/her to give me a good price. 
c. This buyer is not a relative/friend, but always gives me the best price so I 
prefer to sell to him/her. 
d. I am in debt to this buyer, and that is why I sell to him/her  
e. Other reason, specify …………………………………………………………. 
35. More generally, what are the price factors that determine where and to whom you 
sell your maize?  
(Circle the answer which best describes the reason why this is so?) 
a. I sell to the buyer who gives me the best price, and the person can be different 
each time. 
b. I check the price in the market first, and then sell to the person who offers the 
market price. 
c. Other reason, specify …………………………………………………………... 
 
Storage of Maize 
Describe the storage method for maize storage?  
36. Storage facilities/equipment (circle the correct answer) 
a. Brick roofed improved maize granaries  
b. Small Metal silos 
c. Traditional Nkhokwe 
d. Bags stored in the home 





37. Maize treatment during storage (circle the correct answer) 
a. None 
b. Actellic dust 




38. How much maize do you have in store at this moment? ……………………………... 
39. Do you normally lose some of your maize in store? Yes/No (circle the correct 
answer) 
40. And if yes to above for what reason  (circle the correct answer) 
a. Rot due to moisture,  
b. Insect infestation  
c. Rodent infestation 
d. Other specify …………………………………………………………………… 
41. Approximately how much of the maize that you have in store do you expect to lose 
due to these reasons: quantity or rough proportion………………………………….... 
42. What was the purchase price of maize at the time of going into store? 
43. What is the expected duration in store? 
44. What is the expected minimum sale price at the end of the storage period to break-
even? (i.e. selling price at time of expected sale out of store) 
45. What is the current market rate of interest on borrowed money? (Per cent over 
specified time period). 
 
Key Food Marketing Problems and Means to Overcoming them 
 
46. Please rank the following problems and costs of trading, in order of the most 
important (highest cost) to the least important (lowest cost). (Rate 1 the most important 
or with highest cost) 
294 
 
a. finding out selling prices (market search) =|____| 
b. finding out buyers and (market search) =|____| 
c. transporting from the farm to the point of sale (transport) =|____| 
d. storage costs (storage) =|____| 
e. loss of crop in storage (losses in storage) =|____| 
f. poor quality of crop purchased from the farmer (low quality) =|____| 
g. lack of credit (credit) =|____| 
h. use of inaccurate weighing scales by buyers (weighing) =|____| 




47. How is trading treated by officials, local government, and police? 
48. Do you need a license in order to trade? YES/No  
49. If YES: 
 From where do you obtain your license…………………………………………. 
 How much does the license cost…………………………………………………. 
How often must you renew your license……………………………………….... 
 Do you have to pay more than the official fee for the license ?……….YES/NO 
 If YES, typically how much does the license cost you………………………….. 
 
50. Aside from licenses, do you incur other costs for trading? ………………....YES/NO 
 
51. If YES: 
 Taxes paid at point of purchase in villages…………………………...…YES/NO 
 If YES, state typical taxes that must be paid……………………………………... 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 Taxes paid at point of sale in markets…………………………………...YES/NO 




 Are you ever stopped at police roadblocks……………………………...YES/NO 
 If YES, how much do you usually have to pay to pass through the roadblock 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
52. Is it easy to go into trading i.e. are there any restrictions formal or informal for one 
to go into trading? 
If yes what are these restrictions (circle what best describes your situation 
a. Not allowed to sell at the market by vendors already established at market  
b. Lack of space in the market 
c. Other specify ……………………………………………………………………. 
 ………………………………………………………………………………….... 
………………………………………………………………………………….... 
53. To what extent do you think officials are consistent and predictable towards traders? 
(Circle the correct answer) 
a. Very consistent  
b. Very predictable  
c. Inconsistent  
d. Unpredictable  
54. Do you think MIS services provided through MACE and/or MOAFS are adequate to 
act on their own in overcoming problems of market efficiency? YES/NO 
a. If Yes provide reasons (Circle the answer which best describes your situation) 
(i)  To know prices in different markets thereby providing an idea of the ruling 
market prices hence helps improve price bargaining power. 
(ii)  Buyer identification 
(iii)  Information on where o source commodities. 
b. If No provide reasons (Circle the answer which best describes your situation) 
(i)  Poor roads 
(ii)  Lack of transport 
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(iii) Lack of credit 
(iv)  Lack and poor business management and entrepreneurial skills 
(v)  Poor storage facilities 
(vi)  Lack of fast and timely communication systems between producers and buyers. 
(vii)  Other specify……………………………………………………………………. 
55. What policy changes are required towards maize markets? Please rank the following 
policy options in order of the most important to the least important. (Rate 1 the 
most important).  
(vi) Market linkage =|____| 
(vii) Transport brokerage =|____| 
(viii) Grading and packaging services =|____| 
(ix) Warehouse/storage service =|____| 
(x) Weighing services =|____| 
(vi) Credit linkage services =|____| 
(vii) Building entrepreneurial, business management, contract supply obligations 
including supermarket marketing, and leadership capacity of farmers and 
traders =|____|  
(viii) Improving the rural feeder roads infrastructure and general security =|____| 
(ix) Promotion and introduction of Information Communication Technologies 
(ICT) within easy reach distance for fast communication of information 
including agriculture marketing information =|____|. 









Appendix II: Malawi Nominal and Real Average Maize Prices 
 




Note: Real prices are nominal prices deflated by the monthly CPI index, base-year = 2000 
 
  
1989-91 1991-94 1994-97 1997-2000
Year Nom. Real Year Nom. Real Year Nom. Real Year Nom. Real
Jul    1991 0.33 4.46 1994 0.73 5.38 1997 2.53 6.09
Aug    0.36 4.88 0.80 5.71  2.79 7.15
Sep    0.36 4.86 0.90 5.95  3.31 8.44
Oct    0.35 4.65 0.96 5.72  4.04 10.25
Nov    0.40 5.30 1.10 5.95  4.45 10.75
Dec    0.43 5.67 1.23 6.07  4.86 11.15
 Jan    1992 0.43 5.46 1995 1.36 6.21 1998 6.04 12.74
 Feb    0.44 5.40 1.42 6.16  7.59 15.60
Mar    0.44 5.38 1.31 5.48  7.07 14.23
Apr    0.42 5.02 1.39 5.63  4.85 9.63
May    0.43 4.98 1.22 4.80  4.62 9.12
Jun    0.43 5.04 1.37 5.27  4.15 8.28
Jul 1989 0.27 4.39 0.58 6.39 1.51 5.62  4.95 9.96
Aug  0.29 4.72 0.51 5.44 1.63 5.97  5.66 11.53
Sep  0.31 5.04 0.50 5.16 1.69 5.83  7.01 12.50
Oct  0.31 5.06 0.66 6.65 1.82 5.84  8.20 14.02
Nov  0.36 5.87 0.81 7.93 2.21 6.59  9.29 14.74
Dec  0.36 5.87 1.06 10.28 2.80 7.90  10.43 15.64
Jan 1990 0.37 5.71 1993 0.88 8.34 1996 3.18 8.47 1999 11.78 15.97
Feb  0.36 5.56 0.92 8.54 3.49 9.11  11.50 15.14
Mar  0.39 6.02 0.78 7.18 3.25 8.43  10.79 13.86
Apr  0.35 5.23 0.63 5.83 2.87 7.34  9.50 12.30
May  0.31 4.63 0.56 5.21 2.21 5.61  6.31 8.06
Jun  0.31 4.63 0.52 4.89 1.92 4.89  6.40 8.38
Jul  0.33 4.81 0.52 4.93 2.61 6.68  7.36 9.86
Aug  0.38 5.53 0.50 4.60 2.06 5.78  6.60 9.42
Sep  0.39 5.68 0.59 5.20 2.19 6.22  6.98 9.12
Oct  0.39 5.54 0.61 5.23 2.24 6.36  7.31 9.45
Nov  0.42 5.97 0.66 5.48 2.35 6.42  7.61 9.11
Dec  0.45 6.40 0.72 5.90 2.61 6.90  8.53 9.97
Jan 1991 0.46 6.52 1994 0.70 5.51 1997 2.56 6.38 2000 8.27 8.61
Feb  0.48 6.75 0.79 5.96 2.78 6.78  8.46 8.53
Mar  0.47 6.58 0.82 5.99 3.10 7.49  8.84 8.81
Apr  0.40 5.53 0.82 5.94 2.69 6.42  8.02 8.20
May  0.34 4.70 0.84 6.07 2.51 5.96  5.73 5.94
Jun  0.31 4.25 0.70 5.15 2.47 5.91  5.25 5.62
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 2000-2003 2003-2006 2006-2009
 Year Nom. Real Year Nom. Real Year Nom. Real
Jul 2000 5.49 5.87 2003 10.17 6.95 2006 18.76 8.35
Aug 5.15 5.67 10.44 7.09 19.30 8.36
Sep 5.36 5.39 10.83 6.95 20.39 8.62
Oct 5.51 5.28 12.62 7.41 21.32 8.58
Nov 6.32 5.61 14.05 8.25 22.19 8.67
Dec 6.45 5.57 13.83 7.88 22.24 8.74
 Jan 2001 7.21 5.96 2004 15.97 9.13 2007 21.18 8.50
 Feb 7.35 5.94 16.61 9.67 19.22 7.89
Mar 7.53 6.16 19.12 11.32 18.21 7.75
Apr 7.53 6.21 16.66 10.20 16.03 6.89
May 7.16 5.94 13.44 8.20 14.26 6.28
Jun 7.94 6.80 12.96 7.50 14.61 6.11
Jul 9.27 7.88 13.63 7.79 15.63 6.49
Aug 13.14 11.19 14.00 7.78 16.86 6.80
Sep 17.11 13.87 15.73 8.53 18.04 7.09
Oct 18.91 15.73 15.86 8.17 20.76 7.76
Nov 19.67 16.74 17.29 8.63 24.11 8.72
Dec 24.60 21.30 17.53 8.72 28.67 10.41
Jan 2002 31.00 22.17 2005 17.88 9.03 2008 34.18 12.68
Feb 32.48 22.57 17.61 9.03 39.69 15.09
Mar 28.96 20.21 17.36 9.17 43.53 17.08
Apr 18.62 13.23 15.93 8.46 35.41 14.00
May 15.16 10.89 16.39 8.67 32.83 13.25
Jun 14.10 10.45 18.00 9.00 37.94 14.50
Jul 15.16 11.26 18.68 9.22 48.72 18.47
Aug 16.15 11.95 20.55 9.83 55.52 20.43
Sep 16.29 11.42 23.15 10.78 53.38 19.08
Oct 16.74 11.76 29.11 12.85 54.33 18.45
Nov 18.42 12.67 32.77 13.97 57.81 19.07
Dec 19.94 13.51 34.34 14.65 63.47 21.04
Jan 2003 18.34 11.51 2006 41.68 18.20 2009 69.22 23.50
Feb 19.03 11.74 50.67 22.44 70.57 23.28
Mar 17.22 10.90 45.95 21.06 65.27 21.63
Apr 13.39 8.67 27.46 12.68 45.36 15.41
May 10.51 6.93 19.07 9.00 34.08 11.92
Jun 9.47 6.47 18.31 8.19 32.98 11.93
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Appendix III: List of Institutions Interviewed 




Location Institution District 
1 Mrs. A. Lourengo Processor Agency Blantyre Chibuku  Products Ltd Blantyre 
2 Mr. H. Jamaldeen Processor Agency Blantyre Rab Processors Blantyre 
3 E. Mdzinga  Long Distant Trader  Agency Lilongwe Mulli Brothers Lilongwe 
4 Jalo Van Tonder Processor Agency Lilongwe Central Poultry Lilongwe 
5 Paulo Chiziwa Processor Agency Kanengo GTPA Lilongwe 
6 Mahesh Ghedic  Processor  Agency Lilongwe Export Trading Lilongwe 
7 Stanley Kamtsitsi District/National Buyer Agency Mzimba ADMARC Mzimba 
8 N.D Saukira – District/National Buyer Agency Lilongwe NFRA Lilongwe 
9 N. Dzombe Processor  Agency Lilongwe Blessings Campus Lilongwe 
10 W. Mitumbira Local Trader Own Buying Mission Mobile Trader Mulanje 
11 B. Kathumba Local Trader Own Buying Mujiwa  Mobile Trader Mulanje 
12 Lucius Mapeto Local Trader Own Buying Mtambalika  Mobile Trader Mulanje 
13 Keston Mbewe Local Trader Own Buying Mujiwa  Mobile Trader Mulanje 
14 Spoon Local Trader Own Buying Nanchidwa Mobile Trader Mulanje 
15 Steven Nyson Local Trader Own Buying Mtambalika Mobile Trader Mulanje 
16 Lafayeli Leston Local Trader Agency Chinteka  Mobile (Masina) Mchinji 
17 Kalemba Kalieni Local Trader Own Buying Chinteka  Mobile Trader Mchinji 
18 Esnart Nachiola Local Trader Agency Chinteka Kariba ADMARC Mchinji 
19 H. D. Masina Local Trader Own Buying Chinteka Walilanjii Mobile (Masina) Mchinji 
20 Ms. I. Kumwenda Local Trader Own Buying Jenda Jenda MRC Mzimba 
21 Mphatso Mbewe Long Distant Maize Trader Agency Chinteka   FarmersWorld Mchinji 
22 Yamikani Fabiano Long Distant Maize Trader Agency Chinteka   Mulli Brothers Mchinji 
23 Peterson Kaponda Long Distant Trader Agency Jenda Mulli Brothers Mzimba 
24 William Nyirenda Long Distant Trader Agency Jenda Export Trading Mzimba 
25 Andrew Chapola Long Distant Trader Agency Jenda Farmers World Mzimba 
26 Elwin Banda Long Distant Trader Agency Jenda ADMARC Mzimba 
27 Harlord Khulupirire Long Distant Trader Agency Jenda Kulima Gold Mzimba 
28 Kenneth A. Nkankha  Service provider Government  Lilongwe Ministry of Trade  Lilongwe 
 
Source: Field Survey May to August 2008 
 
 
